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Perspectives
The Central European Review of International Affairs

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Abstract: Nuclear energy has received increased attention in the European Union (EU) as a source of energy with the enlargement of 10 members many with Soviet designed nuclear power plants. It has been discussed as an alternative to fossil fuel plants as a strategy to meet Kyoto Protocol goals, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. However nuclear security and safety issues are major concerns. The European Union Commission introduced legislation harmonizing existing safety standards for all Member States. However, a conflict emerged between the Commission and Member States as to whether the EU should expand its legal authority in an area that has been the responsibility of the Member States. EU institutions have been unable to develop harmonized standards for nuclear power plants leaving issues of safety and the long-term disposal of radioactive waste and spent fuel unresolved.

Key words: nuclear energy, nuclear safety, European Union, member states, legal responsibility, harmonization of standards

This research focuses on the development of legislation addressing safety for nuclear power plants in the European Union (EU). Whether or not the Treaties of the European Union give competency in the area of nuclear safety of nuclear installations has become a matter of controversy. For the most part, safety issues have been beyond the scope of EU legislation. While the Treaties of the European Union do not give specific competency in energy policy to the EU, putting nuclear energy safety issues beyond the scope of legislation, the European Commission (Commission) has recently sought to provide uniformity through the development of Community-wide safety standards complementing existing approaches to nuclear safety, with the proposal of new directives.

A conflict emerged between the Commission, which proposed harmonizing safety standards across the EU and the Member States concerned about protecting their own national regulatory regimes for nuclear energy. Some Member States have had long-term experience in nuclear energy having developed regulations to suit their particular thresholds of safety. They neither want to adopt standards of other Member States or be subject to an EU “supranational” authority.

This article reviews and analyzes the proposals for the safety of nuclear power plants and the forces that led to Commission proposals for new and stronger legislation based on provisions in the Euratom Treaty (1957). As will be discussed below, the enlargement of the EU made the issue of nuclear safe-
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ty more urgent because some of the new entrants had Soviet designed nuclear reactors. Soviet nuclear technology was considered problematic because of memories of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986. The new Member States may also be more inclined to build more nuclear power plants now because of planned closures of unsafe plants as a condition of EU accession as well as to reduce dependence on present Russian sources of fossil fuel, i.e. oil and natural gas.

The overarching question is whether Member States would agree with the Commission that it was appropriate to increase its regulatory powers thereby reducing the authority of Member States in nuclear safety regulation. National interest could either point toward keeping the status quo, recognizing national sovereignty interests, or supporting uniform safety standards ensuring that all EU citizens have a protected level playing field. The negative referenda regarding the adoption of the proposed Treaty on the Constitution in France and the Netherlands as well as the slow-down of new legislative initiatives by the Commission, puts the latter course in doubt. This research does not address nuclear proliferation although any increase or questionable management of radioactive material leaves open the possibility of military use.

The attention in the EU has been focused primarily on security of energy supply and liberalization of the electricity market not on safety. Because electricity derived from nuclear power plants has been the responsibility of the Member States, levels of safety vary. The Euratom Treaty allows for the Community to set standards for exposure to ionizing radiation to protect the health of the public and workers as well as the transport of nuclear material. In the 1990s, the Commission more seriously considered energy policy from a security perspective as a result of increased energy demand, dwindling energy supplies, meeting Kyoto Protocol goals and the growing demand for diversification of energy resources. Nuclear energy remained an option especially in view of the dangers of global warming and a need for multiple sources of reliable energy (Taylor, 2002).

The argument for increased nuclear energy stems not only from its important contribution to base load electricity, but that without it, reduction in carbon dioxide levels could not be realistically achieved. Proponents of this view argue that the technological problems of long-term waste disposal will be solved because geologically sound sites will eventually become available. It has been transformed from a technological problem to a political, i.e. public opinion, one. The challenge for this group is to convince the public nuclear energy is safe. However, others argue that with EU enlargement the nuclear energy club has grown and along with the risks, i.e. terrorism, problems with existing temporary radioactive waste repositories and lack of permanent long-term disposal sites remain.

However, the political scene is not all that clear (European Voice, 2006). Some Member States, i.e. Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and Italy, previously pledged to phase out their nuclear power plants, may be rethinking their policy (European Commission 2002a). But for others, it is their desire that the nuclear option remain open.1 France has announced the building of a new plant. Slovakia may be now reevaluating its nuclear options as is Lithuania and the Czech Republic. Moreover, operating nuclear reactors
are ageing. Governments are considering extending their operational licenses rather than closing them which raises additional issues of their safety.

A CONFLUENCE OF PROBLEMS

The management of high level radioactive waste was identified as a special problem by the Commission because of dangers associated with reprocessing, transporting and long-term storage. The issue became more pressing as discussions and negotiations for enlargement ensued in the 1990s. “There is no disposal route available anywhere in the world for the most hazardous radioactive waste... there are significant accumulations of such waste in temporary surface and near surface storage facilities in those EU member States with active or past nuclear power programmes” (Webster, 2003, iv–v). Public acceptance of nuclear power depends on a satisfactory resolution of the nuclear waste disposal issue.2 The situation is particularly grim among some Central and Eastern European (CEE) states which now have to suddenly store radioactive waste on site. Until the early 1990s it had been their custom to ship the waste to the Soviet Union but now Russia no longer accepts it if it is not Russian fuel.

