Denting a Heroic Picture: A Narrative Analysis of Collective Memory

The ENP and EU Actions in Conflict Management

The EU and Non-Accession States: The Cases of Belarus and Ukraine

Types of Political Integration
CALL FOR PAPERS/NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

Perspectives is a refereed journal published twice a year by the Institute of International Relations, Prague, Czech Republic. At the present time, it is established as one of the leading journals in Central and Eastern Europe, dealing with a range of issues from international relations theory to contemporary international politics and regional and global issues that affect international relations. Perspectives invites papers and enquiries from interested scholars.

GUIDELINES FOR AUTHORS

The aim of Perspectives is to produce an eclectic mix of articles dealing with various areas of international relations and regional studies. These may include articles on recent history, specialised articles on some legal or political area which affects international affairs, or articles that capture some issue which, while seen from a national perspective, is at the same time of importance at a regional or international level. While there will naturally be some bias towards the Central and East European region, the same principles will also apply to articles from other parts of the world.

The journal publishes three types of articles (Research Articles, Discussions, and Consultations), Book Reviews and Review Essays. Research Articles are full-length papers (between 6,000 and 10,000 words, including endnotes and references) that contain an original contribution to research. Discussions are topical commentaries or essays (between 6,000 and 8,000 words, including endnotes and references) with the aim to provoke scholarly debates. Consultations are full-length papers (between 6,000 and 8,000 words, including endnotes and references) of a descriptive character that bring information on topical international developments or present results of recent empirical research. Each article should be accompanied by a one-paragraph abstract. Book Reviews should not exceed 2,000 words, and Review Essays should be 3,500 words maximum, including endnotes and references. All submissions should be made in electronic form, unless this is impossible for some practical reason.

Notes should be numbered consecutively throughout the article with raised numerals corresponding to the list of notes placed at the end. A list of References should appear after the list of Notes containing all the works referred to, listed alphabetically by author’s surname (or name of sponsoring body if there is no identifiable author). References to literature in the text should be made by giving the author’s name and year of publication, both in parentheses, e.g. (Wendt, 1999).

BOOKS:

Author’s name as it appears on the title page, date of publication in parentheses, title in italics with capitals in principal words, place of publication, publisher:


ARTICLES, CHAPTERS FROM BOOKS AND INTERNET SOURCES:

Author’s name, title of article or chapter within single inverted commas with principal words capitalised, name(s) of editors(s) if in a book, title of journal or book in italics, volume number, issue number in parentheses, page reference, place of publication and publisher if in a book, url if an internet source:


QUOTATION MARKS:

Single in text throughout; double within single; single within indented quotations.

HEADINGS:

Only main headings and subheadings (both non-numbered) should be used in the main body of the text.

DATES AND NUMBERS:

25 February 1999; February 1999; 25 February; the 1990s.

• For submissions of Research Articles, Discussions and Consultations, or general correspondence, please contact the Editors: Petr Kratochvíl at kratochvil@iir.cz or Mats Braun at braun@iir.cz.

• Articles will be reviewed by two anonymous referees.

• For matters related to book reviews, please contact the Book Review Editor Vít Štrítecký at stritecky@iir.cz.

• While we welcome reviews of English-language academic books, we encourage authors to submit reviews of academic books published in other languages, including the languages of Central and East European countries.

• Following approval for publication, authors of all articles and reviews should send a short biographical note (80 words maximum) including their institutional affiliation and relevant experience to Petr Kratochvíl at kratochvil@iir.cz.

• Since we encourage authors whose first language is not English to submit writing, we assume that authors will accept language editing.

• Authors of Research Articles, Discussions and Consultations will receive one complimentary copy of the journal and 10 photocopied prints of their article.

• The postal address of the journal is: Perspectives, Institute of International Relations, Nerudova 3, 118 50 Praha 1, Czech Republic.

[Continued on p. 3 cover]
Opinions expressed are those of the individual authors and thus represent neither the views of the editors nor those of the Institute of International Relations.

Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted or indexed in Academic Search Premier (via EBSCO host), ABI/INFORM Global, Academic Research Library (via ProQuest), Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO), International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS), World Affairs Online and Czech National Bibliography.
# Contents

Denting a Heroic Picture.  
A Narrative Analysis of Collective Memory in Post-War Croatia  
- Michel-André Horelt, Judith Renner  

The ENP and EU Actions in Conflict Management:  
Comparing between Eastern Europe and the Maghreb  
- Jean F. Crombois  

The EU and Non-Accession States: The Cases of Belarus and Ukraine  
- Rachel Vanderhill  

The Transplantion and Adaption Types of Political Integration: The Case of the German Unification in Parallel with the Eastern Enlargement of the EU  
- Tereza Novotna  

## Reviews

- Zuzana Vilčeková  

- Tadeja Forštner  

- Jens Heinrich  

- Peter Rožič, Peter J. Verovšek  

- Michaela Marková  

- Veronika Bílková  

- Veronika Šůsová

Burcin Ulug Eryilmaz

Notes on Contributors
Denting a Heroic Picture
A Narrative Analysis of Collective Memory in Post-War Croatia

MICHEL-ANDRÉ HORELT, JUDITH RENNER

Abstract: Croatia’s foreign policy towards the ICTY and the EU has been marked by ambivalence in the last couple of years. While reluctant to hand over indicted war criminals on the one hand, Croatia has from time to time demonstrated a willingness to fulfil the demands of the international community, and in particular the EU, on the other. The paper reflects on this seemingly inconsistent behaviour and argues that Croatia’s foreign policy can be better understood when one takes into account how Croatia remembers its most recent past. The paper explores the Croatian identity constructions that emerge from the narratives of Croatia’s war involvement from 1992 to 1995, as expressed in public statements and declarations. It concludes that different, partly contradictory identity constructions existed at the same time and opened different, partly contradictory foreign policy options for the country. The paper suggests that knowing these identity constructions can contribute to an understanding of Croatia’s foreign policy.

Key words: Croatia, ICTY, Collective Memory, Narrative Identity

‘A hero is and remains outside the law and has no moral restraints.’
(Ivan Čovolić, 2004: 267)

‘The Croatian people must not and will not be hostage to those who bloodied their hands and brought shame on Croatia’s name, no matter how deserving they might be in other respects.’
(Stipe Mesić, President of Croatia, 2001)

INTRODUCTION
In 1992 the newly independent Croatia was still to face two violent wars which would rage until 1995. Once the fighting was over, the young nation faced the task
of consolidating its existence, which meant a whole bundle of new challenges, possibilities and obligations. It had to establish itself as a functioning, autonomous state for an interior and exterior audience while at the same time integrating itself into a web of international relations, out of which the relations to the EU were of particular importance. For this project the confrontation of Croatia’s most recent past was a major requirement. Since the end of the Balkan Wars in 1995, the events and experiences of the war have played a major role in the rhetoric of Croatian politicians as well as in the rhetoric of the EU towards Croatia. Even though the latest developments, most notably the prospect of Croatian EU membership in 2009, indicate a successful rapprochement between the two parties, things have not always been easy. In fact, since the Dayton Agreement in 1995, Croatia’s relations with the EU have resembled a never ending story of ups and downs.

This paper takes the above observation as an incentive to examine the different identity constructions which are present in the discourse of postwar Croatia. Building upon constructivist approaches, we think that these images of the Croatian self are relevant for Croatia’s zigzag course towards the EU. From a constructivist point of view, identity can be understood as the social construction of a self which results when an actor is placed in the flow of time and space. Identity constructions are seen as the basis of agency, as it is only by knowing who he is that an actor can know what acting opportunities he has. The paper holds that identity and the struggle for identity play a crucial role for post-war Croatia because the country has recently gone through a number of transitions which require a reconstruction and adjustment of Croatian identity. Croatia has just moved beyond its autocratic past and embraced a democratic government. It has stepped from times of war into a period of peace. Moreover, analysts, due to its geographic location, often describe Croatia as occupying a position ‘in between’ Europe and the Balkans. The paper argues that these characteristics lead to the construction of particularly numerous and fluent identity versions of Croatia. These, in turn, open up various and possibly contradictory acting opportunities and might be able to account for the inconsistent behaviour of the country. The strong presence of the war narrative in foreign policy talk suggests furthermore that the memory and the interpretation of the war are of high importance for Croatia. The paper therefore focuses on the different versions of Croatian identity that emerge from the interpretations of the war narrative within the Croatian discourse.

CROATIA’S ZIGZAG COURSE TOWARDS THE EU
Integration into the EU was Croatia’s most pressing strategic goal since the foundation of the young nation. In 1998 the HDZ created a Ministry for European Integration. In 1999 an Action Plan was launched, which was supposed to promote and propel the move towards the EU (Bartlett, 2003: 74; Tamminen, 2004: 400). Reach-
ing this goal, however, was inextricably linked with requests and conditions brought forward by the EU. Among them, the most important were the establishment of minority rights, the right of refugees to return and a cooperative stance towards the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). The EU tried to enforce its requests through a policy of stick and carrot, pursued first in the context of its Regional Approach towards four former Yugoslavian states, and later through the Stabilisation and Association Process offered to Croatia. However, Croatia’s reactions were marked more by hesitations and ambiguity than by smooth compliance. In the words of Peskin and Boduszynski (Peskin and Boduszynski, 2003: 4), Croatia’s behaviour rather resembled an ‘inconsistent, ad hoc policy’ than a rational reaction to pressures and incentives put forward by the EU (see also Cruvellier and Valinas, 2006: 5).

The ups and downs in Croatia’s policy can best be illustrated by the alternation of cooperation and non-cooperation with the ICTY: During the years of the Tudjman regime, the Croatian government, while paying lip service to the country’s integration in western institutions, continued to consolidate their authoritarian regime and refused repeatedly to accept the ICTY’s jurisdiction over the operations Flash and Storm. The continued non-compliance with EU requests ended in a near isolation of the young nation at the end of the 1990s and led ICTY officials to file two reports of non-compliance with the UN Security Council in 1996 and 1999 (Bartlett, 2003: 49–55; Peskin and Boduszynski, 2003: 15–16). After the change of government in the 2000 elections, Croatia’s foreign policy course first seemed to change. Right after the elections, the new government under Prime Minister Ivica Račan passed a Declaration on Cooperation with the ICTY and promised to work together with the tribunal. Yet despite the cooperative rhetoric, ICTY requests towards the Croatian government to hand over indicted Croatian Generals were answered with hesitation and refusal (Peskin and Boduszynski, 2003: 17 ff; Cruvellier and Valinas, 2006: 8). In 2001, for example, the ICTY requested the handing over of the two Croatian generals Rahim Ademi and Ante Gotovina. At first, Račan seemed to fulfil his promise of cooperation. He announced that the government would immediately initiate the handing over of the generals and called in a ministerial session to discuss the further procedure. However, it soon became evident that his rhetoric would remain without immediate consequences, since the government delayed the issue of the indicted generals due to rising domestic pressures, mainly by nationalist groups, which made cooperation increasingly costly (Peskin and Boduszynski, 2003). Observers speculate ‘whether the government deliberately delayed arresting Gotovina in order to give him a chance to elude capture’ (Peskin and Boduszynski, 2003: 30; Cruvellier and Valinas, 2006: 5ff). After the year 2001, Croatia’s cooperation seemed to decrease even more: in 2003, the ICTY requested the handing over of the Croatian general and war hero Janko Bobetko. In this case, the government not only delayed,
but openly opposed the transfer of the suspected general. The opposition against
the transfer was surprisingly led by Prime Minister Račan himself, who had so far
been the leading voice of ICTY supporters inside Croatia (Peskin and Boduszynski,
2003: 32). In 2004 the Croatian stance became more cooperative again; when the
ICTY requested the surrender of the generals Ivan Cermak and Mladen Markac, the
government provided documentary evidence and persuaded the indictees ‘to sur-
render to the Tribunal whilst assisting with their defense’ (Cruvellier and Valinas,
2006: 9). This support was appreciated by ICTY chief prosecutor Carla del Ponte in
2005 by confirming that Croatia was now ‘cooperating fully’ with the tribunal (Ibid.).

**STICK AND CARROT? OR IDENTITY? POSSIBLE
EXPLANATIONS OF CROATIA’S FOREIGN POLICY**

The outline given above reveals the rather inconsistent character of Croatian policy
towards the ICTY. While a tendency towards ‘pragmatic’ behaviour (Cruvellier and
Valinas, 2006: 5), i.e. towards compliance with the EU’s pressures and incentives,
seems to have existed most of the time as the cooperative rhetoric and some initia-
tives of prosecution indicate, something worked as a brake which made cooperation
either hard to reach or not fully desirable or even possible for Croatia. Despite the
EU’s reliance on clear pressures and incentives, Croatia’s reactions to a large extent
remained limited to mere rhetoric of cooperation. In the end, Croatia failed to carry
out the promised acts. A linear ‘rational’ response to the EU’s sticks and carrots was
missing.

In order to better understand Croatia’s foreign policy course, the present paper
suggests taking into account the identity constructions that emerge from the inner-
Croatian discourse. Many authors writing on Croatia assign an important role to the
country’s history and identity (see, e.g., Bartlett, 2003; Tamminen, 2004; Brkljacic,
2003; Jansen, 2002; Tanner, 1997). Bartlett, for example, notes that throughout her
history, Croatia has been pulled in several conflicting directions in her international
relations due to an unresolved tension between her identity as a central European
country and her identity as a Mediterranean country, as well as due to her proxim-
ity to, and close historical connections with, the Balkan region (Bartlett, 2003: 63).
Tamminen analyses cross-border cooperation in the Southern Balkans in terms of
identity politics and hints at two different identity constructions, which are consid-
ered as the two options Southern Balkan countries can choose from: ‘Balkanisation’
on the one hand and ‘Europeanization’ on the other (Tamminen, 2004: 400; 404ff).
While these authors primarily stress Croatia’s geopolitical location as a reason for
competing identity constructions, the present paper will focus on the identity con-
structions which emerge from Croatia’s particular interpretations of its most recent
past. It takes the basic assumptions of theorists of situated agency as its point of de-
parture, which maintain that an actor’s behaviour can only be understood when it
is seen in the particular spatial and temporal patterns in which it is embedded (this topic is discussed in more detail below). The paper develops an approach to identity by combining those assumptions of situated agency with more general constructivist assumptions about identity. The paper finally presents four broad identity patterns as the result of its analysis of the inner Croatian discourse. These patterns dovetail and partially overlap and suggest different foreign policy options for Croatia. The first identity version tells the story of a heroic Croatian nation that stood up against the aggression emanating from Serbia. This identity version suggests a Croatian that is a rather confident and un-self-critical actor. The second identity constructs Croatia as an innocent nation, which merely contains one or another ‘black sheep’ that committed war crimes (individualisation of guilt). Such an identity construction allows for at least limited cooperation with the ICTY. The third and fourth identity versions are the antagonistic and contradictory ones of Croatia as a ‘Western’ nation and Croatia as a ‘Balkan’ nation. They are intertwined and can be understood as two different options that Croatia can choose from. While choosing the ‘Western’ identity would suggest the establishment of the rule of law and the adherence to democratic values, the ‘Balkan’ identity, as will be shown, is connected with unlawfulness, a criminal habitus and brutality. These four identity versions do not replace each other but exist simultaneously and compete with each other, so that the one or the other might gain dominance in certain points in time.

**ID THEORY AND SITUATED AGENCY IN IR**

Identity based approaches of action became popular in the discipline of International Relations in the 1980s and 1990s. They build primarily upon constructivist assumptions and hold that action should be understood as being based on socially constructed meaning instead of fixed interest. Identity is conceived of as one such meaning (Campbell, 1992; Wendt, 1994; Ringmar, 1996; Williams and Neumann, 2000; Neumann, 1999). The concept of identity stands for the images actors hold about themselves and about others. On the most general level, identity is the answer to the question ‘who are you’ (Tilly, 2002: 11). It is the establishment of a ‘self’, the production and specification of a subject. Identity, it is assumed, is crucial for agency because an actor can know what he can do only if he knows who he is.

Identity based approaches were developed as a criticism of rational choice theories and their major assumption that agents act on the basis of fixed interests and preferences. Identity based approaches, in contrast, hold that identity, and not fixed interests, should be considered as the decisive foundation of agency. Depending on its theoretical heritage, the connection between identity and action is drawn in two different ways: Moderate constructivists argue that agents do not act on the basis of fixed interests and preferences, but that interests themselves can only develop from the image an actor holds of himself and of others. Identities are seen as
the source of interests and therefore as the basis of action (Wendt, 1994; Ringmar, 1996). Interests are still considered as the link between identity and action; or as Erik Ringmar puts it, ‘it only is as some-one that we can have an interest in some-thing. Without this ‘someone’ there would simply not be anyone around for whom something could, or could not, be an interest’ (Ringmar, 1996: 3, 13).

This paper, however, will focus more on post-positivist approaches. They assume that identity and action are not primarily linked via interests, but that identity constructions enable an actor to act in the first place. The argument is not so much ‘only if I know who I am can I know what I want’, but rather ‘only if I know who I am can I know what I can/should/must/want to do’. This idea is closely linked with the concept of situated agency (see, e.g., Bevir and Rhodes, 2005: 172ff; Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). In accordance with the so-called ‘cultural turn’ in social sciences, situated agency assumes that social action must be analysed in terms of the specific spatial and temporal patterns in which an actor is embedded, and through which his options and limits of action are defined. Agency is understood as ‘a temporally embedded process of social engagement informed by the past, but also oriented toward the future and toward the present’. Therefore, ‘social action can only be captured in its full complexity (...) if it is analytically situated within the flow of time’ (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998: 963–964). In this concept, identity can be understood as the hinge between time and space, on the one hand, and agency, on the other. The past does not matter just by itself. Only by relating the past to oneself, i.e. only by placing oneself somewhere in this past, does it start to matter because it becomes one’s own past, which makes one’s own present and one’s own future possible.

AN IDENTITY BASED APPROACH FOR THE ANALYSIS OF CROATIAN FOREIGN POLICY.

The constructivist point of view leads to a crucial aspect of identity: if identity is understood as being socially constructed, it is contingent. Different versions of one single identity can be constructed and coexist at the same time. The exact shapes of the various identity constructions depend on the aspects of the historical narrative which are included or left out, on the one hand, and on the other hand, they depend on the way these aspects are put together and interpreted to frame the actor. Stef Jansen, for example, in his study on the historical narratives told among Serbs and Croats in five Croatian villages in the Krajina region, finds two dominant versions of ‘one single’ history. He points out that the difference between the two largely nationally homogenous narratives was mainly based on ‘vagueness, amnesia and selective remembering’ (Jansen, 2002: 78). Just like the historical narrative itself, the identity constructions which are framed by it might vary. The different interpretations of the historical narrative come to bear when different actors tell different sto-
ries about one single self, or when one single actor tells different stories about himself to different audiences (Ringmar, 1996: 79ff). Identities need recognition to be valid and effective. ‘Only as recognised can we conclusively come to establish a certain identity’ (Ringmar, 1996: 81). Different audiences accept different versions of one single actor’s identity. Thus, an actor might have to adjust his identity construction according to the audience’s requests.

Changes in an actor’s identity constructions, according to constructivists, are likely to occur in or after moments of crisis and dilemma. As Bevir and Rhodes put it, ‘change arises as situated agents respond to novel ideas or problems’ (Bevir and Rhodes, 2005: 173; Wendt, 1992). In Croatia, change is therefore more than likely as the country has passed through various transitions on several levels in the past 20 years. The first transition occurred when Croatia became independent. Croatia has long been part of the Yugoslavian multi-ethnic state. It was established as an independent nation only 15 years ago, in 1992. Since this transition, creating an explicitly national identity has been an important goal of Croatian history writing, as Maja Brkljacic argues (Brkljacic, 2003). Secondly, in the 2000 elections Croatia has moved from an autocratic government under Franjo Tudjman and his HDZ to a democratic administration. Defining its new democratic self might be another challenge to be faced by the country. In public discourse, Croatia’s democratic development is often associated with the country’s aim to move towards the EU. Last but not least, Croatia has recently stepped from a long period of war into a period of peace. Shaping a clear-cut identity in the context of the newly ordered and predominantly peaceful East European region might represent another challenge that Croatia has to confront.

The deliberations on identity presented above can be summarised as follows: although identity is usually meant to refer to the construction of a specific ‘self’, it is neither unified nor static: it consists of various interpretations which compete and try to gain dominance. In respect to collective identities, the aspect of multiplicity seems to be of particular importance as collective identities are constructed, reconstructed and challenged from outside the ‘self’ and by sub-groupings within the collective self (Calhoun, 1994: 12; Wendt, 1994: 385). Changes of identity are fostered by the social context of an actor: identity adjustment becomes a necessary process as soon as the ‘old’ identity cannot face the challenges put up by the situation anymore. If a given identity does not ‘fit’ into a new situation, it might have to be adjusted to find a place in the new present and to remain capable of agency. The multiplicity and variability of an identity is fostered, moreover, by the identity’s need of recognition. Different audiences accept different versions of one single actor’s identity. Moreover, audiences themselves can become constructors and confront the actor with new or different versions of his self which – in their eyes – are more appropriate than the variant told by the actor himself. The different coexisting identity
versions might be in a relative harmony, but they might also contradict each other and – depending on which identity construction is dominant at a given moment – lead to an observable behaviour which seems to be inconsistent and ad hoc.

OUTLINE OF METHODOLOGY

In our analysis, we will treat identities as being constructed through ‘constitutive stories’ (Ringmar, 1996: 76), i.e. through narrative processes (Somers, 1994; Neumann, 2000: 362). An identity is created by narrating the past, the present, and maybe also the future of a subject. Narrating a subject’s story means to organise time and space around him in the shape of a plot. The plot structures the narrative. In contrast to a mere chronological order of events, a plot does not simply add single events upon one another. Instead, events are brought into a causal structure and organised around a central subject, which is the social centre of the story (Ringmar, 1996: 72; White, 1980: 15; Somers, 1994: 616). Through the plot and the social centre, the story gets coherence. Each event functions as a cause or an effect and thus carries an essential meaning for the course of the story. The plot makes a story a closed entity with a beginning and an end. In our analysis, depending on the role Croatia, as the central subject of the plot, plays in the constitutive narratives, Croatia’s identity features might vary. In the following analysis, the focus will be on narrative analysis; however, predicate analyses will also be used, as this helps us to grasp the evaluative dimension of the words. The main questions of the analysis will be a) what events are established as causes in the plot, b) what is constructed as the effect of a particular cause, and c) what role does Croatia play in this plot; is it a driving force or rather passive? Predicate analysis will help us to classify the events delineated in the plot, e.g. to find out whether a war is ‘aggressive’ or ‘defensive’. Predication helps to clarify the structure of the plot, as it classifies, for example, the proactive character of an aggression and the reactive character of a defence, thereby saying whether an act caused a war (aggression) or was the effect of some act (defence). After identifying the constitutive stories that circulate within the Croatian discourse, each identity version which is derived from these narratives will be examined as for the policy options it might open for Croatia in its interaction with the EU.

ANALYSIS: THE NARRATIVE IDENTITY CONSTRUCTIONS OF CROATIA

The following paragraphs will delineate some narratives which contain competing identity versions of Croatia. These narratives appeared in the inner-Croatian discourse. Knowing that we can capture only one small extract of the discourse, we will focus on texts by foreign policy decision makers. These texts were told by different speakers at different points in time, and they were addressed to different audiences. According to the concept of identity outlined above, it can be expected that all nar-
ratives contain different versions of Croatian identity. The first Croatian identity version is drawn from two texts: the 1999 pamphlet ‘Croatia’s Course of Action to Achieve EU Membership’ by the then Deputy Foreign Minister of Croatia, Ivo Sanader, on the one hand, and on the other hand the 2000 Declaration on the Homeland War of the Croatian Parliament (Sabor). The second identity version, on the one hand, emerges from the 2002 text ‘Croatia: What heritage?’ by Mate Granić, who was Croatian Foreign Minister under President Tudjman. On the other hand, it arises from some speeches by and some media interviews with President Mesić from 2001 to 2007. For each identity version we identify, we will delineate possible spaces of action which might open up, thereby enabling Croatia to pursue a specific portfolio of foreign policy options.

CROATIA AS A HEROIC NATION AND AS A WESTERN COUNTRY
The first identity version we identified for Croatia is that of a heroic nation which was attacked by Serbia, stepped into the war in self-defence, and in the end emerged as the victorious hero. This construction arises out of former Deputy Foreign Minister Sanader’s 1999 Discussion Paper as well as out of the Sabor’s Declaration on the Homeland War, passed in the year 2000. Sanader writes:

‘While firmly pursuing its Euro-Atlantic priorities vis-à-vis the EU and NATO in the 1990’s, Croatia was forced, for a number of complex reasons, to concentrate primarily on resolving domestic issues, i.e., defending itself from aggression, liberating the occupied territories, achieving territorial integrity and re-establishing authority over its entire territory’ (Sanader, 1999: 3).

In the text, Serbia is further presented as

‘the very country that started the aggression that resulted in such grave consequences for Croatia and its people’ (Ibid. 5).

The following plot can be reconstructed from these extracts: Serbia started the war by a bold aggression; it caused the war. Croatia, which suffered severely under Serbia’s attacks, was forced to defend itself as an effect of the Serbian aggression. Predicate analysis helps us to specify the moral evaluation of the actions: Whereas Serbia was ‘aggressive’, i.e. hostile and violent (Oxford Dictionary, 2005: 31), Croatia’s actions served to ‘liberate’ its territory, i.e. to set it free from oppression (Oxford Dictionary, 2005: 1009), and to achieve territorial integrity. The narrative which is contained in the Sabor’s Declaration on the Homeland War tells a very similar story when it says the following in its preamble:
‘the Republic of Croatia led a just and legitimate, defensive and liberating war, which was not an aggressive and occupational war against anyone, in which she defended her territory from the great Serb aggressor (velikosrpske agresije) within her internationally recognised borders’.18

The narrative told in both texts establishes Croatia as an actor who is forced to react to Serbian aggression. Serbian aggression is presented as the cause of the war, and the Croatian acts as the necessary reaction enforced by the Serbian behaviour. In the course of both texts, the plot of the story is further developed, as the effects of the Croatian war involvement are presented. Paragraph three of the Sabor’s declaration says that

‘the successful defence through the decisive military and police operations Bljesak (Flush) and Oluja (Storm) and respectively the later reintegration of Croatian territories have laid the ground for a steady development of the Croatian Republic as a country which shares the democratic values of the present Western World […] in the domains of politics, security, society and culture’.

Similarly, Ivo Sanader writes:

‘By liberating its occupied territories, Croatia solved its major problem and with it the crisis that had dragged on for several years in the hands of the international community. Moreover, together with the Bosnian Army and the Croatian Defence Council of B-H, Croatian police and military actions succeeded in liberating the entire Southwest Bosnia, thus helping to break the siege of the so-called Bihać pocket, which was close to suffering the same tragic fate as the UN safe havens Zepa & Srebrenica. The above-mentioned moves by the Croatian political leadership undoubtedly created the necessary conditions that enabled the international community, led by the United States, to bring about the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords’ (Sanader, 1999: 17).

These two passages continue the plot by narrating the effects of the Croatian war involvement. In contrast to the Serbian ‘aggression’ which caused ‘grave consequences’, the Croatian war involvement led to the liberation of the occupied areas and made it possible to build Croatia into a democratic state that follows Western values. The narrative moreover presents Croatia’s war involvement as a contribution to the solution of an international crisis. According to the story, Croatia accomplished what the UN itself was not capable of. Croatia managed to create a safe haven in the Bihać pocket, whereas the UN’s intended protection of the city of Srebrenica ended in one of the worst massacres of the whole Yugoslavian war. The nar-
rative is thus similar to a novel showing the development of a character: it constructs the Croatian state as a character who is first an innocent victim of Serbian aggression but in the end emerges as a victorious hero who liberates his territories and contributes to the peace and security of the whole region.

Beside the heroic frame of the story, another associative figure is significant in this context: the war is presented as the key not only to independence, but also to the Western World. It narrates Croatia as a Western ally in the Balkans that contributed to the peace and stability in the region. Another quotation from the Homeland Declaration is characteristic here and exemplifies the different functions of the two antagonising images. In contrast to the ‘westernising’ role of the Homeland War presented in the Declaration, Croatian involvement in a possible ‘Balkan’ Confederation is irreversibly renounced. The Declaration reads as follows in paragraph three:

‘After the Croatian Republic has become an independent and sovereign state, it is not willing to engage in any Yugoslavian and Balkan confederative structures’.

The Homeland War appears as a turning point in which Croatia had to decide which of the two contrasting political geographical conceptions inherent in the Declaration it would affiliate itself with. Through the Homeland War, Croatia moved on to the West. The following paragraphs show that this conflict between the two geopolitical conceptions of ‘West’ and ‘Balkan’ lies at the heart of the Croatian identity formation.

The heroic version of Croatia’s identity suggests a scope of action that not only excludes but prohibits any kind of apology or restitutive justice from or punishment of Croatian actors. It is not the story of a guilty but of a victorious nation. Cooperation with the ICTY and the handing over of indicted generals seem impossible for a hero. A heroic self-understanding instead suggests that Croatia, as a strong, autonomous country which did the right thing at the right time, should protest against the seemingly ‘wrong’ depiction of some of its members and fight for a correction of the war narrative of the EU and the tribunal. A heroic identity construction would call for resistance and a protest against the accusations, not for compliance and cooperation.

BLACK SHEEP IN THE HEROIC LANDSCAPE

The second identity construction we found is an adjusted version of the first one. Whereas the metastory of the Homeland War remains the same, the frames of the narrative are modified. These changes affect specific events within the metastory of the ‘domovinski rat’. As some declarations by the Croatian President Stipe Mesić
and a text by former Foreign Minister Mate Granic suggest, the adjusted version allows for some ‘black sheep’ in the Croatian herd. Granic, for example, maintains the popular metastory when he writes:

‘Croatia was without a doubt a victim of Slobodan Milosevic’s aggressive procedure. It was severely damaged and had to mourn the loss of numbers of lives. The Croats and the vast majority of the Croatian population wanted their own independent state, which should be built upon the foundation of European values’ (Granic, 2003: 133).

Yet, he allows for some adjustments:

‘In 1987 already, Slobodan M. began to prepare his plan for the creation of a Greater Serbia, and until 1989 his intention got more and more obvious (...) Slobodan Milosevic is the main culprit for the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and for the aggression against this country, whereas Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladić must be held responsible for the mass crimes, the genocide, the detention centres, the rapes, the refugees and all the other war victims there. War crimes were also committed by Croats and Bosniaks, however, and the unfortunate war between the Croats and the Bosnian Muslims, as well as the role played by the radical wing of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, very much called into question the credibility of the Republic of Croatia’ (Ibid.: 129 & 131).

Granic’s narrative corresponds roughly to the story told by President Mesić in an interview on 8 July 2001. The Croatian President states the following:

‘It is well-known that the Croatian side, too, committed crimes during the war. It is well-known that the crimes were committed during operations Lightning and Storm and afterwards, and most probably, in the Medak Pocket operation. [And] this is probably not all’ (RFE/RL 9 July 2001).

In his public statement, President Mesić scratches the overall heroic and morally impeccable story of the Homeland War and tells an adjusted story instead. Even though he admits the occurrence of crimes, he remains rather imprecise as to the concrete actor who committed these crimes, talking vaguely about ‘the Croatian side’. ‘Crimes’ simply occurred (‘were committed’) during the operations and afterwards. Mesić’s declaration was made within the context of fierce discussions on the possible extradition of Rahim Ademi and General Ante Gotovina to the ICTY in summer 2001. Mesić repeatedly declared that the crimes ‘had no nationality’
and that individual suspects – not countries – were on trial in The Hague. He added:

‘The Croatian people must not and will not be hostage to those who bloodied their hands and brought shame on Croatia’s name, no matter how deserving they might be in other respects’ (RFE, 9 July 2001).

