Conceptualizing Multilateralism in Czech Foreign Policy

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Promoting Multilateralism? Conceptualizing Multilateralism in the Czech Foreign Policy

TOMÁŠ WEISS, VĚRA ŘIHÁČKOVÁ

Abstract: Multilateralism is a contested concept that is widely used, but not clearly defined. The paper aims at exploring how multilateralism, legitimacy, and effective multilateralism are conceptualized in the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic is a NATO and EU member state with rather limited foreign policy-making capacity and resources; the views of limited stakeholders on the matter surely influence the country’s position on various international issues and, as such, through the EU and NATO, the international politics as well. This was particularly true in the first half of 2009, when the Czech Republic assumed the EU Council Presidency. The paper concludes that there is no common understanding of the term ‘multilateralism’ among the Czech stakeholders. The way in which particular actors conceptualize multilateralism is rather haphazard. There is no clear pattern set up by ideological affiliations or between politicians and civil servants. By contrast, there are clear ideas about the concept of ‘legitimacy’ in international relations.

Key words: multilateralism, legitimacy, Czech foreign policy, effective multilateralism

As a member of the European Union and NATO, the Czech Republic has been taking part in decisions of regional and global impact that its foreign policy would never have experienced otherwise. The aim of this paper is to map and analyse the Czech conceptualization of the term ‘multilateralism’ and related notions that have recently been very popular in international politics. The Czech stakeholders’ views on the matter surely influence the country’s position on various international issues and, as such, through the EU and NATO, international politics as well. This was particularly true in the first half of 2009, when the Czech Republic assumed the EU Council presidency.

In order to keep the scope focused on foreign and security policy, economic multilateralism will be omitted from the paper. Firstly, whereas economic multilateralism has been widely studied for decades, its importance in foreign and security affairs has been growing since the end of the Cold War. However, there is still a certain confusion about
the concept. Secondly, the Czech Republic has transferred external trade competencies to the EU level and thus has not pursued any high-profile positions in the area.

In this paper, we will first overview the academic debate on multilateralism and its ties to other key notions, such as legitimacy and sovereignty, in order to compare them with the practitioners’ understanding later on. We will also investigate the European Union’s understanding of multilateralism, because the European framework is both affecting the Czech context and being shaped by the Czech positions. Special attention is paid to the term ‘effective multilateralism’ as a key notion of the EU’s foreign policy. In the second part of the paper, we will analyse the Czech understanding of multilateralism as presented in policy documents and among practitioners. At the end, we will draw some conclusions for the Czech foreign policy and offer some options for further research.

SCHOLARLY VIEWS OF MULTILATERALISM

The term ‘multilateralism’ has received a lot of attention during the past few years. With the end of the Cold War and the successful international operation against Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, it seemed that multilateral solutions with UN sponsorship were the future mode for dealing with international security issues. However, the subsequent failure of the UN in the Balkans, NATO’s air strikes against Milošević’s Yugoslavia, and the US-led invasion of Iraq have shown that the picture may be a bit more complicated. In particular, in connection with Kosovo and Iraq, the term ‘multilateralism’ and its alleged opposite, the term ‘unilateralism’, have found their way into everyday politics and journalism. In addition, the term ‘multilateralism’ has appeared in scholarly literature more often as academia reflects the developments of the current political discourse.

Despite being used very often in descriptions of international relations, multilateralism poses a certain problem for the theory of IR (Caporaso, 1992: 604). How one understands why the states behave in a multilateral way implies one’s understanding of the nature of international relations. A structural explanation of multilateralism is different from a functional one; in a structural explanation multilateralism is seen as the independent and normative variable, while in a functional analysis it is understood rather as a product of rational behaviour that minimizes costs, curbs inefficiency and increases one’s gains. For the sake of simplification, a similar dichotomy related to the role of multilateralism is that of realist-inspired concepts or approaches versus neo-liberal institutionalism (Keohane, 1990) or Ruggie’s institutionalist approach (Ruggie, 1992), which sees multilateralism rather as an ideological modus operandi. In foreign policy practice, however, it seems that the understandings of those modalities are rather mixed and messier.

Even though there are many articles that talk about multilateralism, there is no single definition of the term – either among policy-makers or among scholars (Van
This does not mean that there have not been attempts to define the term. On the contrary, too many scholars have defined multilateralism in too many different and often contradictory ways.

The simplest way of defining multilateralism has been offered by Robert O. Keohane, who considers multilateralism ‘the practice of co-ordinating national policies in groups of three or more states’ (Keohane, 1990: 731). Such a definition follows the semantic interpretation of the word and does not pay attention to the circumstances of the particular coordination. According to this view, every interaction with more than two participants is multilateral, regardless of whether the coordination occurs only once or regularly, whether it is institutionalized or ad hoc.

Others, such as John Gerard Ruggie, argue that the simple semantic definition misses the qualitative dimension of the phenomenon (Ruggie, 1992: 566). The important element of multilateralism is not the mere number of participants, but the kinds of relationships that they have among themselves. In multilateral relations, the participants are guided by common principles of conduct observed by each and every one among them. Thus, the definition should be altered as follows: ‘multilateralism refers to coordinating relations among three or more states on the basis of “generalized” principles of conduct’ (Ruggie, 1992: 571). This definition still does not explicitly state that the coordination among the states should occur regularly. It does, however, require set standards of cooperation that implicitly lead to institutionalization. Indeed, Ruggie considers multilateralism ‘a generic institutional form of modern international life’ (Ruggie, 1992: 567).

Scholars still use these definitions, although they originate from the years just after the end of the Cold War. Examples may appear in a work by Corbeta and Dixon inspired by Keohane, or Krause’s paper, which uses the definition by Ruggie (cf. Corbeta and Dixon, 2004; Krause, 2004).

Lately, the generalized principle of conduct has been mainly associated with the UN system (especially the UN Security Council on issues of international security). While not defining multilateralism explicitly, Álvaro de Vasconcelos addresses the UN system when arguing that ‘unfair representation in the institutions of global governance contributes to weakening multilateralism’ (de Vasconcelos, 2008: 23). Ruggie noted that the UN considered what is ‘duly authorized by a multilateral forum’ to be multilateral, labelling everything else as ‘multinational’ (Ruggie, 1992: footnote 18). Other scholars recognize a specific quality of the UN, but broaden the picture with other types of multilateralism that also deserve the label. Van Oudenaren describes three such types, based on actors: besides the ‘global multilateralism’ embodied in the UN and the Bretton Woods system, he also lists the ‘Atlantic multilateralism’, which is based on the sharing of costs and risks between Europeans and Americans, and the specific ‘European multilateralism’, which involves the costs and benefits of sharing among European countries (Van Oudenaren,
2005: 3). Examining multilateralism within a topic-oriented approach, Krause also considers collective security within the UN as, at its core, a special form of multilateralism that deserves specific attention (Krause, 2004: 44).

The main reason for the specific position of the United Nations among other forms of multilateralism constitutes the question of legitimacy. Robert Cooper declares that the UN ‘remains the primary source of legitimacy in international affairs’ (Cooper, 2004: 167). However, the relationship between multilateralism (or multilateral organizations) and legitimacy is very complicated.

Van Oudenaren ascribes to Europeans the easiest way of combining multilateralism and legitimacy (in the case of the use of force): a multilateral institution, specifically the UNSC, is the only body that can give the authorization. He puts the European position in opposition to the alleged US view of UN approval being desirable but not essential (Van Oudenaren, 2005: 25). The US view, as presented by Van Oudenaren, implies that there are other sources of legitimacy outside the UNSC framework. However, he does not specify what these sources are.

Leaving aside the other potential sources of legitimacy, Keohane even questions the legitimacy provided by international organizations, including the UN. Inspired by Fritz Scharpf’s work, he distinguishes two particular types of legitimacy: output- and input-driven legitimacy. The former lies in achievements of the substantive purposes of the organization, the latter in the qualities of processes by which decisions are reached (Keohane, 2006: 3). Keohane argues that although the UN and multilateralism have relied on output legitimacy rhetorically, in reality they have been inefficient. In order to be effective, multilateral organizations must be legitimate in their processes. Input legitimacy thus conditions output legitimacy (Keohane, 2006: 4–5).

Giovanni Grevi indirectly contests this concept when addressing the UNSC reform. He calls for a balance ‘between inclusiveness and efficiency or, in other words, between legitimacy and credibility’ (Grevi, 2008: 162). In other words, this means that there is a tension between input legitimacy (‘legitimacy’) and output legitimacy (‘credibility’), according to Grevi, and that we must balance them against each other.

Yet, other scholars use the term differently, in the sense of output legitimacy. For example, de Vasconcelos warns that if it were powerless in the face of genocide, the international community would lose its legitimacy (de Vasconcelos, 2008: 29). Similarly, Cooper insists that in order to remain legitimate, the UN must become effective (Cooper, 2004: 168).

The effect of multilateral organizations has been tightly connected with the notion of sovereignty. Once again, however, scholars do not agree on the type of link between the two. On one hand, for Christian Reus-Smit, sovereignty is one of three ‘constitutional structures’ that have resulted in multilateralism (Reus-Smit, 1997: 556). Without sovereignty, multilateralism would not have emerged in the form it has
today. Analogically, Miles Kahler argues that multilateralism is associated with ‘the sovereign equality of states’ (Kahler, 1992: 681). On the other hand, de Vasconcelos explains India’s, China’s, and Russia’s preference for bilateralism by their “strong sovereignty” posture (de Vasconcelos, 2008: 27).

To sum up, academia is not unified on what should be considered multilateralism, or on what its relations are to legitimacy and sovereignty. As we will show, this is the case of European politics too, although the European Union has made multilateralism its core foreign policy programme.

THE EUROPEAN UNION’S VISION OF MULTILATERALISM

Multilateralism is a natural selection for the European Union’s external activities. When the EU promotes multilateralism, it actually promotes itself, because ‘[its] own model of integration is the most advanced form of multilateralism’ (de Vasconcelos, 2008: 18). When presenting its ideas about international relations, the EU explicitly refers to its own experience. Therefore, it is no surprise that the commitment to multilateralism is presented as ‘a defining principle of [EU’s] external policy’ (European Commission, 2003: 3).

The EU argues that security and prosperity depend more and more on an effective international system. Moreover, it has a rather clear idea of what this system is and what its key parts are. It consists of many multilateral organizations, but it has the UN at its very core. According to the European Security Strategy (ESS), the UN Charter is ‘the fundamental framework of international relations’ with the UNSC having ‘the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’ (European Council, 2003: 9). The EU views itself as a potential ‘central pillar of the UN system’ (European Commission, 2003: 3) and maintains extensive relations with the United Nations (cf. European Union, 2004).

Clearly, the European Union’s understanding of multilateralism goes beyond numbers to norms. The EU calls for a rule-based international order. The idea of rules guiding and limiting states’ behaviour stems again from Europeans’ own experiences. The supremacy of European law has been one of the key factors in creating an internal market. Hence, the EU commits itself to ‘upholding and developing International Law’ (European Council, 2003: 9), which mirrors European law at the global level. The EU’s commitment to rules is also reflected in the vivid support of the International Criminal Court (one of the issues that allegedly prove the existence of both the European multilateral approach and the American unilateral approach).

The legitimacy of action is also searched for in international law and at the United Nations. The legal basis for the EU’s common foreign and security policies (CFSP), Article 11 of the Treaty on the European Union, refers to the conformity with the UN Charter in two out of the five main objectives listed – in particular, in connection with
peace and international security. All the main documents developing the CFSP recognize the ‘primary responsibility’ of the UNSC for international security (European Council, 1999: par. 26) or specify the role of the EU as ‘supporting an international order based on effective multilateralism within the UN’ (European Council, 2004: par. 1).

A more complicated picture, however, can be found at the level of the member states. Krause has drawn a schematic but useful picture of three distinctive approaches to multilateralism within the EU (Krause, 2004: 48–52). Moreover, although we can hardly expect the EU to carry out any significant activity without a UNSC mandate, we have witnessed this in the case of the member states. The most visible operation of this sort was the NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia in 1999, during which the UN mandate was completely missing. Unlike the case of the Iraqi invasion, where the participants insisted on being backed by their interpretation of a respective UNSC resolution, the NATO operations during the Kosovo crisis were clearly illegal in terms of international law (cf. Falk, 2004: 41–42; Wheeler, 2000). And still, every EU member that was also a member of NATO supported the operation.

The EU reflects the changing concept of legitimacy (and sovereignty) in today’s world, which has been largely connected with the conception of ‘human security’ (cf. Ferrero-Waldner, 2006) and the ‘responsibility to protect’ (Council of the European Union, 2005: 2008a). The changes are not projected into abandoning the UN Charter or international law, but rather into calls for adjusting the law to the current needs, a measure that was partly heeded at the UN World Summit in 2005. But the UNSC resolution has remained the final arbiter and source of legitimacy in the system.

The European Security Strategy has introduced the concept of ‘effective multilateralism’ as the ultimate goal of international system building. The term describes a situation where international relations are carried out within the framework of the UN Charter through international organizations, regimes, and treaties that are ‘ready to act when their rules are broken’ (European Council, 2003: 9). Although the objective is clearly set, it is not as clear how to get there, especially when the key body of the system, the UNSC, fails to act in many cases and has successfully resisted any reform. However, this has not prevented the European Union from referring to effective multilateralism in virtually all key documents and joint declarations with its partners (cf. European Council, 2004; 2007; 2008b).

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY

As we have shown, multilateralism is a contested concept which is widely used but not clearly defined. Even though the EU prefers one particular interpretation of the term, we have seen that the member states may deviate in their practical policy.

The Czech Republic has been an EU and NATO member for more than five and ten years, respectively. As such, it takes part in the unanimous decision-making of the
EU Council as well as the North Atlantic Council on various topics where multilateralism, legitimacy, and ‘effective multilateralism’ show up in the debate and the texts of declarations. Due to the unanimous decision-making in both councils, the Czech Republic’s position influences world politics to a far greater extent than its size and power would have allowed otherwise. Naturally, in the core of any position is a specific understanding of the key terms and relations. Our aim is, therefore, to learn how multilateralism is conceptualized in the Czech Republic’s foreign policy-making and by its respective stakeholders.

There have been two main sources of information for this article. Firstly, an analysis of relevant documents issued by the government, its ministries, and the country’s political parties has been made. Secondly, semi-structured interviews using open questions with senior civil servants and representatives from political parties were conducted, aiming at the people responsible for the formulation of Czech foreign policy. The media debate has been largely omitted because it suffers from politicization and domestic, policy-driven considerations, having arguably little effect on actual foreign policies that are conducted by a narrow group of experts, as argued below.

Three main questions were posed:
- What is multilateralism/multilateral action?
- What is the source of legitimacy in international relations?
- What is effective multilateralism?

A number of current issues of international policy where multilateral solutions are being searched for have also been addressed in the interviews: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Darfur, the Iranian nuclear programme, and Kosovo’s independence. These concrete examples have served as a verification and specification of the more theoretical questions on multilateralism and legitimacy. The selection of the examples has been based on the timely agenda routinely connected with multilateralism/the United Nations in the public debate with the assumption that more tangible situations would provide for more detailed answers by the interviewees.

CONCEPTS OF MULTILATERALISM IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

The term ‘multilateralism’ often appears in relevant Czech foreign policy documents. The 2003 Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, which presents the core ideas of Czech strategic thinking about international relations, declares that the Czech Republic ‘prefers multilateral methods of solving international issues and security problems’ (Government of the Czech Republic, 2003a: 11). The same can be said about the documents and statements of the country’s political parties that use the term routinely.

The majority of the parties consider multilateralism an important factor in international relations. But their positions differ along the lines that Caporaso defines as
‘multilateralism as a means’ and ‘multilateralism as an end’ (1992: 603). The Social Democrats see multilateralism as a ‘key aspect of the security concept of the international system’ and declare the ‘multilateral world’ to be their long-term objective (ČSSD, 2005: 21). They even regard unilateral solutions as ‘a considerable hazard’ (Ibid.: 15). Similarly, the Christian Democrats list ‘multilateral diplomacy’ among their foreign policy pillars (KDU-ČSL, 2006: 82). They want the Czech Republic to ‘continue playing an important role in multilateral diplomacy’ (Ibid.: 83). Both parties clearly tend to see multilateralism as a value per se. The Civic Democrats, on the other hand, state in their last election programme that ‘[international and supranational organizations] are no goals of a policy as such, but only a means to conduct it’ (ODS, 2006: 53).

However, no written document offers a precise definition of the notion, leaving the exact meaning of the statements (and thus, the policy) open to interpretation. Indeed, when asked directly, Czech foreign policy actors differ hugely in what they understand as multilateral. In fact, all the definitions extracted from the scholarly literature in this paper are represented among politicians and civil servants in the Czech Republic. For some of them, the word ‘multilateral’ describes everything that concerns more than two parties. Others also view the number of parties as important but add that the parties must share a common interest. This group does not specify more closely the nature of the necessary interest – whether it is enough if the parties seek to find a solution acceptable for all of them on a disputed issue or if they should have a common position vis-à-vis another party and pursue it. In the former case, there would be no substantial difference apart from the definition that focuses on the mere number of participants. In the latter case, at least an ad hoc coalition would be necessary to fulfil the criterion.

Similarly to Ruggie, some Czech actors emphasize the procedures when defining multilateralism. They insist that it is not enough to have three or more parties, but it is rather necessary that their ability to unify their objectives be based on rules that are commonly accepted and adhered to.4

Moreover, there is a significant part of Czech foreign policy-makers that match multilateralism directly to the United Nations and the derived system of fora, agencies, and organizations. This way of understanding multilateralism seems to be influenced by the latest developments in international policy, such as the Iraq War and the related debates. One interviewee defined multilateralism as a tool ‘to get the US out of the game.’ Another one hesitated between definitions based on the number of parties and those based on the UN system, but subsequently went on to comment on the UN system.

To sum up, there is no common understanding of multilateralism in the Czech Republic. The relevant actors cover the whole spectrum of definitions with no clear preference for any of the poles. What is also important to note is that there is no clear
pattern of any of the cleavages influencing the actors’ views. Neither a politician/civil servant distinction nor the left-right cleavage among politicians influences the way the actors define multilateralism.

LEGITIMACY
There are various views of legitimacy in international relations among the Czech actors as well, even though the differences are not as extensive as in the case of the definition of multilateralism. There are some who argue that effectiveness equals legitimacy, or in other words, they put the emphasis on ‘output legitimacy.’ Their voice is, nevertheless, rather marginal.

The main group of actors clearly prefers legitimization through the United Nations, in particular, the Security Council. However, the importance of the UNSC resolution divides this group into two main camps: those who see the UN as the only source of legitimacy and those who are ready to accept other sources too. These two camps largely follow the left-right cleavage of the Czech political spectrum.

The Communist Party puts a great emphasis on the United Nations and international law. In the 2006 election programme, the Communists not only opposed sending Czech troops abroad without a UN mandate, but they also argued that ‘every armed intervention against any state that does not correspond to international law and, above all, is not in line with a UNSC decision [...] should be considered as an aggression and a war crime with all of the consequences that entails’ (KSČM, 2006). Despite the fact that in a personal interview with the authors, a Communist deputy defined legitimacy in international relations as an ‘acceptance by others,’ the party documents are very clear and consistent in emphasizing the role of the UN Charter and of international law (including the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states) (cf. KSČM, 2004; 2007: 6).

The Czech Social Democrats also accentuate the role of the United Nations. They argue that legitimacy derives from the mandate. They emphasize the UN as the ‘basic tool for problem solving’ and accept any use of force only in cases where it is inevitable ‘in accordance with international law’ (ČSSD, 2005: 21). The party admits that an ex post legitimization of an action is possible in exceptional cases, but this is undesirable because the legitimization is not guaranteed and it is impossible to define what should be considered an exceptional case.

The Green Party shares a very similar view. In an interview, one of the party’s ministers emphasized the role of the United Nations. He also recognized that, depending on the number of states that accept the initiative, there might be a legitimate action beyond the UN framework. Due to the impossibility to define the number required and the negative impact on the system, however, such a practice must be regarded as unfavourable.
By contrast, although recognizing the importance of a UN mandate, the right-wing parties and politicians search for legitimacy in a wider range of sources. The common factors that play a role for both parties are values and alliances. The UN is seen as malfunctioning. A missing UN mandate is not seen as a disqualifying factor – in the words of a minister for the KDU-ČSL: ‘Should we require Lukashenka’s or Chavez’s approval?’ The legitimacy is seen as stemming from doing ‘the right thing.’ Others argue that legitimacy remains with parliamentary democracy and that parliamentary consent legitimizes an international action. The legitimacy of an action is largely seen as an ad hoc question, too complex to be tied up by set rules. An ODS deputy argued in a personal interview that it was impossible to say whether the agreement of any institution was necessary because organizations always work very slowly. It is thus the consultation and the fact that the Czech Republic’s security (or that of its allies) is endangered that matter. The principle of equality among states is abandoned (‘We cannot seek for justice here; it is in order that we judge ourselves by different standards than China or North Korea.’). There are, however, differences between the political parties - for example, differences regarding international law. The KDU-ČSL still wants to pursue a foreign policy officially ‘based on principles of international law’ (KDU-ČSL, 2006: 83). In the ODS election programme from the same year, international law does not play any role except for a vague statement about abiding international obligations (cf. ODS 2006).

This view, although in a more moderate version, can be found among Czech civil servants as well. Whereas the UN mandate and the UNSC resolution are primary, they are not seen as an imperative any longer. According to a senior civil servant at the MFA, the ‘current multilateral world is stepping back from value-based international relations,’ which is a consequence of the rising role of states that were only marginal during the Cold War. Therefore, EU or NATO decisions are seen as sufficient sources of legitimacy. Nevertheless, the ‘mission defines the coalition’ concept cannot be the rule. Effectiveness alone is not seen as sufficient to legitimize an action. Therefore, there always should be a footing in the multilateral framework, even if only through extensive interpretation.

The different understandings of legitimacy among political parties can be traced in documents that influence Czech foreign policy. While the 2004 government mission statement (led by the ČSSD) emphasized that the ‘effort to create an international society was based on the respect of the UN Charter’ and that the government had committed itself to ‘conduct […] foreign policy] on the basis of principles of democracy, international law, multilateralism, and obligations to its allies’ (Government of the Czech Republic, 2004: 27), a statement made three years later (by the then ODS-led government) did not mention international law at all and pledged that the Czech Republic would help democratize the world and set minimal standards of democracy and human rights in the EU foreign policy (Government of the Czech Republic, 2007).
In the core documents of Czech foreign and security policy, however, a certain level of consistency has remained regardless of the government. The UN and multilateral system and international law are seen as the focal point of Czech foreign policy, but there is always a small catch that opens up more possibilities. On one level, the Security Strategy allows using force ‘in agreement [...] with the UN Charter principles’ (Government of the Czech Republic, 2003a: 5). However, on another level, it commits the Czech Republic to taking part in the international community’s coercive actions, which ‘should have an international support as broad as possible, including UN Security Council mandates’ (Government of the Czech Republic, 2003a: 12; italics added). Similarly, in the foreign policy concept for 2003-2006, we can read that the basic values of Czech foreign policy are ‘inalienability of natural human rights, general international law, and the rule of law principle’ (Government of the Czech Republic, 2003b: par. 2.3). Apparently, the Czech Republic considers human rights to be universal (natural) and on the same footing as or even superior to international law. With an analogous nuance, the Government report on security policy expresses the Czech ‘interest and willingness to participate in the framework of the international democratic community in consolidating peace, stability, and security in the world’ (State Security Council, 2006: 21; italics added).

EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM
Despite the fact that hardly any actor in the Czech Republic outside of the MFA building connects the term ‘effective multilateralism’ with the European Union and its view of the world, all of them have an opinion on what makes multilateralism effective or ineffective.6 However, once again, these opinions are very different from each other and sometimes even contradictory.