Many of the candidate states had Soviet designed plants that needed to be upgraded or closed, concluded a 1992 G-7 summit. Agenda 2000 (Com (97) 2000) and the Laeken Council in December 2001 made a commitment that a high level of nuclear safety was a goal that became integral to the accession process. The EU provided resources primarily through its PHARE (Poland Hungary Aid for Economic Reconstruction) and TACIS (Technical Aid for the Commonwealth of Independent States) programmes for assessing and improving safety in these Russian designed reactors. Bulgaria and Lithuania were given significant technical support during the accession process.

The legacy of these problematic Soviet designed nuclear power plants was a potential boon to the nuclear industry. While closure could have contributed to the demise of nuclear energy in Europe, nuclear engineering and construction firms, anxious for new business, lobbied to keep the plants in the former Communist states open and to continue construction of unfinished plants. Safety standards would be important to relieve public fears of another Chernobyl.

Another Russian link with CEE states has been through the exchange of natural gas and oil for currency. There is concern that Russia could stop the flow of resources at any time for political reasons. Former Communist states have unpleasant memories of their past relationship with the Soviet Union. Since enlargement, the EU has become more sensitive to this reality. Natural gas imports provide electricity to Finland, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. One way to reduce their reliance on Russian natural gas is to expand their nuclear sectors.

The EU is at an energy policy crossroads. Decisions must be made concerning the proper role for EU authority in energy policy.3 The issue of safety standards could provide impetus to refocus attention on nuclear energy. In 2000, a controversy over the Czech Republic’s Temelin nuclear power plant gave the EU an opportunity to intervene as a mediator between the Czech Republic and Austria. The latter opposed the upgrading and operationalization of the plant because of safety issues and its close proximity to the Aus-
trian border. Austria argued that a state should be able to protect its citizens against potential harm – in this case – risks associated with a Soviet designed nuclear power plant upgraded by an American company, Westinghouse. Austria hoped that taking the issue to a larger arena, the EU, support could be garnered for limiting or opposing further expansion of nuclear power. If not, at least, union-wide standards could be developed that would ensure a high level of safety. However, the irony was that, with the latter strategy, uniform EU standards could actually lend support to the nuclear industry by calming public fears about the risks associated with the nuclear option. Public acceptance of nuclear power plants might grow if there were equally high safety standards throughout the EU. Another risk was that the uniform standards would be very general or end up as the lowest common denominator. In that case, the public might be assuaged, but in reality, safety would not have been improved.

GETTING NUCLEAR ENERGY SAFETY ON THE EU AGENDA

One of the consequences of enlargement was the attempt to develop an EU policy for nuclear energy. The accession process led the Member States to recognize that national authorities should have an exclusive role in promoting safety in the candidate countries. The Council established a temporary Working Party on Nuclear Safety composed of experts from the Member States to evaluate the status of nuclear power in the accession states. It issued a “non-paper” (European Commission, 2000) with soft recommendations for strategies for regulatory authorities and management practices in line with the best practices. Also prepared were country reports on nuclear safety in the candidate states – an area outside the ‘acquis’, which is the body of EU legislation. There were underlying concerns because most of the candidate states were former Communist countries undergoing political reform and there was a mistrust of their nuclear sector with memories of the Chernobyl disaster and as knowledge of serious technological problems surfaced.

Until the 1990s, research in nuclear energy for the Commission was carried out by the Research Directorate and the Joint Research Centres throughout Europe including Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. As focus increased on policy issues, i.e. environmental protection implications, DG-Environment was given responsibility for these research activities. In late 2000, these policy aspects were transferred to DG- Energy and Transport (TREN). DG-Environment had responsibility for the European Court of Justice (ECJ) case (discussed below) regarding EU competency in nuclear energy, but many of its staff were not enthusiastic about promoting nuclear power. As part of a further internal reorganization, in February 2003, radiation protection was also transferred to DG-TREN from DG-Environment. In addition to DG-TREN personnel in Luxembourg whose responsibilities were related to implementing provisions of the Euratom Treaty, in 2004 other activities were also transferred to Luxembourg. DG-TREN personnel operate from two countries, Luxembourg and Belgium. The transfer of the nuclear dossier from an environmentally focused unit to an energy based one may influence the debate in the Commission. One directorate’s orientation is environmental impact and safety; the other’s is energy supply and market liberalization.
By 2002, the Commission position that would later be challenged by some Member States, was that it already had a de facto a role in nuclear safety. However, the nuclear states, over the years had developed their own nuclear programs independent of each other. Types of reactors differed among Member States as did safety procedures and regulatory institutions. This resulted in a lack of uniform safety standards and procedures in the EU. The nuclear Member States generally opposed the EU’s authority over their nuclear safety programs and did not want non-nuclear states to participate in decisions affecting their own programmes. Nuclear power plants in the candidate states: Lithuania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary raised safety concerns. Member States wanted safety assessments of these candidate states. The difficulty was that, without EU competency in nuclear safety, how would safety be ensured in the new states?4

During the 1990s, representatives from Member States’ nuclear regulatory authorities participated in the Nuclear Regulatory Working Group (NRWG), organized by the Commission to discuss common issues of nuclear safety. Candidate states were included as well. The goal was to increase harmonization of national practices, i.e. understanding of and removal of differences. The CONCERT (CONCertation on European Regulatory Tasks; advisory to the Commission and formed in 1992) was another group adding the Newly Independent States (NIS) (Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine) to the NRWG members. It is a less structured and technical forum to share experiences. While it is not focused on enlargement, it does facilitate the identification of projects for possible EU funding. There was discussion of the range of practices in order to “promote good practice”. There was not an attempt yet to “standardize practices, common approaches or oversight by a centralized body” (European Commission, 1999).