These statements enforce the distinction that was made between the ‘Croatian people’ and ‘those who bloodied their hands’ and that was consistently maintained in Mesić’s subsequent speeches in the context of the war debate.

On the 11th anniversary of the start of operation Storm, on 4 August 2006, President Mesić declared the following at the very symbolic site of Knin, the former Serb stronghold of the Krajina region:

‘For the sake of the purity of the Homeland War and our just fight, we must individualize the guilt for crimes committed after the operation and punish those responsible for them. History teaches us that we must do it for the sake of generations to come’ (BBC 5 August 2006).

As in the earlier quotations, the distinction between the collective enterprise of ‘our just fight’ and ‘those responsible’ for the crimes is again present in the president’s statement. It is interesting to notice that the individualisation of the guilt for the war crimes that were committed after the operation comes along as a duty to secure a higher end: ‘the purity of the Homeland War’. However, another justifying figure is present in the declaration of President Mesić: a notion of transitory violence for which the Croatian state cannot be held accountable. Mesić declared:

‘But on this occasion we must not forget that after Operation Storm the rule of law partially failed and that the liberated area was not reintegrated quickly into Croatia’s political and legal system. Unfortunately, this led to crimes. But those were incidents committed by irresponsible individuals which must be not only condemned but prosecuted’ (AFP 5 August 2006).

The emplotment of the story suggests that because the Croatian legal system was missing in these areas, outlaw actions could have been committed by ‘irresponsible’ criminal individuals. There seems to be an assumption of determinism and causality in Mesić’s words stating that the absence of Croatia’s legal system has ‘led to crimes’. The ‘but’ of the following sentence underscores the message that these ‘incidents’ (not actions) were out of the reach of today’s Croatia. In this storyline the crimes committed by the Croatian military are carefully externalised.
Dalmatian Newspaper Slobodna Dalmacija on the eve of the celebrations of the 12th anniversary of Operation Storm in August 2007, Mesić again underscored his version of transitory violence. However, he softened the moral burden for the former authorities. Confronted with the disclosure of an international report on the break up of Yugoslavia and the question of why the Croatian authorities had failed to prevent the looting and murdering of the remaining Serbian population in the wake of Operation Storm, Mesić replied:

‘I cannot get into it [the explanation of the failing of the then Croatian government]. The inferences that you [the interviewer] were presenting implied that if someone had wanted to, someone could have done something [i.e. could have prevented the atrocities]. In consequence, one could say that the intention to prevent what happened did not exist, and this is why it happened. But this is only one logical construction’ (Mesić, 2007: 5).

Referring to the fiercely debated 2007 publication of the transcripts of the presidential meeting on the eve of Operation Storm, President Mesić stressed that he had opted for the disclosure of the documents in order to enable an open discussion about the role of the Croatian state during the ‘liberation’ of the Krajina region, as well as about state involvement in the expulsion of the Serbian population. To the question of the deliberate expulsion of the Serbian population, Mesić declared in the same interview:

‘Some light is shed on this complex [Croatian state involvement in acts of Serbian expulsion] by the well known transcripts of the high-level talks which the then President Tuđman held, and which I made available to the public, for the very reason that I think the public has the right to know what was done in the name of Croatia, and in the name of Croatian People, even if illegitimate things were done; especially then’ (Ibid.).

Even though the wording is very carefully chosen, Mesić’s interpretation and narration of the independence war subverts the narration of the 2000 Declaration, in which the Sabor had clearly backed the war activities of the Croatian forces. According to the Sabor, the acts committed during this war had the moral absolution of a war imposed on them through outside aggression that necessitated national defence. The Declaration missed out on the highly controversial issue of ethnic cleansing of the regained territories in the Krajina after Operation Storm and is ignorant to the role the Croatian state played in the disintegration of Bosnia Herzegovina. Mesić does not stand alone in opting for a more open and sincere discussion upon the Croatian role during the war. Vesna Pusić, who was president of the Croa-
tian Popular Party (HNS) and thus a member of the six party coalition during the debate upon the patriotic declaration, ‘explicitly insisted that the Resolution must mention that the Croatian leadership of that time had committed aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina’ (Staničić, 2005: 39). She subverted the official narration by displaying a counter-narrative and was immediately accused of betrayal by the conservative faction of the HDZ, while the other factions of her coalition were silent on the issue. Only the leader of the powerful regional Istrian Party (IDS), Damir Kajin, aligned with her. The leader of the HDZ Party attacked both representatives, saying that the allegation that Croatia had launched an illegitimate aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina was ‘totally unacceptable’ and that the ‘Declaration over the homeland war should mute all the lies over Croatian history and the contemporary history of modern Croatia’.22

INDIVIDUALS VS. THE NATION – THE STORY GOES ON...

The tendency to allow for individual guilt and to clearly distinguish between ‘war criminals’, on the one hand, and the ‘Croatian nation’, on the other, went on. In September 2003, during the first visit of a Croatian president in Belgrad after the Yugoslav war, President Mesić and Svetozar Marović, the President of Serbia-Montenegro, exchanged apologies:

‘In my name, I also apologise to all those who have suffered pain or damage at any time from citizens of Croatia who misused or acted against the law’.23

The wording and the message of Stipe Mesić’s personal apology goes hand in hand with other declarations of the president in which the Croatian state is omitted from responsibilities for war crimes. The apology is elusive on the concrete substance of the crime as well as on the specific object (‘to all those who suffered pain or damage’) for which the apology is issued. The perpetrating actors are denominated as ‘citizens of Croatia who misuse or acted against the law’. The individualising figure in Mesić’s apologies has an axiomatic character. During a tripartite regional meeting with the presidents of Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia, Mesić reiterated his individualising interpretation:

‘The truth about the past implies apology, admission and repentance. In a court, be it an international or a national court, both accountability and guilt can and have to be ascertained exclusively on an individual basis. Nations are not guilty. The fact is, however, that crimes were committed in the name of nations and under the cloak of the name of entire nations. It is therefore logical that expressions of apology come in the name of nations or states. Those who express
apologies should be received in good faith and not attacked or boycotted’ (Mesić, 2005).

As in the earlier quotations, Mesić carefully maintains the difference between the individual and the collective level for the moral evaluation of war crimes. Nations cannot be guilty. Nevertheless, the reasoning behind the validity of collective expressions of apology lies ‘in the fact’ that ‘crimes were committed in the name of nations’ or ‘under the cloak of the name of entire nations.’ This passive formulation, ‘were committed’, implies that the crimes were not mandated by the nation ‘in the name’ of which they were committed. The authorship for the crimes is situated outside of the collective actor since ‘accountability and guilt can and have to be ascertained exclusively on an individual basis’. Mesić infers that since the crimes committed by individuals misused the ‘names of entire nations’, expressions of apology should ‘come in the name of nations or states’. But if we follow carefully the line of argumentation and the meticulous differentiation between the individual and the collective level, there is no ‘logic’ or necessity for crimes which are solely individual in their character being apologised for on the collective level. It may appear noble and intuitive but, following the deliberations of Mesić, it is not obligatory.

‘THE BALKANS’ OR ‘THE WEST’?
THE SYMBOLIC CASE OF ANTE GOTOVINA AS ‘BALKAN VILLAIN’ OR ‘CROATIAN HERO’

No extradition case has lasted longer and has stained the Croatian relations with the EU more than the request for the extradition of General Ante Gotovina to the Hague. Between 2001 and 2005, the case led to severe tensions between Brussels and Zagreb, and the evasion of the general caused the delay of concrete EU accession talks in 2004 with Croatia. The case of the fugitive general has captured the domestic political scene since its very beginning. Gotovina was the symbol of the glorious victory over the Serbian ‘aggression’ and thus a crystallising collective figure.

‘The Gotovina Case worked as an indicator in the sense that when one declared oneself to be in favour of or against Gotovina, one was positioning oneself in the political landscape of Croatian politics’ (Jutarnji List 10. 12. 2005).24

The quote above was written by a political analyst in the Jutarnji List at the time of the capture of Gotovina. The same analyst continues by stating that with the detention of Gotovina, ‘the last inherited cleavage of the war’ comes to its end. Jacques Massé sees the Gotovina case as an emblematic figure for the self-positioning of the liberal minority. ‘Gotovina est resté un héro. Pour une minorité seule-
ment, il incarnait au contraire tout ce qui enfermait le pays dans le “trou noir balkanique”: le mépris des valeurs démocratique et de leurs lois” (Massé, 2006: 294). Ante Gotovina represents what Ivan Čovolić has described as the characteristic heroic villain: a personality that does not care for values apart from the patriotism for which he stands (Čovolić, 2004). Viewed through this lens, all the misdeeds committed during Operation Storm, the Medak Operation, and Operation Flush carry the illiberal Balkan odour, from which Prime Minister Račan and President Mesić wanted Croatia to separate once and for all. The remarks of Premier Račan given during one of the Parliament’s voting sessions on the question of cooperation with the ICTY are particularly revealing in this respect. In his speech Prime Minister Račan

‘called on the lawmakers to ensure that Croatia is a respected member of the international community which “respects its international responsibilities no matter how painful they might be”. “Any other choice,” he said, “would lead us back to our Balkan past [in which Croatia would become] a Balkan dwarf and an international outcast”’ (RFE: 16. 7. 2001).26

As we have already seen in the Declaration of the Homeland War, the geopolitical concept of the Balkan appears as a contrasting foil for the Croatian self-ascribed identity. This quote moreover demonstrates that the Balkan stigma not only serves as a concept for the demarcation of the ‘other’, the outside threat, i.e. the Serbian aggressor, but that it also helps to brand political movements within Croatia. Non-cooperation with the ICTY is equated and textually associated with a backlash to Croatia’s ‘Balkan past’. In this sense, through the use of the possessive pronoun ‘our’, Prime Minister Račan confirms the existence of some ‘Balkan feature’ within Croatia. At the same time, however, he maintains that this trait was and is existent only if those who are responsible for the Balkan stain are not handed over to the ICTY. The statement also tacitly testifies that the Prime Minister admits that crimes and unlawfulness did exist as part of the Croatian history, namely during the war. In order to get rid of this stigma, it is necessary to fully cooperate with the international community ‘no matter how painful it might be’.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this study was to present an analysis of the different politically significant narrative identities that are constructed in Croatia. The analysis focussed on the competing identity versions that emerged from the war narratives told by different actors. The study reveals four dovetailing and partially overlapping narrative identity constructions, which have dominated the debate on the domovinski rat. First, we iden-
tified the very prominent narration of a heroic Croatian nation that stood up against the outside aggression emanating from Serbia and finally succeeded in liberating its occupied areas and establishing peace and stability in the whole region. This story creates a scope of action which excludes apologies or extraditions of generals to the ICTY. It rather calls for a firm standing against all requests and pushes Croatia to act as a self-confident, autonomous country which fights a new battle for historical truth. The second identity version is that of an innocent Croatia, which did ‘the right thing’ in defending its territory. Yet, this nation might contain one or another guilt laden ‘black sheep’. Thus a first cautious cooperation with the ICTY becomes possible. The third and fourth identity construction are intertwined, as they represent two opposite identity opportunities that Croatia can choose from. Croatia is at the crossroads between a ‘Western’ and a ‘Balkan’ identity. The Balkan identity seems to be the disliked one; the kinds of action which are typically connected with it include unlawfulness, a criminal habitus and brutality. They are generally presented in contrast to today’s Croatian identity; this suggests that actions – including foreign policies – which are connected with this Balkan identity should be avoided by Croatia. Instead, Croatia seems to prefer the counterpart, i.e. the Western identity. This, in turn, is presented as being connected with actions which are in accord with the rule of law and democratic values. The Western and the Balkan identity cut across the other identity versions and help to specify them and to mark them as past and disliked (Balkan) or as present/future and desired (Europe).

Our analysis has to remain suggestive in respect to action and behaviour, but it tries to contribute to an understanding of the Croatian stance towards the EU and the ICTY. The identity patterns we found are supposed to frame the scopes of action which open up for Croatia. It seems that the heroic self-image is slowly being substituted with the more self-critical and differentiated identity version, which allows for black sheep in the Croatian rows and for a more cooperative stance towards the EU and the ICTY. The prospect of the 2009 EU membership might confirm these findings.

Our findings are also significant on another, more regional, level. The intense and diverse voices present in Croatia on the question of Croatia’s war involvement have important implications for the relationship between Croatia and its former enemies, i.e. Serbia as well as Bosnian Serbs and Muslims. The increasingly self-critical re-evaluation of the war period might convey the image of a changed collective actor that is now more open for restorative politics towards its former enemies and victims. Therefore the modified plots currently present on the domestic scale in Croatia might be of a significant signalling value that should not be underestimated and might help to stabilise or even to promote reconciliation processes in the region.
ENDNOTES

1 The importance of identity and identity struggle for Croatian politics is emphasised by different analysts. See, for example, Bartlett, 2003; Brkljacic, 2003; Tamminen, 2004; Bet El, 2002ff; Todorova, 1997.

2 The Ministry for European Integration was dissolved and included in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2004 in one of the first acts of the Sanader HDZ government.

3 This request addressed predominantly the right of Serbian refugees from the Krajina region to return to and resettle in their houses and the resettlement of displaced persons within Croatia. Between 1995 and 1998, almost 20,000 houses belonging to Croatian Serbs were taken from their owners and given mainly to Bosnian Croat refugees (Bartlett, 2003: 73–76; Cruvellier and Valinas, 2006: 27–30).

4 The cooperation included in particular the willingness of the Croatian government to support the prosecution of indicted war criminals and to hand over important documents to the tribunal.

5 The Regional Approach and the more wide-ranging Stabilisation and Association Process were EU policy strategies directed towards the so-called ‘Western Balkan’ countries, i.e. Croatia, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Assistance towards the five countries in this context was dependent on the fulfilment of a set of political and economic conditions (mainly democracy and economic activity). Compliance with these requests would be rewarded with the prospect to benefit from assistance through the PHARE programme and to negotiate a Cooperation Agreement with the EU in the case of the Regional Approach. The Stabilisation and Association Process even bribed them with the prospect of eventual EU membership (Bartlett, 2003: 73–75; for a Croatian point of view, see Sanader, 1999).

6 They circumscribed the freedom of the independent media and manipulated and used the intelligence services of the country for the stabilisation of their power. Moreover, observers accuse them of having manipulated elections and electoral laws for their own benefit (Bartlett, 2003: 49–55).

7 Operation Flash stands for the Croatian army’s May 1995 attack on the breakaway Serb republic in the Krajina in western Slavonia. Many Serbian residents from the region had to flee to Bosnia. Operation Storm was the major Croatian offensive in August 1995, in which they regained the whole of the Krajina in only a few days. In Croatia, the two operations stand for the victory of Croatia, and therefore for the heroic liberation of the country from Serbian dominance (Bartlett, 2003: 47, 69; Crnobrnja, 1994: 160ff; Goldstein, 1999: 239ff).

8 We do not understand ‘Western’ as an evaluation here. In the Croatian foreign policy texts we analyse, this identity version is generally connected with integration into the European Union and seen in opposition to the Balkan (Eastern) identity. The term is therefore seen rather descriptively than as an evaluation.

9 This contradicts the traditional point of view of social science approaches on identity which conceived of identity as a fixed and essentialist category which could be specified in terms of gender, race, sexual orientation, or other seemingly ‘objective’ attributes (see, e.g., Calhoun, 1994; Somers, 1994).

10 Writing about the importance of the narrative construction of identity as a prerequisite of action, Margaret Somers remarks, ‘Ontological narratives [of identity] are used to define who we are; this in turn can be a precondition for knowing what to do’ (Somers, 1994: 618).
This third perspective somehow reconciles the everlasting antagonism between voluntarism and determinism, since actors act towards culturally determined social institutions but simultaneously have the power to reshape through practises and habits the patterns determining their actions.

In Eric Ringmar’s words: ‘[N]either the temporal nor the spatial present is a natural hospitable location which simply is “there” for us to inhabit. What we must do is instead to create a present for our selves; we must make room for our selves in time and in space. (...) We can be someone today since we were someone yesterday and since we will be someone tomorrow’ (Ringmar, 1996: 76–77; his emphasis). Wendt, in a similar way, considers identity as the key link in the mutual constitution of agent and structure (Wendt, 1994: 385; Wendt, 1987).

This selectiveness and variability of memory and identity construction corresponds with what Jeffrey Olick (Olick, 2003: 6) points out, namely that we should rather talk about contesting ‘mnemonic practices’ than ‘the collective memory’ as a social fact. ‘Memory is never unitary, no matter how hard various powers strive to make it so. There are always sub-narratives, transitional periods, and contests over dominance’ (Ibid.: 8; see also Olick, 2001; Olick and Robbins, 1998; Gillis, 1994).

Such a situation represents what Ringmar calls a ‘formative moment’ (Ringmar, 1996: 83–84). It corresponds to more general constructivist approaches, which expect changes in meaning structures to occur through moments of crisis and dilemma. ‘Change arises as situated agents respond to novel ideas or problems’ (Bevir and Rhodes, 2005: 173).

For the importance of narration in social life, see also Erwick and Silbey, 1996.

Another widespread concept considers identity to be constructed through the parallel creation of an ‘other’ from which the central ‘self’ can be distinguished (see, e.g., Neumann, 1999; Campbell, 1992; Shapiro, 1992). We do not exclude this essential part but want to integrate it in the more encompassing constitutive narrative.

See Granić, 2003. The excerpts we offer on the following pages are our own translation. The same can be said about some Croatian newspaper articles which were only available in a French translation and the Declaration on the Homeland War, which we had to translate into English from Croatian. We are aware that this captures only part of the discourse, but we think that important sections of the domestic Croatian discourse are covered by our selection.

The Croatian version of the Declaration online: vijesti.hrt.hr/archiv/2000/10/14/HRT00006.html.

The notion of Croatia as a ‘generator of peace’ and a ‘factor of stability’ is mentioned explicitly in Ivo Sanader's text (Sanader, 1999: 5). Moreover, he writes that Croatia was ‘geographically a part of Central Europe, not [the] Western Balkan region’ (Ibid.: 11). In the Declaration, in addition to the westernising role of the Homeland War, a Croatian involvement in a Yugoslavian or Balkan Confederation is irreversibly renounced, and Croatia is thereby decoupled from the Balkan region: ‘After the Croatian Republic has become an independent and sovereign state, it is not willing to engage in any Yugoslavian and Balkan confederative structures’.

These two notions of the West and the Balkan are also ambivalently captured by a compilation of country studies made by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) with the title The Western Balkans: moving on.

If not stated otherwise, the subsequent news dispatches are all online: listserv.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0110&L=twatch-&D=1&O=D&F=P&P=77345.
‘Gotovin remained a hero. For a minority, though, he represented everything that locked the country in the “dark Balkan whole”: the disdain of democratic laws and values’ (our translation).

BIBLIOGRAPHY
• Mesić, Stipe (2007) ‘Hrvatska je gurala Srbe Miloševiću’ [Croatia pushed the Serbs into the hands of Milosevic], Slobodna Dalmacija, 4–5.

Newspaper Dispatches Online
If not otherwise indicated, the quoted news dispatches are online:
DENTING A HEROIC PICTURE

- listserv.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0110&L=twatch&D=1&O=D&F=P&P=77345.
- RFE. Online: listserv.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0110&L=twatch&D=1&O=D&F=P&P=77345.
The ENP and EU Actions in Conflict Management: Comparing between Eastern Europe and the Maghreb

JEAN F. CROMBOIS

Abstract: This article assesses the relations between the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and EU actions in conflict management in the neighbourhood. It is based on a comparative approach to the EU actions towards the ‘unsolved’ conflicts in the Maghreb and in Eastern Europe respectively. It argues that the comparative approach may be used to test the ENP with regard to its ambitions in conflict management. This article raises two questions. The first relates to the added value of the ENP with regard to EU actions in conflict management. The second relates to the extent to which the inclusion of conflict management in the ENP may inform us as to the international role of the EU. It concludes that the ENP showed a mixed record in terms of triggering new EU initiatives in conflict management in Eastern Europe and in the Maghreb due mainly to a lack of internal and external coherence. It also concludes that if the inclusion of conflict management in the ENP does not invalidate the thesis of EU civilian power, it sheds light on its scope.

Key words: European neighbourhood policy, conflict management, civilian power, ESDP, EU, OSCE

INTRODUCTION

The present article proposes to assess the relations between the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and EU actions in conflict management. The importance of this issue is justified by the development of the ENP itself, in which EU actions in conflict management play an increasing role. In 2006, the European Commission even stated that ‘[i]f the ENP cannot contribute to addressing conflicts in the region, it will have failed in one of its key purposes’ (European Commission, 2006: 9). In this context, the relationship between the ENP and EU actions in conflict management raises two main questions. The first one deals with the actual contribution of the ENP to existing EU actions in conflict management. In other words: in what ways does the ENP bring any added value to the EU actions in conflict management? The second question deals with the nature of the EU role in international relations, which can be drawn from EU conflict management actions in the framework of the ENP.
In other words: to what extent does the inclusion of EU conflict management actions in the ENP inform us about the nature of the EU's role in international relations?

This article takes the view that such questions could be better addressed by looking at empirical cases of EU actions in conflict management in two ‘sub-regions’ of the neighbourhood, namely in Eastern Europe and in the Maghreb. Both are plagued by situations of unsolved conflicts, often called ‘frozen conflicts’, to which EU actions are addressed. In sum, this article argues that such a comparative approach offers a good opportunity to test the ambitions of the ENP with respect to conflict management.

To develop the above points, the following text will be divided into three parts. The first part deals with the different aspects of the links between the ENP and EU actions in conflict management. The second part addresses the main actions undertaken by the EU in conflict management in Eastern Europe and in the Maghreb. The third part will address the two questions raised by this paper in the light of the comparative approach with regard to ENP and EU actions in conflict management.

THE ENP AND EU ACTIONS IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

The links between the ENP and EU actions in conflict management are not obvious. This is due mainly to three main reasons. First, even if the ENP includes actions in conflict management, it was not originally conceived as a conflict management instrument. Second, as tailored mostly by the Commission, the ENP focuses essentially on instruments related to the Commission’s competence and not to other ESDP instruments developed under the CSFSP/ESDP pillar. Thirdly, the concepts used by both the Commission and the Council of Ministers in regard to conflict management are not always clear. Finally, the literature on the ENP has only recently started to deal with the possible relations between the ENP and EU actions in conflict management, let alone their implication for the EU international role.

THE ENP AND EU ACTIONS IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: CONTENT AND EVOLUTION

The ENP was developed in the shadow of the EU enlargement to the 12 countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It was aimed at re-defining the relations between the enlarged EU and its neighbours without opening any concrete prospects for new membership. Originally, this policy, initiated in January 2002 by the British, was directed towards Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. In December, the Mediterranean countries already involved in the Euromed partnership were included into the ‘Wider Europe’ initiative (see below). As for Russia, she decided in May 2003 to opt-out and to concentrate instead on her bilateral relationship with the EU embodied in the four common spaces. In May 2004, the last countries
to be included were the three Caucasus Republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan (Edwards, 2008). As already mentioned in the literature on the subject, the ENP was not designed to replace the existing relations between the EU and its neighbours. At best, it consisted of reinforcing the acquis set up by the existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreements and Association Agreements concluded with the partner countries (Biscop, 2005; Dannreuter, 2007). One of the innovations brought by the ENP concerned the strengthening of coherence between the two existing EU pillars, namely the Community pillar and the CSFP/ESDP pillar. This cross-pillar cooperation was reflected in the Council decision of November 2002 to mandate both the High Representative for CSFP, Javier Solana, and the EU External Commissioner, Chris Patten, to develop the new policy under the concept of ‘Wider Europe’ (Council of the European Union, 2002). But the Commission took a prominent part in setting up the main guidelines (Tulmets, 2008). In March 2003, these were laid down in a communication entitled ‘Wider Europe-Strategy Paper’ (European Commission, 2003b), which was followed in July by another communication, ‘Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument’, aimed at unifying the existing programmes directed toward the neighbours (European Commission, 2003c). Finally, in June 2004, the Council accepted the ENP Strategy Paper (Council of the European Union, 2004a) presented by the Commission, and the first Action Plans were designed. In other words, if the ENP stemmed from an initiative taken by the Member States, it was mostly tailored by the European Commission. In doing so, the Commission built mainly on its own experience dealing with the EU enlargement (Dannreuter, 2006; Kelley, 2006; Tulmets, 2008; Edwards, 2008).

The ENP consists mainly of Action Plans to be negotiated with the different countries within the framework of their bilateral agreements concluded with the EU. These Action Plans are discussed on the basis of Country Reports prepared by the Commission. In general, they offer the countries selected a stake in the internal market and participation in all the EU programs. The Action Plans also contain an important chapter relating to Justice and Home Affairs and designed to tackle issues such as immigration, human trafficking, drug trafficking and border management. As for the other fields of cooperation, the Action Plans underline the ambition to strengthen relations in regard to energy, transport, and protection of the environment and in the fields of technologies as well as research and development. Finally, the Action Plans include a security dimension aimed at drawing on CFSP resources, amongst other things, in the field of conflict management. It is worth mentioning at this point that these Action Plans are negotiated on a country-by-country basis by the Commission and do not constitute new legal instruments. As political agreements, they are approved by the Council after consultation of the European Parliament (Popescu, 2006; Tulmets, 2008; Rabohchiyska, 2008).
During its first two years, the ENP essentially dealt with the negotiation of the Action Plans with the different countries concerned. In 2006, the mid-term review gave the different stakeholders the opportunity for a first assessment of the ENP. In its mid-term report, the Commission insisted on the need to strengthen the ENP in five main areas: enhanced economic cooperation, enhanced trade cooperation, people-to-people contacts, developing thematic dimensions and building strong political cooperation with the neighbours. These objectives were reflected in the creation of two financial instruments, the Governance Facility Fund and the Neighbourhood Investment Fund (European Commission, 2006a). As far as the Member States were concerned, the Council, following its approval of the Commission’s report, mandated the EU presidency to submit a Presidency Report on the ‘Strengthening of the European Neighbourhood Policy’. The Report was presented by the German presidency in June 2007 (Council of the European Union, 2007). If the Presidency Report went very much along the lines of the documents presented by the Commission, it was considerably scaled down in terms of EU conflict management (see below). As for the financial aspects of the ENP, the Commission developed the Neighbourhood Policy Instrument, regrouping all the existing financial instruments aimed at the neighbours under a single heading. This new instrument was approved by the Council and the European Parliament in June 2006. It provides the ENP with a budget of 11, 181 billion euros for the years 2007–2013. The allocation of funds includes support for governance and investment (Official Journal of the European Union, 2006a).

Nevertheless, the links between the ENP and the CFSP/ESDP, in particular with respect to conflict management, are far from clear. On the one hand, the Commission, in its first communication of March 2003 on Wider Europe, showed a rather great ambition in the field. The Communication stressed the role of the EU as to ‘facilitate the settlement of disputes over Palestine, the Western Sahara and Transnistria (in support of the OSCE and other mediators)’ (European Commission, 2003: 12). In doing so, the Commission pleaded for a greater role for the EU in conflict management that would be seen as a ‘tangible demonstration of the EU’s willingness to share the burden of conflict resolution in the neighbouring countries’ (Ibidem). In its Strategy Paper of 2004, the Commission places conflict management among the objectives of the ENP (European Commission, 2004a: 13). Finally, in its mid-term report, the Commission makes the EU involvement in conflict resolution in the neighbourhood a condition for its overall success (European Commission, 2006). On the other hand, the Member States also emphasize the need to strengthen EU actions in conflict management in the EU Security Strategy approved in December 2003. If the EUSS does not mention the ENP, it makes security in the neighbourhood one of its two core pillars, the other being effective multilateralism. (Dannreuter, 2008) But the EUSS also differs from the ENP in some respects. Firstly, the EUSS is more precise as to the scope of EU actions in conflict management in mentioning explicitly
the Southern Caucasus, which was originally not included in the ENP. Second, if the ENP approaches the neighbourhood as a zone of shared common interests, the EUSS underlines it more as a possible source of threats (Marchetti, 2004). In addition, the Member States have not responded favourably to the Commission’s demands to develop EU conflict management actions in the framework of the ENP. In 2007, the EU German presidency made the enhancement of the ENP under the concept of an ENP-plus one of its main priorities. The main ideas were outlined in the Presidency Report of June 2007. But the report, while acknowledging the ENP as part of the EU ‘core policy’ (Council of the European Union, 2007: 5), does not specifically mention the issue of conflict management. Instead, it emphasizes the need to give the neighbours in the EU a single market, to develop thematic approaches, including security, and finally to enhance financial cooperation (Lippert, 2007). This discrepancy between the Commission’s ambitions and the Member States’ positions is reflected in the ENP when it comes to EU conflict management. It also illustrates the concern of the Member States to keep exclusive control of EU actions in conflict management. This issue raises the question of the limitations of the cross-pillar cooperation (between the Community pillar and the CFSP/ESDP) in the existing institutional regime as reflected in the ENP (Tulmets, 2008).

An additional difficulty in the relations between the ENP and EU actions in conflict management comes from the lack of clarity of the concepts used and the instruments developed. In principle, the EU contribution to crisis management is enshrined in article 17.2 of the Treaty on the European Union (European Union, 2006). The tasks include not only a military dimension, but also a civilian dimension. These civilian aspects have attracted some attention in the literature as they include a broad range of instruments and policies that are implemented under both the Community pillar and the CFSP/ESDP pillar (Gourlay, 2004; Marquina and Ruiz, 2005; Gourlay, 2006; Nowak, 2006). This institutional complexity has given rise to numerous grey areas, which concern mainly the definition of actions in the field. The literature usually distinguishes between the concepts of conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution. The first is essentially aimed at preventing conflict from taking place. The second deals with measures meant to halt a conflict at the request or with the consent of the warring parties. The third may be used to decrease the chance of violence or to prevent conflict re-escalation (Kronenberger and Wouters, 2004). Put into an EU context, such a distinction is not clearly made. On the one hand, the Member States have developed a distinct approach in the field of civilian crisis management as complementing the other ESDP instruments. In June 2002, these civilian instruments were broken down into four categories: police, rule of law, civilian administration, and civil protection. In June 2004, the European Council agreed on an Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of the ESDP followed by the adoption of the Civilian Headline Goal to be completed by 2008 (Nowak, 2006).
These actions were taken with the aim of narrowing the gap between the military aspects of the ESDP and its civilian aspects with the aim of integrating the two in a project for Civil-Military Coordination (Pfister, 2007). All these instruments draw from the decision making and institutional structures set up in the context of the ESDP. In doing so, they reflect a unique EU concept (Dwan, 2004; Gourlay, 2006). But as a result, they also contribute to blurring the distinction between conflict prevention and conflict resolution while leaving some important questions unanswered, such as which pillar would control them (Nowak, 2006; Pfister, 2007). On the other hand, the Commission has at its disposal a variety of tools, financial, economical and political, especially suited for conflict prevention. These tools have been developed under the Community pillar and are therefore based on the Community method (European Commission, 2003; International Crisis Group, 2005). In addition, in 2001, the EU set up a Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) that consisted of an instrument designed to allow the Community to act rapidly for the purpose of political stability. This use of the RRM has sometimes been objected to by the Member States, who were eager to emphasize its lack of political legitimacy and political control (Gourlay, 2006). In 2006, the EU adopted a Stability Instrument aimed at addressing the issues of coherence between Commission actions and ESDP actions in crisis management with CFSP/ESDP interventions (EC Regulation 2006). But the adoption of this instrument led to a turf war between the Commission and the Member States when it came to defining the scope of its actions. As a result, it did not resolve the dividing lines between the two pillars, especially in terms of civilian crisis management (Dewaele and Gourlay, 2005). In the context of these discussions, the ENP, as designed by the Commission, mainly focuses on conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation rather than on direct involvement in conflict management, let alone in crisis resolution (Popescu, 2005).