In general, multilateralism at a global level is not regarded very positively in terms of its effectiveness. For one KDU-ČSL minister, multilateralism is in crisis and virtually non-functional. There is also no chance to make it work unless there is a large reform of the UN (which will take place only after World War III). Other opinions are less pronounced, but sceptical as well. For an ODS deputy, the bigger an organization is, the less effective it becomes. This view implies that the chance of reaching effectiveness at a global level is rather small. Similarly, a senior MFA official suggests that ‘effective multilateralism’ is a contradiction in terms because the effectiveness is hampered by the multilateral approach.

Other actors focus on the ways to become effective at the global level. For two senior MFA officials and a ČSSD representative, effective multilateralism describes a situation where it is possible to find a common interest and a means to put it through. Making use of the networks among states helps one to reach such conditions. Along the same lines are the convictions of a Green minister and an ODS deputy who were interviewed that a higher level of institutionalization increases the
effectiveness of multilateral actions. For all the interviewees, the reform of the UN system is a precondition of an effective system of global governance. However, at the same time, they regard this reform as difficult and unlikely to happen any time soon.

It should be noted that the scepticism towards the effectiveness of multilateralism in the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs must not be overestimated. The concept of ‘effective multilateralism’ is seen rather as a description of an ideal situation for which the state should strive, even though it is hardly attainable. Similarly, the UN system, although not very highly valued in its current shape, is considered the better option. According to a senior ministry official, ‘if this system did not work, there would be no rules at all. Some rules are better than nothing.’

**CONCRETE POLICY ISSUES**

Three of the four examples of concrete policy issues that have been included in the research (i.e. the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Darfur, the Iranian nuclear programme, and Kosovo’s independence) do not constitute any particular stumbling block for Czech foreign policy. All actors, more or less, support the policy that the international community has pursued thus far. Where possible, the solution to the particular problems should be found in the region with support from the rest of the world (among Israelis and Palestinians in the case of their disputes, in the African Union in the case of the Darfur region). The interest in these issues among Czech policy-makers is rather poor.7

In the case of Kosovo’s independence, however, the Czech political scene has split. Perhaps not surprisingly, the division broadly corresponds with the split over international law in which the Communists and the Social Democrats oppose the recognition of an independent Kosovo while the ODS supports it. The Green Party has been divided over the issue - although its ministers voted in support of it (the foreign minister who put forward the case for recognition in the government had been appointed by the Green Party), the foreign policy section at the party secretariat pronounced their opposition to it (Zahraniční sekce SZ, 2008). The Social Democrats were also divided over the issue, but a majority opposed the recognition, a move that soon became the official party policy. The critics argued in terms of international law; the proponents countered with a disputable interpretation of the Resolution 1244 and the necessity to recognize the situation on the ground. The only party that did not fit into the picture was the Christian Democrats. The party refused to support the recognition, with its ministers voting against it in the government. The reasons behind this action have nothing to do with legitimacy or the legality of the issue, though. The party’s opposition has been based on cultural arguments and a fear of a destabilization of the whole region (cf. Král, 2008).8
CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we have analysed how multilateralism is conceptualized in Czech foreign policy. It must be concluded that there is no common understanding of the term ‘multilateralism’ in the Czech Republic. In fact, all the definitions of it that are used or implied in academic literature are represented among Czech policy-makers. The ways in which particular actors conceptualize multilateralism are rather haphazard and mixed. There is no clear pattern set up by any ideological affiliation or the distinction between politicians and civil servants. This leads us to the assumption that multilateralism is not a key concept that would determine the positions of policy-makers. The answer to Caporaso’s (1993: 55) question of whether multilateralism is a means or an end in international relations is that in Czech foreign policy-making it can actually be both at once.

By contrast, there are clear ideas about the concept of ‘legitimacy’ in international relations. For the Czech left, legitimacy is associated with the UN Charter and UNSC resolutions. For the right-wing parties and MFA officials, the ineffectiveness of the UN system requires a more extensive understanding of legitimacy in which the decisions made within NATO and the EU and/or extensive interpretations of international law constitute a sufficient basis for international action. The principle followed in general deliberations, however, may be deserted in specific situations. Several factors blur the picture, including historical and cultural arguments, but also whether the party is in power at the moment.

Czech politicians do not connect the term ‘effective multilateralism’ with the European Union. There are various opinions on what might make multilateralism effective. A reform of the UN system takes the lead in this respect, but it is seen as unlikely at the same time. There is a general scepticism on the effectiveness of multilateral solutions at a global level, which corresponds with the willingness to broaden the sources of legitimacy beyond the UN system.

The Czech politicians and their political parties have abolished the original post-1989 foreign policy consensus years ago. Their long-term positions differ mostly on their relations to the European Union and the United States (but go beyond them) and can be distinguished into four main streams: the Atlanticist, Europeanist, Internationalist, and Souverainist streams (Drušák, 2006). Grave differences over security issues, such as the US missile defence, have also surfaced over the last years. Our conclusions suggest that the understanding of multilateralism is not a constitutive element of these distinctions because its conceptualization cuts across the categories and positions. The concept of legitimacy largely confirms the main streams of the Czech foreign policy, with Atlanticists seeking a broader definition of the term and the Souverainists, Internationalists and Europeanists focusing more narrowly on the United Nations. However, even in this case, some Europeanists and Internatio-
nalists (e.g. the Christian Democrats or some of the Greens) are prone to accept other sources of legitimacy more or less enthusiastically.

Although there is no clear concept of multilateralism among Czech policy-makers and a wide disagreement over the sources of legitimacy, the key foreign policy documents of the country have remained consistent and unaltered in their basic approach, regardless of the government. The main reason may be the fact, as suggested in the interviews with the politicians and the officials, that there are not many politicians who take interest in foreign policy. The ignorance of the ‘effective multilateralism’ concept, a key term for the European Union, even among those who can be labelled as ‘Europeans’ in general, is a good example of the low interest among politicians. It also invokes the question of whether the parties’ foreign policy positions are based on informed, well-founded deliberations or whether they are just ad hoc decisions made under public pressure. As a result, it is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that designs the Czech positions almost all of the time, thus safeguarding their coherence. Under standard conditions, the Czech Republic will thus be prone to seeking multilateral solutions and legitimization through the UN, but it will also be ready to accept other options (e.g. including fewer states outside the UN framework) if the situation so requires, as the limits of the United Nations are clearly recognized. Only when the topic becomes highly politicized, which could happen for various reasons, can politicians and the differences between them play a more significant role and make an impact on a particular policy.

Thus, for a better understanding of the Czech foreign policy making and, subsequently, the future Czech positions in the European Union or NATO, further research on both the party internal decision-making and politicization will be necessary. The concepts covered by this paper will provide for only the first steps in such research, which will inevitably have to include the role of the media, civil society, and the differences between the parties’ positions while in government and while in opposition as well.

ENDNOTES

1 The paper has been supported by Research Project No. MSM0021620841 of the Institute of International Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague. The authors would like to thank all the interviewees for their time and answers as well as the two anonymous reviewers and the editor for their valuable comments and suggestions. All errors remain the sole responsibility of the authors.

2 In July and August 2008, interviews were conducted with representatives from all five of the parliamentary parties (ODS – the Civic Democratic Party, KDU-ČSL – the Christian Democratic Union – Czechoslovak Peoples’ Party, The Greens, ČSSD – the Czech Social Democratic Party, KSČM – the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia), some independents, an independent MEP, and representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, and the Office of the President. These actors have been identified as key players in Czech foreign policy-making, especially in connec-
CONCEPTUALIZING MULTILATERALISM IN CZECH FOREIGN POLICY

...tion with multilateralism (cf. Bílková, 2008: 324). In total, eleven interviews were conducted – six with the parties’ representatives/politicians, four with senior ministry officials, and one with an official from the Office of the President. In the case of the parties’ representatives/politicians, all of them have held senior state or party offices related to Czech Republic’s foreign policy formulation.

1 The third question aimed at placing the Czech conceptualization within the European Union’s framework, which is a key context for the Czech foreign policy making, as argued above.

4 To respect the spirit of the UN Charter, as one expert put it.

5 With acknowledgment of the difficult and contested definition of the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ in the Central European context, the authors follow the positioning of the parties as made in Král, 2008.

6 The ignorance of the EU connotation of the term is rather surprising because the European Security Strategy has inspired Czech foreign policy. This is true not only for the Czech Security Strategy, but also for the ČSSD long-term programme, which supports ‘early, rapid, and – when the situation so requires – robust military intervention’ (ČSSD, 2005: 21). The wording of the ESS and that of the programme are so similar that this similarity cannot be a mere coincidence.

7 Some experts, namely from the political parties, displayed a certain inability to develop the concepts at the abstract level; their conceptualizations, as described in the previous part of the paper, were revealed in connection to the specific examples only.

8 In the case of the Iraq War, the distribution of support in the Czech political spectrum was even more along the lines of opinions on legitimacy. Whereas the Civic Democrats and Christian Democrats were in support of it, the Communists were against it, and the Social Democrats were deeply divided on it. (The Greens were not represented in the Parliament.) (cf. Král and Pachta, 2005)

BIBLIOGRAPHY


CONCEPTUALIZING MULTILATERALISM IN CZECH FOREIGN POLICY

‘Gender’ Includes Men Too! Recognizing Masculinity in Security Studies and International Relations

SCOTT NICHOLAS ROMANIUK, JOSHUA KENNETH WASYLCIW

Abstract: Realism has been a long-standing theory of international relations (IR), but the idea that its views reflect the changing reality of the international system is not widely accepted. This article presents the argument that while feminist literature has heavily engaged the realist conception of security, which advocates a multi-dimensional and multi-level re-definition of security, the solutions put forward to achieve the idea of a more encompassing security inadvertently risks reifying gender as innate rather than an artificial construct. As a result feminist scholars addressing the security paradigm have yet to achieve their desired ends. An alternative is proposed within this article, which advocates for the scholarly community’s shift in efforts to include more male participants in the discourse, and to further emphasize male insecurities as well as female insecurities. This shift in focus would arguably result in ‘denaturalized and dismantled’ gendered hierarchies in a manner that would contribute to greater security for all.

Keywords: feminist scholarship, discourse, international relations, gendered hierarchies, security, constructed

INTRODUCTION

Though scholars have witnessed the proliferation of diverse feminist scholarship in the field of international relations (IR) theory since the end of the so-called ‘Long Peace’ (Jones, 1996: 405–406), the field of security studies has been marginalized in the IR discipline (Steans, 2003: 430). Consequently, a key contribution of feminist literature, the introduction of gender in the study of international relations and its focus on the gendered nature of other IR theories, is overlooked (Jones, 1996: 405–406). Feminists argue that the neglect of gender by other IR theories, specifically realism and its variants, results in a narrow conception of security and does not account for the changing realities in international affairs (Tickner, 2001: 406). Indeed, emphasis has been shifting in the literature from an exclusive focus on na-
tional security to a broadening of the concept to encompass human security (Hoogensen and Rottem, 2004: 156). Nevertheless, it has been argued that this new focus also often neglects the dynamic of gender in its analysis (Hudson, 2005: 156).

Feminists also argue that failing to understand the role of gender in international relations perpetuates gendered hierarchies that value the masculine over the feminine to the detriment of ‘women’s, and certain men’s, real security’ (Tickner, 2001: 62). It is argued in this essay that while feminist literature has presciently critiqued the realist conception of security and advocated for a multi-dimensional and multi-level re-definition of security, the solutions proffered to achieve this more encompassing security inadvertently risk reifying gender as innate rather than constructed and, as a result, have yet to achieve their desired ends (Tickner, 1997: 624). An alternative is proposed that advocates focusing efforts to include more male participants in the discourse and further emphasizing male insecurities as well as female insecurities to help ‘denaturalize and dismantle’ gendered hierarchies to contribute to greater security for all (Tickner, 2001: 62).

‘GENDER-ING’ SECURITY DISCOURSES

The term ‘security’, in and of itself, is a highly contested concept, subject to a myriad of definitions (Blanchard, 2003: 1289). Security, to scholars, ‘conveys urgency [and] demands public attention’ (Paris, 2003: 258). While there is no single precise definition, traditional conceptions envision the state as guarantor of the security of its citizens from the threats of other states (Blanchard, 2003: 1289). This thinking is held by the proponents of realism, ‘the dominant theoretical tradition’ in international relations theory (Beckman, 1994: 16)

For realists, sovereign, self-interested states are the primary actors in an anarchical international environment (Tickner, 2001: 38). All states engage in power-maximizing activities to achieve their desired ends (Schmidt, 2005: 527). This pursuit of power becomes problematic in an arena absent of order. War is an ever imminent possibility ‘because there is nothing to prevent [it]’ (Tickner, 2001: 39). Given the realities of state behaviour and the anarchical nature of the international arena, states must ‘rely on self-help for ... protection’ (Beckman, 1994: 19). Thus, for the realists, the security of the state is tied to its military and its preparedness to fight wars (Tickner, 1992: 32). However, increasing military expenditures or enhancing readiness may provoke suspicion on the part of another state. Concern could arise that a state’s expanding army may be for offensive rather than defensive purposes and it in turn may seek to increase its capabilities, setting off further action by the initial state (Beckman, 1994: 19). This represents a ‘security dilemma’ for realists, though it does not necessarily entail ‘continual war’ as states will engage in a variety of behaviours to manage the threats posed by other power-seeking states (Ibid). If one state is perceived as becoming too powerful, other states may ally to counterbalance the increased power of the former state in order to
ensure their security (Ibid.: 20). Thus, war is constrained though always possible. As such, realists believe that security can never be fully assured (Tickner, 1992: 29).

Though realism has been a long-standing theory of international relations, its views do not reflect the changing reality of the international system. Even though states still predominate, the vast majority of wars are no longer inter-state but rather intra-state (Human Security Centre, 2005: 149–150). The number of wars that occur between states has declined rapidly for the past two decades, a trend that persists to date (Ibid.: 148). This marked decline in inter-state war saw a rapid increase in intra-state conflict during the waning years of the Cold War (Human Security Centre, 2005: 150). Even though the number of civil wars has since started to decrease, these still outnumber the amount of inter-state wars that have occurred in recent history (Ibid.). Thus, the nature of war has been changing in such a way that it is currently characterized not by the struggles of two contending state armies but rather by various factions who, in fighting, ‘frequently target civilians’ (Ibid.: 34). For this reason, among others, realists’ adherence to national security has come increasingly under attack by a diverse range of theorists (Hoogensen and Rottem, 2004: 155). Feminist scholars of international relations have observed these trends and have argued that ‘new threats to security demand new solutions quite at odds with the power politics prescriptions of traditional international relations theory’ (Tickner, 1992: 20). These assertions are supported by the conclusions of others who argue that inter-state war is likely to remain a rare phenomenon (Human Security Centre, 2005: 155).

Realism continues to maintain its narrow conception of security, as its ‘state-centric, militaristic’ definition of security emanates from a masculine bias inherent in the theory (Hoogensen and Rottem, 2004: 159). Feminist scholars have argued cogently that the gendered nature of the theory prevents it from viewing the whole picture with respect to security and that it correspondingly sees only ‘a partial view of reality’ (Tickner, 1992: 30). Feminists have observed that men have long been ascribed certain characteristics such as ‘[s]trength, power, autonomy, independence and rationality’ (Ibid.: 3). For these reasons, men have been seen as rightfully operating in the public domain while women have been relegated to the private because they are seen as weak, peaceful, cooperative and reliant on others for protection. The feminine, in these socially constructed gendered binaries, becomes the devalued other needing protection (Hudson, 2005: 156). Feminists argue that from these social constructions, the hegemonic masculinity outlined above is ‘projected [by realists] onto the behaviour of states whose success as international actors is measured in terms of their power capabilities and capacity for self-help and autonomy’ (Tickner, 1992: 6–7). The realist bases their view of the state and behaviour in the international system on ‘the behaviour of men in positions of public power’ (Ibid.: 37). The state is viewed as aggressive, as males are viewed as aggressive. Indeed, for realists, this masculine trait is necessary in an anarchic international system where states are struggling for power. If
a state were not aggressive, if it was unable to rely on its own capabilities, it could be seen as weak and dominated by other states. Thus, for realists, while aggressiveness is frowned upon in the private sphere, where the state maintains order and which it protects, this trait is encouraged in the public sphere (Ibid.: 17). As feminists note, the equation of males/masculinity with aggressiveness precludes any role for females in decision-making processes pertaining to national security (Blanchard, 2003: 1290). It also prescribes certain activities for women, such as war-fighting, because they are viewed as masculine. Soldiering is the preserve of males who must protect their female compatriots. The state must be prepared for war to guarantee the security of its own. For realists, ‘survival in a violence-prone international system “requires” war-capable states peopled by heroic masculine... warriors’ (Tickner, 1992: 50).

By bringing in gender, feminists have exposed realist conceptions of security as based on a hegemonic masculinity and as not reflective of the full reality of human experience (Ibid.: 17). Resultantly, they unreasonably circumscribe a myriad of possibilities that would engender greater security (Ibid.: 18). Through the incorporation of the experience of women, feminists show that there is room for both ‘competition and cooperation,’ for aggressiveness and passiveness (Beckman, 1994: 5). However, this is not because women have certain innate feminine characteristics that differentiate them from men. Gender is indeed malleable (Hudson, 2005: 156). Rather, women have been ascribed characteristics that can exist in both sexes, much like men have been ascribed traits that can be held by both males and females. For example, the current construction of the male as protector and the woman as dependent can be either reversed or abolished outright. Indeed, this binary ‘has been an important motivator for the recruitment of military forces and support for war’ (Tickner, 1997: 627). Understanding the constructed nature of gender and its instrumental use, feminists argue that war is also a social construction and ‘not inevitable as realists suggest’ (Tickner, 1992: 51).

Furthermore, feminists question the anarchy/order distinction held by realism, demonstrating how its state-centric emphasis ‘[misses] the interrelation of insecurity across levels of analysis’ (Tickner, 1997: 625). Quite simply, this is because realism is unaware of how its theory is based on gendered binaries of domination and subordination which threaten women’s security. Despite the alleged ordered nature of the state, individuals and women in particular are threatened within this environment. Women are often the targets of rape and domestic assault (Tickner, 1992: 56–57). This violence stems from ‘a gendered society in which male power dominates at all levels’ (Tickner, 1992: 58). This includes the state level, where women are also ostensibly protected. Feminist theorists have attempted to elucidate how states have not been adequate security providers by ‘[focusing] on the consequences of what happens during wars rather than on their causes’ (Tickner, 1997: 625). Women have been the primary targets of wartime sexual violence (Alison, 2007: 75–90). Addi-
tionally, women have increasingly been casualties in wars though they are overwhelmingly civilians and have often born the brunt of ‘economic sanctions associated with military conflict’ (Tickner, 1997: 625). Furthermore, feminists argue that the exclusively military focus of security by realists misses various other dimensions where women are rendered insecure due to unequal gender relations. Women are disadvantaged economically, whether as a result of ‘the gendered division of labour’ or ‘the discounting of work in the home’ (Blanchard, 2003: 1298). Environmental degradation is also a source of insecurity for many women around the world (Ibid.).

**Table 1**: Summary of Hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The consistency of gendered war roles across cultures is explained accordingly:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Gender-linked war roles are not in fact cross-culturally consistent.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Sexist discrimination despite women’s historical success as combatants</td>
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<tr>
<td>(a) In female combat units</td>
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<td>(b) In mixed gender units</td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) As individual women fighters</td>
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<tr>
<td>(d) As women military leaders</td>
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<td>3. Gender differences in anatomy and physiology</td>
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<td>(a) Genetics</td>
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<td>(b) Testosterone levels</td>
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<td>(c) Size and strength</td>
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<td>(d) Brains and cognition</td>
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<tr>
<td>(e) Female sex hormones</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Innate gender differences in group dynamics</td>
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<td>(a) Male bonding</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) Ability to work in hierarchies</td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) In-group/out-group psychology</td>
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<tr>
<td>(d) Childhood gender segregation</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Cultural construction of tough men and tender women</td>
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<tr>
<td>(a) Test of manhood as a motivation to fight</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) Feminine reinforcement of soldiers’ masculinity</td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) Women’s peace activism</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Men’s sexual and economic domination of women</td>
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<tr>
<td>(a) Male sexuality as a cause of aggression</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) Feminization of enemies as symbolic domination</td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) Dependence on exploiting women’s labour</td>
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</table>

Thereby, feminists advocate a move past the state-level militaristic conception of national security held by realists to a multilevel, multidimensional security that focuses on ‘mutual enablement rather than domination’ (Tickner, 1992: 65). As Heidi Hudson has argued, such a redefinition of security where ‘the survival of one depends on the well-being of the other […] would not only enhance women’s security but that of men, who are similarly threatened by the conventional gendered approach to security’ (Hudson,
In so doing, feminists have sought to reveal and dismantle the gendered hierarchies that place the masculine over the feminine and value traits such as conflict and autonomy over cooperation and interdependence. For these scholars, ‘a truly comprehensive security cannot be achieved until gender relations of domination and subordination are eliminated’ (Tickner, 1992: 23).

There is a marked absence of a realist rejoinder to these feminist critiques. When forthcoming, responses have been dismissive, asking ‘[What does] this talk [have] to do with solving “real-world” problems such as Bosnia, Northern Ireland or nuclear proliferation?’ (Tickner, 1997: 612). Feminists argue that being cognizant of the role of gender in international affairs allows for the observation of how national security is based on gendered assumptions in addition to how individuals in decision-making positions of the state are predominantly male. The discourse surrounding national security issues is thus structured to favour the masculine. Resultantly, when dealing with the aforementioned problems, ‘[t]he impact of gender discourse […] is that some things get left out’ (Cohn, 1993: 231). Policy alternatives may never be voiced for fear that they will be seen as weak, as feminine. The nature of a gendered discourse that privileges the masculine over the feminine delimits what is acceptable and what is not and thus can perpetuate insecurity rather than allowing for the airing of diverse viewpoints, which may represent the best approach for the policymakers concerned (Ibid.: 235). While most engagement with feminist scholars has been selective and limited, Francis Fukuyama, in an article for Foreign Affairs, articulated what most closely approximates a realist rebuttal. He asserted that gender differences are not socially constructed but rather biologically rooted (Fukuyama, 1998: 30). For Fukuyama, the male is naturally violent and aggressive (Ibid.: 31). The female, following the traditional binaries, is less violent, less aggressive. Noting the increased participation of women in the public realm of democratic countries, Fukuyama argued that these countries have resultantly become more ‘feminized’ (Fukuyama, 1998: 35). Fukuyama problematizes this trend, noting that it engenders a security threat as ‘[i]n anything but a totally feminized world, feminized politics could be a liability’ (Ibid.: 36). For Fukuyama, noting global demographic changes, a greying Western population that will arguably produce more female leaders will encounter the rest of the world, which will not only remain more youthful but be ‘led mostly by younger men’ (Ibid.: 39). This will pose significant challenges to the western world as for Fukuyama, states are still driven by power-maximizing states in an anarchical environment, and anything other than building the necessary capabilities to repel enemies runs the risks of war and domination. Thus, what is needed in this world is not feminized politics but masculine policies (Ibid.: 37). Fukuyama’s argument is similar in some respects to Robert Keohane’s assertion that ‘[p]erhaps states with less gender hierarchy could resolve conflict more easily; but it is also possible that they would be more easily bullied’ (Keohane, 1998: 197).
Francis Fukuyama’s argument is flawed in two respects. First, it mistakenly designates the gender binaries as biologically rooted rather than socially constructed. If it were in fact the former rather than the latter, one ‘would expect a clear distinction between men and women, with relatively little variation within one sex’ (Beckman, 1994: 5). However, there is incredible variation intra-sex. There are pacific women agitating for the abolition of war just as there are female agents of political violence (Alison, 2004: 447–463). The same is true for men. Both militaristic and anti-militaristic males have served as political leaders (Ehrenreich, 1999: 121).