The Euratom Treaty does not give the EU specific authority to legislate in nuclear safety issues or specific standards other than the protection of the public against ionizing radiation and the transport of radioactive material (Chapter III, Article 30). Under Euratom, which was envisioned to aid Europe’s recovery from the economic depression following World War II, a relationship existed between the Commission and the regulators (Euratom, Chapter VII). According to Pamela Barnes, a noted EU scholar, neither a state nor the nuclear industry wanted interference from the EU (Barnes, 2003). There is also provision for nuclear safety inspectors, appointed by the Commission, who have right of access to nuclear power plants concerning the handling of nuclear material (Chapter VII, Article 81) and declaration of intention (of usage). The Commission can impose sanctions and even take an infringement to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (Chapter VII, Article 83.1).

The preamble to the Euratom Treaty promotes nuclear energy: “Recognizing that nuclear energy represents an essential resource for the development and invigoration of industry and will permit the advancement of the cause of peace...” It goes on: “Resolved to create the conditions necessary for the development of a powerful nuclear industry which will provide extensive energy resources...” Article 4 describes how it will be done. “The Commission shall be responsible for promoting and facilitating nuclear standards in the Member States and for complementing it by carrying out a Community re-
search and training program.” The Commission also disseminates the results of its research to the Member States supplying financial resources when needed and promoting joint financing of projects (Article 6). It has been argued by those advocating reform of the Euratom Treaty that the dual purpose of promotion and regulation of nuclear energy, represents a conflict of interest for the Commission.

The enlargement process gave the Commission the opportunity to review its non-binding and voluntary cooperative approaches to nuclear safety not only in the candidate states. Since 1972 Member States had been consulting with each other on safety issues but not on nuclear vessel reactor safety or the disposal of radioactive waste. The Council Resolution of 22 July 1975 (OJ C185 14/08/1975) recommended progressive harmonization of safety standards at the EU level without lowering standards. Harmonization was encouraged through consensus on common positions. It called for Member State collaboration also recognizing the importance of safety beyond European Community borders.5 Review of nuclear installations was part of the accession process. Another Resolution (OJ 172, 08.07.1992) asked the Commission and the Member States to cooperate in the nuclear fields with special attention to CEE states and the NIS and Resolution OJ C 158 25/06/92, encouraged the development of cooperation with CEE states in the management and storage of spent nuclear fuel. Another potential legal basis for competency in nuclear installation safety could be based on the Environment Impact Assessment directive (85/337/CEE of 27 June 1985) if used in relation to siting.6

On the international scene, there is an agreement, the 1996 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management entered into force in 2001, under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) auspices that is voluntary. The IAEA has established general principles and guidelines but are considered too broad and non-binding to be meaningful by some. Despite 25 years of consultation and utilization of IAEA guidelines, Commission attempts to harmonize safety practices have been unsuccessful with the result being disparate and differing standards, systems and procedures in the Member States.

The overarching goal of the Commission was to strengthen its competency in nuclear safety especially since the EU was getting larger. With prospects for even further enlargement in the future, the Commission wanted to create an environment that was supportive of nuclear energy development keeping the nuclear option open. Moreover, the harmonization of a high level of safety standards, a long-term goal of the Commission now had a strategic justification – the meeting of Kyoto targets for greenhouse gas reduction and an alternate energy source enhancing security of supply. The Commission advocated transparency, communication and public participation throughout the standard setting process. “The Commission will do everything it can to promote – with full openness and transparency – the conditions necessary for the nuclear option to remain open safely” (De Esteben, 2002, 7). The controversy turned on whether the Euratom Treaty could be used as legal basis for the Commission to go forward with harmonized standards.
The decommissioning of nuclear plants was another problem of grave concern. Plant managers were not under obligation to address decommissioning until absolutely necessary. According to the Commission, a culture of environmental concern was missing. Large quantities of radioactive material needed to be treated according to safety standards to protect public health. Decommissioning costs needed to be dedicated to cover the entire decommissioning process, but total costs were uncertain and could only be estimated. The Commission found that Member States approaches to decommissioning differed and it was often unclear who was responsible. “It is necessary to consider nuclear safety in a Community perspective. Only a common approach can guarantee the maintenance of a high level of safety in nuclear installations from inception to decommission, in an enlarged EU” (European Commission, 2003a).

INTRODUCTION OF DRAFT DIRECTIVES
Addressing the absence of binding legislation and building on existing soft non-binding cooperation by Member States, in November 2002, the Commission proposed a legislative package to deal with nuclear safety and the management of radioactive waste broadening the definition of civilian nuclear facility to include associated land, buildings and equipment where radioactive materials are processed, handled, stored and disposed of. Because the enlargement process brought in former Communist states, some with questionable nuclear facilities, the Commission reasoned that a high level of safety standards for all, would bring about a level playing field in nuclear reactor safety and the management of radioactive waste. Here was an opportunity whereby the monitoring of nuclear safety in both candidate states and EU members was possible. After all, safety standards differed among existing Member States as well. The Commission wanted to introduce common standards and monitoring mechanisms for nuclear safety that would be legally binding throughout the EU.

The Commission was assisted by an unrelated but coincidentally timely decision of the ECJ. The preamble of the proposed directives states that the legal base for the directives existed in the Euratom Treaty. In Case C-29/99 of December 10, 2002, the Court recognized the right of the Community to legislate in the area of nuclear safety and radioactive waste management arguing that the EU did have competency thereby supporting the Commission position that it could establish a European authority (Court of Justice of the European Communities, 2002a). The Court found that Chapter III, “…under Articles 30–32 of the Euratom Treaty the Community possesses legislative competence to establish, for the purpose of health protection, an authorization system which must be applied by the Member States” (Court of Justice of the European Communities, 2002b). This includes the power to require Member States to draw up plans for establishing measures for emergencies at nuclear plants (Court of Justice of the European Communities, 2002c). Article 33 (Euratom) gave the Commission the right to harmonize safety standards with the assistance of the Member States. Member States must also communicate to the Commission progress of their implementation (Court of Justice of the European Communities, 2002d). Article 37 (Euratom) gave the Community...
competence for disposal of radioactive waste because of potential contamination of the environment of another Member State (Court of Justice of the European Communities, 2002e).