In the light of these problems, the question of the ENP contribution to EU actions in conflict management is to be considered. In other words, we should consider the extent to which the ENP improves (or does not improve) the existing institutional weaknesses of the EU actions in conflict management, which are identified in the literature as: the dysfunctional institutional divide between supranational and intergovernmental institutions, the inadequacy of the divide in terms of the new types of military operations, inefficiency and a fragmented approach to planning (Gourlay, 2004; Gourlay, 2006).

**THE ENP, EU ACTIONS IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND THE EU’S INTERNATIONAL ROLE: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE**

The literature on the ENP has only recently tackled the issue of its relationship with EU actions in conflict management. Authors have first stressed the relationship be-
between the ENP and the EU enlargement process in debating the inside-out dynamic created by the new policy (Lavenex, 2004; Smith, 2005). Others preferred to assess the impact of the ENP on the future developments of the CFSP/ESDP. For example, Aliboni addresses the new challenges posed by the ENP and stresses the fact that it would lead to greater EU involvement in the resolution of conflicts in the neighbourhood and that it therefore requires a reinforcement of its CFSP/ESDP dimensions (Aliboni, 2005). Based on the case study of Moldova, Popescu reaches a similar conclusion, highlighting the need for the EU to develop its contribution to crisis resolution as a condition for a successful fulfilment of its objectives, which are laid down in the ENP (Popescu, 2005). More recently, the literature started to address specifically the relationship between the ENP and EU actions in conflict management. There is, however, no consensus on the issue, and different views have been expressed. On the one hand, Cameron and Balfour highlight the fact that if the ENP was not designed primarily as a tool for conflict management, it still contains useful elements for resolving conflict situations (Balfour & Cameron, 2006). On the other hand, Stefan Ganzle proposes that the ENP should not only be approached as an ‘offspring of the enlargement’ but also ‘in terms of the EU’s efforts at conflict prevention and management’ (Ganzle, 2007: 128). In his contribution, Ganzle makes a useful distinction between the ENP as developed under the EU first pillar and actions in conflict management as developed under the EU second pillar. In this perspective, Ganzle raises the issue of the ‘cross-pillar problem’, which is reflected in the relationship between the ENP and EU actions in conflict management (Ganzle, 2007). But if this literature offers some interesting insights on the ENP, it has overlooked the implications of the ENP for the international role of the EU.

The discussions on the EU international role have revolved mainly around the concepts of the EU as a civilian power proposed by Duchêne in the 1970s. Since then, the concept has been developed and refined under the triptych civilian/civilizing/normative power (Sjursen, 2007). The development of a military dimension of the EU under the ESDP has given rise to numerous discussions as to the validity of that approach. On one end of the spectrum, authors such as Treacher argue that these new developments signalled the end of the EU as a civilian power (Treacher, 2004). On the other end, authors such as Télo, Whitman and Stavridis (Stavridis, 2001; Whitman, 2006; Télo, 2007) consider that these developments do not invalidate their thesis of the EU as a civilian power, and in some cases, they strengthen the concept (Stavridis, 2001; Whitman, 2006). Between these two ends, Ian Manners has raised some important questions as to the consequences of the ‘militarization of the EU’ in regard to the future of the EU as a normative power (Manners, 2007: 18). In other words, this militarization, as reflected in the EUSS, may well undermine the status of the EU as a ‘normative power’ (Ibidem).
The literature reviewed above suffers from one main weakness. This weakness lies in the lack of an empirical basis which would allow us to test these different approaches on the ground. As far as the ENP is concerned, it has only been very recently approached in the light of these discussions, in a special issue of *The European Political Economy Review*, but without reaching a consensus. In their contributions, the authors emphasize the distinctive nature of the ENP as an example of the EU use of soft power, which is aimed at ‘coopting’ rather than ‘coercing’ (Tulmets, 2007), while refuting the belief that the ENP reflects a use of normative power by the EU (Johansson-Nogués, 2007). The last contribution in this series, by Laure Delcour, underlines the fact that the ENP was not launched in a vacuum and that the ENP has to be approached as a ‘two way’ process in which the EU partners try to shape policies according to their own preferences (Delcour, 2007).

In conclusion, this article will raise a second question: to what extent does the inclusion of EU actions in conflict management inform us about the distinctive nature of EU external policy?

**EU ACTIONS IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD: THE CASE STUDIES OF MOLDOVA, GEORGIA AND MOROCCO**

As seen above, the ENP makes clear reference to the unsolved conflicts in Eastern Europe and in the Maghreb. The first sub-region is plagued by the conflicts in Moldova (Transnistria) and in Georgia (affected by two secessionist republics – in South Ossetia and in Abkhazia). In the Maghreb, the unsolved issue of the Western Sahara, annexed by Morocco in 1975, remains the main conflict in the region, opposing mainly Morocco and Algeria.

The choice of the two sub-regions as case studies for this article was dictated by two main reasons. The first one draws from the literature on regional security complexes. In this literature, the European continent is viewed as being divided into two main RSCs, one centring on the EU and the other on Russia. As for the Maghreb, it is generally approached as a sub-complex of the Middle Eastern RSC (Buzan & Waever, 2003). All three of the RSCs have also been the subject of discussions as to their evolution. In the case of the European continent, authors have raised the point whether the two sub-RSCs are not in some respect merged or, to a certain extent, whether their limits have not become somewhat blurred, thereby creating a shared neighbourhood. With regard to the Maghreb, Buzan and Waever have raised the question of whether the region might become an RSC of its own; another author, Haddadi, developed the idea that there is a possibility that the Western Mediterranean forms a ‘liaison security complex’ between Europe and the Mediterranean (Haddadi, 1999: 20). The second reason is linked more specifically to the literature on the ENP itself. Indeed, authors have tended to deal with the two sub-regions sep-
arately, especially when it came to case studies. In doing so, the authors have given a somewhat truncated vision of the ENP in concentrating on the Eastern neighbour- bourhood when dealing with EU actions in conflict management and in concentrating on the Mediterranean and the Maghreb when dealing with the threats coming from the south, such as illegal immigration and terrorism. In choosing unresolved conflicts in the two sub-regions, this article argues that the comparative approach may help us assess the ENP while integrating a more systemic variable.

EU CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE: THE CASES OF MOLDOVA AND GEORGIA

As far as Moldova and Georgia are concerned, the EU policies have not been without ambiguities and *quid pro quo* on the part of the EU as well as on the side of the countries concerned. Concretely, Moldova concluded a PCA with the EU in 1994 and already had its Action Plan approved at the end of 2004. In the case of Georgia, the PCA with the EU was concluded in 1999 whilst its Action Plan was agreed upon in 2006.

In the 1990s, the relationship between the EU and Moldova was limited. In July 1994, the EU and Moldova concluded a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement mostly focused on the development of economic relations with small contributions from the TACIS program. This agreement contrasted with official statements made as early as 1996 in Moldova for EU membership (Vahl, 2004). In December 2000, Moldova was included in the European Conference and was consequently proposed to be part of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. But in general, the issue of the conflict was overlooked by the EU (Barbe and Kienzle, 2007). In December 2003, the EU Presidency at the time expressed concerns with regard to the situation in Transnistria. In the summer of 2003, in the context of renewed tensions between Moldova and Transnistria, calls were made for a more active EU involvement by both the OSCE and the Moldovan authorities. But these were received coolly by the Member States, who, fearing the Russian reaction, opposed the project (European Voice, 2003). In the ENP Action Plan for Moldova approved in December 2004, the EU sets as its main objective ‘to further support a viable solution to the Transnistria conflict, more specifically promotion of political dialogue with the Council of Europe and the OSCE and in line with the EU Security Strategy’ (EU/Moldova Action Plan: 13). A few months later, the EU concern for the situation translated into the appointment by the GAERC of an EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Moldova. The position was given to a Dutch diplomat, Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged, who had served before as a special envoy of the OSCE Dutch Chairman-in-Office in Transnistria (Popescu, 2005). But if the mandate of the EU SR was wide, including, *inter alia*, the strengthening of the EU contribution to the settlement of conflict and the follow-up of the political developments in Moldova, the fact that it did not dispose of locally
based staff reduced its potential considerably (Council of the European Union, 2005a).

In the spring of 2005, two important events opened a window of opportunities for greater involvement of the EU. In April, informal talks between Javier Solana and Vladimir Putin showed a more relaxed Russian attitude towards greater EU involvement in Moldova. Later, in June, a joint letter written by the two Presidents, Voronin for Moldova and Yuschenko for Ukraine, requested a greater contribution of the EU, more specifically in the management of the common border between the countries. The border, particularly, its Transnistrian segment, was viewed as a major place for all sorts of trafficking and weapon smuggling by organized crime. In this context, the GAERC decided in late August to send a joint Commission/Council fact finding mission to Moldova. On the basis of its results, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) agreed on 28 September on the creation of an EU Border Mission on the Moldavian-Ukrainian border (EUBAM) and on the necessity of strengthening the role of the EUSR, notably by the addition of new staff to be based in Kiev and Chisinau (Council of the European Union, 2005b; Council of the European Union, 2005c).

The EU BAM mission was originally launched on 28 October by the Commission through the use of its RRM with an initial budget of 4 million Euros (European Commission, 2005). A few weeks earlier, the Commission had decided to strengthen its presence in Moldova through the establishment of a Delegation in Chisinau. The use of the RRM took observers by surprise as such instruments should be used only in emergency operations. It certainly contrasts with the other EU BAM mission in Rafah, which was launched the same year but remained under exclusive control of the ESDP (Sabiote, 2006). Nevertheless, in its Joint Action, the Council was quick to reclaim the political control of the operation through the appointment of a Special Political Advisor in charge of the political control of the EU BAM mission in Moldova (Council of the European Union, 2005c).

The mission led to two further developments. In December 2005, the Prime Ministers of both countries issued a joint declaration on Custom Issues, which was endorsed by the European Union in March 2006 (Austrian Presidency, 2006). In January 2006, the PSC agreed to prolong the mandate of the EUSR in providing a budgetary line until November 2007. In February, the announcement of Jacobovits de Szeged’s resignation led to the appointment of the Hungarian Kalman Miszei as the new EUSR for Moldova (Official Journal, 2007). In the meantime, the mandate of the EUSR with respect to conflict management was strengthened. Instead of using the terms of ‘assist’ and ‘strengthening the EU contribution’ as adopted in the Joint Action of March 2005 (Council of the European Union, 2005a), the Joint Action of February 2007 refers to the role of the EU as ‘to contribute to peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict’ (Official Journal, 2007: 2). Finally, in February 2008, the mandate of the EUSR to the Republic of Moldova was extended to another pe-
period of 12 months (Council of the European Union, 2008), while the mandate of the EUBAM was extended for another two years – until November 2009 (Gya, 2007).

With regard to Georgia, the country was approached as part of the South Caucasus. As said above, while the South Caucasus was not mentioned in the ENP, it was nevertheless clearly referred to in the EU Security Strategy. In 1999, the country concluded a PCA with the EU. It was included in the ENP in June 2004, and its Action Plan was agreed upon in 2006. Nevertheless, the EU was already active in the region since the appointment, in July 2003, of the Finnish Diplomat Heikki Talvitie as EU Special Representative to the South Caucasus. But the mandate of the EUSR was limited to contributing to conflict prevention and to assisting the existing conflict settlement mechanisms in the region, such as those of the UN and the OSCE Minsk Group. In addition, its visibility was limited as the EUSR was based in Helsinki instead of Brussels (International Crisis Group, 2006a). In 2004, following a suggestion made by an Estonian Diplomat, the Irish EU Presidency endorsed the idea of sending a rule of law mission to Georgia. This mission was eventually agreed on 28 June 2004 (Helly, 2006). The EUJUST THEMIS mission led, in May 2004, to the approval, by the Georgian authorities, of a reform strategy for their judicial system. The mission ended in July 2005. The EUJUST THEMIS represented the first mission of this type to be launched under the ESDP. In the words of Javier Solana, it constituted ‘a new element in our (EU) crisis management toolbox’ (Solana, 2005: 287).

In May 2005, the deadlock regarding the extension of the OSCE border mission on the Georgian-Chechen border being vetoed by Russia led the Georgian authorities to ask for a more active involvement of the EU in the region. But the Member States were divided upon this possibility, which opposed mainly the Baltic States and Great Britain (who were in favour of the possibility) against Germany and France (who were against it). As a result, a compromise was struck, and the Member States decided, in July 2005, to expand the mandate of the EUSR to conflict management in full cooperation with the OSCE and the other actors, such as Russia (Coppieters, 2007). The ENP Action Plan, agreed upon in 2006 with Georgia, very much took stock of the past involvement of the EU while reasserting the need to promote a peaceful resolution of the internal conflicts in the country (EU/Georgia Action Plan).

Nevertheless, the EU did not remain inactive in regard to the two secessionist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In South Ossetia, the financial aid from the Commission led it to be involved in the OSCE mediation and to take part in the Joint Control Commission on economic programs. In Abkhazia, the situation is quite different. The mediation process is ensured by a group of friends, which includes three EU member states, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. In this context, this leaves very little room for the EU or for the EUSR to be more involved in the mediation framework (International Crisis Group, 2006a; Tocci, 2007).
THE EU AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE MAGHREB: THE CASE OF THE WESTERN SAHARA

With regard to the Maghreb, the ENP has to be put in the context of the existing agreements and instruments developed by the EU since the Barcelona agreements establishing an EU-Mediterranean Partnership (Euromed). The Euromed consisted of three baskets covering security, economic and financial cooperation, and cooperation with civil society. Progress has been made in the second basket, in particular in view of the planned creation of a free trade zone between the Mediterranean and the EU by 2010 (Philippart, 2003; Biscop, 2003). In respect to conflict management, the Euromed has produced only slight results, though the issue of conflict prevention was included in the ill-fated project of the Charter for Peace and Stability for the Mediterranean (Biscop, 2003). Numerous reasons have been put forward to explain the lack of results of the Euromed in conflict management: lack of clarity in the EU’s instruments and the differences in the security cultures on both sides of the Mediterranean as well as the nature of the Euromed to focus on ‘soft’ rather than on ‘hard’ security issues (Biscop, 2003; Soltan, 2004; Biscop, 2005). As far as the Maghreb is concerned, the unsolved conflict in the Western Sahara offers another test case with regard to EU’s intentions in respect to conflict management. In itself, the issue of the former Spanish colony, annexed in November 1975 by Morocco, presented the EU with numerous challenges. First, the MS found it difficult to reach a consensus, however minimal. Countries such as Spain and France appeared to have divergent interests compared to the other Member States in advocating respect for international law and the implementation of the UN resolutions (Vaquer i Fanes, 2007). Secondly, the EU tried to present itself as a neutral actor in the conflict, preferring to leave the issue to be dealt with in the UN context (Gillespie, 2004). Despite the situation, the Commission showed high ambitions in dealing with the conflict of the Western Sahara in its first drafts of the ENP. In its ‘Wider-Europe’ communication of 2003 (European Commission, 2003b) and its Strategy Paper of May 2004 (European Commission, 2004), the conflict of the Western Sahara is placed alongside the conflicts in Palestine and Transnistria. But in its subsequent documents, the conflict is barely mentioned. In the ENP Country Report, the situation of the Western Sahara is briefly mentioned (European Commission, 2004a). The ENP Action Plan only contains a vague statement on the EU’s objectives being to ‘contribute to the UN-efforts in the resolution of regional conflicts’ (EU/Morocco Action Plan: 13) and does not mention the conflict in its chapter on conflict prevention and crisis management. This situation reflects at best what Emerson described as ‘an omission in EU foreign policy’ (Emerson, Noutcheva, Popescu, 2007: 31) in mentioning the EU role towards Western Sahara. As a solution, Emerson even suggests to develop EU links with non-recognized entities such as Western Sahara but also with Transnistria (Emerson, Noutcheva, Popescu, 2007).
The ENP and EU Actions in Conflict Management: The Comparative Approach

The comparative approach to EU actions in the two sub-regions of the neighbourhood brings about some important elements that may be grouped into two main points. The first one concerns the added value of the ENP with respect to EU actions in conflict management. The second addresses the information drawn as to the nature of EU’s international role.

The ENP and EU Actions in Conflict Management: What Added Value?

As shown in the different cases, there does not seem to be a strong relationship between the ENP and EU actions in conflict management. In the case of Moldova, the launch of the ENP had the merit of putting the security issues linked to the conflict in Transnistria on the EU agenda. As suggested by some authors, there is ground to argue for a link between the ENP and the raising of the EU profile towards the situation in Moldova (Barbe and Kienzle, 2007). Conversely, in the case of Georgia, the ENP does not seem to have produced any added value due to, amongst other things, its late inclusion in the policy itself. Nevertheless, in both cases, the ESPD missions led to raising the profile of the EUSRs with regard to conflict management. In the case of the Western Sahara, the ENP has not contributed to any new dynamic in regard to the EU role. This has led some analysts to call for the appointment of an EUSR for the Maghreb region (Helmerich, 2007). In any case, such an action would confirm the growing security de-coupling in the Southern Mediterranean between the Maghreb and the Middle East.

Two reasons may account for this mixed record. The first concerns the lack of internal coherence (in terms of both horizontal coherence, including institutional consistency, and vertical coherence) when it comes down to EU actions in conflict management. This lack of internal coherence has led to an absence of a clear definition of the concepts and the actions required as well as of the instruments concerned. The second reason is the lack of external coherence in terms of the division of labour with the other actors and the existing mechanisms established in the two sub-regions.

In the cases of Moldova and Georgia, the ENP has suffered from its difficulty in fostering horizontal coherence and institutional consistency in regard to conflict management. In the case of Moldova, EU actions led to some confusion in regard to the use of instruments. In the case of the EUBAM mission in Moldova, the Commission decided to use its RRM but the situation was far from constituting an emergency situation. The use of the RRM is even more surprising as it refers only to short term actions. The only emergency may have consisted in the window of opportunity.
offered by a more flexible Russian attitude. In any case, the Member States were very quick at regaining full political control of the operation through the EUSR’s mandate. In the case of the EUJUST THEMIS mission in Georgia, the operation was clearly designed as an ESDP mission from the beginning. If the Commission also used its RRM, it was just to complement the operation itself (Kelley, 2006). In conclusion, both operations seem to suggest that the EU views conflict resolution as a sub-set of conflict management but without providing a clear definition of both concepts. In the case of the Western Sahara, the ENP suffered from a clear lack of vertical consistency. In other words, the Member States are clearly controlling the agenda. An interesting difference between the Maghreb and Eastern Europe lies in the role played by the new Member States in taking initiatives such as that of the Estonian government towards Georgia. In the Maghreb, the Member States seem to still be embedded in their post-colonialist policies and concerned with specific issues such as immigration and terrorism (Vaquer i Fanes, 2007).

Finally, the two sub-regions present a striking contrast in terms of the role played by the other international actors, such as third countries and international organizations. The Eastern European neighbourhood is characterized by a situation of overlapping security regimes, mainly consisting of the EU and the OSCE without mentioning the important roles played by third countries such as the US and Russia. In addition, the EU has to deal with existing conflict resolution mechanisms that were established in the 1990s, when its attention was focused elsewhere – mostly on the Balkans. This overlapping of security arrangements has created another set of problems for the EU, namely in terms of external coherence. On the one hand, the density of actors makes the role of the EU more difficult as it may further complicate the resolution of the conflict (Tocci, 2007). On the other hand, it provides alternatives for actions, should one security regime prove unable to take initiatives. In addition, in the Eastern neighbourhood, Russia is a decisive partner. In this respect, it seems that the ENP successes in conflict management depend largely on the state of the relationship between the EU and Russia (de Wilde and Pellon, 2006). In any case, in the Eastern neighbourhood, the EU is still lacking of a clear vision of the division of labour between the different actors concerned (Biscop, 2006).

The Maghreb presents a situation of underlapping of security regimes in which the EU is especially exposed. This situation seems to have had an inhibitive impact on the EU when dealing with conflict management. This may be explained by the reluctance of some Member States, especially the Southern Member States, i.e. France and Spain in particular, to contemplate any possible EU actions in regard to the conflict of the Western Sahara. Instead, these Member States have been successful in decoupling the Maghreb from Mediterranean security through the establishment of the 5+5 group of countries, through which they are able to shape their security relations with their Southern neighbours (Holm, 2002).
THE ENP AND EU ACTIONS IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: THE EU AS A CIVILIAN POWER?

In the Eastern neighbourhood, the two EU actions in conflict management have both been of a civilian nature. Nevertheless, both have been led through the ESDP structures, aimed at the development of military means. This begs the question to know whether that development undermines the thesis of the EU civilian power. Certainly the use of the ESDP structures to launch such operations raises a number of questions, from those of its democratic control to those of the nature of the EU actions (Wagner, 2007). In both cases, the democratic control of the operations was very weak both from the point of view of the European Parliament and from that of the national parliaments, as the main initiatives developed through the ESDP structures. The use of such structures for these actions also confirms the growing militarization of the EU, as already emphasized by Manners. This incremental use of the complex ESDP machinery should not lead the EU to develop actions more for the sake of demonstrating to itself and to the world that it is able to deal with conflicts in the neighbourhood rather than dealing with the situation on the ground. Here too, the ENP does not to provide clear directions as to the way forward.

In any case, the comparison between the two sub-regions suggests that these discussions are in some respect premature. On the one hand, although the the fact is that the EU actions in conflict management have so far been of a civilian nature, it does not mean that they result from a deliberate choice on the part of the EU. Indeed, these actions only reflect the range of possibilities that are seen as acceptable by third actors. Indeed, as mentioned above, the EU is not the only actor involved in the two sub-regions. In the Eastern neighbourhood, the nature of EU operations has been, above all, dependent on Russia’s position. The mission in Moldova came the closest to being a military one. In Georgia, an EU military mission was clearly rejected by Russia, and the EUJUST THEMIS mission proved to be the only feasible one. In the Maghreb, the question of the nature of EU actions with respect to the Western Sahara conflict has not yet been raised.

If, however, EU actions in conflict management in the neighbourhood fall under the concept of EU civilian power, this civilian power has shown a very poor record in terms of domestication of the relations between the EU and its neighbours. In the cases of Moldova and Georgia, the ENP is considered as a second-best option. For the two countries, EU membership has always been considered as the best option. If in Georgia, the EU THEMIS mission has been welcomed as a sign of EU interest in the country, it has fallen short of the country’s demands for greater EU involvement (Tangiashvili, 2007). In the case of Moldova, the EU BAM mission was much praised by the local authorities. Nevertheless, there is a strong demand for the EU to be more engaged in the resolution of the conflict and eventually to get physically involved by providing peace-keeping forces – an option which, as seen above, did
not meet a consensus amongst the Member States (International Crisis Group, 2006b). In the case of Morocco, there is simply no demand for the EU to get involved. As far as the ENP is concerned, the main demand remains the demand for the willingness to upgrade the relationship by the negotiation of an advanced status. In other words, the ENP is seen mostly as the guarantee that the EU will remain committed financially and economically to the region.

CONCLUSION
The comparative approach in terms of the ENP and EU actions in conflict management leads to three main conclusions.

First, it demonstrates the need to focus on case studies when looking at the ENP. All discussions on the ENP and its relation with EU actions in conflict management should be tested first before reaching conclusions. In any case, the record of the ENP in terms of EU actions in conflict management is at best a mixed one.

Second, the added value of the ENP in regard to EU actions in conflict management is not clear. As shown in the three cases, the EU actions in conflict management in the neighbourhood were launched independently of the ENP. At best, the ENP is taking stock on these actions. In the case of the Maghreb, the ENP has not triggered any new EU initiative towards the Western Sahara issue. In general, the ENP has suffered from the lack of internal and external coherence of EU actions in conflict management in the neighbourhood. The cases show clearly that in the cases of Georgia and Moldova, the Member States kept the two operations under their political control under the ESDP umbrella. This lack of internal coherence is also being reflected in the absence of a clear strategic definition of EU conflict management operations. Rather, the cases of Moldova and Georgia suggest that the EU sees crisis management as a sub-set of crisis resolution. The lack of external coherence is reflected in the absence of a grand strategy of cooperation between the EU and the other organizations and existing mechanisms on the ground. There are, however, some important differences between the sub-regions. These differences concern the roles of the Member States, especially those of the new Member States in the Eastern part of the neighbourhood and those of the Southern European Member States in the Maghreb. Another difference lies in the situation of overlapping of security regimes for the Eastern neighbourhood, on the one hand, and the situation of underlapping of security regimes in the Maghreb, on the other. In the latter case, the greater exposure of the EU seems to have had a clear inhibitive effect.

Third, in terms of EU’s international role, the comparative approach also produced some interesting insights. As mentioned, the EU actions in conflict management were all of a civilian nature. But this civilian nature of EU operations results less from a deliberate choice than as consequences of a number of constraints imposed by the other actors on the ground. In the Eastern neighbourhood, these actions were
launched only as they were deemed acceptable for Russia and for the Member States unwilling to antagonize their strategic partner. This led the EU to launch actions that were below its potential and that fell short of expectations in the countries concerned.

In the Maghreb, the debate on possible EU actions has not yet started due to the unwillingness of the Member States to consider it and the lack of interest from the countries involved, especially Morocco. This asymmetry between supply and demand for EU actions in conflict management reflects the extent to which the EU, as a civilian power, has failed to domesticate its relationship with its neighbours through the ENP.

**ACRONYMS**

CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy  
ENP: European Neighbourhood Policy  
ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy  
EU: European Union  
Euromed: European Mediterranean Partnership  
EUSR: European Union Special Representative  
EUSS: European Union Security Strategy  
GAERC: General Affairs and External Relations Council  
HR/SG: High Representative-Secretary General (of the Council)  
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
OSCE: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe  
PCA: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement  
PSC: Political and Security Committee  
RSC: Regional Security Complex  
UN: United Nations

**ENDNOTES**

1 The literature on conflict resolution prefers to use the term of ‘unsolved conflicts’ rather than ‘frozen conflicts’, as the latter overlooks the dynamic on the ground (Tocci, 2007).

2 Association Agreements for the Mediterranean neighbours and Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the Eastern European neighbours.


4 The RRM, unlike the Instrument for Stability, is not subject to the comitology procedure.

5 Even though the EU BAM Mission did not find any strong evidence of such activities (International Crisis Group, 2006).

6 Since 2005, the EU is taking part in a five sided negotiating format that consists of three mediators (Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE) and two observers, the EU and the US.
The Minsk Group was created under the aegis of the OSCE to deal with the conflict over Nagorno-Karabach between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Placed under the joint chairmanship of France, Russia, and the US, it also included Belarus, Georgia, Italy, Finland, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan and, on a rotating basis, the OSCE Troika.

Negotiations for settlement of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict are facilitated by the OSCE in the Joint Control Commission, including Georgian, South and North Ossetian, and Russian representatives. The EU Commission is an informal observer.

Usually, the literature distinguishes between vertical and horizontal coherence. An additional notion of institutional consistency was added by Simon Nutall. For a discussion of these concepts, see Tulmets, 2008. The concept of external coherence relates to the way the EU is in cooperation with the other internal organizations. For a discussion of this topic, see Versluys, 2007.

The 5+5 process was set up in 2005 and included Algeria, France, Italy, Libya, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Spain, Tunisia and Portugal. See Holm, 2002.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


• Emerson, Michael, Gergana Noutcheva, and Nicu Popescu (2007) The European Neighbourhood Policy Two Years On: Time Indeed for an ‘ENP-Plus’ (CEPS Policy Brief, 126), Brussels: CEPS.
THE ENP AND EU ACTIONS IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

THE ENP AND EU ACTIONS IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT


The EU and Non-Accession States: The Cases of Belarus and Ukraine

RACHEL VANDERHILL

Abstract: The majority of the literature examining the European Union’s (EU) ability to encourage political and economic reform only considers its influence on countries involved in the accession process; few have examined its impact on non-accession countries. Therefore, in this paper I assess the ability of the EU to promote reform outside of the accession process and develop a theory explaining a state’s compliance with or rejection of EU pressure to reform. Through comparing and contrasting the cases of Belarus and Ukraine, I determine that a combination of domestic elite preferences and the strength of EU pressure – a function of the degree of unity among the EU members on the issue – influence the likelihood of a state’s compliance with EU pressure. The degree of economic dependency, public opinion about the EU, and severity of inter-elite conflict all affect elite preferences.

Key words: Belarus, Ukraine, European Union, Democratization, Orange Revolution

INTRODUCTION

The majority of the literature examining the European Union’s (EU) ability to encourage political and economic reform only considers its influence on countries involved in the accession process; few have examined its impact on non-accession countries. Does the allure of EU membership promote reform even when there is a low probability of membership? More broadly, what determines a state’s compliance or rejection of EU pressure for reform? The combination of the rewards (or sanctions) offered by the EU and the receptivity of the domestic elite to EU pressure determine a state’s compliance with EU demands. The nature of the rewards, such as trade deals, and the clarity of EU policy affect the cost/benefit calculations of elites regarding reform. However, their calculations take into account not only relations with the EU, but also the domestic political and economic situation. Along with considering the nature of the rewards, elites also contemplate the degree of their economic dependency on the EU, the usefulness of the EU as an ally in internal political battles, and the degree of public support. If the country is economically dependent on the EU, the EU helps strengthen the elites’ position in internal political battles, and the public is generally supportive of the EU, then at least some domestic elites are more likely to adopt suggested reforms.
I examine these questions by looking at two countries that have a low likelihood of obtaining membership in the near future, Ukraine and Belarus. The decision of Belarusian and Ukrainian elites of whether to comply or not is a function of both the nature of the EU policy and their calculations about the domestic situation. The EU has instituted sanctions and travel bans against Belarus to encourage the development of democracy. However, given the current political and economic situation in Belarus, the costs of complying with demands for democracy are too high for the Belarusian elite. As a result, EU policy towards Belarus has failed to achieve any significant democratization or economic reform. In the case of Ukraine, the response to EU reform efforts has been more positive. By the time of the 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine, some elites preferred closer relations with the EU. These elite preferences for better relations with the EU contributed to economic and political reforms in Ukraine. However, the pressure on Ukraine from the EU is weak because of the lack of clarity and uniformity in EU policy on this issue. The combination of a receptive Ukrainian elite and weak EU pressure explains the EU’s limited effect on Ukraine.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Literature about the domestic effects of international institutions, literature about the international dimension of regime change, and the economic sanctions literature are all relevant and insightful in regard to this topic. In an attempt to organize this broad collection of theories, I divide them into two different approaches: normative-based arguments and incentive-based arguments. These two approaches differ in their core assumptions about the motivations of actors and about why states comply with external pressure to change policies. There is some variation among the authors grouped within each approach, but they all share a common focus.

NORMATIVE-BASED

Normative-based approaches include all the arguments that hold constructivist, ideational, logic of appropriateness, or normative perspectives about actors. These arguments give primary causal status to ideas and institutions (Schimmelfennig, 2003). Furthermore, believing that people, states, and institutions are socially constructed, normative-based approaches argue that norms, or ‘collective standard[s] of proper behavior’, partially define actors’ interests and identities (Klotz, 1995: 17; Schimmelfennig, 2003: 71). Actors will make decisions because they are seen as legitimate and agree with their internalized identities and norms (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 9). Although some theories may combine ideational and rational motives and mechanisms, they still consider ideational factors essential for explaining the relationship between international factors and regime change (Epstein, 2005). Two major types of normative-based arguments are theories based on in-
ternational socialization, the process by which a state internalizes the rules of the international community, and theories focused on diffusion, the indirect spread of democratic ideas and norms (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 73).

In the case of EU enlargement, international socialization arguments profess that East Central European countries sought membership because they identified with the EU and shared its values and norms. The EU encouraged the adoption of liberal, democratic norms by requiring that domestic institutions and discourse reflect these norms before it would accept the East Central European states as members. According to Epstein, international institutions, such as the EU, can persuade domestic reformers of the desirability and legitimacy of particular policy measures and then can empower the domestic reformers to implement those policies (Epstein, 2005: 68).