Even if the United States of America theoretically becomes more egalitarian, this does not mean that it will be bullied by a China where gender relations remain unequal. As noted previously, there is a capacity for cooperation and conflict that is inherent in both sexes. It is only when one assumes that traits such as aggressiveness are genetically rooted rather than socially constructed that such a scenario may be plausible.

**ENGENDERED IN-SECURITY**

The feminist critique of realism exposes a conception of security defined narrowly in national terms, ignoring the security needs of the individual. Other scholars of international relations have also found the realist’s definition increasingly problematic in a rapidly changing global environment and have increasingly promoted human security, a concept designed to ‘encourage policymakers and scholars to think about international security as something more than the military defense of state interests’ (Paris, 2003: 253). While precisely what is encompassed by the concept of human security is subject to debate, there is general concurrence that this broader definition of security, while not exclusively moving away from the security interests of the state, places individual security interests into a more front and centre position (Hudson, 2005: 163).

As a relatively new concept, it is widely used to describe the complexity of interrelated threats associated with civil war, genocide, and the displacement of populations. The primary reason for the construction of a new approach to security centres on the fact that the analytic frameworks that have traditionally been employed to explain war and violent conflict between nation-states have simply grown out of place when addressing violent conflicts that take place within nation-states. Since both concepts intersect in many ways, human security and national security should be—and often are—mutually reinforcing. However, as the degree of security for a state increases, the security for its people does not necessarily follow suit. The Human Security Report for 2005 asserts that ‘protecting citizens from foreign attack may be a necessary condition for the security of individuals, but it is certainly not a sufficient one.’

For scholars of the respective disciplines, this re-definition is sorely needed given that the traditional definition does not address a myriad of insecurities. J. Ann Tick-
ner has argued that this broadening of the definition of security is ‘more compatible with most contemporary feminist scholarship’ than the traditional definition espoused by realism (Tickner, 1997: 624). However, even though the redefining of security has been more in line with the multidimensional, multilevel security advocated by feminist scholars, the human security approach often neglects gender and how it factors into security issues (Hudson, 2005: 157). An understanding of gender is crucial to any analysis in international affairs as it is ‘[g]ender [that] decides who goes to war and who does not; who is a victim and who is not; and who is legitimate within the security discipline and who is not’ (Hoogensen and Stuvoy, 2006: 212).

While the human security approach has sought to focus on and foster security for individuals, its tendency to overlook gender results in an approach that addresses the security needs of some individuals and not others. Proponents of human security have focused on the plight of child soldiers conscripted by various groups to fight in a myriad of conflicts. However, the long-standing assumption of those concerned with the welfare of child soldiers has been that these children are exclusively male (Fox, 2004: 465). It is a gendered assumption that is predicated on the belief that males are the aggressive, violent sex. For some, it is difficult to envision female fighters even though research has demonstrated that females may comprise an estimated 30% of child soldiers across the globe (Ibid.). As such, the programming directed towards the needs of these children has been gendered and has not addressed the specific needs of female child soldiers. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs to help child soldiers have failed to recognize that not all female child soldiers were combatants (Ibid.: 473). Some were conscripted for ‘forced labour or sex’, and by ignoring this fact, these programs, which ‘often required the surrender of a weapon’ for entrance into the program, excluded many female child soldiers from receiving care (Ibid.: 465).

The human security approach, when it does acknowledge gender, often reifies existing constructions through various practices which perpetuate ‘a highly gendered understanding of who is to be secured’ (Carpenter, 2006: 85). R. Charli Carpenter has argued that programs addressing gender-based violence have portrayed women and children as those necessitating protection, whereby the vulnerabilities of men are ignored even though they are often specifically targeted in war on the basis of their gender (Carpenter, 2006: 97). Men are often massacred by opposing enemy forces for fear they could be possible combatants, and boys are targeted as they represent future generations of soldiers (Carpenter, 2006: 88). It is the gendered understanding of soldiers committing these crimes that it is men that will be violent and not women, and this is entrenched when programs which are designed to help civilians in wartime present civilian victims as women and children and overlook the insecurities of civilian men (Carpenter, 2006: 99). While the human security ap-
proach is beneficial through its broadening of security, the feminist perspective, through its analysis of the role of gender in security, allows for a more comprehensive approach to security for all individuals, rather than a select few (Hoogensen and Stuvoy, 2006: 209).

Though feminist scholarship has offered a compelling critique of current conceptions of security, the solutions proffered to achieve ‘a nongendered perspective’ are insufficient and risk reifying the social constructions of masculine and feminine as innate to the respective sexes, rather than denaturalizing them (Tickner, 1992: 127). Feminist writing has posited two solutions to move past the current paradigm. Firstly, feminists have argued that it is important to change the discourse on security by exposing the inequalities and problematizing the construction of gender. Secondly and concomitantly, many feminists have advocated the increased representation of women in decision-making structures. For some scholars, ‘no fundamental change in the hierarchy of the sexes is likely to take place until women occupy half, or nearly half, the positions at all levels of foreign and military policy-making’ (Ibid.: 141). Additionally, it is advocated that women should be involved in the decision-making process at all levels, in all spheres including the economic realm (Reardon, 1993: 20). Women, for reasons described above, have been traditionally excluded from these positions and even from key positions in international organizations (Tickner, 1992: 42). However, feminists point to the need for women to be involved beyond the local.

While both of these are arguably necessary, the latter carries an inadvertent risk whereby gender will be essentialized, and whereby the present hierarchy of the sexes will remain entrenched. As Christine Chinkin has observed, women who obtain positions in decision-making institutions nationally and internationally are often relegated to ‘women’s issues’ rather than being included in bodies that deal particularly with issues of security (Chinkin, 2000: 244). For example, in Canada, elected women may be slotted for portfolios in Cabinet other than the key positions that pertain to foreign policy-making, and followingly, the key positions may be predominantly assigned to their male colleagues. Additionally, even if women obtain key foreign affairs or defence posts, these women will be placed in a double-bind. If they advocate positions that have been traditionally structured as masculine positions, this will be viewed as acceptable, but these women will be viewed as anomalies. Being seen as an aggressive negotiator is an unfeminine image. Conversely, women who espouse positions that are structured as feminine will reinforce present beliefs that gender is innate rather than constructed. Given this, it is difficult to see how including more women in the key decision-making processes will result in a denaturalizing and dismantling of existing gendered hierarchies.

Even though a push for increased participation in the relevant decision-making spheres is accompanied by attempts to alter the present discourse by emphasizing
various ‘devalued feminine principles,’ if these are being pushed solely by women, it will have little effect (Blanchard, 2003: 1298). While it is not disputed that these ‘could play an important role in building alternative modalities of behaviour’, it is argued here that the entrenched structures will continue to devalue these principles even if the principles are espoused by women in positions of power (Ibid.). Furthermore, it will continue to reinforce unwanted gender essentialisms. Various scholars, in an effort to problematize essentialist notions of the female as peaceful, have published accounts of women long-engaged in various forms of violence. However, this approach has been to little avail as the stereotype of women as peaceful continues to pervade the discourse despite all evidence to the contrary (Zalewski, 1995: 348).

Feminists have faced and continue to face immense challenges in attempting to dislodge the gendered hierarchies which produce insecurity. The theory is still marginalized in the field of international relations, although it is more than two decades since it came to the fore. The discourse in international relations and in security studies is still gendered, despite a broadening of the definition of security beyond the state. Indeed, almost a decade after the publication of her groundbreaking Gender in International Relations, Tickner noted that women still have not achieved a high level of participation in intergovernmental organizations, and substantial barriers still exist for women seeking formal political office (Tickner, 2001: 110). The solutions posited do not seem to have had any discernible effect.

**RECOGNIZING THE UNIQUE REQUIREMENTS OF THE MASCUINE**

While recent feminist scholarship on the topics of international relations and human security make a compelling and valuable case for shifting the focus of security from the state to the individual, the scholarship has been woefully negligent of acknowledging the unique circumstances which males find themselves in. As Matthew C. Gutmann explains, ‘[too often] masculinity is either ignored or considered so much the norm that a separate inventory is unnecessary. Then, too, “gender” often means women and not men’ (Gutmann, 1997: 403). Gutmann also argues that a productive discussion of any topic of masculinity can not occur if the discussion ‘is reduced to possession of male genitalia or still worse, if it is regarded as “for men only”’ (Ibid.). Thus, in order to complete the shift in transition from the focus on realist conceptions of security to that on human security, the focus must also change from examining how past conceptions of security excluded, or at the very least were detrimental to, women to a new focus on how new gendered conceptions of security result from the victimization and marginalization of men. In order to do this scholars must focus not on the extent to which the masculine dominates security discourse over the feminine, but rather focus on the specific targeting of men, based on their gender. As examined in the following paragraphs, an example of specific targeting of men in-
cludes sexual torture, an area regarded by current gendered security scholarship as overwhelmingly a concern of women, while little focus is given to men.

While sexual torture and the rape of civilian women in conflict situations is a well studied topic, almost no attention is given to the same topic when it pertains to men (Oosterhoff et al., 2004: 68–69). As Pauline Oosterhoff et al. explain, awareness of the use of sexual torture during combat became widespread in the 1990s after the war in Yugoslavia came to an end (Ibid.). After this war ended, scores of women came forward with claims of sex related incidents, ranging from relatively mild cases like those of forced nudity to more extreme cases like those in which women were tortured physically while simultaneously being raped (Ibid.). However while many of these women offered these stories voluntarily, there were next to no men willing to do the same. It was only when researchers began seeking out male victims that they realized the extent to which men were also victims of sexual torture.

Incidents of men being systematically targeted for sexual abuse, rape, and torture are not unique to the conflict in Yugoslavia though. For example, some research on cases of sexual torture of male political prisoners in Greece and Chile was completed (Ibid.: 69–70). In El Salvador 76% of 434 male political prisoners reported being sexually tortured or raped at least once, with many reporting repeated incidents of this sort (Ibid.). In 1997–1998 the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture found that 21% of Sri Lankan Tamil men seeking asylum in London, UK were also victims of sexual violence (Ibid.). Yet another study found that in a sample of 2500 war time sexual torture cases, across a wide contingent of states, 1648 involved male victims (Ibid.: 73). Out of this sample, though, researchers were unable to mention any of the cases of these males in the media, while the media coverage of the 800 female victims was extensive (Ibid.).

One must wonder why female victims of sexual torture in combat situations are so easily recognizable while the existence of such crimes towards men goes almost unnoticed and undocumented. Charlotte Hooper explains how this could be so by examining how the social conciseness of Britain regarded their returning soldiers after World War II (Hooper, 1999: 480). Hooper contends that ‘the return of thousands of youthful war-mutilated servicemen, who were hailed as masculine heroes change[d] the medical and technological approach to disablement for good and even modified public attitudes’ (Ibid.). She continues by stating ‘initially [...] the lightly maimed soldier was regarded as “not less but more of a man.” These were “active” rather than “passive” sufferers who deserved respect, not pity [...] to be physically maimed was far more manly than to be a “malingering” or shell shock victim’ (Ibid.).

Oosterhoff et al. contend that male victims of sexual torture are thus negatively affected by gender stereotypes; where it is acceptable for women to openly report being sexually abused during conflict situations, male victims ‘have difficulty conceptualising and verbalising what happened’ (Oosterhoff et al., 2004: 68) and when they are able
to conceptualise what occurred and report it, they are faced with health care workers who often suffer from the same stereotypical gender roles (Ibid.). As Donnelly and Kenton argue ‘healthcare workers have internalised stereotypical gender roles, men as aggressors and women as victims, to the extent that they are unable to recognize male victims of sexual violence who seek help, and may even dismiss them’ (Oosterhoff et al., 2004: 68). Worse yet, if the sexual torture of a male occurs in a homophobic environment, survivors of homosexual rape may be even more reluctant to seek help or to report the incident for fear as being thought of as inviting it (Ibid.).

Thus, as a result of an increasing focus on human security, male victims of sexual torture, and other crimes, are finding themselves being marginalized at an alarming rate. Suffering from the same violence as their female counterparts, males now find themselves without the support structures to deal with these issues, while female victims are able to access these structures. In effect, the ‘masculine, aggressive’ stereotype is negatively affecting individual men in conflict situations to a much greater degree than the ‘feminine, passive’ stereotype is affecting individual women in the same situations. Natalia Linos echoes this argument, recognizes this as a major shortcoming of gendered security studies and concludes that ‘discourse on gender-based violence during conflict should step away from the stereotype of women as victims and men as aggressors, and identify violence against men as gender based violence’ (Linos, 2009: 1550). Thus while the feminist discourse on security studies has made remarkable progress in rejecting the stereotypes inherent in the realists’ perspectives, scholars still have much work ahead of them if they want to break free of similar shackles binding males. As Matthew C. Gutmann contends, too often scholars recognize ‘men’ as a singular entity while recognizing the plethora of diversity among ‘women’ (Gutmann, 1997: 403)—just as the healthcare workers above suffer from similar stereotypes of who can and can not be a victim of sexual torture and rape. Security studies, such as Fukuyama’s, which regard the male as being naturally ‘aggressive and violent’ are as dangerous to males as the conception that females are naturally ‘gentle and soft’ is to females.

A NEW APPROACH

How then are scholars to go about incorporating ‘the opinions and experiences of women with respect to men and masculinity [within the security discourse]? (Ibid.: 400). Actually achieving this end is even more problematic. However, these authors see the promise of achieving it within the burgeoning constructivist paradigm. Whereas the gendered approach’s attempt to dismantle gendered hierarchies, some of which are the result of social and historical creation, and some of which are the result of biological differences between the sexes, appears to be as inadequate as the realist state-centric model, constructivism provides a unique and valuable alternative which should be able to satisfy, or at least placate, the realist and gendered camps. Theo Farrell explains that a constructivist approach to the topic is concerned
with how engrained cultural norms affect personal, human, environmental, national, and international security (Farrell, 2002: 49). It is this concern with norms which leads constructivists to view structures such as the state, and actors such as individuals, in a much different way than ‘the rationalist approaches to international relations’ such as realism and neoliberalism (Farrell, 2002: 49). It also allows constructivists to view structures and actors in a much different way than feminists.

Whereas realists portray an international system where ‘undifferentiated rational actors’ such as states interact with one another with regards to the capacity of the other’s material power, constructivists see actors, states, institutions, or individuals as being located ‘in a social structure that both constitutes those actors and is constituted by their interaction’ (Farrell, 2002: 49). For example, if the actors are states with great militaries, then the social structure is the international system which gives states and their militaries meaning (Ibid.). Another example is that if the actors are individual people with personal traditions and belief systems, the social structure is the cultural, religious, geographical, or other local community to which they belong. When states and their militaries interact, they shape the international system which gives them meaning; when individuals interact, they shape the community or communities, which in turn give(s) them meaning. As Farrell argues, for constructivists ‘ideas are not merely rules or “road maps” for action, but rather ideas operate “all the way down” to actually shape actors and action in world politics. In other words, when ideas are norms, they not only constrain actors, but also constitute actors and enable action’ (Ibid.). As a result of this focus on norms, the identities of the actors, including the genders of individuals and their interests, become particularly important. Both Farrell and Ted Hopf note that ‘identities strongly imply a particular set of interests or preferences with respect to choice of action in particular domains and with respect to particular actors’ (Ibid.: 50).

Thus, as a result of this approach to security studies, one is able to draw on the valuable understanding of state interaction which realism provides one with as well as to consider how notions of security impact individuals, both male and female, which feminist scholars have attempted to do even if they only partially succeeded in this attempt. As demonstrated above, a ‘gendered’ approach most often implies a ‘women’s’ approach at the expense of interests that both men and women share, such as sexual torture during conflict. Thus, constructivist researchers become generally immune to the critique feminist scholars launch against realists: that their approach fails to consider how gender affects security. As a result of the constructivist approach to security, of taking interests of individual actors into consideration, this paradigm promises hope for engaging males within a discussion on gendered security. Constructivism is willing to bridge the divide between realist and feminist security perspectives and provide a method whereby we can combine state-centric interpretations of security with a focus on individual security. It is through this bridge
that males can be brought into the security arena without disregarding the valuable contributions which the feminist paradigm has offered.

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS**

There is no simple solution to the problem that would result in the dismantling of gendered hierarchies and the engendering of greater security. Nevertheless, it is suggested here that the aforementioned solutions be coupled with an emphasis greater than the emphasis that has been placed on male insecurities and encouraging males to be greater participants in eliminating gender inequalities. It is not enough for women to be the core of the solution. As Carol Cohn has noted, in order ‘to develop, explore, rethink, and revalue those ways of thinking that get silenced and devalued ... men, too, [will] have to be central participants’ (Cohn, 1993: 239). Men will need to voice ideas and values that were designated as being feminine in the decision-making rooms, where the discourse has been structured to be masculine. Men will need to voice women’s security concerns. Women will need to be in these rooms as well. It is both sexes, in offering ideas and making statements that are viewed as traditionally feminine, and also those that are seen as masculine, that will denaturalize these social constructions and allow for the elimination of the gender inequalities that at present predominantly threaten the security of women. It is difficult to propose concrete measures to secure increased male participation. However, it is argued here that a constructivist approach to security studies represents a better way forward than a traditional realist approach or a simple increase in female participation in the realms of foreign and military policy-making.

Feminists need to shed light on male insecurities as much as female insecurities. Indeed, feminist scholarship has already engaged in this practice to a limited extent. Miranda Alison, in a recently published article on wartime sexual violence, illustrated the gendered nature of this violence and how not only women but also men were rendered insecure. Accounting for male victims challenges the dominant discourse that it is only women who need protection and that all men are protectors (Alison, 2007: 84). As previously stated, R. Charli Carpenter and others have also demonstrated how men’s security is threatened by gendered assumptions that all males are aggressive. By focusing on these victims, this can further denaturalize beliefs that it is only females that need protection and allow for the development of a broader security. Further scholarly work in the same vein is needed. Though some have noted that an emphasis on the insecurities of men may hide the fact that existing hierarchies predominantly threaten women’s security, it has been argued that the alternative, seeing ‘the oppressive position of masculinity as inevitable and immutable, makes continued research in this direction seem worth the risk’ (Blanchard, 2003: 1305).

Feminist research in international relations has helped expose the gendered nature of realist theory and its detrimental effect on the security of women. This per-
spective has also shown how human security approaches often overlook gender and thus fail to offer programs which engender security for the entire population. While feminist theorists have correctly pointed the way forward, the solutions proffered in the literature have yet to achieve their desired ends. The difficulty encountered in de-

naturalizing the current construction of gender illustrates the deeply entrenched nature of this concept. However, as feminists have noted, a failure to problematize gender will only perpetuate an environment in which women’s security is threatened.

ENDNOTES

1 It is acknowledged here that ‘there is no one feminism’ (Hudson, 2005: 48); while it may be inferred that this paper’s use of the general term ‘feminism’ implies a unified body of thought, a qualified ‘many’ or ‘much of’ is intended each time the term is used (Tickner, 2001: 48).

2 It is argued here and elsewhere that while sex is biological, gender is a social construction whereby certain traits are ascribed to the male sex and the female sex resulting in notions of what constitutes the ‘masculine’ and the ‘feminine’ respectively (D’Amico and Beckman, 1994: 3–4).

3 It is acknowledged here that ‘there is no one feminism.’

4 John Mueller further observes that ‘there have been remarkably few international wars of any sort since World War II’ (Mueller, 2006: 64).

5 J. Ann Tickner observes that a myriad of scholars have sought to broaden the concept of security to include ‘economic and environmental as well as political/military’ issues since the 1980s (Tickner, 1997: 624).

6 It should be noted that realism is blind to this fact, believing gender to be ‘irrelevant to world politics’ (Beckman, 1994: 22).


8 Scholars have noted how Fukuyama’s argument rests on ‘realist assumptions’ (Blanchard, 2003: 1303).

9 In a direct response to Francis Fukuyama, Barbara Ehrenreich took issue with the author’s claims that violence and aggressiveness are inherent in one sex, observing that women have long been warriors, a practice dating back to the second millennium B. C. (Ehrenreich, 1999: 119).


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‘GENDER’ INCLUDES MEN TOO!

French Geopolitics in Africa: From Neocolonialism to Identity

TOMÁŠ PROFANT

Abstract: This article is placed within the post-colonial theory of geopolitics. Its goal is to prove the hypothesis that ‘France’s declining influence in material terms (traditional geopolitics) has not had much influence on its colonial identity constructs (post-colonial geopolitics).’ Analysing the relations between France and Africa I try to show that France once had substantial influence on Africa, and in turn, Africa was an important source of French identity. With the neoliberal changes France started to lose its influence, but as Sarkozy’s speech in Dakar shows, Africa remains an important source of French identity.

Key words: geopolitics, France, Africa, identity, post-colonial theory

INTRODUCTION

What is geopolitics? ‘Geopolitics, in short, is about politics!’ (Ó Tuathail, 1998: 3). This quasi-definition has three meanings. The first is the traditional one, in which geopolitics’ general concern is with geography and politics. The second is the post-modern one, in which geopolitics in the sense of science is itself politics. The very nature of thinking is political and la science de la géopolitique is not an exception. The third meaning lies in the fact that there is no real definition that excludes any social science from the study of geopolitics. One could find a connection to the political or the spatial dimension in probably all fields of social science.

The meaning of the concept of geopolitics has been changing throughout history, according to the historical circumstances. In the first period of Kjellen, Haushofer and Ratzel, geopolitics was the knowledge of the relation between the space and politics in the service of the imperial aims of the state. During the Cold War the term was used to cover the analyses of the super-power relations in different areas around the world. The main emphasis lay in the influence and control over other states and strategic resources. Kissinger gave the term ‘geopolitics’ his own meaning: the study of the balance of power between the USA and the USSR. Such a view was present in the works of other international relations scientists analysing the possible models of bi-, tri- and multi-polarity, which culminated in the neo-realist and schematic work of Kenneth Walz.
The reason why geopolitics, together with some other IR explanatory frameworks, is so popular is that it enables the authors to address the big picture of the world and to claim to have the capacity to explain how things are happening in the world. It makes it possible to bring together different kinds of actors, relations and dynamics that influence one another in the chosen localities and state that they are all results of geopolitical forces.

Such a macro-view has been attacked by many authors. Criticism of this sort, however, is not the goal of this article. It suffices to say that Norman Long’s interface approach (see, e.g., Long, 1992; Long, 2001) has brought forth many insights and helped us to understand local politics and societies in a manner that the geopolitics by its own definition is incapable of.” A possible response from geopolitical studies would be the incorporation of the interface approach and a widening of the study of geopolitics. Such a widening, however, would make the term useless for scientific purposes and merely create a nice label to be used on the covers of books. It would be then possible to call any social analysis ‘geopolitical’, because we all live in ‘a place’ which has spatial relations. Rather than widening geopolitics, one may prefer pluri-disciplinarity as a means of gaining knowledge from several disciplines which deal with different levels of analysis.

Such a pluri-disciplinarity has been achieved by adding another dimension to geopolitics from post-colonial studies. Not only does geopolitics study obvious relationships among political actors on the basis of their geopolitical features, but the question of identity as approached within post-colonial studies has become an important part of geopolitics.

Therefore, analysing the French geopolitics in Africa, I would like to follow a line of argument moving back and forth between two views on geopolitics. One could be called ‘traditional geopolitics’ and the other ‘critical or post-colonial geopolitics’. The first one is connected to the traditional geopolitical framework of raw materials, while the second has more to do with the identities of the actors of geopolitics and with the influence of geopolitics on these identities. These two notions of geopolitics are, of course, interconnected and the distinction between them is, to a certain extent, artificial. As the first notion constitutes the core of geopolitics since the beginning of the field, and post-colonial studies offer an important critique of such a one-dimensional view on geopolitics, it is useful to use both dimensions as frameworks of analysis.