The Court found that the Euratom Treaty instructed “… the Community to establish uniform safety standards to protect the health of workers and of the general public and to ensure that they are applied” (Court of Justice of the European Communities, 2002f). That protection could only be achieved by controlling the source of radiation, i.e. the nuclear installation. The Commission also had competency through Chapter III (Euratom) to establish harmonized standards for radioactive waste disposal. While this decision supported the Commission, and not the Council, some Member States continued to take issue with the ECJ contending that Chapter III (Euratom) does not apply specifically to nuclear safety installations.

The draft directives (2003/0221 (CNS) and 2003/0022 (CNS), (COM 2003) 32 final, Brussels, 30. 1. 2003) were referred to the Group of Experts (advisory to the Commission) as required in Article 31 of the Euratom Treaty. It commended the Commission for promoting the highest level of nuclear safety in the EU but was concerned that “policy options and planning flexibility” of Member States would be limited (Group of Experts, 2002). This may explain why “framework” was dropped from the title of the directives when they were introduced in January 2003. A framework directive suggests there will be daughter directives following with greater specificity and direction (European Commission, 2003b). Perhaps the Commission realized that this would not be possible. The Commission proposed a two-pronged approach: the development of standards and a mechanism to verify compliance. The Commission intended to develop a legal framework for standards and verification schemes using national experts (referred to in Article 31 of the Euratom Treaty) to be operational by the time of enlargement in May 2004.

Article 3 of the “proposal for a Directive setting out basic obligations and general principles on the safety of nuclear installations” (European Commission, 2003c), required every Member State to have an independent safety authority separate from any body that had promoted nuclear energy. Its role was to regulate nuclear plant safety, approve licensing and monitor implementation of regulations.

Article 5 mandated that Member States were to establish mechanisms to protect individuals and the environment from ionizing radiation, prevent radiological events from happening and, especially ensure safety during the management of nuclear materials including the decommissioning of nuclear plants.

Article 8 mandated inspections by Member States’ safety authorities. Article 9 stipulated that Member States were responsible for adequate availability of financial resources to cover nuclear plant safety and decommissioning. Article 11 required Member States to have the operator of nuclear plants notify the safety authority of incidents or accidents as well as corrective actions. Monitoring was critical to the realization of a high level of safety and effective implementation of the legislation. Therefore Article 12 gave the Commission responsibility for “ensuring verifications of safety authorities”. The Commission would assess the way safety authorities perform their responsi-
bilities. The Commission would receive reports from safety experts appointed by Member States who together with Commission staff carry out the verifications. These experts from the Member States act for the Commission to verify compliance. It was thought of as a “peer review system to inspect the inspectors”, and not an EU inspectorate (European Commission, 2002b). The Commission would send reports back to the Member States with notice of remediation to be done. To maintain transparency, the Commission would receive annual reports from the member states on the progress of fulfilling the goals of the directive. The Commission would then submit a bi-annual report to the Council and the Parliament.

An annex to the proposed directive specified in more detail the strategy for maintaining adequate funds for decommissioning. They were to come from plant operators and included long-term management of spent fuel. Funds were to be liquid and not to be used for any other purpose. They were to be independent from the control of the plant operator unless that was impossible.

The problem addressed by the second proposed directive was the disposal of nuclear waste or spent fuel. The lack of resolution of this problem was an impediment to greater public acceptance of the nuclear energy option. Most high level radioactive waste from nuclear power plants lacked a final disposal route (Webster, 2003, iii–v). Waste is stored in temporary surface sites which is dangerous from both health and security perspectives. The danger is compounded by the situation in the newly admitted states. Soviet designed RMBK type plants produce more waste and these states may have less available funds for adequate waste management. For example, the Czech Republic produces significant high level radioactive waste from its nuclear reactors and uranium mining and does not project the availability of a deep geological disposal site for decades. Estonia has no strategy for siting, Bulgaria which formerly returned nuclear spent fuel to Russia is in the same situation. Most countries lack procedures and standards for even selecting geologically sound disposal sites. Only a few have begun the process of site selection.

The Proposal on the safe management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, addressed the lack of plans for long-term disposal. Although some Member States use spent nuclear fuel as a resource to produce fissionable material, it was not considered as an option. Reprocessing is very expensive and yields even more toxic material. (The United Kingdom is winding down its reprocessing activity.) However, if the price of uranium rises, reprocessing may be more economical than long-term waste disposal. The legislation called for a time-table for Member States to establish national programs for deep disposal burial by 2008 and operationalization by 2018. It also mandated the establishment of rules for safe and consistent management of nuclear waste throughout the EU. The goal was to force Member States to deal with a problem that would impact future generations by the setting of deadlines and harmonizing approaches maintaining Member State responsibility. Key to the legislation was Article 7 that required Member States to forward to the Commission every three years, a report on the status of implementation of the legislation. The Commission would integrate and publish the information in the report. The annex to the legislation was clear on the intent – an open and transparent role for the public, i.e. local communities could testify during site
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selection. To encourage Member States to take action quickly, timetables were required.