Diffusion is a more indirect normative-based approach. In the study of regime change, diffusion refers to the process of democratic norms spreading from democracies to authoritarian regimes (Ambrosio, 2007). These norms affect local ideas about what regime type is legitimate and appropriate. As a complex process, diffusion involves ‘information flows, networks of communication, hierarchies of influence, and receptivity to change’ (Kopstein and Reilly, 2000: 12). Therefore, diffusion requires not only the existence of pro-democratic norms but also the ‘openness’ of the recipient country. The strong reaction of the Russian government to the democratic ‘revolutions’ in Georgia and Ukraine demonstrates that the Russian government believes there is some possibility of democracy spreading through diffusion (Ambrosio, 2007).

If the normative approach explains the effects of the EU on Belarus and Ukraine, then we should see leaders adopting reforms because they accept EU norms about democracy and good governance. A failure of the EU to encourage reforms would be caused by a lack of ‘openness’ of elites to democratic norms or the adoption of alternative norms, such as ideas about authoritarian rule from Russia. Furthermore, if Belarusian or Ukrainian elites comply with EU demands because of diffusion or international socialization, then the cost or benefits incurred by reforming should not affect their choices. The existence of democratic or anti-democratic norms is not sufficient to claim they had an effect. Instead, the cases need to show that diffusion or socialization affected elite behavior or policy. However, as the cases will demonstrate, Belarusian and Ukrainian elites generally did not comply with or reject EU pressure because of normative reasons, but rather because of the costs and benefits associated with each choice.

**INCENTIVE-BASED ARGUMENTS**

Incentive-based arguments, using a variety of methodological approaches, focus on how conditionality, incentives, or sanctions from international organizations and states
influence elite regime preferences, or at least elite behavior, and therefore promote economic and/or political changes. In contrast to the normative approach, they assume that elites are rational actors and make decisions based on calculations of the costs and benefits of different regime outcomes. Working within the framework of Robert Dahl, they assume that elites weigh the costs of tolerating versus the costs of repressing opponents. Incentive-based arguments believe that external rewards or sanctions may affect calculations of the cost of suppression/cost of toleration.

There are two major examples of the incentive-based approach: the conditional-integration literature and the sanctions literature. The majority of conditional-integration literature emphasizes the accession of East Central European (ECE) countries into the European Union (EU). Scholars such as Milada Vachudova, Geoffrey Pridham, Frank Schimmelfennig, and Ulrich Sedelmeier argue that the process of the requirements for membership (conditionality) provided incentives for leaders of ECE states to adopt pro-democratic political reforms. Elites in ECE states compared the costs of complying with EU conditionality versus the benefits of membership. Although incentive-based approaches acknowledge that normative mechanisms occur, the authors conclude, like Pridham, that ‘there are numerous instances of CEE [Central and Eastern European] efforts to consolidate democratic institutions simply as a response to western and especially EU conditionality, not to mention the incentive of western aid’ (Dimitrova and Pridham, 2004: 105–106). The conditional-integration arguments emphasize how the external actor, through offering positive rewards, can change elite regime preferences or elite behaviors.

In contrast, the economic sanctions literature emphasizes how external actors, through punishment (sanctions), attempt to change state behavior by increasing the economic costs of particular actions. For example, Neda C. Crawford and Audie Klotz discuss the incentive-based model, compellance, which assumes that sanctions work when they ‘threaten or actually impose higher costs than the benefits of pursuing a particular policy’ (Crawford and Klotz, 1999: 26). Under these conditions, the elites calculate that complying with the demands of the other state is the least costly action.

The sanctions literature and some incentive-based arguments also suggest conditions under which the external actor is most likely to succeed in promoting regime change or political reform. Different scholars suggest that economic sanctions will be more effective when the target state is a ‘relatively weak, unstable country’, the issue in contention is concrete and specific, the two states are closely linked ‘through economic, cultural, and military cooperation’, and there are few substitutes available on the world market for the goods denied by sanctions (Martin, 1992: 33; Li, 1993: 365; Crumm, 1995: 327). In the international dimension of regime change literature, Levitsky and Way make similar arguments. They propose that both the degree of Western leverage and the density of ties between the state and the West, or
their linkage, determine the success of international pressure to democratize (Levitsky and Way, 2006: 379–380). Therefore, the current literature emphasizes economic interests and linkages between external actors and recipient states.

The incentive-based approach provides the greatest insight for explaining Belarus and Ukraine’s responses to the EU. In other words, it is not necessary to consider norms and culture to explain Belarusian and Ukrainian elites’ responses to EU pressure. Although ideas about democracy and liberalism are clearly present in Europe, the majority of leaders in postcommunist Europe have not changed their behavior because of the existence of democratic norms. Scholars have documented that former communist leaders and authoritarian leaders implemented democratic policies for solely self-interested, rational reasons (Schimmelfennig, Engert, Knobel, 2003). For example, if international socialization was the reason why Romanian and Bulgarian leaders adopted reforms, then the removal of the incentive of membership should not have changed their behavior. However, once Romanian and Bulgarian elites gained membership, problems with democracy, including rampant corruption, have increased. Therefore, the incentive-based approach provides the best starting point for explaining the influence of the EU on non-accession countries.

THEORY
Building on the incentive-based approaches to the international dimension of regime change, I argue that the nature of the rewards offered by the EU combined with elite ‘receptivity’ towards the EU determines a state’s compliance with EU suggested reforms. If the EU’s policy towards the recipient state is clear, with specific rewards offered in response to reform, then it is more likely to be effective. Obviously, signs that the EU is willing to offer future membership increase the EU’s leverage over the non-accession state. However, the effectiveness of the EU in promoting reform is dependent not only on the EU’s policies, but also on the nature of the political and economic situation in the recipient state. When calculating the costs and benefits of complying with external demands for reform, elites consider a variety of factors including internal political struggles, their degree of economic dependency, and the position of public opinion. If their country is economically dependent on the EU and public opinion supports closer relations with the EU, then elites are willing to comply if it furthers their interests in internal political struggles.

EU PRESSURE: STRENGTH, CLARITY, & UNITY
The strength of EU pressure on a non-accession state is a function of the likelihood of future membership and the clarity of the EU’s position. The cases of Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia illustrate how the prospect of EU membership and the ac-
cession process can promote political and economic reform. The great benefit of EU membership is that ‘the incentive structure is set out in such a way that compliance is attractive and noncompliance visible and costly’ for elites (Ekiert, Kubik, and Vachudova, 2007: 23). However, in the case of non-accession countries, the prospects for membership in the EU are not certain. Therefore, the strength of EU pressure depends on the clarity of the EU’s position towards the state and offers of other rewards or sanctions in response to reform. The clarity of the EU’s position is a function of the unity of EU member states on membership for the neighboring state and their overall relations with that state. EU policy has to reflect consensus among the member states. When there is no consensus, EU policy is often deliberately vague. If there are no clear prospects of membership, even in the distant future, then it is more costly for domestic elites to comply with EU suggested reforms.

The EU pressure is also stronger if the EU offers specific rewards or sanctions tied to distinct political or economic reforms – for example, offering to change visa requirements for citizens visiting EU member states or considering a new trade agreement in response to improvements in human rights, democratic rule of law, or economic reforms. Specific policy changes offer stronger incentives than rhetoric from EU officials.

ELITE RECEPTIVITY

The effectiveness of EU pressure also depends on the nature of the domestic situation. As Peter Gourevitch argues, ‘external pressures do not translate themselves into policy automatically’ (Gourevitch, 2002: 314). Others have pointed out that external influences are only effective when they are ‘compatible with domestic conditions’ (Zaborowski, 2005: 29). However, what determines the compatibility has been undertheorized. Therefore, in order to understand when there is domestic compatibility with international pressure, we need to know more about how elites decide whether to comply with external demands for political change.

I argue that elite calculations about the costs and benefits of complying with EU determine the ‘domestic compatibility’ or elite receptivity. In postcommunist Europe, three common factors that have influenced these elite calculations are the usefulness of the EU as an ally in internal political battles, the country’s degree of economic dependency, and public opinion. The benefits of accepting international pressure are highest when three conditions are met: 1) elites can use the EU to strengthen the political and economic position of domestic allies; 2) the country is economically dependent on the external actor; 3) and public opinion supports the external actor.

ELITE DISUNITY: OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXTERNAL ALLIES

When there are strong elite divisions, each group involved in the struggle is looking to strengthen its position by finding allies, including possible international allies. As
the literature on two level games demonstrates, leaders may use international negotiations or agreements to restructure domestic interests (Evans, 1993: 416). Political elites may also utilize international organizations or other states to further their own interests in policy debates or political struggles.4 Therefore, elites in postcommunist Europe may draw upon the issue of EU membership to gain political support or adopt EU suggested reforms because they weaken their opponents and strengthen their domestic allies. When there are no divisions, and therefore fewer political battles, elites are primarily supporters of the status quo.5 Under these conditions, there is a lower likelihood of compliance with the EU because no elite factions will be seeking to use the EU to strengthen their position vis-à-vis their political rivals.

In order to measure inter-elite conflict, I build off Higley and Burton’s description of societies with intense inter-elite conflict: ‘mutual hatreds are regularly and publicly expressed ... conflicts and confrontations have a violent character’ (Higley and Burton, 2006: 13). Incorporating both the existence of violence and the role of rhetoric, I measure the degree of inter-elite conflict as a composite of three different factors: political violence, rhetoric, and political manipulation/illegal activities to weaken opponents. The combination of the frequency of political violence against opponents, the nature of rhetoric about opponents, and the use of illegal activities or widespread manipulation of the legal and/or political process to weaken opponents provides a systematic measure of inter-elite conflict.

ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY
The extent of economic dependency – reliance on the international economy for trade and investment – also influences elite calculations about compliance with international pressure. Elites are more likely to comply with international pressure when the target state is economically dependent on the external actor because the costs of lost trade and investment due to non-compliance are high. As Lisa Martin has shown, ‘one of the best indicators of potential success [of sanctions] is the economic and political conditions of the target state’ (Martin, 1992: 33). Elites in countries with substantial domestic economic resources are unlikely to feel sufficiently coerced by international pressure to change the regime. The elites of relatively small, poor states do not have significant internal economic resources and are dependent on regional powers, international organizations, or the United States for economic investment and trade. As Katzenstein argues, small states are more dependent on a wide range of imports than larger countries because they do not have the economies of scale necessary for all of the industries that are required for a functioning domestic economy (Katzenstein, 1985: 81). In addition, because they have small domestic markets, these states have to export products in order to achieve economies of scale. Therefore, the small countries, ‘because of their small size, are very de-
pendent on world markets’ (Katzenstein, 1985: 24). Although Katzenstein was writing about Western European states, his conclusions about the higher level of dependency of small states on the global economy describes the international economic position of other states throughout the world.

The degree of economic dependency is a function of the size and strength of the internal market of the recipient state, its reliance on trade for Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, and the availability of domestic financing (Levitsky and Way, 2006: 382). Economic dependency is a continuous, not dichotomous, variable. In the globalized economy, almost every state is on some level dependent on elements of the international economy. However, the degree of dependency varies from state to state. The greater the percentage of the recipient states’ GDP that is from exports, the greater the dependency of the state on international trade. The greater the amount of domestic credit that is available, the less dependence there is on the international economy. I use economic measures such as trade data, GDP, and the amount of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) along with economists’ assessments of the economic situation of the country to determine its degree of economic dependency.

DEGREE OF PUBLIC SUPPORT

The degree of public support for the external actor also affects elite calculations about compliance. If the public is favorably pre-disposed to the external actor and desire the ‘rewards’ it is offering, then this increases the benefits of complying as well as the costs of not complying for elites. Furthermore, under these circumstances, the public is more likely to believe international criticisms of its government and to advocate for compliance with external demands. Even in an illiberal democracy, negative public opinion can be costly for elites because these regimes still require some public support. In contrast, if public opinion is against the external actor (e.g. anti-American sentiment), this reduces the pressure on elites. Although public support for the external actor does not guarantee that the leadership will comply, it can influence the calculations of elites.

Public opinion surveys are the primary way in which I measure public opinion about the external actor. There is a good record of surveys of postcommunist states, providing data about public attitudes toward the EU throughout the region. I supplement this data by examining media reports and editorials. The combination of these measures presents a convincing report of public opinion in each country.

In conclusion, elite calculations about the costs/benefits of complying with the international pressure incorporate considerations about the rewards offered by the EU, the intensity of elite divisions, the economic dependency of the country, and public support for the EU. Although each is a separate independent variable, elites will be the most receptive when the rewards offered are clear and substantial, there
are divisions among the elite, the country is economically dependent, and the majority of the public has a positive opinion about the EU. Under these conditions, some elites will find it in their interest to comply with international pressure for political change. In addition, another external actor willing to offer assistance may reduce economic dependency on the EU or provide another source of aid for elites. Belarus and Ukraine both have important economic, cultural, and political ties with Russia, which, especially in the case of Belarus, has affected elite calculations about the EU (Vanderhill, 2007).

THE CASES: BELARUS AND UKRAINE

BELARUS: NONCOMPLIANCE WITH EU DEMANDS

After Belarus gained independence from the former Soviet Union in 1991, the country began to institute political and economic reforms. Acknowledging the start of reform, Freedom House ranked Belarus as partially free in 1993 (Freedom House, 1999: 102). However, since Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s election as president in 1994, political and economic reforms have ended. Today, Freedom House, in its *Freedom in the World Report*, ranks Belarus as neither free nor democratic. By the 2006 presidential elections, government security forces monitored cell phones, the internet, and instant messaging to prevent the opposition politicians from communicating with people (Kennicott, 2005: A14). Belarus is the most authoritarian regime in Europe today.

The EU has applied clear and significant pressure on Belarus to democratize. However, its efforts have so far been unsuccessful, as the continuation of authoritarian rule demonstrates. The primary reason for the ineffectiveness of EU pressure has been the lack of receptivity of the Belarusian elite to EU pressure. Fulfilling EU requirements to institute democracy is too costly for Belarusian elites and President Lukashenka, as it would probably result in them losing political and economic power. Furthermore, as Belarus is not severely economically dependent on the EU and public opinion about the EU is lukewarm, there is limited domestic pressure to improve relations with the EU. In addition, the Belarusian government has received significant financial and political support from Russia, reducing its need for trade or assistance from the EU.

EU PRESSURE

As the political situation in Belarus deteriorated and President Lukashenka intensified his authoritarian rule, the EU began to apply various forms of pressure on the Belarusian government to encourage democratization. As early as 1996, the EU expressed its concerns about the lack of democracy in Belarus by freezing negotiations on its Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and suspending technical assistance. More recently, in February 2004, the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe (PACE) released a report accusing high-ranking Belarusian
government officials of being complicit in the disappearances of important oppo-
sition leaders between 1999 and 2000 (Human Rights Watch, 2005). In response
to the PACE report, the EU banned the Belarusian officials named in it from traveling
into EU countries. In January 2006, the EU gave a two-year contract to a German
broadcaster to transmit news into Belarus, hoping to provide an alternative
source of information (Myers, 2006: 48). Over the last few years, the EU has re-
peatedly condemned the Lukashenka regime and demonstrated support for the
opposition political parties.

The EU has presented its position clearly and consistently to the Belarusian
government. Moreover, the EU has demanded the implementation of specific demo-
kratic reforms before it will consider inviting Belarus to participate in its European
Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The ENP is an attempt by the EU to establish stronger
relations with neighboring states outside of the membership application process.
The ENP is supposed to build ‘privileged relationships’ based on agreed commit-
ments to democracy, human rights, rule of law, and a market economy (European
Neighbourhood Policy). According to the message from EU Commissioner Benita
Ferrero-Waldner in November 2006, the Belarusian government needs to fulfill the
following requirements, among others, before the EU will deepen its relations with
Belarus and have it participate in the ENP:

• ‘respect the right of people of Belarus to elect their leaders democratically...
• respect the right of the people of Belarus to independent information, and to
express themselves freely. . .
• respect the rights of non-governmental organisations as a vital part of a healthy
democracy—by no longer hindering their legal existence, harassing and pros-
ecuting members of NGOs, and allowing them to receive international assis-
tance;
• release all political prisoners—members of democratic opposition parties,
members of NGOs, and ordinary citizens arrested at peaceful demonstrations
or meetings’ (European Commission, 2006).

Along with requiring specific changes to build democracy in Belarus, EU officials
regularly criticize the undemocratic actions of the Belarusian government. For ex-
ample, in October 2007, the Chairman of the EU Delegation for Relations with Be-
larus, Bogdan Klich, called on Belarusian authorities to stop the detention, intimi-
dation, and harassment of peaceful demonstrators calling for closer relations
with Europe (European Parliament, 2007b). The EU has also used economic tools to
pressure the Belarusian government to change policies, such as when the EU in-
creased import duties on Belarusian goods to protest the repression of independent
trade unions (Belapan, 2007). Therefore, the reforms and changes Belarus needs to implement before improving relations with the EU are clear.

In terms of the rewards the EU is offering, the situation is more mixed. The EU has not specifically proposed membership as a possibility, even if Belarus democratizes. The authoritarian nature of the Belarusian government has allowed the EU to avoid making any long-term decisions about Belarus, especially regarding membership (Zagorski, 2004: 92). However, on the condition that the Belarusian government would comply with EU requirements and implement democratic reforms, the EU has offered to ease visa requirements for Belarusian citizens, support the development of Belarusian businesses, simplify border crossing procedures, offer more scholarships to Belarusian students to study in EU universities, and improve access for Belarusian products in the EU market (European Commission, 2006). Although this was not an offer of membership, the EU has offered improved and closer relations if Belarus democratizes.

The EU member states are unified in their condemnation of the violations of democracy in Belarus; however, there are some disagreements among member states on how to deal with Belarus and about the prospects for Belarusian membership. Lithuania and Poland, both sharing borders with Belarus, seek a more active and positive engagement with it (Zagorski, 2004: 92). Poland, fearing that EU policies are isolating Belarus and not assisting the opposition movement, desires to have the EU establish stronger ties with national, regional, and local authorities in Belarus (Idu, 2005: 192). Poland is also more supportive of Belarus joining the EU than other EU member states. However, the current authoritarian nature of Belarus allows the EU to currently avoid the more controversial question of membership and maintain a more unified policy of criticizing authoritarian policies and encouraging democracy. The EU will remove its current sanctions and offer increased economic and political ties only when the Belarusian government adopts specific democratic reforms. The EU policy towards Belarus is therefore relatively clear, consistent, and strong.

BELARUSIAN RECEPTIVITY TO EU PRESSURE
The extent of political violence and manipulation of the political process in Belarus indicates a high level of inter-elite conflict. There are multiple cases of political violence in Belarus. One of the most serious and well-known instances of the violence is, as mentioned earlier, the 1999–2000 ‘disappearances’ and likely murders of the opposition leaders Yury Zakharenko, Viktor Gonchar and Anatoly Krasovsky. In addition, there has been frequent political violence during election campaigns in Belarus. For example, in the 2004 referendum campaign, which was to change the constitution to allow Lukashenka to serve indefinitely, the OSCE reported police raids on campaign offices, detentions of campaign workers, and forced participation in the election (OSCE Final Report, 2004).
The repression of opposition politicians and independent voices has increased over the last few years. After the fraudulent 2006 presidential elections, the government jailed Alexander Milinkevich and other opposition leaders to prevent a continuation of anti-government protests. Security forces have arrested people for holding candles in public, participating in a silent protest commemorating the ‘disappearances’, and discussing the country abroad (an illegal action) (The Economist, 2006: 26). Along with violence and harassment, the government has also manipulated the law to restrict the opposition. Most notoriously, Lukashenka rigged the 2004 referendum. The Central Election Commission reported that 79.4 percent of all voters supported Lukashenka’s referendum to amend the constitution (Maksymiuk and Drakakhrust, 2004). However, an independent poll conducted by Gallup/Baltic Surveys found that only 48.7 percent had voted yes, which was below the required 50 percent needed to change the constitution (Maksymiuk and Drakakhrust, 2004). The rhetoric of President Lukashenka further demonstrates his hostility towards the opposition. Lukashenka alleges that the opposition supports terrorism and is plotting a coup (The Economist, 2006: 26). He regularly refers to political opponents as ‘thugs’ and describes them as mercenaries of the West (Maksymiuk, 2006). Lukashenka and his government have little tolerance for opponents; it is ‘politics as war’ in Belarus. The violence against opposition officials, the repression of independent views, the political manipulation of the election process, and Lukashenka’s rhetoric all illustrate the inter-elite conflict in Belarus.

Despite the level of inter-elite conflict, the Belarusian elite are ‘unreceptive’ to pressure from the EU. In Belarus, the majority of the elite are ‘hard-liners’ who support the authoritarian regime of Lukashenka. Unlike Ukraine and the Central European states, Belarus did not actively seek independence and experienced little domestic pressure to institute a capitalist economy or democracy. Belarus’ history, including the destruction of WWII and the ‘Russification’ and ‘Sovietization’ activities of the Soviet Union, resulted in a low level of nationalism in the 1990s (Mihalisko, 1997). The weak levels of nationalism combined with the relative economic prosperity of the Soviet years produced low levels of support for independence, a desire for reintegration into Russia, and nostalgia for the Communist regime in Belarus. Therefore, when Viacheslau Kebich, the leader of the first government of Belarus, followed a policy of reintegration with Russia to provide economic subsidies, instead of liberalizing in response to the economic crisis, most Belarusians supported his policy choice. Belarus has moved away from a command economy but still has a highly centralized, bureaucratic economy with a small, weak private sector. When Lukashenka took over the leadership of Belarus, he did not change the basic economic policy and orientation of the country. Instead, he intensified ties with Russia and ended privatization. Most political elites in Belarus support the policies of the Lukashenka government, especially the lack
of economic reform, because they benefit from the continuation of a centralized economy.

Therefore, Belarusian elites have little economic incentive to agree to EU reforms. The majority of the elite benefit from the current centralized economy and undemocratic system. Furthermore, substantial aid from Russia has reduced domestic pressure for reform and contributed to the ‘unreceptiveness’ of Belarusian elites. Until recently, Russian subsidies to Belarus were approximately $1–2 billion per year, and Russia provided Belarus with natural gas and oil at below market prices (Rontoyanni, 2005: 130). Given the domestic situation, the incentives offered by the EU and the support from Russia, the costs of complying with international demands to democratize are too high and the benefits too low for the regime supporters in Belarus. Lukashenka forfeited any potential benefits from developing closer relations with the EU, preferring ‘what he perceived to be more lucrative Russian benefits at less political risk’ (Hancock, 2006: 122). Furthermore, as most elites owe their position to Lukashenka, they are less likely to advocate his overthrow, as it would most likely also mean their removal from power. Outside of the small pro-democratic opposition, the Belarusian elite do not seek a closer relationship with the EU, thereby limiting the influence the EU has on Belarus. The lack of a strong economic relationship with the EU and weak domestic support for the EU further reduce the incentives for complying with EU suggested political and economic reforms.

Compared to other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Belarus has had limited trade and investment relations with Western Europe. For example, in 1996, per capita direct investment in Belarus was two dollars; in contrast, it was sixty dollars in Poland and one hundred and seventeen dollars in the Czech Republic (Zlotnikov, 2002: 145). The climate for foreign investment in Belarus was unfavorable in 1996 and has only worsened since then. Annual FDI in Belarus is the lowest in the region because with a centrally controlled economy, there is little to attract Western firms (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002). Belarusian trade with EU countries is relatively low. In 2003, trade with the EU was only 19 percent of all of Belarus’ trade (Shimov, 2005: 14). Belarus is more dependent on its economic relations with Russia than on trade with the EU. Russia accounts for almost half of all Belarusian exports, and the Commonwealth of Independent States accounts for almost half of all Belarusian trade, imports and exports (Shimov, 2005: 14, 17). Furthermore, the integration of Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia into the EU has harmed Belarusian trade with Europe because as members of the EU, they had to raise import duties on Belarusian goods. The limited economic relations between Belarus and the EU reduce the EU’s leverage over Belarus and reduce incentives for Belarusian elites to comply with EU mandated political reforms.

Public support for closer relations with the EU is relatively weak in Belarus. Public opinion polling from 2001 found that only 21.5 percent of the Belarusians polled believed that EU membership was the preferred future for Belarus (Zaiko, 2003:.
In contrast, 37.2 percent of those polled support a union with Russia (Zaiko, 2003: 106). In general, Belarusians are uninformed about the EU, compared to their Central European neighbors (Löwenhardt, 2005: 151). When asked about their views on the EU, the largest response category was no answer (40.6 percent) (Löwenhardt, 2005: 150). In addition, there is a tendency among the Belarusian elite, even those who are not Lukashenka supporters, to blame the West and the EU for ignoring and isolating Belarus. In focus group discussions, Belarusian elites argued that European institutions needed to end their ‘double standards’ and provide help to Belarus to reform and that ‘Western countries gave Belarus away to Russia’ (Löwenhardt, 2005: 155).

The lack of strong public support for closer relations with the EU reduces the costs to elites of ignoring EU suggested reforms and thereby reduces EU leverage over Belarus.

Clearly, pro-democratic norms from the EU have failed to produce political reform in Belarus. Was the failure of the EU caused by Belarusian post-Soviet culture or the acceptance of alternative, authoritarian norms from Russia? The existence of pro-democracy movements in Belarus suggests that democracy is potentially compatible with Belarusian identity and culture. Furthermore, the focus on culture as an explanation cannot fully explain why Ukraine, with its relatively similar historical, cultural, and linguistic background, is more receptive to EU pressure than Belarus. Lukashenka’s relationship with Russia over the past several years challenges any ideas of international socialization from Russia. Lukashenka has repeatedly refused to agree to the Russian demands, including rejecting a common currency (Hancock, 2006: 128). Lukashenka’s behavior reflects calculations of costs and benefits, not normative influence from Russia.

In conclusion, although the EU has applied pressure on the Belarusian government to reform, its efforts have been ineffective because of the domestic political and economic situation and the financial, political, and economic support from Russia for the authoritarian government of Lukashenka. Outside of the few democratic opposition leaders, the Belarusian elite, dependent on Lukashenka for their positions, have little incentive to adopt democratic and pro-market economic reforms. It is unlikely that the EU will be successful in promoting substantial political and economic reform in Belarus, even if it offers the substantial reward of membership, until the domestic political situation changes or Russia ends its support.

UKRAINE: WEAK EU PRESSURE AND RECEPTIVE ELITES

Although Ukraine has struggled with political and economic reforms since gaining independence, unlike Belarus, the country never became an authoritarian state. At the time of the 2004 presidential elections, Freedom House ranked Ukraine as partly free, with scores ranging from 3.75 to 5.75 on most measures of democracy (Freedom House, 2004). After the mass public protests against the election fraud that
led to new presidential elections and the victory of Victor Yushchenko (the Orange Revolution), Ukraine, despite continuing problems, has become more democratic. In the areas of electoral process, civil society, and independence of the media, Freedom House significantly improved Ukraine’s rating from 2004 to 2006. Therefore, most observers see the events of the Orange Revolution as an important step in the development of Ukrainian democracy.

Since the Orange Revolution, Ukraine has sought closer relations with the EU, and top government officials have repeatedly expressed interest in EU membership. However, the EU has refrained from making any commitments regarding Ukrainian membership. The EU’s policy towards Ukraine has been vague and unclear, reflecting disagreements among EU member states. Despite the weakness of EU pressure on Ukraine, Ukrainian leaders have taken steps to improve relations with the EU and to demonstrate their commitment to achieving EU membership. Therefore, the EU’s modest influence on Ukraine is primarily due to the receptivity of some Ukrainian elites to the EU.

EU PRESSURE
In the years after independence and before the Orange Revolution, the EU had limited influence on the political and economic situation in Ukraine. Although the EU was the largest international donor in Ukraine, the majority of the money was for technical assistance and environmental protection dealing with the consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear accident (Idu, 2005: 182). This assistance was not contingent on fulfilling democratic norms. The EU signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Ukraine in the mid-1990s. However, the PCA ‘failed to provide any stronger incentive or rationale’ for Ukraine to further economic and political reforms, and therefore the EU was unable to persuade the Ukrainian government to adopt significant reforms (Zagorski, 2004: 83).

Prior to the 2004 presidential elections, the EU increased its pressure on Ukraine to democratize. The ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Germany to Ukraine, Dietmar Stuedemann, emphasized the importance of ‘the freedom of speech, free mass media and protection of human rights’ for achieving eventual membership in the EU (Holos Ukrayiny, 2001). Furthermore, he stated that if Ukraine fails to adopt political and economic reforms, it ‘will lose certain opportunities and prospects regarding its partnership with the European Union’ (Holos Ukrayiny, 2001).

Furthermore, as the events of the Orange Revolution unfolded, the EU, under the leadership of Poland, directly intervened in the crisis to help facilitate a peaceful resolution. The visit by Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski and EU’s foreign policy chief Javier Solana to Ukraine on 24 and 25 November helped end the crisis. Kwasniewski’s and Solana’s early presence in Kiev ‘provided the protestors with le-
RACHEL VANDERHILL

gitimacy and time, which were both vital ingredients in giving their action bite’ (Wilson, 2005: 138). At the first meeting with President Leonid Kuchma and the candidates Victor Yanukovych and Victor Yushchenko, the EU delegation achieved an agreement from all sides to oppose the use of force, helping to prevent the use of force during the Orange Revolution (Sushko and Prystayko, 2006: 140). Andrew Wilson concludes that the EU intervention was effective in negotiating a resolution to the crisis in Ukraine ‘because it occurred at an early stage, because it was unexpected, and because the Poles led a consensus that, with America’s support, even spanned the Atlantic’ (Wilson, 2005: 140).

Since the election of Victor Yushchenko as President of Ukraine, there have been positive developments in EU-Ukrainian relations. In 2005, the EU granted Ukraine market economy status, improving its access to the EU market. Ukraine and the EU also reached agreement on simplifying the visa regime between the two, making it easier for Ukrainians to travel to EU countries. The Ukraine-EU Action Plan, part of the European Neighborhood Policy, calls upon Ukraine to consolidate democracy, strengthen the rule of law, and protect human rights. The EU’s continued attention to encouraging democracy in Ukraine is apparent in its public statements during the 2007 Ukrainian political crisis. EU officials linked continued negotiations with Ukraine to the Ukrainian government upholding the rule of law (European Parliament, 2007a). As an indirect reward for Ukraine’s political and economic reforms, the EU supported Ukraine’s membership in the World Trade Organization and opened negotiations on establishing a free trade area with Ukraine. If successful, a free trade agreement would lower the costs of EU imports for Ukrainians and offer better access to the EU market (Kyiv Post, 2008).

Despite these positive developments, the EU could be more effective in promoting reform in Ukraine if it used its most powerful foreign policy tool, potential membership. As early as 1996, Ukraine announced its desire for membership in the EU. However, the EU has been reluctant to discuss, or provide any commitment to, an eventual membership for Ukraine (Zagorski, 2004: 88–89). The unwillingness of the EU to commit to future membership reflects the disagreements within the EU over this question. Poland is a vocal supporter of potential membership for Ukraine, but other states, such as France, are currently against Ukrainian membership (Siruk, 2008; The Day, 2007). Therefore, the EU’s official strategy on Ukraine ‘acknowledges Ukraine’s European aspirations and welcomes Ukraine’s pro-European choice’ but does not commit itself to membership for Ukraine (European Commission, 1999). It is a policy of ‘positive ambiguity’ (Zagorski, 2004: 89).

UKRAINIAN ELITE RECEPTIVITY

Although the EU pressure has been relatively weak, at least some of the Ukrainian elite have been ‘receptive’ to the EU. Fractions of the political and economic elite in
Ukraine see EU membership as being in their interests. The costs of instituting the necessary reforms are less than the benefits of better relations with the EU. President Victor Yushchenko and his allies have used the issue of EU membership to strengthen their position vis-à-vis opponents. Furthermore, the growing economic ties with the EU and modest public support for closer relations with the EU provide additional incentives to support closer relations with the EU, even if it requires implementing costly political and/or economic reforms.