Based on this dichotomy, I would like to present my hypothesis that ‘France’s declining influence in material terms (traditional geopolitics) has not had much influence on its colonial identity constructs (post-colonial geopolitics).’ The hypothesis rests on two theoretical foundations. The first one stems from the realist tradition within the IR field. An actor is presented as a rational unit acting especially to serve its own interests regardless of other actors. The second theoretical foundation focuses on the construction of identity. Actors’ identities are perceived as relational –
based on their relationship to other actors. The question that comes up from connecting these two dimensions is to what extent the first dimension influences the second. If France is indeed losing its geopolitical position, can its self-perception remain unquestioned? Thus geopolitical analysis, which remains within the realist tradition on the basis of certain assumptions such as self-interest, can be deconstructed by analysing a completely different aspect of spatial relations.

The hypothesis first consists of showing France as an important geopolitical player in the sense of traditional geopolitics. Such a construction of France will allow me to state that France is retreating from this position later in the article. Therefore, the traditional geopolitics between France and Africa from decolonization until the era of the neoliberal changes brought about by the Bretton Woods institutions will be the first topic to be dealt with. The second section will try to show how important Africa is for France as a source of the French identity. The third part should return to the traditional geopolitics and deal with the neoliberal changes in the relation between France and Africa. There, I will analyse the decline from the position presented in the first part. The fourth part should then analyse the era of Chirac and the short period of Sarkozy’s presidency and show which notion of geopolitics seems to matter more and what the current trends in the French geopolitics in Africa are.

I hope to prove the hypothesis that even though the French influence is declining, this decline does not have much influence on the French identity.

FRENCH GEOPOLITICS IN AFRICA
– STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC RESOURCES

‘The security of France does not depend, of course, solely on the security of Africa but it is, it seems to me strongly associated with it... because the maritime routes around Africa carry the greater part of the oil and raw materials upon which we depend’ (General Méry, 1978, quoted in Luckham, 1984: 69).

French interests in Africa have always followed three main goals. The first is to have a strategic advantage from the relations with African states. The second is to have an economic advantage from these relations. The third, the identity ‘advantage’, will be considered in the following chapters.

Africa holds 42% of the the world’s share of bauxite, 38% of the world’s uranium, 42% of the world’s reserves of gold, and 73% of its platinum. These are the most important geopolitical data for western powers, and France is no exception. Africa is the most important source of raw materials for France, and France has secured privileged access to these resources through several means. For example, the French atomic project would have had been unthinkable without the uranium from Nigeria and Gabon. Nkrumah noted that in 1957, France imported from Africa 100% of
its phosphates, 85% of its lead, and 51% of its zinc (Nkrumah 1984[1966]: 2). Thus the economic aim of securing the raw materials has also been strategic for their vital importance for the French industry.

Just as France has been importing all these necessary inputs for its manufacturing producers, Africa has been an important importer of the French exports. Togo is a perfect example. The income gained from the sales of the phosphates has been used to build cement factories, hotels, oil refineries, textile factories and infrastructure. The companies that were paid to do the job were of western, mostly French, origin.

Of course the African resources have been used to produce manufactured products and for exporting to other countries than Africa, because African people simply do not have enough purchasing power. But according to Luckham (1984), the African market for French products has not been negligible at the time of decolonization.

Another important factor in the economic interest was the penetration of African resources (and products) to the European market. The policy of France after the Second World War was to secure for its former colonies privileged access to the European Economic Community through the Yaoundé convention. This way the French capital, which was, of course, present in many African companies, has been gaining profits through these preferential agreements. This policy changed after the United Kingdom entered the EEC.

These two economic interests, being, in my opinion, the most important part of geopolitics and even creating their own field of geo-economics, are nicely summarized in a figure created by Philippe Hugon in his textbook on African geopolitics. The figure shows the functioning of the economic relation between a colonizer and its colony. The colonizer buys primary products from the colony and sells its manufactured products there. The sector which is most negatively affected is at the right end of the figure – the indigenous sector.

Before proceeding to the strategic interest, it is necessary to analyse the way this geopolitical power has been exerted upon African countries. In general, this system has been called neo-colonialism. According to Nkrumah:

‘...imperialism... claims, that it is “giving” independence to its former subjects, to be followed by “aid” for their development. Under cover of such phrases, however, it devises innumerable ways to accomplish objectives formerly achieved by naked colonialism. It is this sum total of these modern attempts to perpetuate colonialism while at the same time talking about “freedom”, which has come to be known as neo-colonialism’ (Nkrumah, 1984: 239).

The methods and forms of neo-colonialism are various. In an extreme case, the imperial power may send troops to the neo-colonial state to control that country. This was the case of some of the French interventions in African countries. Interestingly this was not happening, according to Luckham, in the core of the former French empire, but rather in those African states that were less bound.4

Most of the time, the control of a country happens through economic and monetary means. Nkrumah’s analysis is very useful in this case as well:

‘The neocolonial state may be obliged to take the manufactured products of the imperialist power to the exclusion of competing products elsewhere. Control over government policy in the neo-colonial state may be secured by payment towards the cost of running the State, by the provision of civil servants in positions where they can dictate policy, and by monetary control over foreign exchange through the imposition of a banking system controlled by the imperial power’ (Nkrumah, 1984: ix-x).

In the Lexikon Dritte Welt one can read that neo-colonialism sets itself up through an elite that is ready to lead its country according to the demands of the world market (Sturm, 1991: 485).

Walsch lists different forms through which the imperial power secures its control over the neo-colonial state. In the military field, the control is assured through educating military officials, police and the army and the supply of weapons; in the political field, through building influence zones and international organizations which work in the interest of the Western nations; in the cultural field, through missions, involvement with the local media and building local schooling; in the communication field, the control is exerted through building posts and telecommunications and through establishing airlines; in the technical field, through creating dependency on the imperial power’s technological know-how; in the social field, through the so-called ‘brain drain’ of scholars and research workers and through support of local
elites in their effort to change local traditions and lifestyles to make them more similar to modern western non-traditional lifestyles; in the financial field, through granting, controlling and conditioning loans from the World Bank and the IMF; and in the economic field, through exploitation via transnational corporations (Walsch, 2003: 39).

This taxonomy of the means through which the neo-colonial dominance is being exerted sketches only very briefly what is actually going on in the relationship between France and its former colonies.

The case of the arms business sheds light on how the actual dependence is happening and how France is maintaining its influence in African countries while making money from it. The most important point of the export of French weapons is the fact that France needs to keep producing more weapons than she actually uses in order to pay for the research and be prepared to start making more weapons for herself if necessary. These strategic imperatives are of vital importance and are the main argument for keeping the business going no matter what the consequences for other nations might be.

Since the decolonization, the French army has exerted influence upon the armies of African states. This has been done mainly through Defense and Military Assistance Agreements and Military Technical Agreements. African officers have been trained in France and French advisors have served in African armies. The close cooperation assured French influence in case of crisis but served also as a reason to import French weapons and technology for local armies. Luckham notices a chain of events in this ‘cooperation’ through the example of a technological safari in Zaire in the mid-1970s during which France sold weapons, especially Mirages, to the government. The transaction was paid for by money that came from a loan guaranteed by the French government, but this added to the indebtedness of Zaire, which almost led to its fall during the Shaba uprisings and consequently led to French intervention. The French intervention is even more important than the export of arms to Africa since it allows France to use African soil as a testing ground for its newest weapons (Luckham, 1984: 71–73).

The strategic interest in intervening is connected to the economic interest of serving the provision of raw materials. As Luckham states, ‘France’s military interventions and her economic interests have been imperfectly correlated’ (Luckham, 1984: 70).

But geopolitics can be viewed from a different angle. One might see it as an important aspect of identity as well.

FRENCH GEOPOLITICS IN AFRICA – THE QUESTION OF IDENTITY

Studying language, Ferdinand de Saussure claimed that the most important feature of language is its arbitrariness. Saussure saw the binary opposition as being the most
natural and efficient code. As binary oppositions are the codes that are the easiest to learn and to produce, they are the common denominator of all our thinking.

Saussure’s structuralist approach would be later overcome by post-structuralists, who perceived the arbitrary relations between signs not as given, but as ever changing.

One of the authors emanating from this tradition is Edward Said, who analysed probably the oldest binary opposition: that between ‘us’ and ‘them’, between one group of people and another group of people, between ‘we’ and the ‘others’. In his famous book *Orientalism*, he deals with the social construction of two groups: the so-called ‘Occident’, representing the We, and the so-called ‘Orient’, representing the Other. Orientalism for Said is a certain way of ‘coping with Orient... Orient is not just a neighbor to Europe...; it represents one of the deepest and most common European images of a different world, different culture as well. This way, Orient helped to negatively define Europe or the West – it was its opposite image, thought, personality and experience’ (Said, 2008: 11).

Such a view is not new to geopolitics. Several authors have dealt with post-modern issues within what Ó Tuathail calls ‘critical geopolitics’. For the purpose of this article, I would like to build upon the post-colonial notion within geopolitics. One could find this in, e.g., Agnew and Crobridge (1995), who claim that ‘the singular trait of modern geopolitical discourse’ is its representation of ‘others as backward or permanently disadvantaged if they remained as they are’ (Ibid.: 49). Slater (2004) specifies three constituting elements of what he calls ‘Euro-Americanism’5: (1) The Euro-Americanist interpretations emphasize the leading civilizational role of the West through referring to some ‘special or primary’ feature of its inner socio-economic, political and cultural life (Ibid.: 10). (2) This special or primary feature is regarded as ‘being internal or intrinsic to European and American development’ (Ibid.: 10–11). Here the importance lies in the self-affirmation of the West as well as in the denial of a potentially beneficial association with the non-Western other. (3) The Western development is then considered to be the ‘universal step forward for humanity as a whole’ (Ibid.: 11). Slater proves this third statement by analysing modernization and Marxist and neo-liberal theories, doing so in a similar vein as post-development scholars (see, e.g., Ziai, 2004; Rist, 2008; or Lummis, 1991). He differs from Ó Tuathail’s approach by giving much less importance to the changes from modernity to post-modernity brought about by new technologies as well as new societal dynamics. Slater’s analysis remains focused on the one aspect that does not change, and this aspect is something that actually bridges modernity with the post-modern times. No matter how ‘liquid’ and ‘uncertain’ (Bauman, 2007) our time is, the colonial distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ remains stable and is gaining on importance as the other features of geopolitics are rapidly changing. I hope to show that such a view is relevant to the analysis of the French-African relations.
The direct colonization since the 1870s started to define Africa politically and geopolitically and transformed the purely geographical view of African land into a political one. While the French national identity has always been defined by France’s relation to other nations and people, since the time of colonization the relation between France and Africa started to have much more influence on the French national identity. As France lost Alsace-Lorraine to Germany in 1871, the colonial expansion was a way to keep the national ethos of being a decisive power in the world.

Later on, during the Second World War, Africa and its land to a certain extent saved France by giving more legitimacy to de Gaulle’s call for unity. In 1940, after the Nazis invaded France and created the Vichy Regime, de Gaulle was backed by French colonies in Africa and the Caribbean. Walsch states that two traditional French claims have been confirmed by the act of solidarity coming from the French colonies. They recognized the universality of French values – a claim that was in the centre of the French Revolution in 1789 and has been in the French identity ever since – and they recognized the territorial principle that considers every part of the French Empire, no matter how far away from the Hexagon, to actually be a part of France (Walsch, 2003: 52). This universal France that consisted of much more than just the European land in contrast to the Vichy Regime is what gave de Gaulle legitimacy and power to negotiate, to speak for a united area with one single French identity. It is this territory that was independent of Europe and was therefore a potential source of resistance against the Nazis. Africa thus saved France not through its incontestable resources of men and raw materials but through the French identity that it helped to sustain. The identity proved to be an important factor of geopolitics.

The identity factor did not cease to play its role in the French and African geopolitics. However, the scene changed considerably. The French identity in international relations still depends on France’s former colonies, but these are no longer perceived as being only a part of France in its universal ideology. They are also perceived as being the Other that gives France an opposition against which it can define itself and keep its power status.

As Luckham states, the reason why France intervened in Africa was not always purely material: ‘...France’s joint military maneuvers with the Francophone countries have not just provided training but have also constituted a symbolic affirmation of France’s ability to project its power in foreign parts’ (Luckham, 1984: 60). De Gaulle expressed it plainly: ‘France... because she is France, must carry out a truly global policy’ (de Gaulle, 1964 in Luckham, 1984: 75).

It is in the French identity to be a world power. Just as one of the reasons for France trying to obtain an atomic bomb after the Second World War was to sustain its power status (in addition to protecting itself), a reason for its military policy of in-
Interventions in Africa was to prove to the rest of the world that France is still a world power (in addition to protecting its capital investments and vital raw materials).

As Luckham argues, during the Cold War, France sought to present itself as the third pole in the bi-polar world. As such it needed to be really independent – to have its own atomic weapons but also to have its own sphere of influence that would allow it to speak for more than just itself. Naturally France chose its former colonies for this sphere of influence, but one can hardly imagine that France would have been capable of subordinating any area of the world with more powerful nations, such as those in Indochina.

A very important part of the French identity stems from another side of the Franco-African relation. Not only has France gained her power-status as an actor that can and may interfere in the affairs of other states. She also has the status of a developed nation in the (binary) opposition between herself and the developing African nations whom she is trying to help.

The question of development is often connected to geopolitics only as a hidden means to reach geopolitical and geoeconomical material gains. Mostly it concerns development projects that led to purchases of sophisticated manufactured goods or machinery from companies from a country pursuing its geopolitical aims or that led to an engagement of such companies in building local dams, power plants or anything of high value.

As, for example, Slater (2004) shows, the identity is being formed by the very existence of the thinking in developmental terms. Just as the former French colonies help to create France as a powerful state by being its weaker counterpart (the weaker Other), they help to create it as the helping, modern, developed state to whom they are the traditional underdeveloped counterpart (again, the Other that needs France).

This line of thought is much older than the power-status identity relation to Africa. The colonial discourse was based upon the perception of France as being the nodal point of this discourse, to which everything else was related. Colonial areas were related to it in a subordinate position by requesting help which France should provide under its ideology of human rights. France saw herself as the civilization and her colonies as the barbarians that needed to be civilized.6

In the post-Second World War era, France would voluntarily offer her own achievements to the service of humanity to help the underdeveloped nations to become developed (metter en valeur). This way she kept the identity of the ‘more’ (developed) in opposition to the ‘less’ (developed) and also gained a label necessary for a country with a power status of helping other countries that are in need of help.

Again the geopolitical game of securing influence in Africa, this time through development, helped France to define its identity. Without African states as the Other, France would not be able to keep its status as a high-ranking power. Thus as a sort of bonus to natural resources, France also found in Africa a support for its identity.
Although this scheme seemed to work very well during the Glorious Thirty Years, the 1980s brought significant changes. While the erosion of the French influence in Africa and the weakening of the traditional geopolitical aspect will be treated in the next section, the question of identity and the most recent events in relation to it will be dealt with afterwards.

**THE NEOLIBERAL ORDER – THE WEAKENING OF THE FRENCH GEOPOLITICAL POSITION IN AFRICA**

Since the 1980s, it is possible to speak of France’s retreat from Africa. The French geopolitical influence is losing against the multilateral Bretton Woods organizations. François Mitterrand became president during the time of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. These two conservative politicians represented a new era of rolling back the state later to be known as neoliberalism. While at home the two heads of states were cutting the social obligations of the state, abroad they were requiring the same (and much more of the same nature) to be done through the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Even though Mitterrand promised before 1981 to break up with capitalism (see, e.g., Blažek–Profant, 2009), his real policy was different. B. Hibou sees several continuities during the 14 years of his presidency. The main feature of the French-African politics that did not change was the persistence of personal relations between high-ranking state officials. It is also possible to identify the preference of short-term politics to the detriment of long-term strategies, and the support of rent-seeking economical behavior rather than of productive behavior. The last feature of Mitterrand’s presidency, according to Hibou, was its bad use of the development aid (Hibou, 1995: 25).

What could be seen as the most important continuity of the French politics towards Africa is that of the incoherencies that characterized it. Instead of following some kind of clear policy, in the economic area, the French treasury was usually just helping out African governments so that their deficits would not be too high and their civil servants would not go unpaid for too long.

French neocolonialism seemed to change with the new neoliberal order of the IMF and the WB. In reality, however, the French treasury was allowing African governments to break the monetary rules of the CFA franc zone by offering them a possibility of immediate loans to cover their deficits. This money was very often stolen by incumbent governments, and France was incapable of preventing it if it did not actually tolerate it as an expression of its personal friendship with the heads of state.

Eventually such policy was unsustainable and France was forced to obey the IMF rules. Not only did the French government wish to lower its aid to its African partners, but it was also incapable of following its traditional policy. It could not main-
tain its autonomy vis-à-vis the IMF and the WB in relation to its former colonies and was forced to start demanding the same structural adjustments as the multilateral organizations did. Simply put, France started to lose its influence in its pré carré.

These adjustments meant especially liberalization and privatization. Hugon (2003) analyses the dismantling of the cotton industry in Africa and points at the negative consequences of these policies for the local industry. From a geopolitical point of view, however, the less cotton was coming from the West African countries, the greater the market share for American subsidized cotton. As Hugon states, ‘[b]ehind the dismantling of the industries, geopolitical stakes aim to break the post-colonial links between national cotton companies and the FTU (French trade union), French public company’ (Hugon, 2003: 139). The argument of the World Bank was that bringing competition to the cotton sector would disintegrate the industry. This industry, however, was a French colonial heritage. It inhibited competition, and the WB policy hurt the producers not capable of adjustment to the free market prices. Such policy was, of course, against the French interest in the cotton industry. France was losing its position because of this liberalization.

A clear sign of subordination to the Bretton-Woods organizations and their policy was the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994. France was unable to change this decision and had to follow the monetary rules of the neoliberal order. Since then African countries lost their privilege to automatically borrow money from the French treasury, and France has become a credit provider of lesser importance than the multilateral organizations or China. The relation has thus been normalized to a certain extent, and France is obliged to demand the same conditions as the IMF and the WB.

Another sign of France losing its grip on its former empire was the speech that François Mitterrand made in La Baule in 1990. He conditioned French aid on the democratization process. However, as, for example, the case of Togo in the 1990s has proved, this has been a mere cover for a continuity of the old personal network between Elysée and its African counterparts. The old way of neo-colonial cooperation with local elites continued without changes, but only to the extent allowed by the neo-liberal order.

Nonetheless, the liberalization and privatization has also helped the French capital. It made many local (and French) small and medium enterprises go bankrupt, but large groups such as Bolloré or Bouygues kept their advantage and gained from the liberalization. More important was the disengagement of the French companies Total and Elf from the pré carré. They are now increasingly less connected to the aid politics of the French state (Hugon, 2007: 65).

The retreat from Africa culminated during the years of Lionel Jospin’s government. It seemed that France had decided to stop being the ‘gendarme de l’Afrique’. The new doctrine called ‘ni l’ingérence, ni l’indifférence’ has been proved in the Ivory
Coast when France decided not to intervene on behalf of President Henri Konan Bédié. Similar non-action on the part of France had appeared already in 1996 in Central Africa, and afterwards France closed its bases in Bouar and Bangui (Banégas–Marchal–Meimon, 2007: 15–18).

This evolution, which led to decreases in the French influence in Africa, has been accompanied by decreases in the importance of Africa for France. According to John Chipman, already during the colonial age, ‘African possessions did not contribute to French economic strength’ (Chipman, 1989: 3). And ‘after the Second World War it was clear that because of the low degree of industrialization of the colonies, they could not buy what many industrialists needed to sell’ (Chipman, 1989: 188). The years that led to decolonization made it obvious that withdrawal from overseas outposts would not seriously damage the French economy. Actually it has been argued that the colonial market was slowing the French economy. Simply put, West Africa was (and is) so poor that it was, according to Chipman, of ‘no real direct economic benefit to France’ (Chipman, 1989: 189).

Such a view has been supported also by Hugon’s account of the 12 years of Chirac’s presidency. Africa as an economic partner has been losing its importance for France not only during this time, but even earlier. The CFA franc zone import from France fell to 1% of all French exports in 2006, while France imported around one quarter of the zone’s exports (Hugon, 2007: 56).

France is therefore not only losing its influence in Africa as a neo-colonial power, but the importance of Africa for France is declining as well. The flows, as shown by Figure 1, have been modified, and the export of manufactured goods has lost its importance.

Jacques Lévy also asserts that ‘the playtime is over’ for France in Africa (Lévy, 2000: 103), but he does so for different reasons. The French state, some French firms and the French-speaking African states worked well together, being financed by the French national budget and corrupting each actor by its counterparts. Such Francheafricaine (Verschave, 1998) has continued through the Mitterrand era, but according to Lévy, three major events seem to profoundly change this deal. First, as the Cold War ended, the classical argument that ‘if we go, they will take our place’ is invalidated (Lévy, 2000: 105). With the end of the Cold War, ‘they’ have disappeared. Second, humanitarian NGOs and mass media nowadays cover not only the French scene but also more distant places, bringing home the French moral issues from abroad. And third, French courts also started to deal with cases which involve foreign leaders and big corporations working together with French politicians.

However, as Lévy states and as I will show in the next section as well, the time of the French involvement in Africa is not over yet, even if it changes profoundly. He mentions the cases from the turn of the century – the Omar Bongo reelection in 1998, the support of the rebellion against the pro-Libyan government in Chad in
2000 and the bloody presidential election in the Ivory Coast in 2000. They all seem to give the impression that France does not want to let go of its pré carré.

As I have shown the French retreat from Africa, thus proving the first part of the hypothesis, let me now turn to the latest changes in Franco-African relations and to the question of identity within these relations.

NEW INTERVENTIONISM AND MULTILATERALIZATION – THE QUESTION OF IDENTITY REAPPEARING

Already during the cohabitation with Jospin’s government, Chirac’s presidency has been marked by a new wave of interventionism. Chirac ignored the ‘ni ni’ strategy, and his visits to Togo, Guinea and Cameroon in 1999, which were supposed to reassure France’s allies of her support, were in a clear contradiction to it. After 2002 the interventionist trend became obvious. There is, however, a new element in this strategy that had not been present before – multilateralism.

According to Banégas, Marchal and Meimon, France started to act multilaterally in opposition to the US unilateral approach in Iraq. In 2003 Chirac announced that the French aid should rise up to 0.7% of the GDP again and that Jospins’s ‘ni-ni’ strategy is over. The aim was not to exclude an intervention a priori, since that could encourage violations of human rights based on the expectation that France would not punish them.

The first case of this new approach was that of Côte d’Ivoire. France sent in 5000 men to suppress the rebels who were revolting against the incumbent government. Later this trend was confirmed in Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Central Africa. In Congo, however, a new trend came into play. With the French interventionism, we are witnessing the multilateralization of this interventionism as well. No matter how multilateral Operation Artemis actually is, the change of the French attitude is clear. France cannot, at least on the surface, show her old neo-colonial face and is forced to include more nations to legitimize her interventions.

As Banégas, Marchal and Meimon state:

‘It is not about a return to the status quo ante, haunted by the old daemons of France-Afrique, but a post-9/11 phase, during which France, like (and against) the US, assumes its international domain through a neo-interventionism freed of the old colonial facade and decorated by virtues of a multilateral framework’ (Banégas–Marchal–Meimon, 2007: 21).

Even if the same authors later refute such an interpretation of Operation Artemis on the ground that in reality this operation has been to such a great extent a French operation that it is not possible to call it ‘European’, the change in direction is obvious. Neither can the idea of multilateralism be undermined by Chirac’s visits to Africa.
assuring his African counterparts of his support and his referring to Togo’s Gnassinbé Eyadema as his ‘personal friend’.

The authors conclude that the next president will have to choose between the trends towards multilateralization and Europeanization and an attempt to keep the policy of bilateral influence, between a retreat and a will to keep the privileged connection with the continent, between a support of democracy and a support of dictatorships led by old friends. This is the choice Nicolas Sarkozy had to make.