EU INSTITUTIONS RESPOND

These two directives were debated in Council during the Irish and Italian presidencies and failed. They were discussed in meetings of experts (Working Party) and more informal bilateral consultations. They were considered at the ambassadorial level in November 2003 and May 2004 but could not secure a qualified majority vote although there was agreement on much of the text. The Council adopted conclusions that were similar to the defeated proposals but were voluntary.

Parliament agreed in principle with the need for greater safety but expressed concern about transferring competence that had been in the domain of the Member States to the EU (Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy, 2003). Referring to the proposed directive on the safety of nuclear installations (European Commission, 2003d), Parliament argued that responsibility lay with the plant operator and the safety authority. It noted the lack of specificity in a procedure for drawing up the technical standards and the approval process. Furthermore, it was concerned that since the directive was not a framework directive, there still needed to be additional legislation to make nuclear safety legally binding. It wanted the verification process clarified, i.e. a review role for international experts. Parliament suggested amendments to the proposed directives for the following reasons: 1) the legal basis still remained unclear for the extension of health protection under Chapter III, Title 2 of the Euratom Treaty, to cover radiation and nuclear safety standards; 2) not being a framework directive, the Commission would therefore not be preparing subsequent and more detailed directives; 3) there was concern that the Commission would expand its competence by creating standards based on best practices that would be legally binding; and 4) there was inadequate information on cost projection and personnel for inspection reporting.

Amendments suggested by Parliament eliminated references to “uniform EU safety standards” substituting “safety principles”, as well as eliminating the primary role for the Commission in guaranteeing nuclear safety. The “prime responsibility for the safety of nuclear installations rests with the license holder under the control of its national safety authorities” (European Parliament, 2003a). Parliament substituted a peer review mechanism (European Parliament 2003b) to review conformity to the directive thereby eliminating the role of the Commission. Whenever it could, Parliament tried to reduce the role of the Commission.

The Parliament resolution on the management of nuclear waste directive changed the language so that the “highest” standards and levels of protection were to be achieved (European Parliament, 2004). It sought to cover above ground or underground disposal facilities. It was also more stringent in specifically referring to steps to preclude radioactive contamination of the environment. Parliament’s amendments excluded disposal at sea, under-sea repositories and in space. No Member State should be forced to accept radioactive waste from another Member State. Parliament wanted the public to be included in the decision-making process for site selection of long-term
high level waste repositories. However, it eliminated the mandatory timetable because it did not account for differences in existing and developing programs and could result in compromised safety. Member States had to inform the Commission of their national programmes by 2006 and they could fix their own implementation schedules. The Parliament, concerned about the sufficiency of financial resources to cover decommissioning and waste management, asked for separate accounts to be reviewed by an outside body. The funds would come from plant operators. Parliament added this provision as an annex to the Proposal for a Council (Euratom) directive on the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste European Commission, (2003d). The Commission had had a similar provision as part of the companion directive. Parliament was also concerned about the environmental impact from the transportation of radioactive waste repositories and wanted “those affected by a decision of an authority or regulatory body”, to have party status in any proceedings regardless of national borders (European Parliament, 2003c). This was not incorporated in the revised directive proposed by the Commission which requires Member States to inform the public about the process of site selection and progress of decision-making in addition to consulting with affected local communities. There is no mention of party status.

THE COMMISSION REVISES THE DIRECTIVES

After months of consultation in international settings, discussion in the Council and the opinion of Parliament, the Commission proposed a revised nuclear package on September 8, 2004. It affirmed many of Parliament’s amendments but eliminated controls and requirements to ensure adequate financial resources for decommissioning to be held separate and secure from funds under the control of the plant operator. Article 7 of the Amended proposal for a Council directive (Euratom) laying down basic obligations and general principles on the safety of nuclear installations (the revised directive) only stated that “Member States shall take the necessary measures of the allocation of responsibility for the decommissioning of nuclear installations, including in those cases where the parties originally responsible are no longer able to meet their commitments” (European Commission, 2004a). The Commission also supported Parliament’s recommendation to establish a Committee of Regulatory Authorities (“The Committee”) comprised of Member State representatives to encourage exchange of information, define guidelines for national reports and use the Commission as a secretariat (European Commission, 2004b). The Commission eliminated references to high EU safety standards and substituted “Member States shall ensure that all reasonably achievable measures are implemented to ensure a high level of safety in nuclear installations” (European Commission, 2004c). Also eliminated was reference to the “polluter pays” principle referring to financial responsibility for radioactive waste including decommissioning. The section requiring that Member States ensure availability of financial resources for safety and decommissioning was eliminated and substituted with “Member States shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that adequate financial resources are available from the regulatory body and the operators to support the safety of nuclear installations throughout their life” (European Commission, 2004d).
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Equally significant was the elimination of specific deadlines for a management program to site long-term disposal, replaced by an open non-binding timetable (European Commission, 2004e). Both Parliament and Member States disagreed with the Commission timetable requirement preferring to leave it to the discretion of the Member States.

As the companion directive on the safe management of the spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste provides, a Committee of Experts (European Commission, 2004f) would be established with its members selected by the Member States, to adopt rules of procedure. The Commission would serve as the Secretariat receiving reports from Member States every three years, forwarding them to Parliament and the Council with consultation with the Committee. Article 8 directs the Committee along with the Commission, to establish guidelines for reports. The Committee would review the reports (of Member State activities), issuing an opinion with recommendations to the Member States.

STAKEHOLDERS AND EU INSTITUTIONS TAKE A STAND

Major opponents to a Community-wide approach that were able to substantially reduce the proposed scope and binding compliance mechanisms have been: the United Kingdom, Finland, Sweden and Germany and possibly Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. The first four states have enough votes to block the legislation. Some of the newer states, i.e. post-Communist, may have seen the directives as a substitution of influence from Moscow to Brussels. Member States may also resist moves they think will compromise existing national approaches and institutions, i.e., safety authorities in the Member States, preferring to preserve safety as their own responsibility.