Ukraine has experienced inter-elite divisions over the issue of the regime type and the foreign policy alignment of Ukraine. By the time of the 2004 Presidential elections, Ukraine’s elites were divided between the oligarchs connected to President Kuchma and the pro-democratic opposition consisting of Our Ukraine, which was led by Yushchenko, the socialists, and some nationalist-democrats. The widespread existence of political violence, electoral fraud, and hostile rhetoric are all examples of the high level of inter-elite conflict in Ukraine at the time of the 2004 presidential elections.

The most infamous cases of political violence in Ukraine are the Gongadze murder and the dioxin poisoning of Yushchenko. Hryhorii Gongadze, the editor of an independent news website, had published several articles that were very critical of Kuchma and his allies. Two months after disappearing in September 2000, Gongadze was found dead. Shortly after this, leaked audio tapes documented Kuchma telling the interior minister to kidnap Gongadze and to ‘drive him out, throw [him] out, give him to the Chechens’ (Wilson, 2005: 53). Despite the best efforts of Kuchma to prevent a real investigation into the matter, investigators did discover that it was most likely two men from the interior ministry, working under orders from its director (and probably Kuchma), that had killed Gongadze.

During the 2004 presidential campaign, there were multiple cases of violent attacks on pro-opposition supporters. However, the most serious act of violence was the attempt to injure or even kill Yushchenko by poisoning him with dioxin in September 2004 (Wilson, 2005: 96). The poison almost killed Yushchenko and left him severely disfigured. The decision of one faction to murder the leader of the other faction demonstrates the intense level of inter-elite conflict in Ukraine.

Along with the use of violence, the regime hard-liners manipulated the election, resorting to outright fraud when media control and patronage failed to guarantee a Yanukovych victory. The National Democratic Institute’s (NDI) report on the elections stated that there were ‘fundamental flaws in Ukraine’s presidential election process’ due to blatant fraud, suspiciously high incidences of voting by mobile ballot boxes (allowing for ballot stuffing), and the ‘disenfranchisement of significant numbers of voters due to their names being omitted from the voter lists’ (NDI, 2004). In addition, a secret Yanukovych team, through bribing election officials, had access to the Central Election Commission’s database and could alter the results electron-
RACHEL VANDERHILL

cally (Wilson, 2005: 106). On election night in November, they used this access to add a million votes after the polls closed (Wilson, 2005: 1). Almost all of these added ‘votes’ went to Yanukovych.

The rhetoric during the campaign also reflected the animosity between the two factions. The state-controlled media, while always presenting Yanukovych in a positive light, regularly called Yushchenko a radical nationalist. Yanukovych campaign ads renamed Yushchenko ‘Bushchenko’ (Bush + Yushchenko = Bushchenko), saying that he was a ‘project of America’ (Wilson, 2005: 95). The Yushchenko campaign heavily emphasized Yanukovych’s criminal record from thirty years ago. The political violence, blatant election fraud, and hostile rhetoric all reflect the high intensity of the inter-elite conflict in Ukraine.

The intensity of the divisions among elites meant that each faction was seeking allies. Therefore, it was in the interest of Yushchenko to use the EU and Ukraine’s possible membership in the EU as a way to strengthen his position against Yanukovych. In the 2004 presidential election campaign, Yushchenko stated that if he won the presidential election, relations with Europe would become ‘the alpha and omega’ of his government’s foreign policy (UNIAN News Agency, 2004). Yushchenko also argued that it was in Ukraine’s interest to become a member of the EU because integration with the EU would support tens of millions of Ukrainian jobs (Novyy Kanal Television, 2004). In contrast, Yanukovych received financial and political support from Russia, including an estimated $300 million for campaigning and election fraud (Petrov and Ryabov, 2006: 153). Since gaining the presidency, Yushchenko has continued to use his support of EU membership to distinguish himself from his opponents and to demonstrate his commitment to democracy in Ukraine (Wilson, 2005: 190). Furthermore, Yushchenko has advocated for closer relations with the EU because it has resonated with those likely to support him, the pro-EU Ukrainian constituency in western and central Ukraine.

In recent years, the EU has become an important market for Ukraine. By 2004, Ukraine’s trade with the EU was 25 percent of its total trade, and if the ten new EU countries are taken into account, then the trade with the EU increased to 35.8 percent (Grytsenko and Sidenko, 2003: 24). In contrast to Belarus’ trade dependency on Russia, after the enlargement of the EU in May 2004, the EU became the largest export market for Ukraine (Grytsenko and Sidenko, 2003: 9). Further expansion into the EU market would help Ukrainian businesses. At the time of the 2004 election, it was clear that there was a higher likelihood of improved relations with the EU if Yushchenko became president. Furthermore, given his record of economic reform, with Yushchenko as president, there was an increased probability that Ukraine would achieve the status of a market economy, limiting the ability of the EU to impose quotas and tariffs. In 2004, the EU still considered Ukraine a non-market economy, which was a significant disadvantage for Ukrainian businesses because it allowed the EU
to institute trade barriers. For example, in 2003 the EU imposed substantial tariffs on goods from key economic sectors in Ukraine, such as fisheries, agriculture, and the metallurgical industry (Grytsenko and Sidenko, 2003: 6). The EU’s willingness to label Ukraine a market economy in 2005, to support its membership in the WTO, and to adopt new agreements on trade in steel and textiles with it, proves that the election of Yushchenko has benefited those with pro-EU economic interests. The growing importance of the EU as an economic partner has increased the EU’s leverage over Ukraine.

However, Ukrainian public support for EU membership remains modest. A 2004 survey found that only 28 percent of Ukrainians thought that relations with the EU were a priority (‘Ukraine’s Future and U.S. Interests’, 2004). In addition, only one third of Ukrainians consider themselves to be more or less European (Zerkalo Nedeli, 2005). Ukrainian elites are not under significant public pressure to pursue EU membership.

In conclusion, EU policy towards Ukraine has been deliberately vague, trying to both support reform and avoid any commitment to eventual Ukrainian EU membership. EU member states disagree over the prospects of membership for Ukraine, thereby weakening their policy towards it. The modest success that the EU has had in encouraging democracy in Ukraine, especially during the Orange Revolution, occurred primarily because President Yushchenko and other elites are eager to pursue closer relations with the EU. Policy towards the EU, especially supporting membership, has been useful in inter-elite struggles. Furthermore, the growing importance of the EU as an economic partner increases the EU’s leverage and the incentives for furthering pro-EU reforms. Although Russia also had leverage over Ukraine, especially through its control of natural gas and oil, it was unable to guarantee the victory of Yanukovych in 2004, demonstrating the importance of elite receptivity to external pressure. As the EU’s pressure on Ukraine has been relatively weak, it is hard to say whether any of the recent progress on democratization and economic reform is the result of EU action. Unless the EU offers membership to Ukraine, its influence may be indirect at best. However, as long as significant numbers of Ukrainian elites desire EU membership and believe that it is possible to achieve, the EU has the opportunity to positively encourage reform in Ukraine.

CONCLUSION

The contrasting cases of Belarus and Ukraine suggest that domestic conditions are very important for predicting when the EU will be most effective in encouraging reform. In the case of Belarus, the EU pressure was stronger, but it has also been ineffective. The current political and economic situation in Belarus, along with Russian influence, makes Belarusian elites ‘unreceptive’ to EU pressure to democratize. The EU is unlikely to have any influence until there are significant internal changes or
Russia ends its support to Lukashenka. However, in the case of Ukraine, the EU pressure is weaker, but there has been greater progress on reforms, although the evidence is too preliminary to say how much of that is due to the efforts of the EU. The cases also suggest that inter-elite conflict and the level of economic dependency have the greatest effect on elite calculations about complying with the EU. Public opinion, being relatively weak in both cases, does not appear to explain the variation between elite responses to the EU in Belarus and Ukraine. Although the domestic situation remains critical for explaining the effectiveness of the EU, the nature of EU policy is also important. The inability or unwillingness of the EU to consider membership for Ukraine significantly reduces its effect on the domestic political and economic situation. If membership were a serious offer, then the EU would be in a better position to influence the Ukrainian reform process.

Comparing Belarus and Ukraine also raises questions about the ability of normative-based approaches to explain each country’s response to EU pressure. Considering the possibilities of the diffusion, it is clear that the existence of pro-democracy norms in Europe has not led to democracy in Belarus. As noted above, Lukashenka’s behavior, especially his relationship with Russia, reflects self-interest more than an adoption of anti-democratic norms from Russia. In Ukraine, it is possible that ideas about democracy from the EU influenced the leaders of the Orange Revolution, such as Yushchenko and Julia Tymoshenko. However, the willingness of Tymoshenko to ally with Yanukovych for political gain also suggests that self-interest, as opposed to the adoption of democratic norms, is the best explanation for Ukrainian elites’ behavior. It is also unlikely that international socialization explains Yushchenko’s pro-EU position. Yushchenko advocated for democracy and EU membership prior to any significant EU pressure or the possibility of membership. Furthermore, the divergent responses of Ukraine and Belarus to Russian pressure challenge the idea of a common Slavic identity explaining Belarus’ receptivity to Russian influence and resistance to EU pressure. An incentive-based argument explains Belarusian and Ukrainian elite responses to the EU better than normative arguments.

ENDNOTES

1 For example, see Pevehouse, 2005: 199.
2 Arguments about economic sanctions consider why states use economic sanctions, the effectiveness of sanctions, and international cooperation on sanctions. See Baldwin, 1985; Martin, 1992.
3 Adam Przeworski makes a similar argument: ‘I am not claiming that normative commitments to democracy are infrequent or irrelevant, only that they are not necessary to understand the way democracy works’ (Przeworski, 1991: 24).
4 Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, Jr. discuss how political elites use international norms to further their interests. (Cortell and Davis, 1996) Jon Pevehouse investigates how elites will use membership in international organizations to strengthen their domestic position. (Pevehouse, 2005)
O’Donnell and Schmitter discuss the role of divisions between hard-liners and soft-liners and believe that this division is necessary for there to be regime change. (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 16)

On a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 being the lowest level of democratic development, Belarus received a 7 on political rights and a 6 on civil liberties. (Freedom House, 2006a)

In 2006 Freedom House ranked Ukraine as Free, and its ranking of Ukraine’s electoral process moved from 4.25 to 3.25 (lower numbers represent a more democratic process), that of its civil society moved from 3.75 to 2.75, and that of the independence of its media moved from 5.5 to 3.75. (Freedom House, 2006b)

Despite the President’s rhetoric in support of EU membership, there have been problems with the Ukrainian implementation of EU related policies. Along with the multiple political crises distracting the government from focusing on reform, the administration has been unable to follow through on agreed policies.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


The Transplantation and Adaptation Types of Political Integration: The Case of the German Unification in Parallel with the Eastern Enlargement of the EU

TEREZA NOVOTNA

Abstract: The article argues that the German unification and the Eastern enlargement of the EU match with two types of democratization through common polity building that occurred after 1989 – the Transplantation and the Adaptation Type of Integration. The Transplantation exemplar stands for an immediate integration with no preconditions and no preceding reforms on either part but, instead, employing a simple transfer principle and economic backing of the ‘accepting’ entity. The Adaptation Type is a model for the opposite process – a gradual, long-term integration through ‘political conditionality’ until the candidate states reach a political and economic level comparable to the level of the accepting unit. Since both of these ways towards integration are diverse, case studies of the actual processes, the German unification and the Eastern enlargement differ in their results as well. While the Eastern enlargement is successful in terms of economics and political stabilization in the new EU member states that are, however, skeptical towards any deepening of European integration, the unified Germany suffers from economic difficulties and, in the Eastern parts, from the rise of political discontent with the unification and post-communist nostalgia. The author elaborates on how such diverging outcomes came about and what the driving forces behind both of the processes were. To illustrate the Eastern enlargement, the author alludes particularly to the Czech Republic and its accession to the EU.

Key words: the European Union, enlargement, the Czech Republic, unification of Germany, East Germany

INTRODUCTION
When the communist regimes collapsed during 1989, a new era for Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) began. The CEE countries soon launched their economic trans-
formations and transitions from totalitarian to liberal political systems. The ‘return to Europe’, or a renewed inclusion within the democratic European community, was one of the CEE countries’ major foreign policy objectives; it was completed by the eastern enlargement of the European Union (EU) in 2004/2007. However, the ‘miraculous year’ 1989 brought about another extraordinary development – the unification of Germany. In contrast to the CEE countries’ experience, the unification process lasted less than one year, culminating with East Germany’s ‘accession’ to the West German state in October 1990. Whereas in CEE, the overall effects of the enlargement can be judged to be at least satisfying, in Germany the results are more mixed.

The article compares and contrasts two case studies of parallel developments in the post-communist areas from 1989 up to the present: the democratization of the former GDR through its integration into West Germany and the democratization of the CEE countries by building a common polity with their West European neighbors. The puzzle is why the conditions in East Germany, which were initially more advantageous than those in the CEE countries, did not produce more favourable outcomes. The paper seeks to clarify the nature and dynamics of both of the common polity building processes and will investigate the question of why we can observe such divergent outcomes and whether or not we might expect a convergence in some areas. To illustrate the Eastern enlargement, the author alludes particularly to the Czech Republic and its accession to the EU.

After summarizing the current scholarly literature and outlining a theory of two types of integration in three opening sections, the fourth section proceeds to examine how both of the integrations came about and how they were legally carried out. It elaborates on the changes that either did or did not take place, firstly, in both parts of Germany during and after the unification and, secondly, in the CEE countries and EU before the Eastern enlargement. The last chapter focuses on the results and negative consequences of the German unification for the Eastern Länder and compares and contrasts them with the situation in the CEE countries.

LITERATURE OVERVIEW
HISTORICAL LITERATURE

The current literature on the problems of post-communist Central Eastern Europe usually excludes the former GDR from its research; developments in the Eastern parts of Germany are generally examined separately from issues troubling the CEE countries. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the resulting collapse of communist regimes in East Germany and other parts of the Soviet bloc are most frequently described from a historical perspective. In the English language literature, Rupnik (1989) and Kenney (2002) look at all the democratic revolutions in the formerly communist areas and see the demise of the GDR in the context of East European history. Their
analyses, however, end with the conclusion of the first phases of the transition to democracy. Maier’s *Dissolution* (1997) intends to present a ‘synthetic history’ of the decline and fall of the East German state. Even though the book draws on recently available archival documents, it is concerned, as the title suggests, with the collapse of the East German communist regime rather than with the subsequent unification process and its consequences. Overall, the historical literature on the CEE political transformations usually elaborates on the peaceful revolutions as episodes concluded in the early 1990s and comments only a little bit on the further post-communist years. Furthermore, historians typically do not include the impact of the EU on the CEE countries’ transformations. The ‘German’ literature, on the other hand, almost exclusively explores German history and politics with few, if any, references to other formerly communist CEE countries. Thus, the historical literature in general fails to link the related challenges that both regions were facing and continue to face even today.

**POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY LITERATURE**

Comparative politics pays a great deal of attention to theoretical questions of transition from totalitarian rule to democracy in the CEE countries. The ‘transitology’ literature mostly delves into various forms of the political (Huntington, 1993; Linz and Stepan, 1996) and economic transformation (Przeworski, 1991), inquires as to what was the strategy between prior and incoming rulers (Karl and Schmitter, 1991), and eventually sorts out the CEE countries into numerous categories according to the type of transition process (Karl and Schmitter, 1991). Even though the ‘transitologists’ view the initial democratization as involving related courses of action in the former GDR and in the post-communist CEE, they avoid speaking about the later phases of democratization in the new Bundesländer after their unification with the ‘old’ West German Bundesländer.

The political science studies on the German political system are overwhelmingly centred on West Germany. The sources for the recent German political and economic malaise are explained in reference to a broader crisis of the German economic model (Green and Paterson, 2005), federal structures (Padgett et al., 2003), and the impact of international developments on Germany’s role in the world. Other scholars (Kitschelt and Streeck, 2003; Jeffery and Paterson, 2003) suggest that these problems are not entirely ‘German’; rather, they have more to do with issues that trouble all Western-type democracies. These arguments, however, consider only the situation in the western parts of Germany (and of Europe). In this case, the specifically ‘Eastern’ issues are neglected, and therefore, the final explication omits a significant component. The exception to this rule is Jacoby’s (2000) comparison of the effective British and American policy transfers into West Germany during the post-
World War II reconstruction period with the less effective West German policy transfers to East Germany during the unification. Jacoby explains that in the latter case, West German policymakers used ‘exact’ rather than ‘functional imitation’ and ignored regional interests when redesigning East German society. In a certain sense, this article arrives at similar conclusions regarding the unification of Germany. Although Jacoby (2004) extends his theory of imitation to a comparison of the NATO and EU enlargement in his second book, no explicit contrasts with the GDR were made.

As in the discipline of history, the political science literature on CEE leaves out discussions of the post-communist politics in the new German Bundesländer. Political scientists and sociologists often look into individual CEE states like, for example, Dunne (2004) on the Polish case and Deegan-Krause (2006) on the Czech/Slovak Republics. The political science literature also compares economic and political competition in several CEE countries. Seleny (2006) studies economic transformation in Hungary and Poland, and Grzymala-Busse (2002) contrasts the post-communist parties of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech/Slovak Republics. Other groups of authors bring together contributions on various aspects of politics across the CEE region into edited volumes (e.g. Mair and Zielonka, 2002). In all these books, however, the comparative case of the former East Germany is missing. The single exception is Howard’s work (2003) on weaknesses of post-communist civil societies; he nevertheless addresses the former GDR and Russia. Russia cannot be well incorporated into the CEE group due to its political and economic underperformance; rather, it forms a distinct category of post-communist societies.

**LITERATURE ON THE EASTERN ENLARGEMENT OF THE EU**

Even though the CEE states have been members of the EU since May 2004, the literature assessing the influence of the external actors, such as the EU, on the form of democratization in the post-communist states remains insufficient. Linden’s *Norms and Nannies* (2002) looks for mechanisms by which international, mostly European, organizations disseminate their norms through their ‘teaching’ and ‘nursing’ activities (hence, international organizations are viewed as ‘nannies’). The book places the research results in a broader context of ‘international socialization’; it does not single out the EU accession process as a special form of political integration that had the most profound effect on the CEE countries’ polities, politics, and policies. On the other hand, the authors represented in the volume edited by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) investigate the Europeanization of CEE as a unique political integration process. Their research pertains mainly to public policy areas, such as health care, banking, and agriculture, though it spans across the entire CEE region rather than touching only on the individual CEE countries. Vachudova’s *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration After Communism*
(2005) is the only exception among the recent scholarly literature in that it combines a study on democratization with a thorough analysis of the EU accession process. Firstly, she argues that from 1989 to 1994, the EU exerted a ‘passive leverage’ merely by virtue of its existence and ‘attractiveness’ and had only a negligible impact on the political changes in CEE. In the second period, however, from 1994 until the CEE countries’ entry into the EU in 2004, the EU used its ‘active leverage’ as a deliberate set of policies toward candidate states. The largest impact of the EU’s ‘active leverage’ can be observed in illiberal states (Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia), where the EU helped create a more competitive environment and encouraged opposition and civil society groups. This led to their eventual domestic changes towards liberal democracy.

Vachudova’s notion of the EU’s active leverage is so far the best tool for analyzing the Eastern enlargement and its impact on the CEE countries’ democratization and institutional change. In her view, as in those of most of the other works, local actors in CEE are seen as more or less reacting to pressure by actors and policies produced at the European level. It is without a doubt that there has been a power asymmetry between candidate states and European political actors. Nevertheless, this article argues that the EU has never attempted to directly alter CEE countries’ institutions or to export its own ‘EU personnel’ into the CEE’s major political, economic, cultural, etc. posts; there has always been room for self-reform in CEE. This fact would have been clearer if the recent scholarly literature had considered the German unification as an alternative mode of political integration after 1989. This article, therefore, seeks to fill the gap in academic literature by providing a thorough comparative research of German unification and EU enlargement.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK I: TWO CONCEPTS OF INTEGRATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AFTER 1989

The success or failure of the transition to democracy can be measured, among other ways, by the progress towards EU accession. Generally speaking, only after the transition is completed can a candidate country join the EU. In this respect, the former GDR is considered an exception, which excludes it from the CEE group: it neither had to build new democratic structures from scratch nor to strive for EU membership, as both objectives were attained automatically with the unification with West Germany. Despite their diverging paths since the end of 1989, East Germany and other CEE countries still share precisely this one point: all of them underwent integration into a larger political and economic entity. Both the German unification and the Eastern enlargement thus constitute two case studies that provide examples for two ideal types of political integration accomplished in the 1990s: the ‘Transplantation Type of Integration’ and the ‘Adaptation Type of Integration.’
SPEED AND TIMING OF THE TRANSPLANTATION TYPE OF INTEGRATION

First of all, both types of integration differ in how the entire process had been planned before it actually started. Secondly, they vary in the way in which they were executed and, finally, in the outcomes and further consequences that they brought about. This chapter elaborates on the first point – the general conceptions of both types of integration. Here the key contrast lies in the speed and timing of the two. Firstly, the Transplantation Type gives a priority to the fastest pace possible over any other factors (such as political, social, and economic compatibility of the coalescing parts, their mutual preparedness and willingness to associate themselves, etc.) that are taken into account. Rather, the early integration is what matters, moreover, since it would be a very unrealistic endeavour to expect from the accessing unit swift adjustments in all the social areas. The proponents of immediate integration have to choose which realms of the integration will be realized at the outset and which will be left to modifications during the later period, the post-integration period. In contrast to the slower Adaptation Type, the Transplantation Type of Integration is, therefore, based on a specific timing and phasing-in. Given the fact that it is easier to hasten an economic liberalization and constitutional transition than to speed up the time-consuming institution and civil society building, the Transplantation Type of Integration favours the completion of the economic and legal transformation before the political one. For this reason, this type of integration cannot build on any far-reaching political prerequisites, since any conditionality would impede or even totally hinder a prompt integration. The involved population therefore experiences both a transition to democracy and integration simultaneously and as a result must deal with both the positive and the negative effects. This can be not only the main cause of a popular discontent with factual hazards and pressures accompanying both developments, but also a primary reason for shifting the blame to the integration (and transition) per se.

STRONG LEADERSHIP AND THE PROCEDURAL CHARACTER OF THE TRANSPLANTATION TYPE OF INTEGRATION

Any sweeping actions such as a popular uprising typically require a strong leadership, especially when these revolutionary events happen overnight and are fairly unexpected. A quick integration belongs among such breaking changes, moreover, when it is coupled with a democratic revolution. The Transplantation Type of Integration therefore encourages a powerful political figure to appear on the scene and seize the moment. This person, above all, has to be able to consolidate all the democratizing efforts and merge calls for free elections, democracy, liberty, and so on into one voice demanding rapid integration. Furthermore, the newly emerged leader must be capable of imposing the rules of the integration from above without con-
resulting either side in a plebiscite or referendum. To be able to do so, it is highly likely that he or she would come from the accepting rather than the entering part, particularly given the lacking capabilities of the ‘entering’ elites. Because a lengthy election procedure would hamper the smoothness of the immediate integration, the legitimacy of the integration has to find its grounds in other factors, including a common language, history, and nationalism. In general, the Transplantation Type of Integration is designed and carried out as a top down course of action.

**THE SPEED AND CONDITIONALITY OF THE ADAPTATION TYPE OF INTEGRATION**

The Adaptation Type of Integration, on the other hand, exemplifies the opposite path. The ultimate integration is envisaged as a long-term goal that can be attained only after the transition from the totalitarian rule to democracy is accomplished. Thus, in this case, a completed democratization precedes the integration. The key principle of the entire method is ‘political conditionality’. The conditionality principle allows the accepting entity to set up political requirements that have to be fulfilled before the integration is even considered. The meeting of all the pre-established criteria becomes a prerequisite for the final integration; it is also a culmination of all the pre-accession efforts of the entering part. From the policy-makers’ view, the eventual integration can be comprehended as evidence of the correctness of the policy actions and as a reward for or even a triumph of these policies. The majority of work which needs to be done consists of adaptation of an applicant’s laws and institutions in order to bring them into line with the ‘admitter’’s standards. Therefore, at the moment of definite integration, the first step can be to marry up political institutions and legal systems. Nevertheless, there still remain areas (for example, common currency and free movement of labour) that demand further deepening after the integration since they were, for various reasons, unfeasible beforehand. In brief, the Adaptation Type of Integration entails political integration as the very first step before any other goals can be reached.

**BUREAUCRATIC LEADERSHIP AND THE CONSENSUAL CHARACTER OF THE ADAPTATION TYPE OF INTEGRATION**

Due to the fact that only a gradual advancement towards the final integration is likely, there is no necessity for one chief leader. On the contrary, it is more beneficial to have a strong ‘bureaucratic leadership’ derived from a wide-ranging consensus over the aim (integration) and the means (‘harmonization’) among a larger number of political actors. This broader leadership, preferably wider than a mere political majority in a parliament, has to push through a vast amount of new legislation, but it also has to keep the public convinced of the desirability of the accession. In the end, it is indeed the population that will decide in a direct voting procedure whether the long
awaited integration will materialize. Thanks to the final say of the populace, the Adaptation Type of Integration can be characterized as a bottom-up course of action; furthermore, it is rooted in a general consensus of nearly the entire society over a longer period of time. Because of its rather ‘evolutionary’ nature, the integration cannot be held responsible for any negative consequences produced by a preceding democratization. Moreover, since both the accepting and the entering parts vote directly or indirectly on their integration, neither side can say of the other that it could not decide freely but was compelled by the power and interests of the other. This is probably the most advantageous feature of the latter type of integration.

To sum up, the following chart illustrates the main conceptual features of both types of integration:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Transplantation Type of Integration</th>
<th>Adaptation Type of Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Speed</strong></td>
<td>immediate, speedy integration</td>
<td>long-term, gradual integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Timing</strong></td>
<td>economic integration before political</td>
<td>political integration before economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democratization</strong></td>
<td>simultaneously with integration</td>
<td>democratization before integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conditionality</strong></td>
<td>no political preconditions</td>
<td>political conditionality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership</strong></td>
<td>strong political leadership at the accepting side</td>
<td>strong bureaucratic leadership at the entering part</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public involvement</strong></td>
<td>no preceding referendum</td>
<td>preceding popular voting procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Final decision-making</strong></td>
<td>top down</td>
<td>bottom up</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK II: TWO COURSES OF INTEGRATION IN GERMANY AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AFTER 1989

INSTITUTIONAL, ECONOMIC, AND ELITE TRANSFERS AS THE BASIS FOR THE TRANSPLANTATION TYPE OF INTEGRATION

Given that the Transplantation and Adaptation Types of Integration embody contrasting overall approaches towards integration, their actual implementation takes disparate routes as well. The Transplantation Type exhibits a very straightforward principle: all political, economic, legal, administrative, and other social arrangements are simply transplanted from the accepting party to the entering one. New offices and agencies are organized on previously established models found in the accepting country and act as affiliated branches or satellites of these older organizations. Thus, the joining country receives brand new democratic institutions such as a new government, a new party system, a new judiciary, and so forth almost effortlessly. To more easily create a market economy and get it moving, the economic transformation is directed by the more experienced partner that provides knowledge and cap-
Moreover, to soften the anticipated impacts of the liberalization, the ‘senior’ entity subsidizes the ‘junior’ entity through financial transfers so as to avoid jeopardizing its inhabitants through all the economic and social perils as much as possible. Because waiting for new elites to grow up from inner resources would take too long, qualified personnel recruited in the accepting entity fill in the areas that a local staff cannot adequately provide for. Hence, in the case of the Transplantation Type of Integration, an elite transfer complements the institutional and economic transfers. The quick pace of the integration, however, does not allow for any foregoing reforms on the receiving side; thus, not only the entering unit but also the admitting unit and its populace have no chance to become accustomed to the radically altered situation. The absence of any earlier preparations in the accepting party is another source of disappointment with the unification, this time for the receiving state.

**INSTITUTIONAL, ECONOMIC, AND ELITE BUILDING AS THE BASIS FOR THE ADAPTATION TYPE OF INTEGRATION**

The Adaptation Type of Integration, by contrast, proceeds in a very different tempo. Basically, before any integration can be carried out, the entering country has to build all the political institutions, transform its economics, adopt new legislation, and train new elites on its own. To put it briefly, the greater the difference between the accepting and entering entities, the more extensive and deep adaptation efforts are required. Nevertheless, the accepting entity serves as an attractive prime example and offers material help, for instance, partial funding for specific projects. Besides this, it provides managerial, administrative and other kinds of training for the home-grown elites. Since long-term, gradual adaptation precedes the actual integration, the longed-for moment could pass practically unnoticed if there were no official ceremonies and no publicity. Last but not least, the Adaptation Type also involves a thorough reorganization and reformation of the internal structures of the accepting counterpart. As a consequence, the integration comes as less of a shock for the two partners.

The basic characteristics of the two courses towards unification, the Transplantation and Adaptation Types of Integration, are demonstrated on the following figure:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entering Part</th>
<th>Transplantation Type of Integration</th>
<th>Adaptation Type of Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>politics</td>
<td>institutional transfer</td>
<td>institutional building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>party system</td>
<td>party system transfer</td>
<td>party system building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>judiciary</td>
<td>judiciary transfer</td>
<td>judiciary building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>administration</td>
<td>elite transfer</td>
<td>elite building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economics</td>
<td>economic transfer</td>
<td>economic transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accepting Part</td>
<td>no preceding reforms</td>
<td>preceding internal reforms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
HOW THE GERMAN UNIFICATION AND EASTERN ENLARGEMENT OF THE EU CAME ABOUT: TWO HISTORICAL CASES OF INTEGRATION

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION AND UNIFICATION IN GERMANY: A HISTORICAL PARALLEL TO THE TRANSPLANTATION TYPE OF INTEGRATION

The proper breakdown of the communist regime in the East German ‘SED-state’ (Schroeder, 1999) originated from the mass exodus of East Germans through the GDR embassies and Hungarian borders during the late summer of 1989, though the economic erosion started much earlier. The most suitable date to place the beginning of the German unification is perhaps November 9th, 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell. On this day the GDR regime permitted free travel into the neighbouring West Germany and the dismantling of the Wall soon followed, which became a symbol of the German ‘Wende’ and other peaceful democratic revolutions throughout Europe. From the German point of view, however, this moment also signifies the beginning of hopes for the ‘Wiedervereinigung’ of both German states.

In correlation with the theoretical model of the immediate, top-down integration, the first official move towards the unification came from the initiative of a West German leader. Chancellor Kohl, twenty days after opening the internal German borders, proposed his Ten-Points-Program (Zehn-Punkte-Programm). To start with, Helmut Kohl affirmed in his introductory Bonn speech the solidarity with ‘fellow countrymen’ and declared that ‘chances are opening for overcoming the partition of Europe and thereby of our fatherland.’ Afterwards, the Chancellor announced that his ‘Ten Points’ outline is the ‘way towards German unity.’ For the eventual integration, the fourth and fifth points are the most significant: Kohl suggests developing confederative structures between both Germanys with an ultimate goal of creating a federation. Although he urges free elections, abolition of the power monopoly of the GDR’s communist party, constitutional amendments, and, above all, fundamental transformation of the economy (point 3), these systematic changes are ‘no[!] preconditions,’ but only ‘matters of fact that [Western] help can actually grasp.’ Although Kohl was not entirely sure what the reunified Germany would look like (he also pointed out that ‘no one knows this today’ but that ‘if people in Germany want the unification, I am positive it will come’), his statements definitely gave a potent impetus to further popular unification efforts. Thus, at the end of his speech, he could assure the audience that ‘reunification, that is, a regaining of the German national unity, remains a political objective of the [German] Federal Government.’

The vital function of a skillful manager who is able to formulate and push forward the swift integration is even more evident in comparison with the distinct character of the elites working on the Eastern enlargement. In the CEE countries, a very influential
position was that of a ‘chief negotiator,’ a high-ranking civil servant who was responsible for the success of bargaining between a candidate country and the EU. Elected officials, then, presented preparations for the enlargement as legislative and administrative matters and barely used the closing of pre-accession negotiation chapters (i.e. steps towards the integration) as an opportunity for ceremonial proclamations.