How are these changes to be interpreted from the point of view of identity in geopolitics? France has been losing her capacity to intervene but, of course, she has not lost it completely and is capable of a military intervention to protect African leaders with close ties to the Elysée. France needs to intervene to support these autocrats in order to maintain her power status. Only in this way can she be seen as an important nation capable of forming the direction of global trends.

But the actual declining relative French power has two consequences. First, France has to focus on the weakest states, where she actually still can exert her influence, and, second, she needs to be joined by other countries in her neo-colonial endeavor. Such an alignment, even though it might seem to support the aspirations of French power, paradoxically only shows its weakness. It is not possible anymore for France to lead her interventions alone. She needs at least moral support from other nations to make them look legal. The Europeanization in this case is not so much a sign of a stronger Europe as of a weaker France. In her attempt to keep her identity as a power influencing the course of events, she is showing that she actually is not capable of doing it alone and that she herself needs help.

The divergence between the interests of the French capital and the French armed backing of incumbent governments is showing that France is not so much interested in preserving the material part of the French geopolitics in Africa. In reality it does not need to do this, as has been proven by the statistics. What France is desperately trying to preserve are the ties to its African ex-colonies that give it a leverage in the world stage decision-making process.

Since the local rulers also need backing from a powerful state, they do not wish to let go of the mutually reinforcing relationship either. For France, material factors are not at stake to the extent that they are for the local leaders, but more importantly, what is really at stake for France is her national pride and identity. Without someone to whom France can disseminate her universal human rights and her other norms, the universality of the French ways of thinking would be contested. There would be no other particular nation to prove the universality of French particular values and, correspondingly, of France’s identity as a source of humanity.

Therefore, France needs to keep on proving that she is a powerful country to show that her values are indeed universal and thus maintain her identity. With the strengthening of other nations in other parts of the world, the relative decline of France...
makes it impossible for her to go on this way unilaterally, and thus she needs support from other nations, even if only non-material support.

This unfortunately does not change the status of Africa in the world geopolitics. It remains to be an object and is not in any position to influence its geopolitical relationships with other countries. With the rise of China and India, Africa seems to be one of the last battlefields in geoeconomical terms. France, represented by Europe and vice versa, is trying to secure her access to natural resources just as China and India are. The conflict is inevitable and different strategies come into play. I will now proceed to the ‘strategy’ chosen by Nicolas Sarkozy at the University of Dakar. What changes in identity is he preparing for his own country in relation to Africa, and how is he going to preserve her geopolitical interests in Africa?

There is one change that Sarkozy did bring to the relation between France and Europe. It is the new language. Sarkozy, known for the direct form he uses when addressing his audience, was frank as usual in his speech in Dakar. But his alleged openness seemed to be rather a ‘thank you’ to the electorate of Lionel Jospin that decided to vote for Sarkozy. His direct language has been understood as an insult among the audience in Dakar and also among the audience throughout the African continent. It brought so much outrage among intellectuals that there is actually a collection of reactions from well known African scholars who have decided to reply to Sarkozy, L’Afrique répond à Sarkozy, edited by Makhily Gassama.

The authors of the collection have criticized Sarkozy mainly for his neo-colonialism and racism. Gassama, professor of literature and Minister of Culture of Senegal under the president Léopold Sédar Senghor, reminds Sarkozy of the African past, that is, in terms of human freedoms (Charted du Mandé – 1222), comparable with those of the United Kingdom (Magna Carta – 1215), which far surpass those of France (Declaration of Human Rights – 1789).

But the point is not to show that African culture or history of thought is well developed and comparable to the allegedly superior culture or history of thought in Europe. African intellectuals are forced to reply by their need to defend millions of humiliated people. In a brilliantly elaborated analysis of Sarkozy’s speech, Mwatha Musanji Ngalasso, professor of linguistics, criticizes the way Sarkozy treats his hosts. He comes to talk to them as if they were grown children. Ngalasso states that it is really unimaginable that any president or prime minister would come to a foreign country and tell its people about themselves, about what their problems are, about what they need to do to solve them, about their past and about their possible future. But this is precisely what Sarkozy did and what actually seems to be normal in the Franco-African or Eur-African relations. The colonial tutelage seems to remain the determining factor of this relationship.

Even if the main ‘material’ message of this discourse is that African states should keep their young people at home and prevent them from trying to emigrate to Eu-
rope (Ngalasso, 2008: 278–279), the most important message is that the relationship will remain the same. Sarkozy will continue on the colonial path, which has been confirmed by de Gaulle and modernized by his successors to be known under the name of neo-colonialism. Just as Sarkozy does seem to give some credit to the African continent by accepting the view that colonialization was a crime and honoring the specificity of African culture, he nonetheless keeps on telling his African audience how Africa has not sufficiently entered history or how its villagers live in harmony with nature instead of following the idea of progress and mastering it.

Guaino, the author of the text, in his reply to the critiques, asks where the scandal is. Why can Aimé Césaire speak of homme noir while Sarkozy cannot speak of homme africain? Ngalasso replies:

‘The scandal is to affirm in the year 2007, as it has been affirmed by the ideologues of super-ordination and theorists of colonization, that if all the people have known “the time of eternity to be present”, Africa still has not... If the colonization consists of a material occupation of the territory of the other, and of exploitation to one’s advantage, colonialism is a state of mind that consists of a symbolic occupation of the space and time of the other while preventing him from mastering his own territory and history and imposing on him one’s own mode of thinking, speaking and doing, which is considered to be superior...’ (Ngalasso, 2008: 289).

This is precisely what Sarkozy did, or more precisely, what he continues in doing, what he inherited from Chirac, Mitterrand or de Gaulle.

What are the implications for the French geopolitics in Africa? By confirming the policy of his predecessors, and actually by using such frank and direct language, Sarkozy told us that the policy will not change and that France will try to preserve its influence in its pré carré. The reasons, however, may not be material anymore. The main point in his speech being the prevention of immigration to France seems to be in accordance with Chipman’s conclusion. The problem in the Franco-African relation that seems to be passed on to the Euro-African relation is the state of mind of the wealthier partner. France, as personalized by Sarkozy, needs someone or something to define her, to be her Other. And if Africa is the last actor on which France is capable of imposing such a role, she will keep it in this position, no matter how racist and old the idea might seem. The national pride is more important than post-modern ideas of cultural relativism that give the same value to each culture. As such, it gives an imperative to the policy and to the geopolitical direction in the French leadership.

CONCLUSION

The goal of this paper was to analyse the French geopolitics in Africa in relation to the hypothesis stated in the introduction: ‘France’s declining influence in material
terms (traditional geopolitics) has not had much influence on its colonial identity constructs (post-colonial geopolitics). Concerning the traditional geopolitics in this relationship, Africa has, to a certain extent, lost its importance for France, especially in terms of exports. But Africa remains important as a source of mineral resources for the EU, and with the entry of China into the scene of world geopolitics, Africa has become a battlefield where some actors (France and the EU) are retreating from their positions and others (China and India) are gaining loyal partners.

The loss of the French influence has been clear since France’s subordination to the policies of international financial organizations. France had to stop lending money to its former colonies without their structural adjustments, and it has become a lender of secondary importance to them. Together with the WB and the IMF, China took over the French role.

These changes in the world of traditional geopolitics did not have much influence on the French national identity. Throughout the 20th century, France based its identity on its colonies, and since the process of decolonization, it based its identity on its former colonies. The colonies helped France to appear as a world power on the world stage – first as an important partner in the fight against Hitler and then during the Cold War as a possible third pole with some political power.

Jospin as prime minister seemed to begin the retreat from Africa, but the rest of Chirac’s presidency has been characterized by a new wave of interventionism. Since then, however, France has been forced to multilateralize and Europeanize its interventions. Franco-African relations are becoming Euro-African. As France is losing its power, Europe is taking over its role of a world power.

Sarkozy, in his speech in Dakar, has shown very openly that he has no intentions of changing his attitude towards Africa, or of changing the relationship between France and Africa. Africa is to remain the object in geopolitics, which helps to define the role of France as a world power. Sarkozy came to Dakar to assure anyone who had doubts that he is not going to change the direction of the neo-colonial path of his predecessors. Now, when it is maybe the last chance for France to actually break the ties to its colonial past and start perceiving its former colonies as equal partners, Sarkozy demonstrated that he will be fighting for the French world power identity until the very last moment, when the African peoples themselves decide to stand up against the masters of their identity. The findings of this article confirm the hypothesis, but there is a need for further research that would take into account a broader range of empirical material.

One last point that I would like to make regarding identity in geopolitics is that Europe is taking over the French role. It is to be seen whether the EU will be using the African soil as a playground for its intervention in the future, but what is clear is that the European (or western) identity is also defined by the Other. Here the definition
of the European identity is in the relation of developed and under-developed nations. African countries help the European countries to keep their identity of being better than the rest by accepting their role of under-developed nations who need to be helped. Just as France is holding onto its power status identity in relation to Africa, so is Europe always highlighting its status of a developed entity that is in a position to help. This part of its identity gives Europe its self-confidence.

There is not much new in the French geopolitics from the point of view of the influence of geopolitics on the identity of the actors. France and her successor Europe are gaining their self-esteem from the policy they are leading on the African continent.

ENDNOTES

1 The actor-oriented sociology of development descends within development studies from the (inter)national level to the ‘actors’ level – that is, to the level of the target population – and finds out how insufficient the Marxist or liberal theories of development are (Long, 1992). An analysis on such a micro level should help the policy-makers to adjust their policies in a way that would suit the receivers of the development aid better. The novelty of this approach, which could be also beneficial to geopolitics, is that it shows the relevance of the micro-analysis and the unsatisfactory results brought about by the macro-theories. For the level of the analysis problem in IR, see, e.g., Hollis–Smith (2000).

2 This article from Luckham reflects the era during which it was written, when the neo-colonial Franco-African relations were about to change but were not changing yet. At the time the functioning of neocolonialism seemed clearer then it does today, as today many more factors come into play. These factors are, for example, the growing influence of the World Bank (WB) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and, more recently, of China and India in Africa. They both lower the French capacity to ‘do politics’ in Africa.

3 The first Yaoundé convention (1964–1969) was the first association agreement between eighteen francophone African states, Madagascar and the EEC. At this time the French goal was to adjust the economic relations with former colonies of France and Belgium.

4 Luckham, in his article from 1984, differentiates between several different groups of African countries. The first group is made up of the core neo-colonies – the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Senegal, Cameroon and Togo, in which the French and especially their capital have the greatest interest. The second is the group of countries in which France has an interest because of their natural resources (Niger, Mauritania, Central African Republic, Burkina Faso (which was still Upper Volta at the time of the publication of the article), and Mauritania) or because of their strategic position (Chad – until 1980). All of the countries in this group have suffered French military interventions but have not been tied to France as closely as the core group. The third is the group of countries that tried to set themselves apart from the French military system (Guinea, Mali, Benin, Congo and Madagascar). Except for Guinea all of these countries kept some military ties with France (Luckham, 1984: 64–65).

5 Salter addresses what is usually called ‘Eurocentrism’. But Wallerstein (2008), for example, uses the term ‘European universalism’. 
This is well documented in *The History of Development* from Gilbert Rist, an author not alienated from the post-development thinking. He quotes, for example, Victor Hugo: ‘To fashion a new Africa, to make the old Africa amenable to civilization – that is the problem. And Europe will solve it’ (quoted in Rist, 2008: 51). This vein of thought has also been present among the most important philosophers. Makhily Gassama, a professor of literature, when criticizing Sarkozy for his speech in Senegal, traces Sarkozy’s thoughts in this matter back to Herodote, Montesquieu, Hume, Kant, Voltaire, Rousseau and Hegel (Gassama, 2008).

‘Pré carré’ is a French expression for a territorial domain within an administration, which is to be protected against those who seek to usurp this domain. It used to mean a double line of fortified towns which was supposed to protect the French Kingdom’s border against the Spanish in the 17th century. Nowadays it is very often used in relation to Western Africa.

Only one speech by the head of state is, of course, insufficient for making any ultimate claims about the French society as a whole. Following the typology of geopolitics created by Ó Tuathail and Dalby (1998), which divides geopolitics into the *practical geopolitics* of state leaders and the foreign policy bureaucracy, the *formal geopolitics* of the strategic community and the *popular geopolitics* that is found within the artifacts of transnational popular culture (mass-market magazines, novels, movies, etc.), Sarkozy’s speech represents an important part of the practical geopolitics, and one could add that it represents an important part of the formal geopolitics as well.

That is, with the conclusion that Africa has lost its importance for France in the traditional geopolitical sense as a recipient of French manufactured goods.

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Polemics: Fitting Metaphors – The Case of the European Union

NICHOLAS ONUF

Abstract: Across many fields, scholars study metaphors, often starting with Aristotle, as I do here. Aristotle saw that we use metaphors to persuade others to accept or act on what we say—they are performative. By virtue of use, metaphors are concepts in the making; concepts are metaphors that we no longer recognize as such. Our representations of the world, however fitting in the moment, are never fully or finally fixed. Metaphors orient us in space and time, express awareness of our bodies, and reflect our relations with other embodied beings. In International Relations, scholars ignore these distinctions and find only a few metaphors worthy of attention. Petr Drulák’s work on motion, container and equilibrium metaphors is an example which I discuss with some care because his view of metaphors as sedimented in time and use is close to my own. I then suggest other metaphors that better fit the experience of the European Union than Drulák’s choices.

Key words: metaphor, Aristotle, Drulák, sedimentation, European Union

Metaphors, like epithets, must be fitting, which means they must fairly correspond to the thing signified...

Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1405a10-11

Across many fields of study, scholars have turned to metaphors as a key to understanding some aspect of the human condition that has resisted or eluded their investigations. Many of these scholars offer ritual acknowledgement of Aristotle for defining and elaborating on metaphor in Rhetoric and Poetics but do not read these texts closely. In this essay, I start with Aristotle as if I were engaged in an archeological undertaking. Yet I do so not simply to bring some ancient, unfamiliar concept, or way of thinking, to the light of day.

Aristotle saw the ornamental value in metaphors, and more. We use metaphors as one of many means to persuade others to accept or act on what we say. In effect, Aristotle anticipated the view that speech is performative—all speech. Representing the world, naming its contents, sorting things out—these are performative acts (further see Onuf, 1989: 78–95). Some names for things that seem to be alike (some concepts) fit better (as representations) and work better (as performances) than others; things change and so do conceptual vocabularies. Metaphors are
concepts in the making: concepts are metaphors that we no longer recognize as such.

Aristotle never went this far. He did say that things have names and that metaphors are names. ‘Metaphor consists in giving the thing [any thing] a name that belongs to something else’ (Poetics, 1457b7-8). Even if every metaphor names a concept, Aristotle did not say that all names are metaphors. In my opinion, he could have done so, had he considered the use of metaphor as an act of predication (here see Onuf, 2009a), and not just persuasion. Through predication, new concepts acquire names already in use, and they give their names to yet newer concepts. I would call this process metaphorical extension.

In Aristotle’s view, we can invent a name for some kind of thing that may or may not be new or different instead of using the name of some other kind of thing. The new name works the way a metaphor does and therefore has the same effect as metaphorical extension. While we do find occasion to invent new names for new concepts, we more frequently borrow names already in use and put them to a new use. I suggest we do this because it is easy—there is always an inventory of names at hand—and because what we take to be new nevertheless reminds us of familiar things. It is also frequently the case that things we take to be new are not new. Already named, they end up renamed. Metaphorical extension is an inevitable consequence of predication—of speech itself—and the engine for changing what we think we know.

Not all metaphors are equally persuasive. If we use metaphors to persuade listeners (or readers) that what we say is worth listening to, then those metaphors must seem right. As Aristotle said, they should help us ‘get hold of something fresh,’ and they ‘must not be far-fetched, or they will be difficult to grasp, nor obvious, or they will have no effect’ (Rhetoric, 1410b13, 1410b32-33). To get at something fresh may take a fresh metaphor—one that is arresting because it is unfamiliar yet fitting—or it may take a familiar metaphor to make what is fresh easier to grasp. Either way, a metaphor must be fitting to be effective. Persuasion takes skill and practice in using metaphors.

The Romans assiduously practiced the art of persuasion but, with so much else, ars rhetorica (also the Latin title of Aristotle’s work on this subject) fell into the trash heap of history (to use a familiar but still effective metaphor). When Renaissance humanists finally recovered this art, their foremost concern was the many figures of speech to be deployed for ornamental or stylistic effect in a literary culture where plain speech was little valued. Modern egalitarianism gradually undermined the social value and persuasive effect of highly ornamental speech, and thus much of the incentive to ask what metaphors are and how they work.

Thanks largely to postmodernist scholarship, there has been a renewed interest in texts and textuality, discourse and the social uses of rhetoric (see White, 1973 for an
influential example). In my view, this kind of scholarly work exhibits a certain ambivalence: figures of speech are ornamental, yet discourse in the most general sense, and not just clever word play, constitutes social reality. The publication of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s *Metaphors We Live By* (1980) had an enormous impact in many fields of study, not least because it uses plain language to show that metaphors suffuse the plain language we use every day. In the decades since this fresh and accessible book appeared, there has emerged a new field of metaphor studies, in which Lakoff and Johnson continue to play a significant part. In this essay, I draw selectively on some of the major works marking the rapid development of this new field (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; Gibbs, 2005; Gibbs, 2008). A major theme in these materials is the importance of our daily experience, as ‘embodied’ beings, in our choice of metaphors.

I have already asserted that all metaphors are concepts. While most contemporary students of metaphor hold this view, they may not say so directly. Instead, they often talk about conceptual metaphors. Such talk denies, at least implicitly, the sharp distinction between substance and style, concept and metaphor, that defines the humanist heritage in the study of rhetoric.

To soften this distinction, we need only say that so-called literal concepts are generalized, conventionalized and naturalized metaphors. Fixed by repetition, concepts are metaphors that are no longer fresh but all the more fitting in naming some kind of thing. As metaphors become naturalized, they tend to acquire affective and evaluative weight, and when they are used with modal auxiliaries, they also acquire normative weight. If all metaphors are concepts, it is no less the case that all concepts are metaphors.

Aristotle held that metaphors ‘must fairly correspond to the thing signified’ (*Rhetoric*, 1405a11, quoted above). I would further say that metaphors are fitting when we believe they correspond to the thing signified, which they do because we have already used metaphors to make that thing what it is. No such correspondence is perfect. In saying that ‘metaphors are similes’ (*Rhetoric*, 1413a14), Aristotle was expressing the same position, if indirectly. To be similar is to be different in some small degree.

Many contemporary students of metaphor agree with Aristotle, even if they do not realize it. Performative language undercuts the possibility that our representations of the world, however fitting in the moment, are ever fully and finally fixed. Yet this existential uncertainty has important cognitive consequences. Similes encourage us to make comparisons. When we compare things that we take to be alike in one respect with things we take to be alike in another respect, we draw analogies and assign kinds of things to more inclusive kinds. By classifying things, we impose an order on the world that our representations depend on if they are to do the work we need them to.
Scholars in the new field of metaphor studies often say that effective metaphors are directional. In Aristotle’s language, names are given, but not given back, even if the thing thus named already has a name. Take, for example, this metaphor: THE EU IS (LIKE) A HOUSE WITH MANY ROOMS (here following the convention of using capital letters to indicate some metaphor under consideration). We are unlikely to say that A HOUSE WITH MANY ROOMS IS (LIKE) THE EU. Yet we could well say that BOTH A HOUSE AND THE EU ARE (LIKE) CONTAINERS, in which case directionality goes from the more general kind to the more specific kind. Moreover, metaphors of the same kind will lose their directionality as they become conventionalized. For example, social fraternities on university campuses in the United States have houses, and fraternity and house are interchangeable names (A FRATERNITY IS A HOUSE/A HOUSE IS A FRATERNITY).

Some metaphors are more durable and more widely distributed across cultures than others. These would seem to be basic or, as many scholars now say, primary because they reflect, or represent, the experience we all have, as embodied beings, in dealing with the world. Even though it is frequently acknowledged that a large, indeterminate number of such metaphors are likely to exist, there has been some effort to assemble a list of primary metaphors (see Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: Table 4.1, 50-54), so far without any system or plan. Few scholars in the new field of metaphor studies are social scientists, and few of the primary metaphors they put forward have a social content or context.

With this in mind, I suggest that any such list should include three kinds of metaphors, all of which will have strong affective and evaluative associations. The first kind represents our experience in orienting ourselves in space and time. The second kind represents our awareness of our bodies. The third kind arises from having learned that there are other embodied beings in the world. As we experience close relations with other embodied beings, we also learn that they have relations with each other. Primary metaphors constitute the world as a social place, even as they remind us that our bodily selves occupy that world.

**Metaphors in the Field of International Relations**

Only in the last twenty years have some few scholars in the field of International Relations (hereinafter IR) given serious consideration to metaphors. The large majority of scholars in IR believe that the function of language, and therefore of concepts, is to represent objects, their properties and relations. They take metaphors to be stylistic flourishes often impeding the clear statement of literal concepts. Only those scholars who have taken the ‘linguistic turn’ are inclined to consider figures of speech as integral to the way people construct an inter-subjectively meaningful reality for themselves. In my own case (Onuf, 1989: 155-159), I endeavored to show
how metaphors (along with other figures of speech) work in shaping a world that is shaped in turn by our choices of words. To whatever extent my peers could relate to my larger argument about social construction, my more specific claims about figures of speech fell on deaf ears (to use another fitting metaphor).

Among those scholars in IR who have taken the linguistic turn, a growing number, starting with Friedrich Kratochwil (1989), have given their attention to discourse and argument. Yet they tend to disregard Kratochwil’s important discussion of rhetoric as persuasive speech and thus have little to say about metaphors. There have been studies of the way metaphors are used in the conduct of international relations and of the constitutive effects of their use (Lakoff, 1991; Chilton and Ilyin, 1993; Chilton, 1996; Mutimer, 1997; Marks, 2001; this list is hardly exhaustive). Not all of these studies are from scholars in the field, and they showed little in the way of constitutive effect themselves. There are, however, recent signs of gathering interest (Beer and Landtsheer, 2004; Hülsse, 2006; Slingerland, Blanchard and Boyd-Judson, 2007; Carver and Pikalo, 2008; Kornprobst, Pouliot, Shah and Zaïotti, 2008). One of the more conspicuous signs is the appearance of Petr Drulák’s ‘Motion, Container and Equilibrium: Metaphors in the Discourse about European Integration’ (2006) in a leading journal.

Drulák (2006: 503) adopts a constructivist approach to metaphors: ‘Rather than just describing pre-existing similarities between two subjects, and objectively mediating between them, metaphor actually contribute to the establishment of similarities and, thus, to the construction of our knowledge of the world’ (2006: 503). Implied here is the Aristotelian position, which was recently reaffirmed by scholars in the new field of metaphor studies, that metaphors are indistinguishable from similes. While Drulák points to Lakoff and Johnson (1980) as a source of inspiration—an earlier version of Drulák’s 2006 piece tells us this book offers ‘a radical elaboration of the constructivist perspective’ (Drulák, 2004: 6)—he has little to say about the relation between metaphor and bodily experience, which Lakoff and Johnson have continued to emphasize. In this respect, Drulák has much company, perhaps because the philosophical idealism of discourse studies and constructivist IR does not fit well with materialist tendencies in the new field of metaphor studies.

‘Of paramount importance,’ Drulák tells us, ‘is the idea that language is not only a simple mirror of social reality, but... contributes to the very constitution of social reality’ (2006: 501). This claim would seem to make Drulák a language-oriented constructivist. Since he credits Alexander Wendt (1999) as an influence on his work (even though Wendt is notoriously indifferent to language), we might think Wendt’s ‘rump materialism’ (1999: 92–138) would have pointed Drulák toward Lakoff and Johnson’s more thoroughgoing materialism. There is, however, no evidence that Drulák has, as a constructivist, come to grips with this nettlesome issue.