The United Kingdom claims the directives will not improve nuclear safety but could damage the existing national system. It did not want an EU peer review team checking on its plants, some of which lack double containment vessels. Some Member States argue that there could be duplication of the work of the IAEA (European Voice, 2004). Finland is now committed to the building of a new nuclear plant and has designated a site for long-term deep disposal at Okiluoto. It will be decided by 2010. These states do not want interference from the Commission. France has supported the Commission position, perhaps because of its influential role in developing best practices of safety requirements for nuclear reactors as part of Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA). France may hope to continue its leadership role.

The Commission had wanted segregated funds for decommissioning for each utility with a separate audit to prevent use of funds by a utility for other purposes, e.g. reinvestment in other countries that could be considered anti-competitive. It had wanted to move towards mandatory standards, unlike the general principles of the IAEA, but the Council was resistant (European Commission, 2004g). France and Germany have invested decommissioning funds in outside projects while other states have no restrictions on how the funds are spent. It appears that many Member States are not ready to share another policy area with Brussels.
Commission officials view the Member States as having an advantage with greater resources and personnel. All the Commission can do presently is to assist national authorities with their programs. What the Commission would like to accomplish and its proposed directives would be a first step towards, is to open the door to the development of legally binding community-wide standards for nuclear safety and the management of radioactive waste. Member States may be afraid of just that – strengthening of the proposed directives over time by the Commission.

For critics of nuclear energy expansion, approving this legislation with its promise of safety standards gives the appearance that, in fact, nuclear energy is safe. However, some like Germany’s former Environment Minister, Jürgen Trittin, may want to keep a barrier, i.e. lack of safety standards, to thwart nuclear energy development. There is an unusual commonality of interest among national regulatory bodies, some Member States and anti-nuclear groups, e.g., Greenpeace opposes the directives. Another non-governmental organization (NGO), Friends of the Earth (FOE) is concerned that given the current situation, if legislation is passed, it will strengthen the nuclear energy industry without a guarantee of greater safety (European Voice, 2004).

Another argument from the opposition is that if Euratom if not revised it will continue to represent an inherent conflict, since it both promotes and regulates nuclear energy. Article 1 (Euratom) is pro-nuclear: “Recognizing that nuclear energy represents an essential resource for the development and invigoration of industry and will permit the advancement of the cause of peace.” IAEA, FOE claims, also regulates and promotes nuclear energy. But in an open market, a level-playing field is not served when the rules and the organizations that implement them are biased. Mark Johnston, of FOE, would like parts of Euratom included in the proposed Treaty on the Constitution in a nuclear safety and security chapter along with the creation of a secondary level agency to implement regulations (Friends of the Earth, 2004). The Council, however, may be concerned about a long-term financial obligation since the clean-up and management costs of existing plants could be staggering. The Council would not want to create an opportunity for back-door subsidies by the EU.

There was discussion of joining Euratom to the proposed Treaty on the Constitution but some Member States rejected the idea. If Euratom is not reformed there has been the suggestion that the Treaty be voted down. Austria, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Sweden and the European Parliament asked for a review or a conference of states in Declaration 44 attached to the Treaty on the Constitution so that Euratom could be brought up-to-date repealing the obsolete provisions. The Declaration also noted the lack of democratic decision-making procedures and promotion of nuclear power in Euratom. The signatories supported the idea of a Conference of the Representatives of the governments of the Member States, which should be convened as soon as possible (Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, 2004). Parliament, in its resolution regarding the Constitution, declared that it “Welcomes the separation of the Euratom Treaty from the legal structure of the future Constitution; urges the Intergovernmental Conference to convene a Treaty revision conference in order to repeal the obsolete and
outdated provisions of that Treaty, especially those relating to the promotion of nuclear energy and the lack of democratic decision-making procedures” (European Parliament, 2003d).

Although DG-TREN Commissioner Loyola de Palacio wanted the directives to be approved quickly and during her term, that was not to be. The Commission lacked agreement from the Parliament and the Council. In June 2004, the Council had adopted conclusions reaffirming the goal of a high level of nuclear safety and safe management of radioactive waste as embodied in the proposed directives. It directed Member States along with the Commission to participate in the review meetings under the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management as well as the work of WENRA “...to engage in a wide ranging consultation process facilitating the choice of instrument(s), in the framework of the Euratom Treaty, that can contribute more effectively to achieving nuclear safety...” during the next year (European Council, 2004a). Austria, Italy and Luxembourg regretted the inability to pass the directives in an Annex to the June 2004 conclusions. They reiterated the need for a high level of uniform Community-wide standards covering the full life-cycle of a nuclear installation. (European Council, 2004b)

When the Council was still unable to pass the revised proposed directives it issued an Action Plan in December 2004. The Council recommended an exchange of information among Member States on decommissioning within the Euratom framework (European Council, 2004c). Those Member States that had not already done so were asked to sign the Joint Convention on Nuclear Safety and all were to continue to participate in the review meetings referred to in the June conclusions, informing the Working Party on Atomic Questions, of their progress. The Council meeting of 13 January 2005 had on its agenda a discussion of the Action Plan. The Council conclusions established a consultative process, including the participation of the Member States and the Commission to review the state of nuclear safety and radioactive waste management and recommend whether this legislative approach or a new Community instrument would better achieve the goal of nuclear safety throughout the EU. The Council said it would issue a report on the exchange of views of by the delegations to the Council with recommendations at mid-term (European Council, 2005a). However, it is more likely that the results of the process will not be published until the end of 2006. As of May 2005, the Parliament has not reintroduced the legislation. A spillage of radioactive liquid at the UK Sellafield nuclear site in May 2005, forcing closure of one reprocessing center, gave the Commission another opportunity to call for greater control over nuclear installations to prevent accidents stemming from poor national regulatory controls resulting in inadequate records and insufficient inspections by the EU.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The controversy over nuclear energy safety legislation turns on the role of the EU in developing and ensuring compliance for a common approach. While uniform standards for nuclear safety and the safe management of ra-
dioactive waste may appear reasonable given the trend toward harmonization of legislation in general and liberalization of the electricity market, there are stakeholders that question interference with national prerogative. The principle that all citizens should expect the same level of safety or health throughout the EU has been an argument for greater harmonization and integration.