From the ‘Monday demonstrations’ in December 1989, slogans emphasizing German unity dominated popular demands. The process leading up to unification started moving at a very fast pace. Shortly before Christmas, Chancellor Kohl visited the East German city of Dresden, where he was welcomed with acclamation. In March 1990, the first free elections since the beginning of the GDR’s existence took place: the apparent winner, though without an absolute majority, was the GDR-CPU-led coalition with 48% of the vote, while the recently founded Social Democrats received 21.9% and PDS (the renamed Post-Communists) occupied the third place with 16.4%. Though the parliamentary elections, whose turnout was well over 90%, were interpreted as an explicit popular approval by GDR inhabitants for the rapid unification, it was not clear how a referendum would end up, particularly because the Social Democrats and Post-Communists, since the early debates, had been warning against a too hasty integration and preferred a slower, gradual pace. It would be interesting to find out if West Germans would have agreed to the unification, since frankly, no one has ever asked them. V. Kaina (2002: 7) poses a question worth mentioning: ‘[...] was the unification actually wanted in West Germany?’

According to polls from October 1989, only about 30% of West Germans thought that unification could take place within the forthcoming years, while a majority of 56% thought it to be impossible. In January 1990, though already 82% of FRG citizens saw the unification as a realistic perspective, only 2% of them supposed that it might happen within less than one year (at that point, it took only eight months). The most striking research results came in February 1990, when 70% of West Germans asserted that the unification proceeded too quickly and only about 20% believed that its speed was adequate. Finally, the data from June 1990 show that 52% of Westerners repeated that the unification progressed too fast (a drop of 18%) and almost 30% were against the politics of Helmut Kohl (Kaina, 2002: 7–9). V. Kaina thus answers the above mentioned question with a telling response: ‘yes, but...’ Consequently, we can assume that West Germans did not imagine such an instant integration, nor were they psychologically prepared for it. Notwithstanding international circumstances, Kohl’s politics of rush integration is then quite understandable; the Chancellor was not confident as to how long the initial enthusiasm and goodwill on both sides would actually last. This only confirms the theoretical premise that in order to organize an immediate, top-down integration, a strong leader is the necessary prerequisite. Due to the lack of direct assent on either side, unification of Germany proceeds as a top-down course of action.
On the contrary, European politicians planning the Eastern enlargement had no doubts as to whether the member states, after the conclusion of thorough negotiations conducted at the legislative and administrative level, should eventually vote on the CEE countries’ accession. From the outset, it was evident that the final agreements on the enlargement would have to be ratified either directly in referenda or indirectly by parliaments in the EU member states as well as by directly elected representatives in the European Parliament. This was not, however, a populist gesture but an obligatory stipulation used since the 1950s for any enlargement of the European Communities. Moreover, since the enlargement took place several years after membership had been ‘offered,’ European leaders went through numerous elections in which they had enough time to convince their respective publics about the enlargement’s advantages. Something similar, obviously, could be said about the CEE citizens: they had more time to decide and were, in the end, consulted in a plebiscite on their accession to the EU. Therefore, in contrast to the unification of Germany, the Eastern enlargement was in the end approved by a bottom-up political decision.

After the newly elected cabinet, under Christian Democratic prime minister Lothar de Maizièrè, took office, nothing stood in the way towards unification. By April, both German governments reached an agreement on the so-called State Treaty (Staatsvertrag), which took effect on July 1st, 1990. The Preamble acknowledges that ‘in the common will, the social market economy will be introduced also in the GDR as the basis for a further economic and social development’ and that the ‘creation of the monetary, economic and social union is the first significant step in the direction of the creation of the national unity... as a contribution towards the European unity.’ The core of the treaty, and the issue most greeted by East Germans, establishes the monetary union (article 1); from this point on, the deutsche mark was the sole currency in the GDR area. In addition, the State Treaty (article 10) determines that incomes, salaries, scholarships, pensions, rents, and leaseholds as well as savings (those up to a certain limit) in Eastern marks will be exchanged at the rate of 1:1 for the Western currency, while other earnings will be exchanged at the rate of 2:1. This was, naturally, a no less applauded point with far-reaching consequences that weren’t all positive. The theoretical significance of the Treaty rests in the fact that the German unification was, now without a doubt, primarily based on an economic unity before a political one.

The integration then proceeded to the political unification expressed by the ‘accession’ or ‘entry’ (Beitritt) of the former GDR to the Federal Republic. Meanwhile, two important matters had to be solved. First of all, the West German constitution – Basic Law (Grundgesetz) – enabled the use of two techniques for the unification. The first method, which was ‘purer’, along with article 146, required the adoption of a new constitution and either a direct or an indirect vote of all Germans (i.e. both
Western and Eastern). The second method, along with article 23, enabled them simply to extend the Western constitutional and legal principles over the East and thus reduce the accession of the GDR to its incorporation into the existing Western structures (Koch, 2001: 44). In fact, then, no new state originates but as the current Basic Law’s Preamble states, ‘Germans... have achieved unity and freedom of Germany in free self-determination.’ The underlying rationale for the second method was that Kohl’s government did not want to run the risk of delaying the unification if a more time-consuming ‘constitutional’ method was chosen, one that could include provisions that might be ‘too’ innovative to be endorsed in a new constitution (from explicit rights of social welfare to housing, employment, or social security) (Schluchter et al., 2001: 22).

The second matter to be discussed pertained to the territorial administration. The question became whether the GDR would join West Germany as one region or whether the original six Länder (incl. Berlin) would be restored. The pragmatic reasons spoke for the former option: the ‘territorial enlargement’ (Glæner, 2001: 16) of the FRG could be applied with fewer troubles on one accessing state, and moreover the total number of the GDR population equaled roughly the population of North Rhine-Westphalia. Nevertheless, tradition, feelings that the communist state has to completely disappear, and fears that if the GDR was somehow preserved, a separate Eastern identity could emerge favoured the latter alternative. Therefore, on August 23rd, 1990, the GDR’s National Assembly (Volkskammer), with 294 yes-votes (62 against, 7 abstained), declared ‘entry into the sphere of force of the Basic Law in accordance with Article 23’ (Judt, 1998: 533). On September 18th, the signing of the Unification Treaty (Einigungsvertrag) was a true culmination of the integration efforts. The Treaty repeated the Beitritt of five new Länder to the Federal Republic in accordance with Article 23, taking effect on October 3rd (today, the Day of German Unity). It also regulated many aspects of the unification: for example, amendments to the Basic Law (incl. the elimination of Article 23 due to its future redundancy), a new distribution of votes in the Bundesrat, the setting up of the German Unity Fund (financially supporting the new Länder), international obligations, rehabilitations, economic, educational, and welfare systems, etc.

If we put aside practical reasons, another interpretation provides us with a plausible explanation of the raison d’être for the immediate, top-down ‘Beitritt’ integration. After WWII, the Federal Republic was quite successful in the ‘institutional export’ (central bank, regionalism, multilateralism) projected onto integrating Europe (Jeffery and Paterson, 2003: 60–61). When Adenauer managed this in the West, could not Kohl presume that a similar ‘institutional export’ could take place in the East? On the other hand, accusations that Kohl’s Christian Democrats were supposed to time the unification sufficiently early to take advantage of the initial enthusiasm and win the all-German elections planned for December 1990 (Wiesenthal,
2003: 39) were somewhat exaggerated. Rather, Helmut Kohl did act in the logic of the immediate, top-down integration model. In any case, rapid national unification became a virtual guarantee of victory (Kitschelt, 2003: 136), and in the first unified _Bundestag_ election, Kohl’s Christian Democratic-Liberal coalition received an absolute majority of votes.

DEMONOCRATIC TRANSITION AND PRE-ACCESSION EFFORTS IN THE CEE COUNTRIES: A HISTORICAL PARALLEL TO THE ADAPTATION TYPE OF INTEGRATION

The Eastern enlargement, on the other hand, proceeded much less spectacularly. In 1993, the declaration of the EU membership criteria at the European Council summit in Copenhagen represented the decisive moment when the Eastern enlargement really got started. This moment passed in a relatively quiet manner, though it was no less emblematic than Kohl’s Ten-Points-Program. In the conclusion of this ‘three point program’, the European leaders promised a full integration of the CEE countries and agreed that ‘the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union.’ Nevertheless, at the same time, they made it clear that the CEE countries would join the EU only after they reached a certain democratic (political), economic, and legislative/legal level: ‘Accession will take place as soon as an associated country is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required.’ Thus, by introducing these conditions, which were laid out in the ‘Copenhagen criteria’, the European Union members recognized that the integration would be a gradual process that might run for several years. Moreover, this integration would be based on the ‘conditionality principle’ so that, in the end, the EU members would judge whether a candidate country has met all the pre-established requirements and is hence allowed to enter the EU. In brief, European representatives opted for the method of the long-term, bottom-up Adaptation Type of Integration.

The entire integration process (from 1993 to the accession in 2004) lasted almost eleven years, even though its true inauguration can be dated from March 1998 when, on recommendation of the European Commission, the EU opened accession negotiations with five CEE countries and Cyprus. Negotiations were conducted individually, and the progress of each candidate country was measured on its own merits in an annual ‘regular report’ prepared by the Commission. The 1999 EU summit in Helsinki appreciated the efforts of ‘catching-up’ candidates and added the remaining five CEE countries and Malta to the negotiations. Although a ‘basic law’ of the EU, the Treaty on the European Union, claims that ‘any European state which respects [liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law] may apply to become a member of the Union’ and the Helsinki conclusions demanded that candidates ‘must share the values and objectives of the
European Union as set out in the Treaties,’ the core of the negotiations entailed more than merely ‘sharing the values and objectives’. The negotiations, divided into 31 chapters, were focused on complex issues such as free movement of labor as well as on technicalities such as food labeling. In sum, the EU waited until the candidate countries implemented all the necessary political, economic, and other reforms on their own. This is not to say that the EU did not provide any assistance (on the contrary, the EU supported a wide range of projects from establishing a warning system along the Danube to helping women in business in the rural areas of Lithuania). It just means that the EU leaders have chosen another method of integration than their German colleagues.

The culmination of the Eastern enlargement process, paralleling the conclusion of the German Unification Treaty, was the ceremonial signature of the Treaty of Accession on April 16th, 2003 in Athens. The document was designed as one treaty between ten CEE and Mediterranean countries and fifteen member states. The Accession Treaty contains three main parts – the relatively short proper text of the treaty, the Act of Accession, and the Final Act. The main body of the 5,000 page treaty contains the Accession Act with annexes and protocols that elaborate on all of the negotiated matters to the smallest detail. The language of the treaty is slightly restrained when it merely states that applicant countries ‘...hereby become members of the European Union’ (Article 1). Nevertheless, the Final Act, alluding to the famous phrase of an ‘ever closer union,’ includes the Joint Declaration: One Europe that affirms:

‘Today is a great moment for Europe... 75 million people will be welcomed as new citizens of the EU... The Union will remain determined to avoid new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union. We are looking forward to working together in our joint endeavour to accomplish these goals. Our aim is one Europe.’

Similar to the German unification, the Eastern enlargement was crowned by a first common election, this time to the European Parliament in June 2004. Nevertheless, the successful integration to the EU was not, at least not in all the cases, a ‘virtual guarantee of victory’. In the Czech Republic (and to some extent in Hungary), for example, the left-centrist governing coalitions, which were considered ‘eurooptimist’ and whose representatives signed the final accession treaties, lost to their ‘euroskeptical’ oppositions. Moreover, the Social Democrats and their partners in the forthcoming 2006 national elections ranked fairly low. This was most likely the result of their domestic policies and their inability to use the achievement of the integration to attract more voters. It is a significant fact, however, that the Adaptation Type of Integration is considerably less popular than the Transplantation Type, at least during the time when it actually takes place.
OUTCOMES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE GERMAN UNIFICATION AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE EASTERN ENLARGEMENT OF THE EU

DEMOCRATIC AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION AND ITS EFFECTS IN THE UNIFIED GERMANY

Before we can unravel what the outcomes and consequences of the Transplantation Type of Integration are, let us go back to 1990. The initially high popularity of the German unification is beyond dispute; it is also the first theoretical outcome regarding this type of integration – at the time of its completion, the Transplantation Type of Integration gains more public support than the Adaptation Type. Nevertheless, Chancellor Kohl’s metaphor of ‘flourishing landscapes’ created a climate full of expectations. As the Economist (2004) pointed out, the phrase might be less memorable had it come true. The West presented itself as a saviour of the East, particularly in economic terms; nonetheless, the actual range of economic disasters was underestimated at the time of the unification. What is worse is that the amount of financial assistance needed for the economic recuperation was also immensely mis-calculated (Vesper, 1995: 572). The economic transfers, subventions, and other types of subsidies coming from the West eventually peaked incredibly high; as of now, they total 1.25 trillion euro, which makes an annual sum of 90 billion euro, and, amazingly, it still seems to not be enough. The largest fraction of this money went to the welfare system (pensions, unemployment compensations, health care, etc.).

In accordance with the State Treaty, the federal government extended social benefits to all East Germans. This led to a sudden increase in wages, quality of services, and consumption, but also in welfare costs. In the long term, though, transfer policies were inconsistent with the German model and accelerated its crisis even in the West. As a result, the most pressing phenomenon became the unemployment rate, which burdens the entire German system, the more so given that unemployment is highest precisely in the former GDR regions. Its annual average (as percentage of the civilian labour force in the East) increased from 14.8% in 1995 to 20.6% in 2005 (nearly twice the Western rate), and in the most afflicted areas, it has risen up to 30% (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2004: 51). This, apparently, contributes to the overall disappointment with the economic transition and, more seriously, with the unification.

To avoid difficulties in getting a job, particularly young East Germans tend to ‘flee’ the former GDR and move to the Western parts. Yet this ‘brain drain’ only adds to the deterioration in general conditions in the East. Thus, out of those who stay, the most satisfied are families of East German pensioners, who at present have higher allowances than their Western counterparts. To cite Günther Nooke, MP for CDU and former GDR dissident: ‘this generation [of Eastern pensioners] gained from the
unification. The new generation, however, which was in recent years hit by unemployment and earned low wages, is in a completely different shape. This generation, on the contrary, is afraid to lose jobs' (Palata, 2005a: 9). From the theoretical point of view, we have thus arrived at the second finding about the consequences of the Transplantation Type of Integration: it brings benefits at the start, but later it brings costs.

When we further ask whether the ‘culprit’ of the contemporary depression is to be transformation, integration or both, another paradox surfaces. The transition from a centrally planned to a free market economy was, ironically, conducted from the centre: it was directed by the federal government and executed by Western-based companies. Due to political pressures for the immediate, top-down integration, institutional and economic transfers went together with a transfer of Western elites to the East. The ‘external governance by Western elites’ (Wiesenthal, 2003: 39) might have invoked feelings that ‘Ossis’ were excluded from the crucial decision-making, just as they were under communism. Leaving aside talks about ‘colonization’ of the East, the new state interventionism and the continuous flux of subventions were highly unmotivating. The World Bank study proves that one of the reasons for the relatively poor East German performance (in terms of the declining net creation of new small and middle enterprises /SMEs/) is a lack of their ‘own’ Eastern initiative. As a result, imprudently carried out transformation should be charged for inducing a missing ‘inner unity’ (cf. Lang and Pohl, 2000: 10) and building a ‘wall inside people’s heads’ (Weidenfeld et al., 1999: 439). This is exactly the third theoretical consequence of the Transplantation Type of Integration: the integration process tends to be blamed instead of national policies.

THE EAST GERMAN SITUATION IN COMPARISON WITH THE SITUATION IN OTHER CEE COUNTRIES

The last aspect correlates the situation in the unified Germany with other post-communist CEE countries that experienced a democratic transition and fifteen years later underwent integration into the EU structures. From this point of view, East Germans have always measured their accomplishments vis-a-vis their Western partners (and not other CEE countries). This ‘special situation’ (Glaessner, 2001: 15) still disadvantages East Germans; to this day, they use a more demanding criterion. Although in many respects their lives improved profoundly and earlier than in other CEE countries, it does not translate into their subjective satisfaction. Thanks to financial transfers, East German cities and villages shine with novelty, roads and rail networks have been renovated, and universities have been equipped with facilities more modern than those of the Polish or Slovak universities (sometimes even attaining a higher level of development than West German colleges, towns, and infrastructures). In spite of this, as D. Pollack (2000: 13) noted, ‘the reality is better than the perception.’ Because East Ger-
mans contributed relatively little to this improvement, they have fewer reasons to be proud of it; they identify with the progress comparatively less than other CEE inhabitants or their Western predecessors in the 1950s (Pollack, 2000: 20). We can deduce from this that it is not always beneficial to be helped almost effortlessly and ‘for free’. On the reverse side, it is then understandable that West Germans can feel tired and annoyed by the constant ‘whining’ from the Easterners; they find it unjustifiable, particularly because Westerners are the ones who are paying for their progress.

Even more bewildering, however, is the rising popularity of the post-communist party in the former GDR (together with the popularity of right-wing extremism, especially at the beginning of the 1990s). In other CEE countries, most of the former ruling parties either disappeared from the political scene or transformed themselves into modern socialist/social democratic parties (Grzymala-Busse, 2002). Probably the closest equivalent of the German Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)/Die Linke is the Czech Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), though even here the analogy is not a perfect one. In the German case, the most striking is the PDS’s electoral success in ‘New Germany’ coupled with, until recently, its failure in ‘Old Germany’. Yet no less salient is PDS’ coalition potential at the Länder level. On the federal level, though, both the SPD and the Greens pledge that a German-wide cooperation with post-communists is not in play. The theoretical model of the Transplantation Type of Integration offers a plausible explanation. At the beginning of the 1990s, a component of the institutional transfer from the West to the East was a party system transfer: all existing Western parties were extended to the East with one exception – the post-communist party. Consequently, only the two largest parties (CDU and SPD) gain votes in both parts of Germany (in the East, greens and liberals are basically missing). PDS then presents itself as the sole representative of Easterners’ interests. The outcome is that the German East-West divide manifests itself also in diverging party preferences and systems, even more so when the PDS program and rhetoric resonates with the Easterners’ ‘Ostalgie’.

If we consider the difficulties dealt with in present-day Germany, it can be appreciated that the Eastern enlargement left much more space for some initiative by the individual CEE countries. Even though the pre-accession financial assistance from 2000 onwards amounted to an impressive 3.12 billion euro a year, this sum was divided among all ten CEE countries. Moreover, the EU sponsored concrete projects and did not subsidize the individual budgets of every country. In addition, the CEE countries were not reliant on an elite transfer, but had to generate elites from their own sources. This facilitated their ability to handle their own quandaries independently and limited their inclination to blame the EU. The final theme distinguishes the German ‘Sonderweg’ from the Eastern enlargement: while East Germans sweat it out through the transformation that changed their lives overnight and the GDR ceased to exist, the West
German political system remained practically untouched. In 1989/90, a modification of the German system was neither prepared nor wanted. In the European Union, on the contrary, it was obvious from about 1997 that without a thorough reform, no enlargement is possible. Nonetheless, it took several years before the indispensable reforms were accomplished – in fact, they were accomplished at the very last moment of the Copenhagen summit in December 2002. In the end, however, the internal change was completed and smoothed over the road to the enlargement.

Last but not least, at the time of writing this article, it has been only about four years since the accession of the CEE countries to the EU; therefore, it is too early to determine what kind of identity, if any, they will share. On the other hand, from the relationship of the CEE countries to the United States, the vocal euroskepticism of some leading Czech and Polish politicians, such as Vaclav Klaus and the Kaczyński brothers, and their attitude towards the Lisbon Treaty, it is possible to infer that ‘New Europe’ will probably be rather hesitant to further deepen the European integration. Therefore, we can suggest two concluding outcomes of the Transplantation and Adaptation Types of Integration. Generally speaking, whether Germans want it or not, it appears that the final consequence of the Transplantation Type of Integration is a continuation of two diverse German mentalities (and perhaps of two diverse German identities). The Adaptation Type implies that the CEE countries will be characterized in the near future by a weaker European identity (though it is arguable whether ‘Old Europe’ really personifies a ‘stronger’ European identity). The following chart recapitulates all the outcomes and consequences of the two types of integration we have established:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Transplantation Type of Integration</th>
<th>Adaptation Type of Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>public discourse</strong></td>
<td>popular at the beginning, unpop. after a few yrs?</td>
<td>less pop. at the beginning, more pop. after yrs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>speed</strong></td>
<td>shock therapy</td>
<td>time for adaptation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>timing</strong></td>
<td>first benefits, then costs</td>
<td>first costs, then benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>post-communist nostalgia</strong></td>
<td>blaming the integration</td>
<td>blaming national politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>post-communists in local governments</td>
<td>post-communists transformed or excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>identity</strong></td>
<td>mentality (identity) divide</td>
<td>weaker European identity, stronger national identity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CONCLUSION**

Even though it might appear at first sight that the former East Germany and other Central Eastern European countries do not have anything in common except for their joint communist past, the very opposite is true. The former GDR and the other CEE countries all underwent integration into a larger political and economic unit:
East Germany ‘entered’ West Germany in 1990, while the CEE countries joined the EU in 2004. Besides, the former East Germany went through an EU ‘enlargement without the accession’ (Spence, 1991) as well. Thus, to paraphrase Timothy Garton Ash (in Bazin, 2003: 243), who thought that Germany was a ‘Western system built on Central European experience’, we might say that the Eastern enlargement of the EU is, or perhaps should be, a ‘Central European system built on German experience’. This article therefore argued that the Transplantation and the Adaptation Type of Integration represented two models of political integration. These two types differ in a range of factors that were elaborated on in previous chapters: they vary in their general conceptions, in the method in which they were carried out, and, finally, in their outcomes and consequences.

On a theoretical level, the Transplantation Type of Integration exemplifies an immediate, speedy integration which proceeds, due to a strong leader from the accepting entity, as a top-down course of action without a vote on the accession and favours economic integration over political integration. The German unification precisely copies this model: Chancellor Helmut Kohl unified Germany within less than a year on an economic basis, though he did not seek direct approval in a referendum from either West or East Germans. The Adaptation Type of Integration, on the contrary, assumes a much slower and gradual pace; it requires bureaucratic, consensual leaders in the entering entity who first embark on democratization and economic transformation, meet all the political conditions, and then, after conducting a ‘bottom-up’ voting procedure, are rewarded by an allowed accession. The Eastern enlargement of the EU progresses consistently with its hypothetical pattern: even though CEE countries were first interested in EU membership at the beginning of the 1990s and the EU basically agreed to their accession in 1993, it took eleven more years (in the case of Bulgaria and Romania, fourteen more years) before the CEE countries could materialize their hopes. Meanwhile, all of them, more or less successfully, completed extensive reforms: they built their elites, institutions, party systems, and judiciary from scratch and transformed their economies from centrally planned systems to functioning free market systems based primarily on their own resources. During the same period of time, the East German Länder benefited from the massive economic and political backing of their Western partner in the form of economic, institutional, party system, judiciary, and elite transfers. While for the Transplantation Type of Integration, the keyword is ‘transfer’, ‘building’ is the buzzword for the Adaptation Type. The outcomes and consequences and pros and cons of both types of integration are intricate and therefore difficult to judge. Even though the German unification enjoyed an immense popularity at its outset, the public support is steadily declining or is at least very dubious. Moreover, the East-West divide, or a continuation of the separate East German mentality and identity, is considered a matter of fact. Although the overall East Ger-
man dissatisfaction has various roots, the unification, rightly or wrongly, is what is most often blamed for it. What’s worse, the elimination of an inner barrier between East and West Germans still seems far away. Sadly, one might agree with V. Handl (Palata, 2005b: II) that ‘there is no real alternative because this would actually mean a refutation of the German unification. To go so far off, no one dares.’ And hopefully, no one, in fact, wants to.

The Eastern enlargement of the EU seems up till now a relatively more successful endeavour. All the new member states are so far doing well; there were no major economic shocks in the CEE countries as some had predicted, and fears of thousands of ‘Polish plumbers’ flooding the West European labour markets did not come to fruition either. Nevertheless, there has not yet been enough time since the accession to assess whether a triumphant mood is justifiable in the long term as well. There are, indeed, negative signs, be it the split of ‘Old vs. New Europe’ over the Iraq war and transatlantic relations in general (though this has probably been overcome), or the euroskeptic voices coming from the CEE countries which reject further integration, the Reform Treaty, European citizenship, etc. This can be just a momentary fashionable trend, populism, and an Eastern European analogy to a certain reinternationalization that is also visible in the old member states. More disturbing, however, is the suggestion that the problem could stem from the EU’s own inability to adjust its structures to an expanded size and the altered geopolitical position of the EU. If there is any lesson which the EU could draw from the German experience, it is certainly the notion that before the EU will enlarge even further, its leaders should primarily examine the EU’s own capacity to absorb more countries. Even though it can be painful for waiting candidates, it is probably the only way to prevent future difficulties similar to those that Germany has faced since unification.

ENDNOTES

1 Vachudova chooses Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as the ‘liberal states’ in her sample.
2 From the legal point of view, the European Communities treated the unification not as an accession, but as an expansion of the territory of an existing member state – the Federal Republic of Germany. This way, the EC avoided all the accession procedures, including an assent by the European Parliament and a subsequent ratification by the member states’ national parliaments. By implication, however, East Germans were deprived of any impact on negotiations as East German officials had no negotiating rights (EC negotiated with West German officials from the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs) and subsequently no seats in the EP. To secure the compliance of the new Bundesländer with EC rules, the GDR was awarded several transition periods in the secondary legislation in the areas of environmental policy, structural funds, and external relations (particularly agricultural trade with the COMECON partners). Due to simultaneous talks on the Maastricht Treaty and EMU, most of the transition periods were nevertheless set to expire by the end of 1992. For further details on institutional arrangements and other aspects of the GDR’s inclusion into the EC, see Spence (1991 and 1992).
As one of the anonymous reviewers pointed out, another example of the Transplantation Type of Integration might be the creation of independent Czechoslovakia in 1918. The merger of the Czech lands and the Slovak regions was in essence an integration of the rural Slovak regions into a highly industrialized and urbanized modern society. The massive transfer of institutions, policies, and elites (though administrative and educational rather than political) took place within the next 20 years with very mixed results. Similar examples include the annexation and incorporation of Western Poland into the USSR in 1939 and the American Unionist policies in the South during the reconstruction period after the Civil War. These examples might lead us to the assumption that the two types of integration actually correspond with state-based (Transplantation Type) and multilateral-institution-based (Adaptation Type) policy transfer models. However, although the author could not find a case study for the Transplantation Type of Integration being applied to a multilateral organization, there are instances of a state-based Adaptation Type of Integration, for example, during the colonial era. Therefore, the issue of correspondence between types of integration and the question of into what kind of institution the entering entity is being integrated would require further exploration which goes beyond the scope of this article. In any case, neither the Transplantation Type nor the Adaptation Type of Integration have a sample of N=1.

We can observe this even during the Eastern enlargement of the EU: while ten CEE countries were originally considered candidate states, in May 2004, only eight of them (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia), together with Cyprus and Malta, joined the EU. Bulgaria and Romania could enter the EU after three more years in 2007.

The first two points deal with waves of migrants from the GDR to the FRG, ‘welcoming money’ (Be-grüßungsgeld) for them, and railway and telecommunication connections, while points six through ten pertain to international affairs. Chancellor Kohl from the very beginning insists that the German unification can happen only within the context of the European integration, and thus, he manages to also obtain international support. For more details on the international context, see further.

Until then, East Germans used the slogan ‘Wir sind das Volk’ (‘We Are the People’), which was a symbol of a democratic revolution. After December 1989, calls for unification epitomized in the new slogan ‘Wir sind ein Volk’ (We Are One People) began to prevail (Weidenfeld et al., 1999: 162–163).

The winning ‘Alliance for Germany’ consisted of the GDR-Christian Democrats (40.8%) and two smaller freshly established parties (Demokratischer Aufbruch – DA, 0.9%, and Deutsche Soziale Union – DSU, 6.3%), which took part in round-table negotiations with the SED and the government (Weidenfeld et al., 1999: 189).

Both West and East German politicians were uncertain about the political situation in the USSR and wanted to use the window of opportunity. Besides, the Soviet soldiers were still based on the East German territory.

The Treaty on the Creation of the Monetary, Economic, and Social Union between the FRG and GDR (Vertrag über die Schaffung einer Währungs-, Wirtschafts- – und Sozialunion zwischen der BRD und der DDR) was agreed on May 18th, 1990 and approved by both German parliaments on June 21st, 1990 (Weidenfeld et al., 1999: 162).

Art. 146: ‘This Basic Law... shall cease to apply on the day on which a constitution freely adopted by the German people takes effect.’

The Treaty between the FRG and the GDR on the Establishment of German Unity (Vertrag zwischen der BRD und der DDR über die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands) was signed in East Berlin on August 31st, 1990 and approved by both German parliaments on September 20th, 1990. It entered into force on October 3rd, 1990 (Weidenfeld et al., 1999: 190–191).

The so-called Two plus Four Agreement (Zwei-plus-Vier Vertrag) is the last international treaty in the context of the German unification, which was agreed between the two German states and four World War II allies. The treaty gave a full sovereignty to the reunified Germany and enabled the unification from an international point of view (Weidenfeld et al., 1999: 794–803).

The so-called Copenhagen criteria consist of democracy requirements (stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities), economic requirements (the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU), and legislative requirements (the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union). For details, see europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague_en.htm as of October 6, 2008.

The CEE countries were originally divided into ‘two waves’ of candidate countries. The first wave was promised an earlier accession and consisted of Cyprus (added), the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia.

The accession process involved an Accession Partnership, which was based on the so-called structured dialogue with individual candidate countries and on the Pre-Accession Assistance that provided resources from three programs: Phare (general, operating since 1989), ISPA (environmental), and SAPARD (agricultural). Besides these, other international organizations such as OECD/SIGMA assisted the process – for example, by helping to train the CEE elites.


The financial transfers consisted of regional transfers (net transfers from the federal level, financing of the Fund for German Unity, financial compensations from ‘richer’ to ‘poorer’ Länder) and of social security transfers (mainly unemployment and pension insurance) (Vesper, 1995: 575).

The unemployment rate decreased to 19.2% in 2006 and to 16.8% in 2007.

In 2006, PDS merged with the WASG party, a leftist splinter faction of social democrats under the leadership of Schroeder’s former rival Oscar Lafontaine, into Die Linke. The article refers primarily to the party’s role in the German East and therefore will continue to use the term ‘PDS’.

Since 2006, Die Linke has been successful in getting into Länder parliaments in the German West as well: Bremen, Hessen, Lower Saxony, and Hamburg.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Internet Resources


The author would like to thank Thomas Berger, Tim Haughton, Stephen Kalberg, Igor Lukes, Miroslav Novak, Vivien A. Schmidt, and this journal’s two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and support throughout the writing of this article. My thanks are extended to the Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund, which provided funding for my stay at the Department of Government and Center for European Studies at Harvard University, where this article was finished.
Reviews

Janusz Bugajski and Ilona Teleki: Atlantic Bridges: America’s New European Allies


A new global security situation after 2001 and the enlargement of NATO and EU for countries of Central and Eastern Europe in 1999 and 2004 have added a new dynamics to the traditional Euro-American relationship and research in this area. In Central Europe there could be found predominantly publications aimed at introducing these organizations, their history and significance to the accessing countries. The publication _Atlantic Bridges: America’s New European Allies_ offers the opposite point of view. The authors Janusz Bugajski and Ilona Teleki, both experts in the New European Democracies at the American Center for Strategic and International Studies, introduce an in-depth study of CEE-U.S. mutual relations and approaches. They cast no doubt on the new member countries’ loyalty towards the USA and Atlantic structures, regarding them always as ‘allies’. A high importance is attributed to the CEE countries as the bridges between Europe and America. The first sentence of the Introduction, ‘America’s new allies in central and eastern Europe will contribute to the shaping of relations between the European Union and the United States over the coming years’ (p. 1), truly is the main premise of the whole publication.