Drulák foregoes any effort to define metaphor precisely. He does, however, quote Kenneth Burke’s classic work on literary theory, A Grammar of Motives: ‘Metaphors...
can be broadly understood as devices for seeing something in terms of something else’ (Burke, 1945: 503, quoted in Cameron, 1999: 13). Drułák’s choice of the metaphor A METAPHOR IS A DEVICE is related to what I would call a primary metaphor, DOING IS MAKING, and reaffirms his constructivist affinities. Burke’s ocular metaphor (KNOWING IS SEEING) points to Aristotle’s conception of metaphor as using the name of one thing for another but away from Aristotle’s emphasis on predication and, correspondingly, the constitutive power of language.

Whether Drułák would concur with my view that all metaphors are concepts and all concepts metaphors is unclear from a close reading of his work. He affirms a distinction, first drawn by Lakoff–Johnson (1980), between ‘conceptual metaphors’ and ‘metaphorical expressions’ (Drułák, 2006: 503–504). While such a distinction might indicate resistance to the directionless metaphor A CONCEPT IS A METAPHOR, methodological considerations may also be a factor. The distinction between conceptual metaphors and metaphorical expressions reflects two different ways of examining metaphors: the micro perspective at the level of the participants and the macro perspective viewed by the analyst’ (Drułák, 2006: 504).

Methodologically speaking, I fail to see what Drułák gains by introducing different ‘levels’ (in this context an ill-fitting metaphor) when his concern is language users’ ‘perspective’ (reverting to an ocular metaphor). By standing back, an observer—the analyst—presumably sees something—a ‘structure’—not visible to those whose language the observer is attending to. Yet the observer is also a language user (and could be the very one stepping back for a better view) who uses a ‘metaphorical expression’ to conceptualize whatever she sees (or hears—auditory metaphors fit better here). Everyone is speaking and listening all of the time; in the process everyone is making, using and remaking concepts—‘conceptual metaphors’—all of the time. Drułák says that conceptual metaphors are ‘abstract’ and metaphorical expressions are ‘specific’ (2006: 503–504). Yet this formula gives the game away. Over time and with use, fresh metaphorical expressions become familiar, and as this happens, they seem to their users to have become more generally relevant to their conversational needs.

Drułák seems to concur on this point at least. He emphasizes that ‘a metaphor first emerges as a novel and unusual statement, and then gradually loses its metaphoricity by intensive usage to eventually become part of plain thought’ (2006: 506–507). Much as I endorse this view, the term metaphoricity is ambiguous. It might be taken to imply that a metaphor has some essential properties which would mean that the metaphor would cease to exist if these properties were to disappear. Aristotle’s belief that metaphors must be fresh but also fitting does not make these properties essential if, as Drułák insists, we treat ‘metaphors as necessary conditions of speaking and thinking, rather than as mere rhetorical deviations from normal language’ (2006: 502).
Granting Drulák a coherent position consistent with his constructivist claims, he is inclined to minimize the distinction between metaphors and concepts. Thus in the early version of his piece, he invokes ‘the traditional distinction between “dead” and “live” metaphors’ (2004: 9). Later he no longer makes this distinction. Instead he refers to the ‘life cycle of metaphors’ (Drulák, 2006: 506), which suggests metaphorically that metaphors change with time. He also claims that ‘many seemingly literal statements are actually hidden metaphors’ (Drulák, 2006: 506). This is a significant metaphorical shift, suggesting that a metaphor ages and fades from view, but does not die. More abstractly, some of the observable properties of a metaphor change over time without adversely affecting their function in social construction. Indeed metaphors may function better as constituents in the process of concept formation because they are hidden.

That metaphors go from being novel to familiar to hidden results in ‘three stages of sedimentation’ (Drulák, 2006: 507). Linking stages and sedimentation results in a mixed metaphor. The metaphorical thrust of the term sedimentation derives from what is certainly a primary metaphor (UP IS NEW), while the term stages derives from a different yet also primary metaphor (CHANGE IS FORWARD MOTION). Drulák gives Ole Wæver credit for the term sedimentation. In Drulák’s summary (2006: 502), ‘social and discursive structures can be seen as layered. The different layers of sedimentation are the result of historical practices, while at the same time they impact on actual practices.’

Using the term sedimentation for the conventionalization of metaphors seems to be Drulák’s innovation. This is a fresh and effective way of talking about a cumulative but periodically discontinuous process. Indicatively, the earlier version of Drulák’s piece titles a section ‘The Conventionalization of Metaphors’ (2004: 11), which the later version changes to ‘The Sedimentation of Metaphors’ (Drulák, 2006: 506). Distinguishing ‘three stages of sedimentation gives us a useful system for classifying metaphors. Metaphors can be categorized as sedimented, conventional, or unconventional’ (Drulák, 2006: 507). ‘Sedimented metaphors are taken for granted and, thus, uncontested,’ and they are ‘ubiquitous’ (third stage); ‘conventional metaphors are frequent and contested’ (second stage); ‘unconventional metaphors are rare but contested’ (first stage) (Drulák, 2006: 508).

Why the classificatory scheme reverses the order of the stages is unclear and somewhat confusing. Why contestation is one of the scheme’s two discriminating properties (the other is frequency) is not explained. I would think that some few novel metaphors work well (for rhetorical purposes) because they seem uncontestably right, and they are added to the stock of familiar metaphors because they are not generally contested. Those novel metaphors that do not work well and thus do not achieve rapid acceptance will simply die from neglect.

As I have already indicated, I would call a metaphor no longer recognizable as a metaphor naturalized and, in many cases, normativized. Often used by postmodern
writers, the term naturalization suggests that the metaphor in question seems natural to its users—they feel it is given by nature rather than by human artifice. As with most of nature so-called, such a metaphor is subject to change, however gradual and causally complex. More than this, naturalized metaphors are active concepts, constantly put to use and infinitely subject to novel applications and alterations. As shifting metaphors, they are subject to metaphorical rehabilitation. The term sedimented suggests that once a metaphor is buried under layers of unconventional and conventional metaphors, ‘the harder it is to change it’ (Drulák, 2006: 502). In metaphorical terms, the accumulation of dead metaphors turns into rock.

Wæver addresses this issue: ‘the deeper structures [of discourse] are more solidly sedimented and more difficult to politicise and change, but change is always in principle possible since all of these structures are socially constituted’ (2003: 32). Discursive structure consists of extended arrays of related metaphors, some of which are normativized. Such massively complex metaphors disrupt layers and afford opportunities for change, for example, through the circulation of novel metaphors. Because Drulák deals with discrete metaphors, sedimentation packs them together like specks of sand—they have no structure, metaphorically speaking.

Drulák associates sedimentation with internalization, the latter term referring to individuals, the former to ‘speech communities’ (about which see Drulák, 2006: 505–506). We might better associate sedimentation with socialization—a term that points to external conditions (institutions, social-material factors) in the process of sedimentation. Drulák introduces internalization by reference to Wendt’s ‘two levels of structure: micro-structure and macro-structure’ (Drulák, 2006: 501, citing Wendt, 1999: 147–153; recall Drulák’s micro and macro perspectives). In my view, specific institutional contexts shape processes of internalization and socialization, not abstract structures as observers’ metaphorical contrivances (unless, of course, those contrivances have become sedimented features of institutional arrangements) (see further Onuf, 2009a).

**METAPHORS IN THE DISCOURSE ABOUT EUROPEAN INTEGRATION**

Europe’s novel institutional arrangements have prompted the metaphorical extension of familiar concepts (sedimented metaphors) to previously unnamed phenomena. Many of these metaphors have rapidly sedimented. Spillover, engrenage, acquis and supranational are obvious examples. Even the extension of the term integration to economic relations dates only from the 1940s. Some extensions of sedimented metaphors to European arrangements have been contested—for example, that of federation—on grounds of dissimilarity.

Drulák applies the ‘framework’ he has so carefully constructed to the European Union as a case study. He says this framework ‘relies on discourse analysis,’ but that
it is ‘structure-oriented’ (Drulák, 2006: 511). Even if Wæver talks about discursive structures, Drulák does not. Had he actually developed the sedimented metaphor structure, which he introduces on methodological grounds (see above), it would have unduly complicated his framework. As it is, talk of structure gets him in trouble.

Because ‘there is a close connection between IR theories and theories of European integration,’ Drulák identifies ‘the EU as a type of international structure’ (2006: 511) and proceeds to classify theories of European integration as either intergovernmental or supranational (2006: 509). Too much is going on here with too little clarification. Any claim that IR theories and theories of European integration are structurally similar is contestable. While intergovernmental theories do resemble IR theories in their emphasis on the relations between governments, supranational theories are anomalous at best in IR, just as the prefix supra- implies. The frequent recourse to novel metaphors in supranational theories suggests that IR’s sedimented metaphors do not fit the European situation.

Drulák (2006: 510) tells us the ‘conceptual metaphors used by EU leaders’ are the ‘actual subject’ of his research. This claim is misleading. His paper has two actual subjects (in addition to itself). One subject is the conceptual metaphors constituting scholarly discourse, metaphorically identified as theory. The second subject is the conceptual metaphors leaders use in public, metaphorically identified as practice. The point of Drulák’s study is to use each discourse to look at the other. If we call theories of European integration discursive institutions (discourse set apart as a relatively stable complex arrangement of metaphors), we avoid the disadvantages of using structural metaphors and downplay the unhelpful comparison with IR theories. By doing so, we take European Union studies and the European Union’s institutional arrangements to be discrete discursive fields, each with at least some discursive conventions of its own. Then there are other discursive conventions that are shared between two or more discursive fields and still other conventions that are even more widely shared.

Drulák limits his research to three years of official debate over a Constitution for the European Union. This framing of the subject effectively removes institutional arrangements from consideration, leaves a nominally homogenous ‘speech community,’ and relieves him from complicating his exposition with talk of ‘micro-structure.’ The other subject—theories of European integration—he classifies by reference to structure (in effect, different institutional features). Then he associates these theories with familiar metaphors: ‘while intergovernmental approaches see the EU as an EQUILIBRIUM OF CONTAINERS, supranational approaches imagine the EU as a CONTAINER’ (Drulák, 2006: 511).

Container metaphors are much favored in metaphor studies. In IR, STATE AS CONTAINER is understandably treated as a constitutive metaphor. Insofar as inter-
governmental theories start and end with states as units of analysis (as do most IR theories as discursive institutions), the container metaphors will be found in abundance. With such an obvious finding, it is hard to see what is gained by subjecting these theories to a metaphorical assessment. If, however, we switch from IR to Political Theory or Constitutional Law as fields of study, we might expect to find metaphors involving bodies and persons: THE BODY IS (NOT JUST) A CONTAINER, SOCIAL BODIES ARE PERSONS, LEADERS ARE HEADS, THE STATE IS A POLITICAL BODY, etc. Alternatively we might follow Weber and say THE STATE IS A CHAIN OF COMMAND and go on to say NATION IS BODY or NATION IS FAMILY.

In an ad hoc alteration of the initial classificatory scheme (side-by-side containers), Drulák takes neofunctionalism out from under the supranational ‘umbrella’ and designates it as a container like the other two because ‘the central neofunctionalist metaphor sees the EU as a MOTION’ (2006: 511). This claim seems wrong on the face of it. The central metaphors for neofunctionalism are FUNCTION IS NEED ADRESSED and FUNCTION IS TASK PERFORMED. If this metaphorical complex is not obvious, then we should surmise that it is so sedimented in bureaucratic discourse (i.e. institutionalized) that public officials and scholarly observers take it for granted. Motion is metaphorically highly visible because the future of the EU is much contested.

Drulák’s texts have very little (two paragraphs) to say about the remaining contents of the supranational container. Yet federalism and constitutionalism (closely related as discursive institutions) offer sedimented metaphors as pervasive as they are unseen. Perhaps the best examples have to do with levels: LEVELS ARE PLATFORMS, LEVELS ARE LAYERS. Federalism is one important part of an exceptionally old and dense discursive institution which, as a whole, is no longer in view. This institution is called republicanism; as glossed by scholars, it is republican theory. Republicanism consists of a great many sedimented metaphors that no longer seem to be related in the way they once were. 8

Drulák holds that federalism and constitutionalism ‘are among the most influential examples of CONTAINER thinking’ (2006: 512). I find this claim unconvincing. It rests on a tendency (hardly Drulák’s alone) to extend the metaphor CATEGORY IS CONTAINER to social phenomena where relations are paramount. Even with respect to categories, we often prefer to employ the metaphor CATEGORY IS FAMILY, as in Aristotle’s species and genera and Wittgenstein’s family resemblance.

Once we say, following Aristotle, that an association, as a whole, is a voluntary relation of like, that like associations form wholes by voluntarily associating, and so on, we begin to visualize the relations within associations horizontally and those between associations vertically (even if Aristotle did not). Here we discover the metaphorical value of the metaphor LINES ARE BORDERS—in this case, horizontal
This metaphorical complex is at the heart of republican theory as a body of claims, for which Aristotle is the canonical source, about institutional arrangements for the common good. This metaphorical complex does not insist that LINES ARE BARRIERS (lines mark layers but do not make them impermeable). On the contrary, Aristotle took for granted that parts and wholes are always related, and the Renaissance and early modern revival of republican theory developed representation as a metaphorical complex to show just how relations between levels worked in principle.

Functional theory postulates a variety of human needs, a division of labor in meeting those human needs, and increased task specialization over time. Functionalists draw vertical lines between sectors differentiated by task. If we combine federal and functional theory (with Aristotle’s figurative blessing and republican theory as discursive institution), we can visualize institutional arrangements as a lattice (Onuf, 1998: 271–272). Insofar as a lattice suggests straight lines both in parallel and at right angles, and thus an ordered arrangement of self-contained boxes (CONTAINERS ARE BOXES) or cells, this metaphor may create the impression that stable relations across both vertical and horizontal lines are seriously hampered. Furthermore, when this metaphor is applied to European institutional arrangements, it is immediately clear that lines are irregularly spaced and cells vary considerably in size (hence variable geometry as an associated metaphor).

An alternative metaphor, well-known to students of the United States as a federal republic, is the layer cake (with local, state, and federal layers). We can visualize this cake as a disk and thus cut it in different-sized wedges (separation of powers as constitutional doctrine, functional bureaux). If this metaphor is too tidy for descriptive purposes, then the metaphor of a marble cake, which Morton Gродzins popularized (President’s Commission on National Goals, 1960: 265), may be too messy. Despite the sedimented status of the marble cake metaphor, it leaves no way to discriminate between association visualized by place or space and function as activity fixed not by place but by needs, skills and tools.

DOWN AND UP

If every concept started off as a metaphor and most concepts have buried histories, then most of the metaphors deployed in a public debate go uncounted and their importance in discursive institutional change goes unrecognized. In other words, the deeper layers of meaning and significance do not register when the observer has ‘metaphoricity’ in mind and chooses metaphors accordingly (Drulák, 2006: 509). One could start with the claim that buried meanings are basic (PRIMARY IS BASIC) and then proceed by digging through sedimented layers (LEARNING IS DIGGING) for metaphors that reveal what has later disappeared from view. There is a methodological problem: How does the investigator identify an exemplary text, or a
metaphorical complex, from the accumulated rubble making up deeply sedimented layers? Must it protrude into higher layers, have ‘ripple effects’ in its own layer, seem to be typical for its time and place, or display exceptional craftsmanship? Many scholars will be relatively untroubled by these questions on the assumption that scholarship is cumulatively self-correcting (MORE IS UP). Those scholars (such as myself) who do not find this assumption persuasive will claim instead that the past is what we make it today, for reasons (REASONS ARE SUBJECTIVE CONSIDERATIONS) that some future scholar may wish to investigate.

ENDNOTES
1 I presented a longer version of this essay at the Institute of International Relations, Prague (Onuf, 2009c).
2 I am grateful to Petr Drulák and Petr Kratochvíl for their hospitality and encouragement, and to all present on that occasion for a bracing discussion. Eric Blanchard deserves much of the credit (or blame) for reviving my interest in metaphors. I thank Harry Gould for serving, yet again, as sounding board and gentle critic. Finally, I thank Vendulka Kubálková for insisting that the time had come for me to visit her homeland.
3 All translations of Aristotle are from Barnes (1984).
4 For a much fuller statement of what I think this undertaking involves, see Onuf (2009c, 2009d). Onuf (2009d) adapts material from Onuf (2009c) which is not used here.
5 Cf. Johnson (2008: 44): ‘Philosophical theories, like all theoretical constructions, are elaborations of conceptual metaphors. In a very strong sense, philosophy is metaphor’ (his emphasis).
6 The metaphor EUROPE IS A HOUSE is often used. See Hülsse (2006: 412–414) for discussion and citations.
7 Of course, the same can be said of my own Kantian constructivism. In recent work, I try to show in different ways (Onuf, 2003, 2009b) that constructivist idealism and a materialism more expansive than Wendt’s can be reconciled.
8 Drulák cites Waever (1998: 106–112)—a text that I have not read. But see Waever (2003: 23–47) for what appears to be a similar exposition.
9 To illustrate the point, Hooghe and Marks (2003) discuss the concept of multi-level governance, as developed in several fields of study (European Union Studies, IR, Federalism, Local Government, and Public Policy), with no reference whatsoever to republican theory as a discursive institution.

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Polemics:
Of Metaphors, Concepts and Reality – A Reply to Onuf

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Abstract: The article replies to the polemic by Nicholas Onuf. It defends a particular conceptualisation of metaphor distinguishing between conceptual metaphors and metaphorical expressions and explaining why metaphors are unidirectional. Following this, performativity of speech is addressed. Then metaphors of European integration are discussed. Finally, the case for metaphorical analysis is put in terms of ontology, epistemology and methodology.

Key words: conceptual metaphor, metaphorical expression, speech community, European integration

Prof. Nicholas Onuf belongs to the most original and the most influential IR thinkers of the past thirty years (Waever, 1997; Wind, 1997). He came up with concepts which at first might have seemed strange and difficult to grasp to the IR community but which turned into a common knowledge of the discipline since then. Thus, he was among the first to define his theoretical position as ‘constructivism’ in his opus magnum of the late 1980s (Onuf, 1989), inspiring one the most important streams of the current IR theorizing. From the very start, his understanding of constructivism was strongly oriented towards language and its role in the social construction of the ‘World of our making’. The potential of his language orientation became even more topical once the mainstream constructivism chose to follow a different path. This path is exemplified by the ‘Social Theory of International Politics’ of Alexander Wendt (1999), which according to its critics forgets about the contribution of language to the social construction of the political reality. Therefore, paradoxically, the current mainstream understanding of constructivism differs from how Onuf understood constructivism when he introduced the concept.

Onuf’s attention to language led him to the examination of metaphors in his opus magnum. It needs to be again emphasised that, unlike nowadays, metaphors have been only rarely (if at all) discussed in the IR literature at that time. In this respect, I consider it a great privilege to exchange a few ideas on metaphor in IR with Onuf on the basis of his thoughtful critique of my own work (Drulák, 2006). To clarify my position with respect to Onuf’s, I will primarily refer to his polemic in this journal.
(Onuf, 2010). However, due to the understandable brevity of this polemic, I will also refer to his previous investigation of the metaphor (Onuf, 1989), in relation to which he could explain his conceptualisation in greater detail as nothing suggests that he would renege on that position (Onuf, 2010: 6).

I am going to structure my response as follows. To start with I will explain how I understand the concept of metaphor and why I find useful the distinction between conceptual metaphor and metaphorical expression. In addition to that, I will argue that the direction of the metaphor from A to B does not necessarily imply the opposite direction (from B to A). Following this, I will argue that the concepts of sedimentation and speech community offer a possible take on the issue of the relation between word and world which Onuf misses in my work. Then I will defend my choice of metaphors of European integration, which I made in my previous analysis (Druľák, 2006). Finally, I will identify what I see as the most important insights gained from the use of metaphors as conceptual tools for understanding social reality.

**METAPHORS ARE NOT CONCEPTS**

I agree with Onuf on the usefulness and appropriateness of Aristotle’s definition of metaphor as ‘giving the thing a name that belongs to something else’ (Onuf, 2010: 1). I take this definition as a good starting point and I actually use a similar definition, which only lightly elaborates on Aristotle: ‘seeing something in terms of something else’ (Druľák, 2006). However, following Ricoeur, I would argue that Aristotle’s understanding of metaphor goes much beyond this elementary definition and definitely beyond reducing the contribution of metaphor to persuasion. On this Onuf seems to agree to some extent even though he believes that the above definition by Aristotle, as well as the definition I use, points to the persuasive function of the metaphor and away from its other functions.

Unlike Onuf, I do not consider these definitions as closed classifications but as starting points from which a more thorough understanding of metaphor is developed. Ricoeur shows how Aristotle distinguishes between the rhetorical function of metaphors and their poetic function (Ricoeur, 1975: 13–61). While the former is about persuasion, the latter is defined as mimesis, whereby mimesis should not be interpreted as a simple imitation (which is the usual translation of the term). According to Ricoeur, Aristotle understands mimesis as construction of the myth, thus associating it with creativity and a step beyond the particular and towards the universal. This step also explains Aristotle’s claim that poetry is more philosophical than history (Ricoeur, 1975: 55–56).

Similarly, there is nothing in my article which would suggest that I consider metaphor as a tool of persuasion only. On the contrary, the same paragraph which includes the above definition also says that metaphors are ‘necessary conditions of speaking and thinking, rather than ... mere rhetorical deviations from normal langu-
Thus, there is no real contention between Onuf and myself about the fact that metaphors do much more than merely affect the ornamentality and persuasiveness of speech.

However, we differ on the relationship between metaphors and concepts. Onuf does not distinguish between the two, claiming that ‘all metaphors are concepts and all concepts metaphors’ (Onuf, 2010: 9). Now I more or less agree with the second part of the statement, even though I would qualify it by saying that all concepts rely on metaphors. However, I respect Onuf’s metaphorical move here, which he makes more explicit by introducing the metaphor A CONCEPT IS A METAPHOR (ibid.), which is indeed useful. In this connection, I find important the contributions by scholars like George Lakoff or Paul Chilton (Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff–Johnson, 1980; Chilton, 1996; Chilton–Lakoff, 1995), among many others, who showed how such seemingly abstract concepts as security, state or sovereignty are embedded in specific metaphors without which they would lose their meaning. However, the metaphoricity of concepts had been pointed out much earlier – for example, by Friedrich Nietzsche.

Nevertheless, I do not see any reason for the claim that ‘all metaphors are concepts’. Even though Onuf uses these words, he is not consistent in his claim as he also argues that ‘metaphors are concepts in the making’ (Onuf, 2010: 1). On this I agree as long as one can read it as meaning that metaphors can be developed into concepts. A metaphor indeed points to a link between two things which can but do not have to be developed into a concept. In his careful analysis of Aristotle, Ricoeur (1975: 323–344) shows that conceptual thinking differs from metaphorical thinking and that these two modes of thought, philosophy and poetry, are indeed separate without denying links between them.

The distinction between metaphor and concept is too important to be abandoned. It is related to other important distinctions – the distinctions between general and particular, between structure and agency, and between macro- and microlevel phenomena – without being identical with them. All these distinctions refer to different phenomena which are ontologically linked by mutual constitution.

That is why I work with the distinction between a conceptual metaphor and a metaphorical expression, whose significance Onuf underestimates. He cannot take the distinction too seriously as long as he insists that ‘all concepts are metaphors and all metaphors concepts’. I use this distinction as an operationalisation of the micro-macro opposition, which has been a perennial issue in social science. Like Onuf, I want to stress ‘the continuous co-constitution of micro- and macrolevel phenomena’ (Onuf, 1989: 29). The fact that in my article I refer to Wendt’s conceptualisation of micro- and macrostructure (Wendt, 1999) is not so important in this respect, as both Wendt and Onuf agree on the mutual constitution of micro- and macrophenomena.
In this connection, the mutual constitution of metaphorical expressions, at the microlevel, and conceptual metaphors, at the macrolevel, represents an ideal operationalisation of the micro-macro phenomenon as analytically distinct yet ontologically co-constituted. The fact that all of us are language users trapped in metaphors, as Onuf rightly emphasises (Onuf, 2010: 10), does not mean that some of us cannot reflect on the language use and discover structures which are hidden in daily use. That is what Lakoff and Johnson (1980) did when they pointed out how our daily concepts rely on hidden metaphors, of which we are not aware when speaking.