The Commission has challenged national authorities with its proposed directives, at a time when the integration process is slowing down. Member States may believe that energy policy belongs to them and transferring competence to Brussels is another blow to national sovereignty. Since the principle of subsidiarity became an integral part of the Maastricht Treaty and reappeared in the Treaty of Amsterdam, the pull between the Member States and the Commission over policy responsibility has been recognized and the Commission must justify the necessity of proposed legislation. States have used the principle of subsidiarity to rein in the Commission to protect their national interest. States have claimed decisions would be better made at the national level than at the Community level, challenging Commission action, if a national policy was jeopardized. One strategy is to influence the EU to adopt the national policy. However, the goal of harmonization of legislation among Member States is compromised when Member States want to protect their responsibilities for policy areas important to them. Three major issues are: 1) whether the Commission has legal competence; 2) the conflict between the goal of uniform legislation among the Member States and the policy objectives of other Member States; and 3) competition among EU institutions.

Member States tend not to support harmonization of legislation if it is detrimental to their perceived interest. The question of legal competence for energy policy and therefore nuclear safety is caught up in the bind of whether states recognized the Commission’s authority agree to be subject to uniform legislation. Also at issue is the extension of Commission power vis-à-vis the Parliament and Council. The latter institutions have not been overly supportive of nuclear safety legislation.

This case is controversial not only because it pits Member States against each other, but it raises the issue of the existence or lack thereof, of an energy policy, more specifically for nuclear energy safety. Such a policy exists de facto if part of the EU promotes a particular energy source through R&D. EU Energy Commissioner, Andris Piebalgs has asked the nuclear industry to address safety, cost and waste treatment issues (Financial Times, 2006). He would like states like the United Kingdom to embark on a program of building a new generation of nuclear plants.

Some stakeholders, that oppose nuclear energy, favor the legislation (e.g. Austria which is nuclear free), while others that oppose nuclear energy, oppose the legislation (FOE). To the dismay of opponents of increased reliance on nuclear energy, without solving the problems associated with terrorism and security, long-term disposal of radioactive waste and high costs including decommissioning, the proposed directives represent a green light for the nuclear energy industry. But the nuclear industry can win either way. Without a Community-wide safety standards approach, it can continue working with national authorities within each state, providing safety utilizing IAEA principles and national regulations. If the Commission increases its role within the
scope of the proposed directives, it is likely that the nuclear option would also increase its standing in the EU. The direction the EU will take affects not only Europe but the future of nuclear energy globally. The key is to find a balance between safety prerequisites and energy supply and demand – a formidable task.

ENDNOTES

1 For discussion of the future of nuclear energy in Sweden see Lofstedt (2001).
2 For an analysis of public opinion on nuclear energy in the EU see Johnson (1999).
3 The lack of competency in energy policy was to be addressed in the proposed Treaty on the Constitution.
5 For a fuller discussion see European Commission, “Nuclear Safety and the Environment: 30 Years of NRWG activities towards harmonization of nuclear safety criteria and requirements”, EUR 20818, November 2002.
6 For a discussion of the need for a greater Commission role in nuclear safety see, Taylor (2002).
7 For a more informative discussion of these problems, see Webster “Radioactive Waste Management in Central and Eastern European Countries”, Commission of the European Communities, EUR 1954, Brussels, July 1999.
8 For an analysis of subsidiarity see Axelrod (1994) and Van Kersbergen and Verbeek (2004).

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Regina S. Axelrod
Austrian Neutrality: Burden of History in the Making or Moral Good Rediscovered?

MICHAL KOŘAN

Abstract: Since the late 1980s, when the importance of neutrality for Austrian politicians and officials significantly decreased, mainstream scholarship on Austrian foreign policy has condemned neutrality to oblivion. Today, these scholars feel considerable disappointment when they confront the return of the idea of neutrality even among previously neutrality-sceptical politicians. The aim of this essay is (1) to show that the inability to comprehend this development is caused primarily by posing the wrong questions and (2) to suggest a different orientation of future research.

Key words: Austria, critical social theory, discursive analysis, foreign policy, neutrality

INTRODUCTION

Grounded firmly in the critical social theory platform of IR (for overview see George, 1994: 139–190; Burchill–Devetak et al, 2001: 155–180; Linklater, 2002; see also Ashley, 1987; Campbell, 1992) and siding with the Vienna School of Critical Discourse Analysis (see Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart, 2003), this essay point out some of the serious shortcomings of the prevailing way of addressing questions related to Austrian foreign policy and neutrality and to offer an alternative avenue for future research. The text will unfold in four thematic steps. Firstly a close kinship between the scholar narratives and specific political discourses will be revealed. It will be shown that Austrian scholars have been dealing with the issue of Austrian neutrality in three virtual waves (“paradigms”) – international-law research orientation, rationalist orientation and, most recently, by engaging in a mix of rationalist and constructivist orientation. It will be argued that no matter what research mode has prevailed at a given time, all of them followed the basic tenet of the given political discourse. Secondly, the often unspoken theoretical premises of the recent scholar narratives will be elucidated. The recent approach can be best characterised as rationalism enriched (mostly unconsciously) by some ontologically ideational features. The third step will be to subject this intellectual position (some prefer to call it “via media” (Wendt, 1999) or “middle ground” (Adler, 1997) constructivism to critical scrutiny. As a result of this step, it will be argued that this meta-theoretical and epistemological stance is due to its very nature bound to fail because it claims to achieve unattainable research fruits. The essay will then conclude by suggesting some possible alternative avenues for the research on Austrian neutrality and foreign policy.