This book addresses mainly American audiences and especially the policy makers in Washington. In the recent years, the U.S. policy put an increased focus on overcoming new global threats and regional insecurities in new areas of interest outside Europe. Also grave policy differences occurred between the U.S. and EU in the aftermath of 9/11. The authors view the weakening of the transatlantic ties as the most serious security challenge for the Alliance. Their publication is an attempt to draw the attention of American policy makers back to Europe, in particular to the CEE countries. They argue that Washington has an opportunity to strengthen its ties with the CEE states and rebuild productive problem-solving relations with the EU and the NATO alliance as a whole, but the window of opportunity may be closing. Therefore it’s important for the U.S., the CEEC and the whole Atlantic Alliance that Washington set forth effective policies toward its ‘new allies’. This policy has to be based on a qualified knowledge of numerous factors that affect the CEEC behaviour in world politics.

The Introduction outlines these basic premises and five sets of questions about CEEC relations with the United States in the aftermath of their EU accession: CEEC support for the United States, the effect of EU membership on bilateral relationships, the effect of anti-Americanism on the U.S.-CEECC relationships, fissures in policy solidarity among the CEEC, and attempts by Washington to maintain policy sol-
The introductory part is followed by seven chapters, selected references, an index and ‘About the authors’. Chapter one, ‘Strategic Choices’, provides an ‘assessment of the strategic dilemmas and policy choices faced by the CEE countries as they seek to balance their relations with the United States, NATO and the European Union’ (p. 9). A section of particular interest is the evaluation of the impact of the CEE on EU policy and on other Eastern European Countries, viewed through the prism of the CEE countries’ relations to the United States. Regrettably, this part comprises only a few pages within the first chapter. Chapter two gives a glimpse into the transatlantic connections. The CEE views of the US have been shaped primarily by the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, when the picture of the United States as a ‘beacon of freedom’ (p. 51) and a guarantor of national independence has been created. This recognition for the most part persists in the CEE countries. Also Washington’s reasons for supporting the CEE states are briefly mentioned. The main part of this chapter concerns the weakening of transatlantic links, an analysis of its possible reasons and options of reviving the U.S. – EU relations with an emphasis on the CEE states’ participation. The last part offers an overview of the evolving perceptions of the United States in Central, Eastern and Western Europe in the post-Cold War period and especially in the post-9/11 period. Bugajski and Teleki draw from several similar analyses, such as Rubins’ Hating America: A History, and commentaries in relevant Central and Eastern European newspapers.

Chapters 3 to 6 focus on individual countries of Donald Rumsfeld’s New Europe: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Bulgaria. For each of them, there is a description of the country’s contemporary politics, political development since the fall of communism, relations to the U.S., EU, NATO and neighbouring countries, political options, examining the position of relevant political subjects, and development of public opinion towards the U.S. and EU.

The largest part, almost 50 pages, is given to Poland, which the authors denote as the ‘Key to Central Europe’ (p. 79) and attribute to it a prominent role among the Atlantic bridges. ‘Poland is a medium-sized power whose voice cannot be neglected in EU decision making’ (p. 79). Moreover, it has always been supportive of the U.S. military solving the security threats in the world and advocated maintaining the American presence in Europe. Negative historical experiences with multinational bodies and the perception of the national military as one of the pillars of independence have added to Poland’s willingness to contribute to allied forces abroad. The description of the Visegrad, Baltic and Balkan countries go on very similarly. It would be interesting to examine and compare the national approaches to those of the United States and the European Union. Unfortunately, the differences and specifications of particular countries are entangled among certain amount of additional information. This makes any subject-focused comparison
The ‘Conclusions and Recommendations’ chapter is a summary of the U.S.-CEE ties and their implications for the U.S. policy. In order for the United States to develop its new alliances, its policy makers must be attuned to the foreign policy goals of CEE states, their regional objectives and threat perceptions, and the views of their citizens and diverse political elites. ‘It is in the U.S. interest to ensure that it has dependable and predictable partners within the EU. Such a situation would help forestall the EU from developing into a potentially hostile bloc that might seek to oppose or neutralize U.S. policies’ (p. 251) That is probably the main reason for the American-based scholars to inquire into the politics of the CEE countries. Also, in this book, the approach to this region is slightly simplified. The CEE countries are almost exclusively ascribed the role expressively designated by Western-European politicians as ‘American Trojan horses in the EU’. Their future development and interests are considered by their ‘value to Washington’.

Undoubtedly, the accession of ten new member countries to the EU is a relevant factor, in terms of which the policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic should re-examine their policies. Bugajski and Teleki suggest several measures to help to establish a foundation for a long-term strategy for strengthening transatlantic relations. First of all, they advise Washington to set out its position and priorities towards the CEE countries. On this basis the evolution of multi-level contacts on a regular basis will be possible. The authors adopt a clear pro-American and pro-Atlantic attitude, regarding Russia as ‘increasingly authoritarian and imperialism ambitiously’ (p. 258). This is in accord with the tendency persisting in the Baltic states, but also in other CEE countries, that presses for orienting the foreign policy on NATO and the U.S. because of the distress about Moscow’s power ambitions. Bugajski and Teleki point to the fact that, being supportive of the U.S. policy, the CEE states have become more vulnerable to the security risks, but still the expected reward, for example in the form of dispensing with visa agreements, has not come across. They call on Washington to preclude the allies’ disappointment and also avoid placing them in the unwelcome position between Europe and the United States.

As to the sources, the authors use a wealth of official and unofficial documentation – policy statements, policy papers, interviews, analyses, expert commentaries, mostly from the CEE states. The authors state that their aim was to ‘better inform’ the U.S. and CEE policy makers and ‘offer several pertinent recommendations’ (p. 249). In light of this, the book appears as an attempt at another Atlantic bridge, approximating the mutual approaches and points of view of the U.S. and CEE policy makers.

Zuzana Vilčeková
Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez: Human Rights and World Trade: Hunger in International Society


In terms of the absolute number of hungry people, progress has been shown in the past twenty years. However, famine remains one of the main problems in the developing countries. It is a cause for deep concern that permanent hunger, which excludes emergency situations (wars and natural disasters), affects almost 800 million people. Paradoxically, the Food and Agriculture Organization’s findings show that with current agricultural production, 12 billion people could be fed, and every individual could consume 2,700 calories a day (p. 9). Human Rights and World Trade: Hunger in International Society investigates global responsibility and the response to reducing hunger and tries to find solutions to this problem, at least in theory.

Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez claims that the non-implementation of the right to food presents the largest violation of human rights in the modern world (p. 1). The book explores connections among hunger, poverty and international trade, especially agricultural trade, which is essential in developing countries. The author is convinced that dynamics of agricultural trade affect the food production, distribution and prices (p. 3). The main time framework of the analysis is the period from 1990 until 2005, but the author periodically leaps back to the 1970s and 1980s to show the development of the hunger problem and, in this connection, to more easily evaluate the degree of the non-implementation of the right to food.

The study is based on John Vincent’s pluralist-solidarist theory of basic rights. Gonzalez-Pelaez’s aim is to develop Vincent’s theory and to find out whether his idea of the right to food for all people is still a viable goal for international society.

As an English School theorist, Vincent accepted a pluralist commitment to the right of sovereignty and the distinctiveness of states. However, when studying human rights, Vincent argued that there were some values and basic rights that should be common to all states. Therefore, a higher degree of international integration is warranted, but simultaneously, the principle of sovereignty needs to be preserved. His analysis is grounded on a distinction between the normative (how it should be) and the practical (how it is in reality) dimensions of hunger. Gonzalez-Pelaez analyses the gap between the two dimensions, explores how it can be reduced in practice and tries to find out how successfully the current international system deals with the hunger problem.

There are several different terms used in connection with food problems (food (in)security – access to food that ensures (in)adequate nutrition; hunger or under-nourishment – a continuing lack of calories so that basic energy requirements are
not met; malnutrition - a physiological condition that develops as a result of a lack of vitamins and minerals) (pp. 6–7).

The author believes that access to food should be granted to all people. In this context Gonzalez-Pelaez uses the term ‘basic rights’, which appeared after the Second World War as a specific issue within the wider human rights context. There is no consensus in the public and academic discourse about the common definition of basic rights, but usually it refers to ‘the minimum requirements for a life of dignity’ (p. 38) or to ‘the right to be free from hunger and poverty’ (p. 39). In understanding basic human rights, the study of Gonzalez-Pelaez had been influenced by Henry Shue¹, the author of Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (1980, 2nd ed. 1996). In the book, Shue argued that basic rights, although not more valuable than other rights, were fundamental for the protection of all other rights. As basic rights, Shue recognized security rights and subsistence rights, giving priority to the latter. Vincent also gave an emphasis to subsistence rights, believing that they were fundamental to non-basic rights and to other basic rights (p. 48). He claimed that international society was responsible for the starvation problem.

Gonzalez-Pelaez admits that hunger is a multidimensional problem, and she indicates the main (national or international) causes of world hunger: overpopulation, food distribution, access to land and credit (whether the food is available and whether the people can afford it), discrimination against women, corruption, wars, external debt, poverty, developments in biotechnology and world trade. She also claims that there are internal (conflicts, exporting infrastructure, internal tariffs, unequal distribution of wealth within countries) and external dimensions (quality control measures, import restrictions and export subsidies) of international trade that establish a discrepancy between rich and poor countries. The study also finds that there are three regions that are the most affected by food shortage: Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean.

After identifying the scale of the problem, Gonzalez-Pelaez focuses on responses of the international community to the food problem. The author investigates how binding various international instruments are, namely The World Food Summit and its Plan of Action, poverty summits and the Doha Declaration. She analyses the plight of the mentioned instruments through three dimensions: obligations – states are bound to respect them; precisions – what states are expected to do; and delegations – the preparedness of states to give others the authority to implement their agreements (p. 69). The study shows that international food-related instruments are characterized as soft law by a low degree of legislation. But even if the commitments are non-binding, she argues, they can stimulate the establishment of international norms or have an influence that would lead to better regulation of specific areas. The analysis also acknowledges that international (agricul-
ture) trade and poverty are connected, explaining that the availability of food for purchase and the individual capacity to afford it have a direct impact on hunger (p. 78). It is claimed that the economic institutional structure must be changed in order to reduce hunger and poverty.

The book discusses three options for the future development of the international trade system and, in this context, possible solutions for reducing the hunger problem as well. These options are: first, to leave the current trading system unchanged; second, to reform it; and third, to introduce a radical change in the trade system. The advocates of the first option believe that the problem of hunger will be solved in the long term. The ones that prefer reforms of the trading system propose the following solutions: the adoption of equitable trade policies, the creation of a Development Box (which would provide exemptions for developing countries, where basic food security is not granted, and would focus on important crops for the poor), a reform of the Marrakesh Decisions and the creation of sub-global arrangements. The advocates of radical changes believe that the current system does not work and that an alternative system has to be introduced.

Gonzalez-Pelaez supports the second option like Vincent, who compared the elimination of hunger in international society with the elimination of the slave trade and believed that the solution for both was ‘a combination of aid and reform of the existing structural arrangements, but not the elimination of the system’ (p. 114). The dilemma, as to whether the international society can eliminate hunger, is examined by using two English School concepts (world society – non-state subjects, including individuals; and international society – the society of states) and from pluralist-solidarist perspectives.

Some readers may criticize the overly high amount of stress that is placed on international society’s responsibility to solve the problem of hunger and argue that national responsibility has not been exposed enough. One could also find a weakness in her explanation of the links between the international (trading) system and hunger reduction. This relationship is more complex in the real world than how it is presented in the book. However, from a conceptual point of view, Gonzalez-Pelaez succeeds in upgrading Vincent’s theory and demonstrating that the idea of (at least minimal) solidarism remains viable in both theory and practice. Clearly, human rights, including the right to food, are not understood anymore as internal affairs of states, but as a concern of the whole international community. It is even moreso the case that human rights can be legitimising criteria for humanitarian intervention.

The book is not designed only for international relations theorists interested in hunger, but for a wide range of readers. The structure of the book is systematic, the language of analysis is simple, and each chapter paves the way for the next and in this way establishes a logical procedure within the context. The author uses tables,
numbers and percentages to demonstrate the scale of the hunger problem. Focusing on a specific human right, the right to food, there is no doubt that the book brings a significant contribution to the human rights debate.

Tadeja Forštner

ENDNOTES

1 More about the work of Henry Shue can be read at: ccw.politics.ox.ac.uk/people/bios/shue.asp.
Valerie M. Hudson: Foreign Policy Analysis. Classic and Contemporary Theory


Hudson’s book on foreign policy analysis (FPA) is an introduction to the field of International Relations (IR) directed at advanced undergraduates. The book has three parts, which are divided into sub-chapters. The first part gives an overview of the theoretical history of FPA. The second part focuses on the ‘level of analysis’, such as that of the individual, group, or culture. The last part deals with the option of bringing all the levels together, which would make analysis of foreign policy possible and meaningful.

On the first pages, at the beginning of part one, the author makes clear where she stands. The individual is the basis for all foreign policy analysis because without a human being acting, no policy (either domestic or foreign) would be imaginable. For Hudson, it is of secondary interest whether to focus on single actors or groups. She argues that neo-realism, for a long time (and maybe still) the main theory in IR, is no longer able to provide answers to questions like the following: Why did a State act like it did? Why did it change its position?

The bottom line is that the ‘black box’ thinking of states as unitary actors in world politics is no longer (and probably never has been) a useful category of research because it keeps too many variables out. According to Hudson, the reason is simple. The state is a construct, and only the human being as such can be seen as an actor because he or she is the only one that can act.

Hudson argues further that even mainstream constructivism à la Alexander Wendt is not appropriate to IR research, although it does not consider the structures of the international system as unchangeable. Wendt introduces ideas to IR inquiry but he fails, according to Hudson, to answer the question of who carries ideas and who is able to articulate ideas.

The second paragraph of the first part is a short description of the attempts of early research to contribute to FPA. Hudson did a great job insofar as giving an overview of certain periods of FPA development. She names other authors who influenced the whole process, and students have the possibility to check the literature.

For Hudson, one special direction of FPA development seems to be of special interest: the establishment of Comparative Foreign Policy (CFP). Hudson argues that CFP’s main problem was the too narrow concentration of data sets and behaviouralism. It is, according to her, not only a technical problem (How to gather all the variables?), but also a theoretical one (What is the aim of CFP?). She identifies trade-offs between theory and method. She describes the situations as follows:
CFP methods demanded parsimony in theory; CFP theory demanded nuance and detail in method. FPA rejects the technical concept of CFP. It acknowledges that FPA research needs deep insight into the political process; it needs to be multilevel, integrated, inter-disciplinary, and actor-specific.

Hudson, in the second part, goes into more detail and explains different levels of analysis, i.e. the ‘leader-level’, groupthink, bureaucracies, and culture.

When she talks about the ‘leader-level’, she applies much of psychology. This might be useful but, as she admits, it might be complicated by the fact that world leaders almost always refuse psychological analysis. Further she even emphasises things like the physical well-being of world leaders. For FPA, this may be too many variables, though Hudson claims that this is exactly what FPA should do.

A second level is the ‘groupthink’ approach, where Hudson uses much of the work of Irving Janis. Groupthink is much more appropriate for analysing foreign policy than focal points from the ‘one man show’ because foreign policy is at a minimum always formulated in groups. Hudson does not mention this, but even the leader approach can be incorporated into groupthink. It depends, as she notices, on the role the leader plays in the group. Hudson should have done more to provide the analytical tools of mixing the leader and group levels together. According to Hudson, groupthink can be analysed in different ways. She addresses the following questions: What role does the leader play? Is the group inclusive or exclusive? Under what circumstances does the group operate (crisis or routine)? Hudson makes one important point when it comes to the analysis of groups in the foreign policy process. She argues, leaning on Janis, that when the group consensus (the cohesion) of the group becomes more important than the problem solving, then groupthink exists. But Hudson fails to explain how a researcher, as a mostly excluded individual, can separate these two different things. Neither does she say anything about how to gather general information from the inner circle. She gives advice but remains unclear and too general. Sometimes it would have been better to avoid too much ‘FPA development history’ and focus more on methods and research tools.

In a second section Hudson introduces the so-called ‘organization process’. This section is very illuminating because it provides the reader with deep insight into how organisations and agencies like the Department of Defence or the State Department work or do not work. For example, Hudson asks why agencies work slowly or why the result, when change has occurred, is not satisfying for high level authorities.

Besides the well investigated information, Hudson identifies several characteristics of organisations like the agency’s (‘agency’ being another word for ‘organisation’) essence (‘vision’ or ‘mission’), turf (claims), budget and personnel. With this, she gives students and researchers a ‘handbook’ of important aspects that inquiry
has to focus on. This whole section is written as if she has always been in the ‘game’ of organisations. The same holds true for the last section of the decision-making chapter, which deals with bureaucratic politics. Hudson argues that bureaucracy politics is not really something one can see or touch. It is rather a means for the transport of orders and information.

The examples she gives are very well chosen. Maybe Hudson knows all too well how hard it is to research topics like these. The examples function like a guide on what to concentrate on during the research (taking official statements, comparing timeframes from the beginning to the end). But again, the biggest mistake is that methods are only mentioned marginally.

Her chapter on culture and foreign policy is quite interesting but not wholly convincing. As she admits, there exists a small interface between culture studies and FPA. This small degree of interface may be caused by either an ‘objective’ failure of measurable interaction between culture and foreign policy or by the fact that research did not develop the right methods to combine both yet.

A very exciting but highly questionable topic is what one can call ‘storytelling’. Myths and history become instrumentalised (e.g. America as unique and always optimistic; Germany with traditional close relations to the USA) to justify a certain policy.

But Hudson fails to address one crucial point. Given that ‘culture’ does not erode or change dramatically overnight so that it would be more constant, how can a constant explain variation?

The 5th chapter is about domestic politics and foreign policy. One might think of Krippendorff’s famous article ‘Is foreign policy foreign policy?’. Hudson describes in an illuminating manner the effects of domestic politics on foreign policy. She also offers variables and indicators that provide every student of FPA with a plot. What matters, according to Hudson, is not only the proximity to the foreign politics realm but also the fraction of the actor, its supportiveness of the administration’s position, its size, and its activity. What is confusing here is only the usage of the term ‘regime’ because it is not always clear if ‘regime’ means ‘government’, and if so, it is not clear, for example, why she separated the state department from the government.

In the 6th chapter, the reader has to call the beginning pages into mind. Hudson examines factors like military power, economy, and population and systemic factors like anarchy and power distribution. The circle closes when she argues that the decision-making chain begins with the human being. Systemic factors influence the human actors in their decisions if at all. Hudson argues that military power does provide the rationale for a certain foreign policy decision but that leaders make use of it. This can be illustrated by a comparison of the foreign policy styles of ‘world powers’ and small states. The president of the United States of America has other
means at his disposal than the president of Egypt. Knowing what you have influences the way you act. However, this is not to say that decisions follow capabilities.

Finally, Hudson describes how all the variables she mentioned in the previous chapters were to be combined. Without some statistical understanding, it will be difficult to follow the several models. After all, it seems that the critique of the too technical approaches of Comparative Foreign Policy becomes less important here. Curiously Hudson admits that integration of all of the levels has not been achieved yet. The task that remains is exactly the opposite of what FPA should do: to separate the several levels of analysis.

The book ends with some nebulous advice which recommends us to see what neuroscience can contribute to FPA. But this would lead to a total dependence on natural science.

Despite some shortcomings, this introduction to the field of FPA is an illuminating book for those who have just started studying FPA and its problems. It is valuable as a first step from which one can go further.

Jens Heinrich
Stathis Kalyvas: The Logic of Violence in Civil War


The Logic of Violence in Civil War by Stathis Kalyvas is a serious and pioneering attempt to demonstrate the mechanisms that explain violence in the context of civil war. Kalyvas examines the dynamics of internal wars by focusing on the micro level and by differentiating between the broad concept of civil war and the phenomenon of civil war violence. He shows that violence in a civil war can neither be reduced to irrational factors, such as strong emotions or illogical behavior, nor to pre-existing ideological cleavages. On the contrary, violence against civilians has its own rationale and logic.

Kalyvas’ study breaks new ground for political science and the study of violence in two senses. First, his analysis separates the violence-and-civil-war pairing by distinguishing ‘between violence as an outcome and violence as a process’ (p. 21, emphasis in original). While previous studies focused on violence as a direct outcome of civil wars, Kalyvas understands civil war as an exogenous shock and deals with violence as a dependent variable. His nuanced theory breaks civil war violence down into two basic categories. Indiscriminate violence is executed en masse without regard for the actions or preferences of individuals. In contrast, selective violence describes aggression directed towards individuals who are targeted based on specific information about their actions.

This distinction between indiscriminate and selective violence leads Kalyvas to a second novel contribution. Contrary to conventional literature on violence and civil wars, Kalyvas understands the use of violence as rational. For him, violence is the end product of many individual rational actions by political actors and civilians, who work to fulfill their interests within a given territorial space. More specifically, Kalyvas claims that despite the frequency and planning that go into indiscriminate violence, it often proves to be counterproductive. Faced with death regardless of their actions, ‘many people prefer to join the rival actor rather than die a defenseless death’ (p. 160). Since armed groups in civil wars eventually realize that the incentives fostered by indiscriminate violence are against their interests, they replace it with selective violence. Though more costly, as it requires armed groups to collect specific information about individuals, selective violence gives individuals incentives to cooperate. Since selective violence requires information about specific people, which is most easily collected from individual non-combatants, Kalyvas argues that selective violence is ‘a joint process, created by the actions of both political actors and civilians’ (p. 209, emphasis in original). Instead of seeing the civilian as a mere pawn caught between the rebels and the state, he shows that non-combatants are agents in their own right.
The key variable in determining the availability of information and thus the ability of political actors to practice selective violence effectively is control. Kalyvas explains variance in the level of violence by the degree of control that the warring factions have over a particular geographic region. Differing levels of control give rise to different calculations, leading civilians to defection or denunciation. According to Kalyvas, the logic of violence unfolds as follows: the irregular warfare of civil war enables contenders to meddle and hide among the civilians. Hiding produces uncertainty and causes identification and communication problems. To overcome these obstacles, the competitors use violence to encourage active participation and denunciations from oppressed civilians. The stronger the actor’s control of the area, the higher the rate of collaboration and denunciations. Also, the higher the control, the less likely it is that the actor would resort to violence. Perhaps most controversially, Kalyvas predicts that the parity of control between the actors ‘is likely to produce no selective violence by any actors’ (p. 204). This statement holds for two reasons. Firstly, in areas where control is evenly divided, political actors will be unable to collect enough information to practice selective violence. Secondly, they will be loath to engage in indiscriminate violence, for fear of encouraging mass defections to the other side. While areas of parity may experience large amounts of direct violence between political actors, as their armed forces come into direct contact with each other, this aspect is exogenous to the scope of Kalyvas’ theory.

The dependent variable of Kalyvas’ hypothesis varies across spatial lines, while the temporal lines are regrettably not fully developed. Kalyvas tests his theory rigorously on the case of the Greek civil war, focusing primarily on the micro level of the Argolid region in 1943–1944. Lacking in his argument is the intensity of selective violence, which can also be explained over a period of time. For instance, pre-war or wartime grievances and feuds that fuel violence on ideological and intimate levels could decrease over time. Moreover, while Kalyvas explains the role of actors, he does not give the reader sufficient insight about the long-term impact of institutions. For example, within certain governmental structures, incumbents could well determine the logic of violence. Also, different types of political and judicial institutions, developed in areas controlled by the insurgents, might affect the use of violence against civilians.

While Kalyvas’ thorough theoretical and methodological approach deserves much praise, it raises a few additional questions. Though his theory focuses on civil wars, his testing is based on the foreign occupied Greece during World War II. Since the majority of the combatants fell under Greek sovereignty before the outset of hostilities, Kalyvas contends that this case falls within his fairly broad definition of ‘civil war’, i.e. an ‘armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of
hostilities’ (pp. 5 and 17). However, this is pushing an already broad definition of civil war to the extreme. Though Kalyvas argues that the war had ‘features parallel to many civil wars’ (p. 249) despite the Nazi occupation, it would be important to see his theory tested on a civil war without external occupation.

Furthermore, though the theory focuses on explaining the incidence of selective violence, this accounts for only half of the homicides in Kalyvas’ dataset (see Table 9.2 on p. 267). This suggests that indiscriminate violence deserves greater attention, even if it is harder to gain leverage on both theoretically and empirically. However, despite these concerns, rooted primarily in Kalyvas’ omissions, which may be addressed in future research, this book is exemplary both as an overview of the civil wars literature in general and as a new approach to the study of violence within civil wars.

Peter Rožič, Peter J. Verovšek
Throughout the Cold War Era, the United States believed that the possession of nuclear weapons would deter Russia from taking a military action or engaging in a conflict with them. At that time, Russia was militarily stronger – in terms of conventional weapons – than the United States. Furthermore, it had a strong intent to change the territorial status quo in Europe and expand its sphere of influence to other parts of the world as well. Conventionally, it could easily outnumber American forces, which made any possible battle a lost cause beforehand. Unless the United States wanted to ‘lose Europe’ and other parts of the world in the event of a military attack, they had to come up with another way to counter Russia in a possible military situation.

The introduction of the nuclear weapons to the Cold War system was a perfect way to achieve superiority over Russia or at least equality in the event of a military conflict. The advocates of the deterrent effects of nuclear weapons were quite happy with the finding that their theory had actually worked and they kept applying it to other situations around the globe. However, not all the conflicts seemed to fit into the framework of the deterrence theory. Observing the developments of the conflict between India and Pakistan in South Asia, the scholars ended up with the discovery that with an increased nuclear proliferation to the region, the number and the severity of the conflicts between these two states have risen over time. What does this finding leave us with? Does it mean that the deterrence theory is incorrect? Or does it function only in certain situations?

With his book *Dangerous Deterrent. Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia*, S. Paul Kapur explains the correlation between nuclear proliferation and conventional military conflicts in South Asia, and on the example of India and Pakistan, he portrays the effects of nuclear proliferation on the conventional military behavior of these new nuclear states. S. Paul Kapur is an associate professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, and previously he was a visiting professor at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. His main fields of work are nuclear weapons proliferation, deterrence, ethno-religious violence, and the international security environment in South Asia. In his book, he advocates the idea that with the increase of the nuclear proliferation in South Asia, the conventional military disputes between India and Pakistan have risen and consequently, the stability in South Asia has decreased.
It is no wonder that the author decided to choose this topic. The question of the deterrence effects of nuclear weapons has been researched for quite a long time already. However, with the erosion of the North Korean nuclear crises or with the doubtful uranium enrichment program of Iran, the debate has intensified recently. The western scholars usually advocate the idea that the nuclear proliferation decreases the stability in the South Asian region, while the Asian states, such as India and Pakistan, insist on the stabilizing effects of the nuclear weapons. Does the possession of nuclear weapons stabilize this region or does it increase the possibility of a great conventional or even nuclear conflict?

The author develops his argument in a very logical way. Due to the chapter divisions in the book, the reader is able to clearly understand the causal relationships between all the components of his theses. The first three chapters of the book explain the author’s argument theoretically. The author uses quantitative analyses (COW - the Correlates of War project) to capture the militarized dispute data of the South Asia region. He concentrates on the time period between 1972, when the major Bangladesh War occurred, and 2002. He picks the Bangladesh War in 1972 as a starting point because Pakistan was utterly defeated in this war, which has changed the whole perception of the Indian-Pakistani conflict. Before then, Pakistan had never lost to India in any kind of conflict, and there was a view among Pakistanis that Muslims cannot lose in a war with Hindus. However, after this major defeat, Pakistanis have realized that this perception might not always be true (p. 18).

According to rates of militarized disputes, including low intensity conflicts, the amount of disputes has constantly risen from 1972 until 2002. However, because the balance of conventional military capacity between Pakistan and India was relatively stable in this time period, while Pakistan was always conventionally weaker than India, the growing number of conflicts in the region, the author states, had to be caused by some other factor than conventional balance (pp. 22, 23). By performing two statistical tests, the author finds out that by using nuclear capacity as a variable, he ends up with a positive correlation between the nuclear proliferation and the growing number of disputes in the South Asian region (pp. 26–28).

But how does the nuclear proliferation cause the growth in the number of military disputes between India and Pakistan? The author explains this phenomenon by using the negation of the ‘stability/instability paradox’ and by underlining the fact that the effects of nuclear proliferation always depend on the territorial preferences and the conventional military capacity of the states involved. During the Cold War, the stability, meaning the absence of the nuclear weapons and the conventional conflicts, created the growing aggression of Russia as a conventionally stronger and revisionist state that wanted to challenge the territorial status quo of Europe. Thus the certain stability in the system created the following instability between the United States and Russia. Therefore, the United States had to deter the Russian aggression by using the
threat of a nuclear conflict in order to stop Russia’s revisionist intentions. However, the situation in South Asia is different. India, as a conventionally stronger state, is a status quo country that is satisfied with its territorial situation. Pakistan, on the other hand, is a strongly revisionist state that is not satisfied with the territorial division in Kashmir, but it does not have the military conventional capability to change the status quo. By introducing nuclear weapons to the region, the author argues, Pakistan has suddenly had an ace in the hole for furthering its territorial intentions. It has acquired certain military incentives to behave aggressively towards India without risking an all-out conventional conflict with it due to the fact that India was discouraged by Pakistan’s possession of the nuclear weapons. Furthermore it acquired certain diplomatic incentives because of the increased international attention to the potential nuclear conflict. Thus the certain amount of instability, meaning the possession of nuclear weapons by Pakistan, created even more instability in the region (the ‘instability/instability paradox’, in contrast to the ‘stability/instability paradox’) (pp. 40–43).

The ‘stability/instability paradox’ does not work in the case of the South Asian region, as opposed to the Cold War Era, due to the different territorial preferences and conventional military power of the states involved. While during the Cold War, Russia, as a revisionist state, was at the same time a conventionally stronger state, in South Asia, Pakistan, which is a revisionist state as Russia was, is, however, conventionally weaker. While in the Cold War Era, Russia could take a military action knowing that it would win as long as the conflict was conventional, in South Asia, Pakistan could not engage in a military dispute due to its conventional weakness. On the basis of different combinations of these four variables – the status quo state, the revisionist state, the conventionally stronger state and the conventionally weaker state – the author explains the logic of nuclear proliferation effects. He states that if the state is revisionist and at the same time conventionally weak, the proliferation of nuclear weapons will, with high probability, increase the instability in the region because it enables the weak and revisionist state to pursue a low intensity conflict with its contrary without fearing an all-out conventional retaliation.

In the next three chapters, the author uses comparative analyses of the concrete case studies between the years 1972 and 2002 to support his argument empirically. He divides this time period into three phases. The first phase – a non-nuclear period lasting from 1972 until 1989 – was characterized by the author as a very stable and non-violent phase. Although the territorial preferences of both states were still opposite, the situation did not come to any major military conflict due to Pakistan’s conventional weakness and India’s status quo character. However, the question of Kashmir intensified in Pakistan’s national debate. Because of the Islamization of Pakistan, the Kashmiris’ dissatisfaction with Indian rule and the victory of the mujahideen in the Afghan war, Kashmir became the center of Pakistan’s political debate (pp. 90, 91). The second phase, from 1990 until 1998, became more volatile. Pakistan did not
have a nuclear capacity, but its nuclear technology was advanced enough to build a nuclear weapon in a very short time. This fact gave Pakistan a certain confidence to start challenging the territorial status quo in Kashmir by supporting the Kashmir insurgency in the region. Pakistan did not have to fear any full-scale conventional attack from the Indian side because its possible nuclear retaliation discouraged India from making one (p. 114). The last period, from 1999 until 2002, was characterized by an overt possession of the nuclear weapons by Pakistan. The frequency and severity of conflict in this period have increased in comparison to the previous phase. The 1999 Kargil conflict and the 2001–2002 standoff were very serious crises that support the author’s argument that the possession of nuclear weapons created instability in the South Asian region due to Pakistan’s increased confidence, which was created by the overt acquisitions of the nuclear weapons (p. 139, 140).