While, indeed, every abstract concept relies on a metaphor and therefore is a metaphor, metaphors can be developed into concepts but that does not mean that they all are concepts. All conceptual metaphors are concepts. Metaphorical expressions are not concepts as long as they are not conceptual metaphors. The very concept of concept is less clear than the concept of metaphor and thus likening a metaphor to a concept does not help us much.

Conceptual metaphors represent the structures which are made visible in speech by metaphorical expressions. In this respect, I do not agree with Onuf’s criticism that I only focus on ‘discrete metaphors’ that ‘have no structure’ (Onuf, 2010: 13). It is the function of a conceptual metaphor to integrate dozens of seemingly discrete metaphorical expressions into a whole which is structured by an abstract metaphorical rule such as THE EU IS A CONTAINER.

This structural feature of conceptual metaphors can be helpful in the analysis of metaphoricity on which Onuf briefly reflects in his concluding paragraphs (Onuf, 2010: 18). The type of analysis he suggests is historical examination of sedimentation. He argues for uncovering the original meanings of metaphors which, over the course of time, disappeared under layers of sedimanted discourse. This type of analysis may indeed bring fruitful results and there are etymological studies which focus on the original metaphoricity of a seemingly literal speech. However, one can also follow Lakoff and Johnson, who investigated metaphoricity by looking into the coherence of the conceptual metaphor. The more metaphorical expressions can be deduced from the given conceptual metaphor, the more coherent it is.

**METAPHORS ARE NOT DIRECTIONLESS**

Onuf’s identification of metaphors and concepts is linked with his insistence that metaphors tend to be ‘directionless’ – i.e. by saying A is B, they also say that B is A. If this is the case then A CONCEPT IS A METAPHOR by necessity leads to A METAPHOR IS A CONCEPT. However, his treatment of the metaphorical direction is too quick. He argues that ‘metaphors of the same kind [i.e. of the same kind of specificity] will lose their directionality as they become conventionalised’ (Onuf, 2010: 5). This can indeed happen but there is no reason why this should always happen with conventionalisation. We have the conventional metaphor ‘man is a wolf’ but not
the corresponding metaphor ‘a wolf is a man’. A metaphor transfers meaning from one thing to another and there is no reason why this transfer should bring about an analogical transfer of meaning in the opposite direction.

Onuf’s belief in directionless metaphors may be linked with his understanding of metaphor as one of the tropes as they were defined by classical rhetoricians. Even though he insists that his concept of metaphor does not limit its functions to ornamentation and persuasion, in his previous work he introduces metaphor as one figure of speech among others while failing to recognise its unique role (Onuf, 1989). On this basis, he comes up with a tropical triad of metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche, whereby each trope is associated with a different model of society, a different kind of politics and, most importantly, a different type of rule. I am not sure to what extent Onuf still sticks to this concept of metaphor. However, his repeated insistence on the directionlessness of the metaphor gives me a welcome opportunity to clarify my own position.

How is this classical rhetorical approach linked with the direction of the metaphor? This is connected with Onuf’s own definitions of these tropes (Onuf, 1989: 156–157). The fact that he took them over from Hayden White (1973: 31–36) is controversial in itself. He argues that all three tropes link two different things (A is B), but they differ according to whether these things are of the same kind or whether one is a part of the other. While a metaphor links two things of the same kind, a synecdoche makes a ‘part-to-whole’ link (A is B while A is actually part of B), and a metonymy makes the opposite ‘whole-to-part’ link. By implication, a change in direction between the two things constituting a metonymy turns it into a synecdoche and vice versa. Metaphor is the only trope which does not transform itself into a different trope with the change of the direction. Therefore, Onuf argues that ‘the directionless fit of assertives is always recognizable as a metaphorical construction’ (Onuf, 1989: 156).

This neat classification of tropes is highly misleading. Not only does it make metaphor appear directionless but it also misdefines metonymy, which is usually understood as ‘the use of the name of one thing for that of another of which it is an attribute or with which it is associated’ (Webster’s Dictionary). Therefore, synecdoche is usually considered a special case of metonymy.

Most importantly, the very perspective of metaphor as only one of several tropes leads to the underestimation of its role in speech and thought. The above definition by Aristotle actually covers all three of the tropes. In this respect, I do not find it fruitful to distinguish between metaphors, metonymies and synecdoches in the study of politics. I address them all as metaphors even though I grant that they are different types of metaphors. However, the question of what types of metaphors one can then distinguish is empirical and should not be answered a priori without respect to the research subject. The typology of tropes is unlikely to turn out to be relevant
to the typologies which come out from the discourse within which political practice is embedded. In this connection, the links between different tropes and different kinds of societies as they are described by Onuf (1989) seem rather artificial.

**WORDS OF METAPHORS AND WORLDS OF SPEECH COMMUNITIES**

Onuf is right in pointing out that I do not specify to a great extent how ‘language makes the world ... what it is’ (Onuf, 2010: 8). Even though I used the concepts of sedimentation and speech community to address this to some extent, I acknowledge this as a problem of my approach. At the same time, I also believe that all language-oriented approaches suffer from a similar weakness as they usually pay scant attention to anything non-discursive. They usually claim that it is only discursive reality which really matters, thus excusing themselves for their failure to engage a non-discursive reality as well. Onuf is close to this position. While the previous discussion about metaphors and concepts was related to the structure and agency debate, the discussion about the discursive and the non-discursive refers to another perennial debate, namely, the one between idealism and materialism.

Onuf claims that his language-oriented perspective is immune from the usual weaknesses of these approaches. There are two lines of arguments in his article to justify this claim. One is related to metaphor and speech performativity, and the other is related to metaphor and primary experience. The performativity argument he puts forward is the less convincing of the two. He argues that speech is performative, that ‘metaphors are directly performative’, and that ‘to represent the world metaphorically is to make it real’, which makes social reality ‘a finite set of metaphors’ (Onuf, 2010: 8).

Even though I also consider speech as performative, I do not understand how its performativity can be explained only with reference to special qualities of metaphor. The performativity of the speech lies not only within the discourse itself but in the nexus between the discourse and non-discursive reality. To see how language makes the world, we need to develop the concept of the world differently than the concept of language to investigate how they relate to each other. This is not to say that words and worlds are mutually independent, but, on the contrary, that they are mutually constituted at least to some extent. But taking language seriously should also be understood as recognising its limits.

Such limits can be set by our bodily experience and this is where Onuf’s second line of arguments about connecting words and worlds points. He reminds us of the materialism of Lakoff and Johnson (1980), who relate the metaphors we use to the primary experience of our bodies, such as being up or down, feeling temperature or touching objects. Onuf rightly points out that I did not address the relation between metaphor and bodily experience. Like many constructivists, I actually did not
pay much attention to the bodily experience, focusing instead on the language and discourse. Even though this relation may not be of a paramount importance to my research on the metaphors of the European integration, it is an important ontological issue which should be elaborated on. Onuf’s quest for primary metaphors can provide an important contribution to this topic.

Now, as acknowledged, I do not really tackle the relation between words and worlds in my previous work (Drulák, 2006). Still, my analysis of metaphors as sedimented within a particular speech community points in this direction. The sedimentation is a historical process which is conditioned by both ideas and material factors. The speech community within which sedimentation takes place represents the key subject of the performativity of the speech. The effectiveness of the metaphor and its impact on institutions and practices both depend on what the speech community does with it. In this respect, the speech community and the sedimentation process represent the world to which the words of metaphors are related. The relation is mutually constitutive: metaphors are constituted by their users in the speech community, and the speech community is based on a shared discursive practice which itself relies on a network of metaphors.

When Onuf discusses sedimentation and internalisation (which refer to the same process), he confuses these with a micro-macro distinction (Onuf, 2010: 13). That is misleading. The concept of internalisation and the conceptual distinction between micro-structure and macro-structure (Wendt, 1999) are two rather different things. On the one hand, the micro-macro distinction represents an attempt at an ontological middle way in the agency-structure debate which I operationalise by the distinction between conceptual metaphor and metaphorical expression. On the other hand, internalisation refers to a historical process which is indeed shaped by a variety of factors including ‘specific institutional contexts’ (Onuf, 2010: 13), which can also be referred to as conventionalisation or socialisation, and which I operationalise as a sedimentation of the metaphor.

Thus, they cannot refer to the same process as Onuf seems to believe. He sometimes confuses the distinction between different layers of sedimentation with the distinction between metaphorical expressions and conceptual metaphors. For example, he argues that through intensive use, fresh metaphorical expressions become ‘more generally relevant’ (Onuf, 2010: 10). Similarly, he claims that ‘specific institutional contexts shape processes of internalization and socialization, not abstract structures as observers’ metaphorical contrivances’ (Onuf, 2010: 13).

Given that sedimentation is a complex process involving the discursive and the non-discursive, it is not easy to operationalise. For example, the amount of time for which the metaphor has been in use is an important proxy measurement of sedimentation but not the only one. Some metaphors can keep their metaphoricity in the eyes of users for centuries, but others get sedimented within decades. That is the
reason why I introduce another possible source of evidence for sedimentation in the shape of contestation by arguing that the less contested the metaphor is, the more sedimented it is.

Onuf challenges my argument about the link between sedimentation and contestation (Onuf, 2010: 12). However, the words he uses when speaking about sedimented metaphors actually contribute to my argument. He prefers to call sedimented metaphors ‘naturalized’ as they seem to their users to be ‘given by nature, rather than by human artifice’ (ibid.). Now, I argue that metaphors that are seen as given by nature and not as human inventions can hardly be contested as they have the status of natural facts which are supposed to be evident to everyone. One can quarrel with people but not with nature. On this basis, one can argue that the less naturalised the metaphor is, the more open it is to contestation. However, I would like to again emphasise that sedimentation is a complex process and that the contestation, while being an important factor, does not provide the whole story.

Also, it is only with respect to sedimentation that one can speak about metaphoricity. Onuf is right in pointing to the ambiguity of this term, which may indeed seem redundant in a perspective which sees metaphors as the basis of our speech and thought. Still, the term refers to the commonsensical observation that some expressions seem more metaphorical than others to users. And I refer to sedimentation to explain this, arguing that the less sedimented a given metaphor is, the more metaphorical it appears to its users.

NEOFUNCTIONALISM IS ABOUT MOTION

Onuf criticises me for blurring the distinction between IR theories and theories of European integration, arguing that IR theories cannot account for the specificity of the EU. Now the problem gets deeper than this. I actually argue that the whole of our political vocabulary is at odds with the EU experience regardless of whether we use IR theories, European integration theories or domestic politics theories. All the same, several traditions of IR thinking such as realism, liberalism, functionalism and federalism have been relevant to the thinking about the European integration. This is no wonder as the EU started out as a project of international co-operation. Therefore, I find it legitimate to turn to IR theories and theories of European integration (and actually to domestic politics theories too) for advice when analysing scholarly thought about the EU.

However, the main added value of my theoretical analysis consists in the new classification of the theories by the conceptual metaphors on which they rely irrespective of the discipline or sub-discipline from which they emerge. While the centrality of the conceptual metaphors of CONTAINER and EQUILIBRIUM OF CONTAINERS is obvious, the centrality of the MOTION metaphor is not. The identification of the MOTION metaphor as the master metaphor of neofunctionalism
as well as the one behind much of the EU policy talk helps us explain why it is so difficult to grasp the EU by the usual political vocabulary, which is static by default.

Onuf offers alternative metaphors for neofunctionalism and I do not contest their general relevance. However, I do not see how they would improve my research, which is motivated by the question of the nature of the beast which is called the EU. The same actually applies to other alternative metaphors that Onuf is developing. Their added value depends on the research question. No doubt there are research questions for which Onuf’s metaphors of European integration are more appropriate than the conceptual metaphors which I suggest. But my research question was not one of these.

**METAPHORICAL VIRTUES**

Being students of international politics, why should we actually spend so much time and ink on metaphors at all? I believe that there are many reasons for metaphor being a unique tool of analysis of social reality. I will mention just three of these, as I consider these three essential and believe that they develop on the preceding discussion. While the first is related to ontology, the second is about epistemology, and the third is methodological.

To start with, ontological virtues of the metaphor are conditioned upon the ontological assumption that the social reality is ambiguous and dynamic. These virtues stem from the definition of the term ‘metaphor’. As argued, the metaphor is frequently summarised as saying ‘A is B’, whereby A and B are two different things. However, as Ricoeur (1975: 313–320) points out, the metaphorical ‘is’ is somehow special. It means both ‘is’ and ‘is not’, merging the literal and the metaphorical reading. In other words, the metaphorical ‘is’ is ambiguous. This inherent ambiguity gives two special qualities to the metaphor. First, it corresponds to the ambiguity and contradictions of the social reality, and therefore, it can better address it than standard conceptual tools, which by default try to avoid any ambiguity. Second, the ambiguity brings about a tension inside the metaphor which points to the transformation. Thus, unlike static categories, metaphor is inherently dynamic, which again brings it somewhat closer to the social reality.

Epistemologically, very different modes of inquiry and very different modes of reflection on the world use and depend on metaphors. As metaphors are ubiquitous in this heterogeneity, they can help us link and compare areas which are otherwise seen as incommensurable. Therefore, an epistemology which is based on the study of metaphor taps into much richer and diversified resources than more conventional approaches. For example, Ricoeur (1975) pays much attention to metaphors in philosophy and in poetry. Even though he insists on the profound differences between the two as well as on the differences between the kinds of metaphors which they use (Ricoeur, 1975: 394–395), he also shows how metaphors cut across these
boundaries and especially how poetic metaphors enrich the conceptual thought of philosophers.

Finally, what has been just said applies to language as such. However, methodologically, a narrower focus is needed to operationalise language into an analytical tool. In this respect, metaphors are specific enough to be of a practical use in empirical research while being profoundly developed enough philosophically to guarantee that the research results will be of a more general relevance.

CONCLUSIONS

In response to Onuf’s thought-provoking contribution, I have tried to make a case for the distinction between conceptual metaphor and metaphorical expression, for an examination of the sedimentation of metaphors, for a particular metaphorical understanding of the European integration and for the use of metaphor in the study of social reality. However, I do not want to argue that there is one single correct operationalisation of the metaphor for social analysis. The operationalisation depends very much on the questions we want to raise in our analysis of social reality. There are questions where other conceptualisations of metaphors may be more useful than mine and surely there are also questions which will be best answered without any reference to metaphors at all.

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Reviews

ANDREW F. COOPER, CHRISTOPHER W. HUGHES AND PHILIPPE DE LOMBAERDE (EDS): REGIONALISATION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: THE TAMING OF GLOBALISATION?


For many years, the globalisation phenomenon has been a popular topic of academic discussions; not many other issues get such a spotlight. Besides globalisation, regionalisation has been attracting a lot of attention since the 1990’s. The submitted book reacts to current discussions regarding the relation between globalisation and regionalisation and captures some of the selected problems in which the mutual relationships between these two trends can be traced.

The editor themselves admit that their goal was not to cover the entire complex of relationships between regionalisation and globalisation, but rather to capture their partial aspects (p. 5). The purpose of the entire text was to spare the readers from excessive details and rather to offer them quality texts which can make the initiation of a dialogue between various opinion streams easier. The selection of articles is, therefore, significantly selective, which, however, does not degrade the value of the reviewed book. Following the introduction, the book is divided into four sections (all annotated by references): ‘The Theoretical Level of Regionalisation and Globalisation’; ‘The Economical Dimensions’; ‘The Security Dimension’; and ‘Governing Structures’. This publication was created in cooperation with the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, and the majority of the text was presented at a conference in October 2005 that was organised in the facilities of the mentioned university.

This review is especially focused on articles which provide new and comprehensive descriptions of well-known phenomena, and each chapter has its own aim. The first four contributions have theoretical insights and their authors offer the reader a very factual and, at the same time, high quality introduction to all the discussed phenomena. The first text, ‘Enhancing Global Governance through Regional Integration’ (pp. 17–42) by Ramesh Thakur and Luk van Langenhove, is, besides the limitation of the individual terms, focused on the position of regional organisations in the system of global governance. The central question of the entire chapter is whether functioning regional organisations can efficiently contribute to the solutions of contemporary global problems. It is obvious that the authors have been interested in their topic for a long time and that their arguments and explanations are logical and understandable. Due to the many mentioned examples, this chapter is really useful for students or other persons who look for basic information with a comprehensible theoretical framework.

The second chapter, ‘Studying Regionalisation Comparatively: A Conceptual Framework’ (pp. 43–60) by Warleigh-Lack, impeaches one of the main ideas in con-
temporary discussions about regionalisation/regionalism – namely the division of regionalism into ‘new’ and ‘old’ regionalism. In contrast to the widely spread thesis of the accession of ‘new regionalism’/NRA during the 1980s, Warleigh-Lack is of the opinion that the mentioned differences between both streams are artificial and unnecessarily exaggerated. Instead of the dominantly spread typology of the region, he offers his own very inspiring typology of regionalisation. The Warleigh-Lack classification includes five types of regionalisation: structured, dominance, security, network and conjoined regionalisation. Due to its provocative, and at the same time innovative, content, this article can be, without any doubt, considered one of the most valuable texts in the entire book. In fact it is a pity that no more space is devoted to Warleigh-Lack’s typology after his innovative idea is summarised in only a few pages.

The article ‘The Future of Regionalism: Old Divides, New Frontiers’ (pp. 61–79) by Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum is an immediate reaction to the previous text. These ‘founders’ of NRA react to criticism impeaching the difference between new and old regionalism and call for their mutual atonement, which would, however, preserve the validity of the ‘new regionalism theory including the new regionalism approach’ (p. 62). The authors naturally defend the onset of the second regionalism wave in the 80’s and point to its positive impacts.

In the last theoretic chapter, with the title ‘Rethinking Classical Integration Theory’ (pp. 80–95), Ben Rosamond tries to overcome the established stereotype of the European integration process as a universal template for the world outside of Europe. By the Classical Integration Theory (CIT), he means the theory of European integration, which must, according to Rosamond, go through a principal review should it have the ambition to contribute to the study of the contemporary regional projects. Should it serve as a tool in understanding the regional integration, it has to be completed by a critical element that allows for an evaluation of the present regional forms, get rid of its analytical primitivism and refuse the universality of the European model. It is extremely useful to realise that European integration is a model sui generis which should not be adopted in other parts of the world without profound revision.

The second topic is the economical dimension of regionalisation, with Alan M. Rugman as the author of the introductory chapter of this section, ‘Regional Multinationals and the Myth of Globalization’ (pp. 99–117). Based on empirically demonstrable facts, Rugman proves that multinational enterprises (MNE) are, in fact, of a regional, and not a global, character because the majority of their business is usually conducted in their home regions (Rugman talks about three regions of the broad triad – EU, North America, and Asia-Pacific). It is quite difficult to understand Rugman’s text without economic knowledge because it contains many mathematical figures and tables which demonstrate his standpoints. The next chapter, ‘The Role of Regional Agreement in Trade and Investment Regimes’ (pp. 118–141) by
Stephen Woolcock, deals with the importance of the regional trade agreements (RTA) for the formation of trade and investment rules on both regional and international levels. The text is, for the most part, a list of general RTA characteristics and related factors affecting trade agreements and will be more valuable for economic analysts than for social scientists. This paper does not offer anything besides a short summary of RTA features and it lacks a deeper analysis. The seventh chapter, ‘No Safe Havens: Labour, Regional Integration and Globalisation’ (pp. 142–156) by Robert O’Brien, is focused on the relationship between employment and regionalisation. O’Brien bases his analysis on the existence of macro regions (Europe, North America, Latin America, Southeast Asia, the Asia-Pacific region) and applies the Hobson and Seabrooke approach called Everyday IPE (p. 144), which, unlike the classical IPE, focuses on the population majority and their labour rights. From the perspective of further research, especially pointing out the different understandings of the importance of the formal and informal integration in countries with weak/strong labour protection, it seems very inspiring. Also, it is positive that he mentions some concrete examples but on the other hand his text is intended for actual experts who already know the broader connections of his topic.

The third section is covered only by two chapters. The first of them, ‘Regionalisation and Responses to Armed Conflict, with Special Focus on Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping’ (pp. 159–186), is written by Kennedy Graham. It would be relevant to ask the question why this chapter has been included in the book because it describes nearly the same things as the first chapter. The name of the ninth chapter, ‘Non-traditional Security in Asia: the Many Faces of Securitisation’ (pp. 187–209) by Mely Caballero-Anthony, suggests that the text is based on the securitisation concept of the Copenhagen School and its subsequent application to non-traditional sources of insecurity (illness, illegal immigration, environmental degradation). Besides a theoretical explanation of securitisation, whose use is derived from a rigid differentiation of traditional and non-traditional security threats, the most attention is devoted to two securitised topics in the Southeast Asia region – poverty and contagious diseases. There is no doubt that the application the theory of securitisation is innovative, but it would be more advanced to apply this conception to many regions and to compare some of the particular outcomes.

The last three chapters of the books, which are included in the section ‘Govern- ing Structures: Managing Contemporary Multilevel Architecture’, are quite inhomogeneous in their content. The main aim, topic or idea of this part is not clear and thus perhaps it would have been better not to include it in the book at all. In contrast to previous chapters, the last two of these three texts have a distinctive narrative-normative character. The first piece, ‘Making Cultural Policy in a Globalising World’ (pp. 213–229) by Patricia M. Goff, searches for a modus vivendi between the cultural globalisation leading to uniformity and the growing cultural indepen-
dency appearing in reaction to cultural globalisation. The next piece, ‘Regionalism in Global Governance: Realigning Goals and Leadership with Cultures’ (pp. 230–248) from Martin Albrow and Colin I. Bradford, is more an essay than a detailed analysis of a specific phenomenon, and it could be interesting for political thinkers.

The last text, ‘Executive but Expansive: the L20 as a Project of “New” Multilateralism and “New” Regionalism’ (pp. 249–264) by Andrew F. Cooper, devotes its attention to the initiatives of the Leaders’ Twenty (L20) group (originated by the expansion of the Group of Eight/G7/8), which he understands as a practical demonstration of the North-South regionalism. The paper is quite similar to Cooper’s other texts (see endnote 3).

Most parts of the reviewed book are quite readable and well structured and offer the reader many different perspectives and approaches on regionalisation. In my opinion the book is especially written for students and teachers of international relations, political science or economics who have a general knowledge of regionalisation (except for the first chapter, which offers a general overview). The first part introduces articles which are in discussion with each other and, especially on a theoretical level, often have contradictory standpoints. The part is not only a summarisation of single facts, but an interesting introduction of various (often contradictory) opinions which force the reader to think. But on the other hand, the book also has its weaknesses. The chapters by Graham and Thakur and van Langenhove partly overlap, some texts are so scientific that it is quite difficult to understand them, and the last section is missing a common idea. Despite some shortcomings, this book is a valuable asset to discussions about regionalisation and offers a fresh approach to regionalisation in many ways.

Linda Piknerová

ENDNOTES

1 The authors talk about two waves of regional integration: the first took place in the 1950s and 1960s (old regionalism) and the second in the 1980s (new regionalism).

2 O’Brien rather talks about formal and informal integration. He understands formal integration as a set of official international agreements containing binding rules and procedures. He then understands informal integration as activities of non-state participants who, by their activities, stabilise their regional awareness (p. 142).

3 Cooper’s article ‘The Making of the Inter-American Democratic Charter: A Case of Complex Multilateralism’, which was published in the magazine International Studies Perspectives and deals with multilateralism on the grounds of the Organization of American States, is a very interesting text.
The need to achieve stability and security in Europe has always been considered a motivation for EU actors in their rationale in favour of enlargement, yet how big a factor have security considerations been? In *Security through Integration* Teemu Palosaari, Research Fellow at the Tampere Peace Institute sets out to answer this question and, despite some minor reservations, does an excellent job in many respects.

This book is split into five chapters and has two main themes. First it analyses the role that security has played in the process of European Integration. Second it compares the 12 New Member States’ views on security with that of the EU norm. It thus highlights 2 important divides; the different priorities and perceptions among individual member states, both new and old, and the large divergence of views within the heterogeneous Central/Eastern European bloc.

Throughout its 60 year history EU’s leaders have often justified changes to the existing enlargement strategy by making references to threats to security in Europe. As the integration process continued over the past 60 years, the importance of security as a factor has fluctuated greatly. Chapter 3 of this book is dedicated to providing an understanding of the role of security in the integration process but also of how this role has changed during the process. The chapter gives a chronological overview of this relationship, with an analysis of each enlargement process in relation to EU security. The chapter analyses here is the evaluation of membership criteria but also treaties, declarations, summits and political mandates that all relate to the EU and CFSP. Strong attention is also given to the enlargement dialogue and the issues the applicant countries choose to give priority to.

At the very beginning of EU integration the Schumann declaration was seen as a means of creating peace by binding the economies of Western Europe together, thus, as a reading of the neo-liberal theories of International Relations would suggest, making war less likely. Yet security considerations since the Schumann declaration seem to come second to economical concerns with the EU becoming increasingly dominated by a commitment to open markets, free trade and new liberal economics as the years progressed.

Yet the author is quick to remind us that security concerns have always been present during the integration process over the past 60 years. In particular, security concerns have made a comeback recently with the Eastern enlargement of the 10 new members in 2005 viewed by Palosaari as, once again, a way to attain peace and
security in Europe reminiscent of the original hard security concept of the Schuman declaration. Indeed, as the author says on page 76, ‘Never has the EU been so frequently connected with security debates as today’.

Part 2 (Chapter 4) of the book is concentrated on the new Member States and their concepts of security. At the beginning of the book, the author sets out to show that the fifth and sixth enlargement rounds of the EU completed in 2005 and 2007 are in many ways totally different from the previous enlargements rounds. In order to show this, he analyses the role of security in the 5th enlargement round by adopting a constructivist security studies framework. To examine the compatibility of security studies concepts of the EU and NMS, he focuses on 4 different sectors: the environment, economic, societal, and political and military sectors. Here the reader can see that at least in rhetorical terms (national security strategies), the difference between national security strategies and how the dominant security concept is manifested in Solana’s 2003 security strategy is decreasing. However, compatibility is much stronger in certain sectors than in others.

The strongest correlation is in the economy sector, where the preferences of all member states, new and old within the EU are matching, and thus within this sphere the supranational decision making process has become the norm. Much less progress has been made in the societal sector, where national identities continue to dominate and the idea of a ‘European identity’ has not functioned as a basis for securitisation.

In the political sector the author shows the widespread support of new member states towards the legislation of the EU, yet the does not see this as eroding member states’ individual national identities. To explain this phenomenon the author states that ‘it seems to be feasible to simultaneously promote integration and state sovereignty’, Indeed, as has been well demonstrated recently with the controversy surrounding the Lisbon treaty, any attempts by the EU to become active in this area and to securitise national identity and state sovereignty in the future look unlikely to make an impact.

However, the biggest gap between new and old member states can be witnessed in the military sector. In the military sector it has become clear that the applicants’ view on military security differed from the dominant EU concept in the sense that the EU was considered the primary solution for problems of economic and social security but not those of military security. Here NMS have placed emphasis on soft security, and as the author states on pg. 152, ‘in reforming their military security sector they emphasised integration to NATO rather than to the EU’. In this sector it seems that New Member States are happy to be members of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and thus modernise their national security strategies accordingly, but as the author states on pg. 152, ‘there is a perception of the ESDP as safety net in case US interest in NATO fails’. This assessment is a grave indicator for those
who see the EU as forming a stronger common defence policy for the future based on a common European strategic culture.

Overall Palosaari has written a highly intelligent book which should be of interest to scholars of European security studies across the spectrum from both Old and New Member States. Old Member State academics would benefit from reading this and understanding New Member states’ security preferences a little better. The book should be seen as an important contribution to the deepening versus widening debate, as it shows a new methodological framework that can be applied to integration studies and also gives due attention to security concerns that are so often overlooked in integration studies their.

In the widening versus deepening aspect, security can be seen as having played a major role in the fact that due to security concerns priority has been given to the process of widening the EU through integration over the process deepening of the EU in certain areas.

The author demonstrates this well by using examples from the 2nd and 3rd enlargement rounds highlighting how the economic reasons stated by the Commission against the accession of countries such as Spain and Greece were overridden by the security agreements of member states whose priorities were of a non economic nature (the peaceful stabilisation and democratisation of former military regimes and dictatorships). Thus despite the central role that economic issues had in the security concept of the European Community of the 1980s/90s, economic conditions were largely discarded in a faceoff with security preferences.

The book is also innovative in that it is the first of its kind to look at security by applying the constructivist school. While social constructivism has grown greatly in the past 20 years unlike other sub disciplines of IR, in integration studies a major constructivist turn has not taken place. In terms of methodology it can be concluded that the constructivist approach to studying integration that builds on the Copenhagen School’s framework is a successful move towards constructivist integration studies. By using this framework the author was able to grasp the changing role of security in the European integration process as well as to show how the dominant security concept of the EU has changed during the integration process. In addition this framework also allowed one to access the compatibility of the New Member States with the EU.

From this we can also conclude that the Copenhagen School, when it comes to integration studies can produce functioning research questions, coherent methodological solutions and plausible answers. It also helps to dismiss repeated criticism aimed towards the theory from academics such as Moravcik which claims that constructivism has little connection to the real world.

Another aspect that the book deserves praise for is that it gives security concerns, which are so important yet so often overshadowed in studies of integration, their due
attention. The overall effect of security in the enlargement process has not been adequately analysed in previous studies of EU enlargement and instead it always tended to be looked at from a largely commercial or economic standpoint. This is a mistake when one considers that security and integration inevitably go together. The enlargement of the EU as a special form of integration inevitably has aspects of territoriality that unavoidably connect it to traditional security considerations.

The entire EU integration process started with clearly security orientated aims in that the Schumann Declaration presented European integration as an answer to the questions of war and peace at a vulnerable time. Indeed, throughout the process, security arguments have always been present in the integration process, and as Palosaari’s book excellently demonstrates, they have only varied in form and importance.

_Cillian O Donoghue_
Since the onset of the so-called ‘third debate’ in the field of International Relations, the discipline has witnessed the emergence of various theorizations of what constitutes the subject matter. Among the alternative conceptualizations is feminist theorizing that utilizes gender as a category of analysis in global politics. Due to its perceived ‘naturalness’ and apolitical character, gender has rarely been considered relevant in the study of international relations. Largely framed by masculinist understandings of the world, the discipline of IR has systematically excluded feminist critiques of the biased nature of ‘malestream’ IR and gendered understandings of what constitutes the international.

Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart’s *Rethinking the Man Question. Sex, Gender and Violence in International Relations* is a significant contribution to the increasing literature of feminist IR that has proliferated in the past 20 years. Parpart, who is Professor Emeritus at Dalhousie University in International Development Studies, Gender and Women’s Studies and History, and Zalewski, who is currently the director of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Aberdeen, have put together a volume that fills in a gap in the past scholarship carried out around the topic of gender and IR. Whereas much of earlier feminist work focused on women in international relations and tackled the ‘woman question’, Parpart and Zalewski’s edited volume examines the role that masculinities play in global politics. The book is an outstanding contribution to research done on men and masculinities as it combines the insights of various IR scholars utilizing varied methodologies and theories in their attempts to tackle the Man Question.

One of the first remarkable theorists in masculinities research, Raewyn Connell, opens up the debate on the Man Question in her preface to the volume. Connell’s term ‘hegemonic masculinity’, denoting the masculinity that occupies the position of power in a given society at a given time, is a crucial element in most theorizing on gender and masculinities. Most of the contributors to the volume are indebted to Connell’s groundbreaking research and utilize the term in their chapters in various ways. Therefore, a lengthier contribution from Connell could have perhaps elucidated the importance of applying gender lenses in the field of IR and made the links between masculinities and global politics more clear for a reader not acquainted with gender theorizing. However, in the first seven pages of the volume, Connell does succeed in throwing some light on the centrality of the construction of masculinity and femininity in global politics and explaining why gender matters.
In the opening chapter, Kimberly Hutchings argues that feminist and gender theorizing is marginalized in IR due to the legitimizing function played by masculinity discourses. Through analyzing two pivotal IR texts, Hardt and Negri’s *Empire* (2000) and Mearsheimer’s *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (2001), Hutchings suggests that masculinity operates as a resource for thought in IR theorizing and is one of the crucial ways in which our imagination is shaped and limited. Arguing that without the logic of masculinity, grand theorists of IR ‘would be required to work a great deal harder in order to persuade us of the accuracy of their diagnoses of the times’ (2008: 24), Hutchings paints a clear picture of the way in which ‘malestream’ IR reproduces itself.

In a similar vein, Kevin Dunn examines the marginalization of feminist critique in IR and looks at the ways in which white male privilege manifests itself in international relations theory. Dunn interrogates white male privilege in the academic discipline by utilizing Pierre Bourdieu’s insights on structures and social and symbolic capital, along with habitus and practices. Arguing that white male privilege is internalized through habitus and reinscribed through constitutive practices, he states that the current academic discipline of IR is built on a strong foundation of white male privilege. Moreover, the process of privilege remains an active element in the ways in which the discipline continues to be constructed, reproduced, taught and practised (Dunn, 2008: 51). Dunn’s critique of white male privilege is rather convincing; however, it must be acknowledged that had the same criticism come from a female academic’s standpoint, it would easily be written off as a mere ‘flailing, man-bashing screed’ (Dunn, 2008: 65).

Bringing to the fore the ways in which theories do not merely reflect the world as it is, Dunn’s chapter highlights how theorists are actively constituting and reproducing our understandings of what constitutes IR and what matters as valuable knowledge. Discussing the agency/structure problematic, he argues that privilege does not flow merely from individual acts but also from systematic power structures. Noting that ‘IR is discursively structured to privilege white male subject positions and associated methodologies’, Dunn recognizes that work questioning and challenging the structure is easily dismissed as poor scholarship employing a flawed methodology (Dunn, 2008: 59). Two weaknesses in Dunn’s otherwise convincing article are his simplistic understanding of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ and his failure to acknowledge the multiplicity of masculinities and privileges. His analysis would have benefited from examining how other variables, for example social class, race, and sexual orientation, affect the manifestation of white male privilege.

The chapters by Terrell Carver and Cristina Masters interrogate the links between masculinities and technology, albeit they approach the issue from different angles. In his chapter ‘The Machine in the Man’, Carver focuses on metaphors which, in his argument, act as motors of discourse naturalizing masculinist assumptions within
international politics. He examines mechanical/mechanistic metaphors flowing from Thomas Hobbes’ depictions of human nature and theorizes militarization as constituting a machine-like masculinity. For him, the modern, rational, calculating hegemonic masculinity resembles the ones conjured up in Hobbes’ influential writings on anarchy and the state of nature.

However, it is Cristina Masters’ chapter that constructs the most convincing argument about the effects of militarization, technology and masculinity. Arguing that technology must be read as a productive site of power/knowledge, Masters examines how soldiers in the American military are constituted through techno-scientific and masculinist discourses within biopolitical architectures of power (Masters, 2008: 90). It is Masters’ utilization of biopolitical theories of power and Foucauldian notions on the production of subjects and subjectivity that create the strength in her argument. The modern nature of sovereign power, biopower, centring on sustaining and producing life, ‘is a masculinist project in that it represents a masculine desire to overcome death by making obsolete a body that must die’ (Masters, 2008: 100). In the biopolitical architecture of power, the use of hi-tech weapons is rationalized by protecting and saving the lives of the soldiers; the right to make live is the right to kill. Masters succeeds in illuminating this contradiction at the heart of biopolitics as well as in highlighting the disembeddedness from the materiality of war that follows from the fusing of militarization and biopower.

Daniel Conway and Sandra Whitworth both examine the role that militaries play in the production of masculinities and the reproduction of gendered dichotomies. Conway argues that conscription and objection to military service are performative practices generative of individual and collective subjectivities. Using South Africa as a case study, he demonstrates the effects that individual acts of resistance in the form of objection can have in destabilizing militarization and the gendered norms that underpin it. His analysis points out how the acts of resistance in South Africa uncovered the vulnerability of the traditional understanding of militarized masculinity as generative of proper citizenship. Whitworth, in turn, emphasizes the fragility of militarized masculinity and examines the complicated processes through which soldiers are made into killing machines. She argues that the exclusion and shame that soldiers suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder experience is indicative of the fragile ground on which militarized masculinity is built, as well as being symptomatic of the hollowness of the so-called ‘warrior brotherhood’.

The last three chapters of Rethinking the Man Question examine the links between masculinity, nationalism and war. Jamie Munn looks at the role of gender in the reconstitution of national identities in post-conflict societies through his research and interviews conducted in Kosovo. He challenges Connell’s simplistic understanding of hegemonic masculinity and its links to heterosexual warrior masculinity, and argues that masculine subjectivities are re-negotiated and produced in various com-
plex ways in post-conflict Kosovo, especially through utilizing nationalist myths and narratives. Using Hindu nationalism in India as a case study, Dibyesh Anand argues that nationalism should be conceptualized as a political move to create, awaken and strengthen a masculinist-nationalist body. Founding his analysis on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in India, Anand argues that the gendered representation of Muslim Others as hypersexual and sexually deviant creatures assures the Hindu nationalist self of its moral superiority while installing an anxiety about the threatening masculine other. His analysis illuminates the role that gender and masculinity discourses play in creating and reproducing understandings of hostile Others who need to be confronted in order to create an identity for the wholesome and superior Self.

In a similar vein, Parpart’s closing chapter looks at the role that masculinities and gender have played in the violent struggles in colonial Zimbabwe. By examining the colonial history of Zimbabwe and the ways in which gender relations have been manifested and transformed, Parpart argues that the colonial war in Zimbabwe was a triumph for masculinist authority and long-established gender hierarchies: ‘a hegemonic masculinist project emerged with the new state... legitimizing atrocities and defining who has the right to power and rule’ (2008: 196–197). Although the chapter echoes earlier points made about the links between war, nationalism, and masculinity, it also brings in some new insights that throw light on the gendered nature of global politics. Parpart’s analysis deserves praise for her discussion of war-time rape, gender-based violence and feminization of the enemy as productive sites of masculine power, a significant issue surprisingly neglected by other contributions to the volume.

Parpart and Zalewski’s Rethinking the Man Question succeeds in illuminating the various ways in which gender and the construction of masculinities matter in international relations. As more research has been carried out about women and the international, this work offers various fresh insights into a subject area often ignored in feminist scholarly articles. However, the volume could have benefited from incorporating analyses on the relationship between post-9/11 politics and gender relations, by, for example, focusing on the resurgence of masculine narratives accompanying the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the centrality of masculinity in constituting the identities of the U.S. self and its enemy others in the ‘War on Terror’.

The extent to which this volume works to convince those who are sceptical of including gendered analyses in the field of IR and willing to reject feminist theories as marginal and irrelevant is uncertain. Furthermore, for those not so familiar with gender theorizing, this book might not be the best starting point for unravelling the relevance of gendered IR. The volume is nevertheless an important contribution to the field of international relations, as well as being a manifestation of the shift away from,
to quote David Campbell (1992: 246), ‘patrol[ling] the intellectual borders which frame the study of world politics’. While it may not give a clear and easily accessible answer to the ‘Man Question’ in international relations, this volume certainly opens up significant space for critical debate about the relevance and effects of the construction of gender in world politics.

Sini Ramo

ENDNOTES

ANDREW WALTER AND GAUTAM SEN: ANALYZING THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY


Analyzing the Global Political Economy is a book that merges together the economic and political aspects of the international political economy (IPE). Authors who claim to have a great knowledge of economics are very important in political science. Although international politics and economics are two different areas, the authors’ intention is to analyze the advantages that come from analyzing IPE with the help of rational economics. The main issues discussed in this book include international trade, money and financial systems, production, how these issues interact with each other, and their relations with international politics and economics. Although these issues could be discussed separately, in the authors’ opinion ‘they are interrelated in practice’.

The book is divided into four parts and eight chapters, in which international trade, the international monetary system, international financial integration and foreign direct investment (FDI) are analyzed. Furthermore, it has a foreword by Benjamin J. Cohen, and after every chapter there are additional suggestions for further reading.

At the beginning of the book the authors describe what international political economy is and its emergence as a separate academic field which congregates economics with international politics. Moreover, different approaches to this area of study are presented. In the end the authors tend to create their own approach towards IPE by taking into consideration the previous approaches and also by adding to it a ‘critical engagement between economics and political economy’.

In the second and third chapters the authors analyze the political economy of international trade. A brief history of the rise of international trade is provided and then its institutionalization through the establishing of different international institutions that deal with the multilateral international trade, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), is analyzed. Walter and Sen also provide the argument that over the course of the last two hundred years, the liberal theories of Adam Smith and David Ricardo have persisted in the debates on international trade and examine how these theories undermine the political sovereignty and the settlements of disputes that come from international trade. However, the authors also mention other difficulties that international trade faces through the protectionist policies adopted by some states, even though trade liberalization has been favored in debates concerning international trade. Moreover, the emergence of other actors such as environmental NGOs and their influence in shaping multilateral international trade are also analyzed.
In the following two chapters the authors analyze the development of the international monetary system and the international financial system. Regarding the international monetary system, Walter and Sen evaluate the emergence and implications of the gold standard, the fixed exchange rate system, the establishment of the Breton Woods system and the management of the monetary system that is carried out by the national central banks in the international monetary system. However, it is pointed out that because of the emergence and the increase of private international financial markets, the limitation of the capital interdependence and keeping the fixed exchange rate have proven to be unattainable.

In the sphere of the international financial system the authors examine the implications of the creation of international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), and the global as well as regional financial integration. Walter and Sen argue that the financial system is the sector most regulated by the governments because the majority of states can not afford a failure of the financial institutions. The authors claim that in the international financial sector the Keynesian approach in governing financial institutions still prevails, especially in developed countries.

The development and the implications of FDI and the global political economy is another issue that is argued about in the book. Even though the roles and the activity of FDI and multinational corporations (MNC) have been increasing over time, many governments are still hostile towards them and try to limit their activities in some sectors. Moreover, the authors analyze the public perception regarding FDI and MNCs. Some NGOs, as well as many members of the public, claim that MNCs exploit labor and environmental standards. However, the authors call for more research to be done on MNC activities in order to solve the controversies on FDI.

In the last chapter the authors assess the weak points of the book, i.e. those points that still require additional research. The first weak point includes the effects of the technological changes in international trade as well as in the welfare distribution and the dislocation of the economies. According to the authors, technology has played a big role in welfare distribution, and other aspects of the change in technology such as the big question of whether it creates new employment or destroys it (Schumpeter’s argument of ‘creative destruction’ versus the Luddites) need to be elaborated upon.

The second area which needs additional research is related to FDI. Walter and Sen argue that many issues which involve FDI and IPE, particularly the relation between FDI and exchange rate policies, still remain under-researched. Furthermore, the authors also mention the questioning roles of the international financial institutions in relation to the FDI and international capital markets since these markets and FDI have become sources for technology importation and access to international markets for the developing countries. Similarly, the need for more evidence and research is indicated here as well.
Moreover, the deliberate exclusion of other factors that affect IPE, such as environment, crime, terrorism, immigration and so forth, which is caused by the primary objective of the book being a demonstration of ‘the benefits of a critical engagement of IPE with economics’, creates another disadvantage in assessing IPE.

Despite the weaknesses mentioned by the authors themselves, the book may even have some other drawbacks when it comes to assessing the global political economy. In order for the authors to stress the primary objective of the book, its arguments rely very much on economic theories, thus shading political, historical and cultural theories in many cases. One example of such a reliance on economic theories might be the analysis of the development of the European Monetary Union (EMU), where the theories mentioned by the authors (interest-based and optimal currency area) could not provide an answer to the question of what are the reasons for the European monetary integration. Instead, the neofunctionalist approach of examining spillover effects would have given a better explanation of EMU than other theories. Moreover, the European Union’s single currency’s (Euro) implications on the international monetary and financial system might have been considered.

Likewise, the authors very often tend to analyze IPE based on the theories of two main schools of thoughts, realism and liberalism, thus neglecting other paradigms such as the dependence theory. They mention the dependence theory very briefly in the FDI section of the book, but a more extensive use of this theory might have been necessary in assessing other factors that affect IPE, such as international trade.

Similarly, the authors very briefly mention the financial crisis that hit the USA in 2007 and its spillover effect on the economies of all the other countries, but the crisis deserves more attention and a more elaborate assessment. In addition, the same can be said for the role of the international financial institutions. It is true that the questioning of the role of these institutions in the context of the contemporary world is mentioned by the authors in their book’s conclusion, but it still occupies only a very small part of the book.

Nonetheless, the book is of great value to the IPE academic discipline. Despite a few drawbacks it still analyzes the core factors that affect IPE such as international trade, the monetary and financial system, and FDI. Moreover, this book is an innovation in the IPE discipline because in the book, the field of economics has a central role in analyzing IPE, whereas before, the IPE discipline has been dominated by scholars from international relations and political science. However, the authors have also considered and included other academic disciplines – such as international relations, political science and history – in their analyses. Late undergraduate or graduate students can find this book useful for understanding IPE. As was mentioned in the book, IPE is a relatively new academic discipline, and thus the book enriches the studies in this field. In addition, the authors are looking forward to analyzing
other factors that have impacts on IPE by improving assessments of and adding other assessments to political economy.

Ardit Azizaj
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The journal publishes three types of articles (Research Articles, Discussions, and Consultations), Book Reviews and Review Essays. Research Articles are full-length papers (between 6,000 and 10,000 words, including endnotes and references) that contain an original contribution to research. Discussions are topical commentaries or essays (between 6,000 and 8,000 words, including endnotes and references) with the aim to provoke scholarly debates. Consultations are full-length papers (between 6,000 and 8,000 words, including endnotes and references) of a descriptive character that bring information on topical international developments or present results of recent empirical research. Each article should be accompanied by a one-paragraph abstract. Book Reviews should not exceed 2,000 words, and Review Essays should be 3,500 words maximum, including endnotes and references. All submissions should be made in electronic form, unless this is impossible for some practical reason.

Notes should be numbered consecutively throughout the article with raised numerals corresponding to the list of notes placed at the end. A list of References should appear after the list of Notes containing all the works referred to, listed alphabetically by author’s surname (or name of sponsoring body if there is no identifiable author). References to literature in the text should be made by giving the author’s name and year of publication, both in parentheses, e.g. (Wendt, 1999).

ARTICLES, CHAPTERS FROM BOOKS AND INTERNET SOURCES:

Author’s name, title of article or chapter within single inverted commas with principal words capitalised, name(s) of editors(s) if in a book, title of journal or book in italics, volume number, issue number in parentheses, page reference, place of publication and publisher if in a book, url if an internet source:


QUOTATION MARKS:

Single in text throughout; double within single; single within indented quotations.

HEADINGS:

Only main headings and subheadings (both non-numbered) should be used in the main body of the text.

DATES AND NUMBERS:

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• For submissions of Research Articles, Discussions and Consultations, or general correspondence, please contact the Editors: Petr Kratochvíl at kratochvil@iir.cz or Mats Braun at braun@iir.cz.

• Articles will be reviewed by two anonymous referees.

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• Authors of Research Articles, Discussions and Consultations will receive one complimentary copy of the journal and 10 photocopies of their article.

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