So what conclusions has S. Paul Kapur actually made in his book? The Dangerous Deterrent is a highly scientific book that shows all the students and scholars in the field how a scientific paper should be written. It clearly states that the effects of the nuclear proliferation depend on a combination of four variables – the status quo state, the revisionist state, the conventionally stronger state, and the conventionally weaker state. If the revisionist state is conventionally weaker at the same time, the nuclear capability of this state will increase its aggression towards its counterpart, and consequently the stability in the region will decrease. The author is highly scientific and objective in developing this argument, using statistical tests, quantitative analyses, comparative case study analyses and theories of other authors to support it. Through the provision of all the potential counterarguments and the argument’s following negation, he does not leave any room for doubts about his theses. Furthermore, by discovering the positive correlation between the nuclear proliferation and conventional military disputes, this book can serve as a perfect base for future research of the military behaviour of other nuclear states. Already in chapter seven, the author points out certain implications for China, North Korea and Iran, but detailed research on this subject was left for future projects.

To sum it up, The Dangerous Deterrent is a book that offers a new approach to nuclear proliferation theory. It revises the deterrence theory and provides us with some potential solutions to the aggressive behavior of the new nuclear states. It clearly shows that in situations where the militarily weaker state is a revisionist state at the same time, the number and severity of conflicts increases with the nuclear proliferation. Therefore this book is of a high value not only for its recent research in this field, but for future evaluations of the behaviour of new nuclear states as well. The Dangerous Deterrent is a work that certainly should be read by everyone who wants to get an interesting and insightful picture of the correlation between the nuclear proliferation and military instability.

Michaela Marková
While much ink has been spilled to describe the pros and cons of particular models of multilateralism presented by the UN and the European Union, the interplay between the two has, somewhat surprisingly, so far received only limited attention. By offering an inquiry into the EU presence at the UN and by studying how the two entities, disparate in structure and level of integration, but similar in goals and visions, influence each other, the reviewed book aspires to fill that gap. And though ambitious, this aspiration is largely met with success.

The publication encompasses ten chapters assembled into four parts. The introduction (written by the editors) asks the main question, namely ‘whether the world’s most integrated regional organization can effectively act within the universal organization’ (p. 3). Effectiveness, one of the key words in the book, is given a threefold interpretation covering at the same time the EU’s effectiveness as an international actor (internal effectiveness), the EU’s effectiveness at the UN (external effectiveness) and the EU’s contribution at the UN (effective multilateralism). The second key word, multilateralism, is understood in a more canonic way, designating, according to Ruggie’s definition, ‘an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct’ (p. 5). The third key term, Europeanisation, is again marked by uncertainty, referring, in accordance with Olsen’s approach, to a plural set of concepts linked to the European integration process, such as changes in external boundaries or development of institutional capacity.

The first part (by Mary Farrell) dwells on the general issue of EU representation and coordination within the UN. It reveals that this sphere is marked by a disparity between the two dimensions of the EU integration, the inter-governmental dimension being represented by the EU presidency and the supranational dimension finding its mouthpiece in the EU Commission delegations or ad hoc missions. The relation between the two dimensions and their representatives remains complicated, occasionally forcing outsiders to ask the old Kissingerian question of ‘who do I call if I want to call Europe?’.

The second part draws attention to three groups of EU states and their performance at the UN. The first group (discussed by Christopher Hill) is constituted by the two EU states occupying the permanent seats at the UN Security Council, France and the UK. These two ‘medium powers of the first rank’ (p. 50) stick to their privileged position that they view as the last sign of their erstwhile international fame.
and a tool for global self-projection. Determined to keep the status quo, the two states not only fight against the idea of a single European seat at the Security Council, but also largely ignore the obligation to ‘ensure the defence of the positions and interests of the Union’ (Article J.5) imposed on them by the Treaty of Maastricht, thus practicing a controversial politics of ‘disjointed multilateralism’ (p. 68).

The second group of states (discussed by Katie Verlin Laatikainen) consists of middle powers, i.e. states that tend to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, embrace compromise positions in international disputes and promote notions of good international citizenship. In the EU, the Netherlands, with its tradition of economic and political liberalism, human rights advocacy and development support, and the Nordic countries, champions of bridge-building across camps, are typical examples of middle powers. Whereas for decades, those states were among the most fervent adherents of the UN, more recently they have seen their position shaken by the creation of a common European foreign policy that discourages individual EU states as well as subregional groupings from pursuing independent initiatives, forcing them to adopt unified European positions.

The third group (discussed by Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués) includes the new EU members from Central and Eastern Europe, which joined the organisation just recently in 2004/2007. The author, basing her conclusion on a quantitative analysis of the voting behaviour of EU members in the General Assembly, draws attention to an unexpected coherence of opinions between the old and new members, manifested in all spheres of the GA agenda (environment, development, human rights, security). Moreover she demonstrates that the EU enlargement has started a two-way process at the UN, in which the newcomers adapt themselves to common European standards, whereas the old members agree to have the priority agenda enriched by topics such as minorities protection or criminality prevention.

The third part discusses the EU’s performance in four key UN policy arenas, those of collective security, economic and social affairs, human rights and environment. The chapter on collective security (by Sven Biscop and Edith Driskens) presents the EU as an indispensable, though not always unanimous actor, which is strong in conflict prevention but only slowly asserts itself in battlefield situations. Confronted with its member states’ divergent political interests and with the traditional European preference for ‘soft’ solutions, the Union has difficulties to satisfy the four criteria of effective international actors: recognition, authority, autonomy and cohesion. A strong EU foreign minister and a single EU seat at the Security Council would probably help to enhance the EU image and performance in the area but they seem hard to realise in the current setting.

The EU engagement in economic and social affairs (discussed by Paul Taylor) displays a constant tension between two opposite logics: the logic of synthesis, promoting adoption of common EU policies, and the logic of diversity, favouring
unilateralism. The author enlists arguments upholding each of the logics, and reveals that their combination makes the EU appear as an active but heterogeneous player. Attention is furthermore drawn to mechanisms used to enhance the common European approach, such as the participation of the EU Commission in international organisations or the practice of enunciating uniform principles of policy by the member states. Finally, two strategies by which the EU pursues its policies in outside forums, incorporation and inter-institutional linkages, are presented.

The third arena, human rights (discussed by Karen E. Smith), belongs among the sensitive spheres where the EU member states have a hard time deciding whether to act alone, in regional subgroups or at the EU level. The Union strives to achieve unity by promoting the practices of common statements and explanations, sponsored resolutions and enhancing voting cohesion, but faced with the plurality of national interests, it is not always successful. Moreover, the EU’s record at the UN is hampered by its wish to keep freedom of action and by the fact that the EU itself did not so far have its human rights record put under international control.

Finally, the environmental agenda (discussed by Chad Damro), while displaying similar confusion related to the questions of ‘who represents?’, ‘who signs and ratifies?’, and ‘who implements?’ as the other arenas, can be seen as a success story. Far from being a mere passive participant, as is often the case in the previous spheres, the EU frequently behaves here as a true frontrunner who sets the agenda, militates for it and draws others to join. This is clearly illustrated by the role that the EU played in the negotiations leading to the adoption and ratification of the Kyoto protocol on climate change.

The fourth part of the book (by Knud Erik Jorgensen) brings up the general question of why the EU, unlike the USA, tends to prefer multilateralism even outside its own also multilateral framework. Three groups of other factors are identified, namely internal factors (interest groups, political system, the executive, political culture, military weakness) linked to the EU system, external factors (distribution of power, other governments, international interaction, international organizations) having to do with outside actors and processes, and constitutive factors, added to break the inside/outside dichotomy.

In spite of the plurality of authors, the reviewed publication manages to keep a rare coherency and to provide readers with a clear message. This message indicates that while the EU surely counts as an important player at the UN, the degree of its internal coherence, as well as the level of its involvement, differs across various spheres of activities. Otherwise said, the EU brings a valuable contribution to the effective multilateralism but it could do more both in its internal and external effectiveness score. Apart from that, all chapters hint at the fact that the Europeanisation, though generally positive, also has its drawbacks. Externally, it questions the value of state membership at the UN. Internally, it turns the EU into an in-
flexible and reactionary actor, which spends more time looking for a balance between ‘insiders’ than listening to ‘outsiders’ and which is unable to compromise once adopted positions.

Whereas some particular findings may raise objections, the publication as a whole makes a highly convincing impression. It is so not only because the chapters display a high degree of convergence, but also thanks to the fact that the authors seek to take an unbiased stance, presenting both assets and failures of EU actions at the UN. All in all, the book sets a high standard that scholars interested in the matter will not find easy to overcome.

Veronika Bílková
Ian Shapiro: Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy against Global Terror


On the eve of the presidential elections year, Ian Shapiro comes with a sharp and brilliant critique of the Bush Doctrine, offering a constructive and viable alternative in the form of the once again revived containment strategy. Ian Shapiro is Sterling Professor of Political Science at Yale University and Henry R. Luce Director of the MacMillan Centre for International and Area Studies. In his research work, Shapiro concentrates on theories of justice, democracy and political theory. He has won several awards and fellowships during his academic career, including his election as a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2000.1 Shapiro is known for his vigorous writing style, which has remained his characteristic this time as well. In his book, Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy against Global Terror, Shapiro dismisses the Bush Doctrine as something that should never have been developed in the first place, not to mention promoting it as a universal truth and giving the international community the choice to either accept it as such or to become an enemy comparable to the ones the Doctrine is aimed at. Shapiro’s greatest concern is the abandonment of the criminal justice consensus after the 9/11 events and the Democrats’ inertia to do anything about it. Shapiro argues that containment is still capable of addressing the current threats and defending the Americans and their democracy. Containment, as Shapiro shows, naturally results from the democratic principle of non-dominance, and as such can gradually wipe out the widespread notion of the United States as a nation of imperialists, which the Bush policy makers have so blithely fostered.

The first three chapters of the book deal with the vacuum the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon created and how it was filled with the 2002 National Security Strategy. The Republicans, as Shapiro conveys, have rewritten their foreign policy literally overnight without any serious discussion about it and without any discontent voices being heard from the loyal opposition’s benches. (pp. 1–2) Shapiro describes the complete freeze-up of the Democrats in the wake of the terrorist attacks and their incapability to act as a viable opponent and to formulate any strategy of their own. In the preface, Shapiro atomizes the reasons for the Democrats’ failure and also describes the background of the birth of the new Republican foreign policy as introduced in 2002. In the first chapter, Shapiro displays the Democratic failure to form a strong security strategy during the 2004 election campaign and concludes that ‘you can’t beat something with nothing’. He further observes that to win [e.g. the elections], you ‘[have] to formulate an alternative and demonstrate its superiority and attractiveness,’ which he intends to do in his book. (p. 4)
After having expressed disappointment about the end of the criminal justice consensus in chapter two, which basically summarized the executive authorities’ dismissal of the criminal justice system as incapable of dealing with the terrorist threat, Shapiro moves to describe the new national security doctrine. He goes back to 2002, when President Bush introduced the new *National Security Strategy*. Mr. Bush denounced the doctrines of deterrence and containment as not suitable to fight the threats confronting America today. (p. 16) Shapiro points out six main areas in which the new Bush Doctrine radically differs from Republican orthodoxy and American security policy as defined before the 9/11 attacks. These are: the ‘worldwide scope of the policy, unilateralism, recasting of the policy of the pre-emptive war, the regime change rationale, ban on neutrality and the condition of permanent war.’ (pp. 19–28) Shapiro analyses these six diversions from the pre-9/11 security policy and observes that not only are some of these features twisted, unsuitably used and opportunistically misused, but they also lead to the inevitable conclusion – which even the Doctrine itself unwittingly admits when talking about permanent war – that the war on terror is unsustainable. (p. 30) Yet, Shapiro remarks that even though the Doctrine is on the road to perdition, there is still so much damage that it can cause during its retreat that it is unthinkable to let it slowly fade away. Shapiro voices ‘an urgent need for the alternative [he pro- pounded] here,’ (p. 31) this alternative being a return to the doctrine of deterrence and containment.

The main argument made for containment in the fourth chapter is closely linked to democratic principles. Shapiro explains:

*For the United States to be committed to undermining domination in the world without seeking to establish its own supremacy is to affirm a principle that flows naturally out of its democratic raison d’Être, and it can appeal to those who harbour democratic inclinations everywhere.* (p. 36)

Simply put, the success of containment lies in the principle to defend American democracy and in supporting democratic efforts around the world without imposing democracy with guns and by the means of bullying. The second key principle concludes that engagement in wars for ‘peripheral reasons’ (pp. 34–35) casts the U.S. in the role of imperialists, mostly without there being any bigger success to override this negative image when the war is over. The Bush Doctrine, Shapiro boldly pronounces, ‘is a raw assertion of American might,’ (p. 52) and he follows this statement with examples of the way American unilateralism damaged the moral image of the United States abroad in a relatively small lapse of time. On the other hand, Shapiro continues, containment’s ‘intimate link to the project of preserving the U.S. as a democracy [...] and its compatibility with widely accepted ethical systems, give it a principled basis that the Bush Doctrine [...] lacks.’ (p. 53)
The fifth chapter deals with the question of the realism of containment in the post-9/11 era.

The twin towers and Pentagon onslaught has smashed the idea that America is rich and secure enough that it can consider itself invulnerable and immune to any current threats. (p. 56) New threats have been named, and a consensus has been reached about the necessity of adoption of new strategies and tactics. Shapiro takes the new threats as identified by the Bush administrative one by one and by the means of careful and objective analysis proves that these are neither new nor invincible. Most importantly, he demonstrates that these threats can be contained.

The sixth chapter returns to democracy as an argument for containment. Shapiro makes a few key points with regard to how the spread of democratic values around the world should be approached to comply with the ‘democratic understanding of non-domination.’ (p. 102) Among these principles belong, according to Shapiro, ‘[avoiding] uniting potential adversaries by demonizing them, improving relations with allies, supporting indigenous democratic movements without fighting their battles for them and [fostering] pluralism and competition within the Islamic world.’ (pp. 104–117) Shapiro also conveys that the U.S. should help improve economic conditions in the developing world to ensure the survival of the newly established democracies. (p. 118)

The last chapter – Our Present Peril – summarizes the arguments made for containment throughout the book, and the author returns to the principal motivating factor that lead him to take up the case of indictment of the Bush Doctrine. In the preface, Shapiro stated that his aim was to present a superior and attractive alternative (p. 4) to the current National Security Policy. Without a doubt, he succeeded in that with a logic, persuasiveness and unobtrusiveness that put the belligerent Bush Doctrine to its knees. The power of this book lies not in the strength of Shapiro’s language or tone, which is often criticized in his style. It presides in the strength of his argument. All of his arguments are exceedingly well structured, explicit and clear. At the same time, Shapiro avoids generalization and simplifying. He focuses on all the main points and arguments of the Bush Doctrine and manages to prove them self-serving, wrong or leading to catastrophic international consequences. More importantly, Shapiro substantiates the argument that containment should be the successor of the Bush Doctrine. He proves it to be realistic, capable of facing current threats and immune to the opportunism that corrupts the image of America abroad. He also makes a bright inquiry into why no reasonable alternative to the neo-conservative security and foreign policy has materialized yet and why the Democrats have stood dumbfounded and have been doing nothing about it. Shapiro implies that even if the Democrats retook the White House next year, without a strong alternative to the Bush Doctrine they stand little chance to suc-
REVIEWs

...cessfully ward off the crises the Doctrine has created or intensified over the time of its existence. Containment as outlined by Ian Shapiro seems to be the most suitable candidate for such a strategy.

Veronika Šússova

ENDNOTES

1 Yale University, 31st Oct. 2006, 28th Nov. 2007; www.yale.edu/polisci/people/ishapiro.html.
In the post-Cold War period, Europe has become the theatre of an ambitious project of liberal-democratic transformation of CEECs via Western international organizations. This book is an attempt to theorize the international socialization efforts of European regional organizations (socializing agencies) to disseminate constitutive rules and norms (democracy and human rights, among others) of the Western international community in Eastern European transition countries. The main task is to decipher patterns, processes, and outcomes of international socialization by asking specifically ‘how’ and ‘when’ this process has taken place in Europe and under what conditions and with which mechanisms it is operated. It is also a case-oriented qualitative research project in that the authors try to figure out the conditions and mechanisms of European socialization agencies (NATO, EU, OSCE, and CE) on democratic transformation countries by putting nine ‘norm-violating’ states under the spotlight on a case-by-case basis: Belarus, Northern Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Turkey.

For the sake of clarity, the book can be analyzed in three main parts. Chapters 2 to 4 are devoted to the ‘synthetic’ theoretical approach of the authors, namely to ‘strategic action in the international community’ and its application to international socialization. In the second part (chapters 5 to 13) nine problematic target countries undergoing international socialization are presented as case studies. Apart from the socialization process and dynamics, selected cases in the book guide the reader through a useful overview of the political and socio-economic panorama of accession and associate countries, actual members and potential candidates as well. Those case studies also inform the reader about the relations between the selected countries with the EU as well as about fundamental stumbling blocks on their way to EU membership. The bulk of the cases, except for Belarus, confirm the relevance of the rationalist bargaining approach and the core hypothesis of the book. The last three chapters (chapters 14 to 16) present a systematic comparison of the cases by using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) so as to draw a holistic picture of conditions of compliance and reach theoretical generalizations. Before proceeding with some conclusions on theory and policy, the authors study ‘long-run’ patterns and dynamics and medium-term effects of international socialization in a larger group of states and examine how they produced different patterns of socialization in the longer term. To account for the variance in the socialization of different countries, the authors propose that ‘the effectiveness of inter-
national socialization will depend on the party constellations in the target countries and their respective domestic power costs of compliance’ (p. 245). The authors conclude that the socialization process taking place between socialization agencies and target states is a ‘rationalist bargaining process’ whose success depends on the size and credibility of the material incentives offered by European regional organizations and the domestic power costs inflicted on target states.

International socialization is basically defined as a ‘process in which states are induced to adopt the constitutive rules of an international community’ (p. 2). It is a process leading to ‘rule-adoption’ by the target states. Since rules are regarded as articulations of other intersubjective content of socialization like identity, norms, values, and beliefs, the state has to achieve membership of the community organizations to become fully ‘socialized’. The possibility of a shift from the logic of consequences to the logic of appropriateness is rejected by the authors on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Indeed, the authors acknowledge in the end that ‘different logics operate on different time periods.’ For example, the logic of consequences and its strategy of political conditionality require behavioural compliance in a short span of time, whereas the logic of appropriateness, by its concomitant strategy of persuasion, arguing and social influence, needs a longer amount of time to take place. This position not only contradicts with their understanding of ‘socialization’ but also with their rejection of the likelihood of transition from one logic to the other. This is because it is argued that successful international socialization occurs once the international bargaining power of the Western community (in the form of threats and promises) is replaced by a domestic enforcement mechanism to guarantee rule compliance rather than through an internalization of norms and values via learning, persuasion and endured interaction, which requires time. Indeed, the reader can be confused by such a pre-given and ‘limited’ understanding of ‘socialization’ since, firstly, it curtails the explanatory power of the constructivist ground from the outset and announces a premature triumph of a rationalist perspective. The second reason is that the basic indicator of compliance is regarded as legal rule adoption such as passing a law or signing a treaty. Yet, the authors do not check and indeed admittedly omit implementation and subsequent rule-conforming behaviour consistently. This negligence, in turn, contradicts with their particular conceptualization of a rule-conforming and membership-based ‘successful socialization’. Thus, the question arises as to how to observe a successful socialization, by definition, in the absence of an exogenous enforcement mechanism (namely membership). The authors’ particular understanding of socialization also falls short of EU’s meritocratic socialization strategy, giving primary importance to ‘implementation’. As the Latvian case illustrates, even after Latvia gained its membership to the EU, ‘statelessness’ still remains a fundamental problem. Latvia’s full compliance on paper and its resulting ‘successful’ socialization do not necessarily pave the way for compliance in practise.
Theoretically, the attraction of the book lies in the fact that it seeks to contribute to the lively debate between rationalist and constructivist research agendas by elaborating their validity and relevance with regard to ‘European’ experience. The authors claim to develop a ‘synthetic’ theoretical approach to the study of international socialization, namely, ‘strategic action in the international community’, by combining two perspectives. While the OSCE, CE, NATO and EU act as socializers to expand liberal and political values and norms, it has also been observed that international socialization in Europe after the Cold War has been highly instrumental and strategic in character. Although the title sounds like a ‘hybrid’ theoretical implication, deeper analysis displays a reconfirmation of a ‘rationalist bargaining approach’ with minor modifications.

As revealed by the comparative case studies, the EU and NATO have opted for a material reinforcement strategy known as conditionality (tangible incentives such as assistance, institutional ties and membership) in addition to ‘social reinforcement’ whereas the OSCE and CE rely exclusively on social incentives like influence, persuasion and argumentation. To underline ‘hybridity’, the authors point out that social incentives are seen as insufficient per se in bringing about rule conformance unless they are complemented by the material incentives of the EU and NATO (political conditionality with a membership perspective). Consequently, in contravention of initial claims of combining two logics, the rationalist approach prevails in the core hypothesis of the book as already confirmed by most of the cases: only the credible reward of EU/NATO membership and low domestic political cost (unless it does not lead to a fall of the government or a regime change) are ‘both individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of successful socialization.’

According to the authors, the rationalist bargaining process which is directed towards socialization is not immune from normative restraints due to the existence of ‘community effects of rhetorical action, legitimation, and social influence’ which go beyond material considerations. It is acknowledged that community organizations pursue reinforcement by reward strategy in situations of ‘low interdependence.’ Seen from this angle, high-cost military interventions of the NATO in ex-Yugoslavia and the Eastern enlargement strategy of the EU and NATO seem difficult to reconcile with rationalist expectations of low-cost socialization efforts. These deviations are merely justified by the normative community effects mentioned above. The high explanatory power attributed to ‘community effects’ appears to be troublesome because the ‘normativeness’ of NATO’s motivations in the Balkans and enlargement towards the East could be well seen as ‘material’ and ‘instrumental’ rather than ‘normative’ once we consider NATO’s bid for a new raison d’etre, the likelihood of the spread of ethnic conflicts, the Russian factor and the endurance of American primacy as additional ‘material’ factors. Likewise, the EU had -material- motivations to bear additional costs in admitting new members as evidenced by
the massive technical and financial support given to CEECs. Indeed, material considerations of the Union like access to new markets for goods and services, blocking future refugee flows, hindering the spread of violent conflicts, and curbing Russian influence problematize the ‘low interdependence’ argument of the study. Put differently, what is problematic here is not the authors leaving material factors out but rather their assumption of reinforcement by the reward strategy and low-cost socialization efforts of the EU and NATO in situations of ‘low interdependence’. Thus their justification of deviant cases merely by ‘normative restraints’ without specifying material factors looks ambiguous. Since normative restraints are not adequate per se to account for high-cost socialization efforts, the explanatory power of the book’s claim of ‘hybridity’ is reduced. As to the selection of case studies, the content of the chapter on Northern Cyprus should be analysed within a joint chapter dealing with both Cyprus and Turkey for two reasons. First, ‘Northern Cyprus’ is not regarded as a true entity enjoying full sovereignty and all of the attributes of statehood by the international community, as opposed to Montenegro. Second, the ‘Cyprus question’ has been firmly embedded in and even determined by the quality of Turkish-EU relations, as was already revealed by the authors.

The illustrative dimension is strengthened by a variety of figures and tables which refine basic arguments, thereby making the book more reader-friendly. In spite of its linguistic clarity, the content requires prior technical knowledge. It is therefore a well-written supplementary for potential readers rather than a self-sufficient textbook by itself.

Overall, though, this study falls short of providing a consistent synthesis with its inherent rationalist bias and a limited conceptualization of socialization. Despite hardly being a genuine contribution to rationalist/constructivist epistemology, it is well worth reading for a wide audience of academicians as well as professionals interested in ‘socialization’, ‘conditionality’ and the transformation of Eastern Europe.

Burcin Ulug Eryilmaz
Notes on Contributors

VERONIKA BÍLKOVÁ is a research fellow at the Institute of International Relations in Prague and a lecturer in International Law at the Law Faculty of the Charles University in Prague. She graduated from the Law and Philosophical Faculties of the Charles University (Dr., PhD.) and from the European Master’s Degree Program in Human Rights and Democratisation (E.MA). She focuses on international law (especially the use of force, international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and human rights) and international relations (mainly security topics and the UN).

JEAN F. CROMBOIS is Assistant Professor of European Studies at the American University in Bulgaria. He has published on the history of international relations, the history of European integration and more recently on the European Neighbourhood Policy. He has taught in Belgium, Morocco, and Poland as a visiting faculty member and was a Wiener-Anspach Post-doctoral Research Fellow at Balliol College, University of Oxford (1999–2002).

BURCIN ULUG ERYILMAZ holds a B.S. degree in International Relations from the Middle East Technical University, Turkey and received her Master’s degree in European Studies. She is a lecturer at Yasar University and is currently working on her Ph.D. thesis on ‘Europeanization of Turkey’s Cyprus Policy’ in the department of International Relations, Bilkent University, Turkey. Her research interests are European integration, Europeanization of foreign policy and Turkey-European Union relations.

TADEJA FORŠTNER graduated from the International Relations programme at the University in Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences. For her thesis, she conducted a research on the challenges for Slovenia as a small state in the UN. Currently she is a post-graduate student completing her Master Study in International Relations at the University in Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences.

JENS HEINRICH is currently a student of Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Magdeburg. He holds a B.A. in Political Science and History from the University of Greifswald. He is interested in non-proliferation, arms control and missile defence. He was intern at the Hamburg-based Peace Research Institute (IFSH), the European Parliament and the IIR.

MICHEL ANDRÉ HORELT received his MA in International Relations, Contemporary History and Social Psychology in 2007 and is currently PhD Candidate in International Relations at the Geschwister-Scholl-Institute of the Ludwig-Maximilians-University in Munich. He is also working as Research Fellow in the Research Project
'Apologies and Reconciliation in international relations', funded by the German Foundation for Peace Research.

MICHAELA MARKOVA was born in Slovakia and is a student of Political Science in her 8th semester at the University of Vienna, Austria. As a second major, she is studying Arabistic Studies/Oriental Studies and is currently in her 3rd semester in this major. Her main interests are post-conflict peace building, nation and state building, and other security issues such as nuclear proliferation, etc.

TEREZA NOVOTNA is a graduate of Charles University Prague and a doctoral student at Boston University. At present, she is a Visiting Fellow at the Department of Government and the Center for European Studies at Harvard University. She has been working on her dissertation as a DAAD research fellow in Berlin and at IWM in Vienna. She published book chapters and articles in Journal for Contemporary European Research, e-sharp, Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, and Czech Political Science Review.

JUDITH RENNER is a PhD Candidate and Research Fellow at the Geschwister-Scholl-Institute for Political Science at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich, focusing on reconciliation, transitional justice and political apologies.

F. PETER ROŽIČ SJ holds a BA in Philosophy and an MDiv from Centre Sèvres, Paris. He is completing his PhD in the Department of Government, Georgetown University. His research interests include democratization, transitional justice and lustration, and East-Central Europe.

VERONIKA ŠŮSOVÁ has been studying at the Faculty of International Relations of the Economic University in Prague. Her major is International Politics and Diplomacy, with English-American Studies as her minor specialization. Her main research interests are conflict prevention and resolution, geographically she focuses on the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 2007 she became a volunteer with OSCE, taking part in the Election Observation Mission to Ukraine. In the same year, she spent three months at the Institute of International Relations as an intern/Research Assistant.

RACHEL VANDERHILL is currently a Visiting Assistant Professor of International Relations at Wheaton College in Wheaton, Illinois. She is also completing her dissertation, ‘International Pressure and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe’, at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville.

PETER J. VEROŠEK is a PhD student in Political Science at Yale University. After graduating from Dartmouth College, majoring in Government and German Studies,
he spent a year in Slovenia on a Student Fulbright Grant. While there, he conducted research on how memories of World War II continue to affect politics within the former Yugoslavia and in the relations of its successor states with Italy. His current research focuses on how memories of conflict affect identities at both the individual and the state level, thus affecting domestic and inter-state relations.

ZUZANA VILČEKOVÁ graduated from the Faculty of Political Science and International Relations of Matej Bel University in Banska Bystrica, Slovakia, where she obtained a Master’s degree in International Relations and Diplomacy. Currently she is working in the commercial sector. She is particularly interested in the realist theory of international relations, US foreign policy and EU-US mutual relations.
CALL FOR PAPERS/NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

Perspectives is a refereed journal published twice a year by the Institute of International Relations, Prague, Czech Republic. At the present time, it is established as one of the leading journals in Central and Eastern Europe, dealing with a range of issues from international relations theory to contemporary international politics and regional and global issues that affect international relations. Perspectives invites papers and enquiries from interested scholars.

GUIDELINES FOR AUTHORS

The aim of Perspectives is to produce an eclectic mix of articles dealing with various areas of international relations and regional studies. These may include articles on recent history, specialised articles on some legal or political area which affects international affairs, or articles that capture some issue which, while seen from a national perspective, is at the same time of importance at a regional or international level. While there will naturally be some bias towards the Central and East European region, the same principles will also apply to articles from other parts of the world.

The journal publishes three types of articles (Research Articles, Discussions, and Consultations), Book Reviews and Review Essays. Research Articles are full-length papers (between 6,000 and 10,000 words, including endnotes and references) that contain an original contribution to research. Discussions are topical commentaries or essays (between 6,000 and 8,000 words, including endnotes and references) with the aim to provoke scholarly debates. Consultations are full-length papers (between 6,000 and 8,000 words, including endnotes and references) of a descriptive character that bring information on topical international developments or present results of recent empirical research. Each article should be accompanied by a one-paragraph abstract. Book Reviews should not exceed 2,000 words, and Review Essays should be 3,500 words maximum, including endnotes and references. All submissions should be made in electronic form, unless this is impossible for some practical reason.

Notes should be numbered consecutively throughout the article with raised numerals corresponding to the list of notes placed at the end. A list of References should appear after the list of Notes containing all the works referred to, listed alphabetically by author’s surname (or name of sponsoring body if there is no identifiable author). References to literature in the text should be made by giving the author’s name and year of publication, both in parentheses, e.g. (Wendt, 1999).

BOOKS:


BOOKS:


ARTICLES, CHAPTERS FROM BOOKS AND INTERNET SOURCES:


QUOTATION MARKS:

Single in text throughout; double within single; single within indented quotations.

HEADINGS:

Only main headings and subheadings (both non-numbered) should be used in the main body of the text.

DATES AND NUMBERS:

25 February 1999; February 1999; 25 February; the 1990s.

• For submissions of Research Articles, Discussions and Consultations, or general correspondence, please contact the Editors: Petr Kratochvíl at kratochvil@iir.cz or Mats Braun at braun@iir.cz.
• Articles will be reviewed by two anonymous referees.
• For matters related to book reviews, please contact the Book Review Editor Vít Střítecký at stritecky@iir.cz.
• While we welcome reviews of English-language academic books, we encourage authors to submit reviews of academic books published in other languages, including the languages of Central and East European countries.
• Following approval for publication, authors of all articles and reviews should send a short biographical note (80 words maximum) including their institutional affiliation and relevant experience to Petr Kratochvíl at kratochvil@iir.cz.
• Since we encourage authors whose first language is not English to submit writing, we assume that authors will accept language editing.
• Authors of Research Articles, Discussions and Consultations will receive one complimentary copy of the journal and 10 photocopied prints of their article.
• The postal address of the journal is: Perspectives, Institute of International Relations, Nerudova 3, 118 50 Praha 1, Czech Republic.

[Continued on p. 3 cover]
Denting a Heroic Picture: A Narrative Analysis of Collective Memory

The ENP and EU Actions in Conflict Management

The EU and Non-Accession States: The Cases of Belarus and Ukraine

Types of Political Integration