Having said this, it is obvious this essay seeks to satisfy not only the empirical-analytical demand (i.e., laden by critical social theory, to provide some...
clues on the issue of Austrian neutrality and on the scholarly ways of dealing with it) but also to touch some of the fundamental theoretical quarrels within IR in general (with the help of Austrian neutrality as a case study). However, it must be noted that the essence of this essay is to provide a critique of the prevailing scholarship on the issue of Austrian foreign policy and neutrality, while saving the alternative research for the future.

SETTING THE STAGE

It could be started from the premise, that – as will be shown below – the peculiar nature of the Austrian neutrality was invented where it had never existed before. It was invented in 1955 and from then on, through endless redefinitions, it was (and it is) a subject of constant (re)building. Particular meanings of the term “neutrality” have always been dependent on the particular social context in which they have materialised. This context has had an overwhelming discursive effect on the inquiries related to neutrality and foreign policy. It has to be stated beforehand that the approach, as suggested later in this paper, does not pretend to be able to escape the “discursive trap”. On the contrary, the limits posed by the surrounding discourse are inevitable. However, with this inevitability in mind, questions asked can be adjusted accordingly. Before turning to the actual overview of the discursive effects it is necessary to clarify our apprehension of a concept of “discourse”.

“Discourse” is herein understood in a Foucauldian vein that takes explains it as the “power that makes us understand certain problems in certain ways, and pose questions accordingly” (Adler, 2005: 103). Discourse is the “prevailing mode of subjectivity”. (Burchill–Devetak, 2001: 199) It is “not a way of learning ‘about’ something out there in the ‘real world’; it is rather (...) producing that something as real, as identifiable, classifiable, knowable, and therefore meaningful. Discourse creates the conditions of knowing”. (George, 1994: 30) Critical discourse approach is supposed to contribute to our understanding of the “process by which the political figures, academics, journalists others (...) frame their reality”. (Shapiro, 1998: 696)

Whilst it is in the very foundation of critical social theory to praise diversity and heterogeneousness, there is a minimal agreement among critical scholars that discourse is constructed by privileging certain types of “goods” over others. It is the privileged “good” that enables us to define a particular type of “other” and that of “same” and provides for adjusting human behaviour accordingly; it is the superior moral “good” what lends to differentiate between outside and inside. Other is “regarded as something not occupying the same moral space as the self” (Burchill–Devetak, 2001: 199). This approach, close to Habermasian critical theory, stresses the importance of the shifts in the ways social bonds are constructed. In the world of IR, these bonds unite members of a given state and separate them from the outside world. In this case, state is not only a bounded geographical but also a bounded political and moral community. (Linklater, 2002)

The same holds true in the case of Austria and the following paragraphs will show how overwhelmingly have the discursive practices of “moral space” building affected the ways (mainstream) scholars have been pursuing their inquiries related to the issues of neutrality and foreign policy.
NEUTRALITY – A MATTER OF “NECESSITY” NOT “MORALITY”

The so called Neutrality Act was adopted by the Austrian National Assembly on October 26th 1955 as a constitutional law and was proclaimed as a unilateral act albeit one with strong international consequences. The narrow wording of the Act did not suggest any particular significance for the foreign policy orientation (it is mostly defined in negative ways). Neither did it carry any particular moral loading. On the other hand it invited endless opportunities for different interpretations.

The privileged discursive cleavage in the period of 1954–1957 was one of freedom and independence (as the superior “good”) versus dependence. After a decade of the State treaty struggle – period of doubts, uncertainty and insecurity – freedom and sovereignty were the “goods” that were chosen over others. Spatial boundaries were being re-secured through the references to freedom and the ability to exercise an active foreign policy as a sovereign state. What was the neutrality position in this moral geography? Neutrality was seen as a tool to achieve Austrian independency and freedom but it was by no means seen as a constitutive element for it.

Throughout the first months following the declaration of the Neutrality Act, roughly till the end of 1956, it was clear that the Austrian government had no intention to broaden its neutrality to non-military, i.e. political, cultural and above all economic affairs. It was constantly stressed that Austria is “free state not subjected to any obligations; its neutrality is of purely military nature” (Leopold Figl’s press announcement, October 23, 1956;6) Gehler, 2002b: 194). This reading of the Neutrality Act implied that Austria was free to make a choice for full membership in any given non-military alliance and organization. Thus, as opposed to the case of Switzerland, Austria opted for membership in the UN (December, 14 1955) and for that in Council of Europe (April 16, 1956).

However, the original commitment to neutrality as declared in the Moscow Memorandum signed on April 15, 1955 involved a provision that obliged Austria to execute much broader policy of perpetual neutrality: that “of the type maintained by Switzerland” (Verdross, 1956: 61). Since it was necessary for the Austrian government to maintain full credibility of its neutral standing, both the Neutrality Act itself and international law in general had to first be interpreted so that it could provide a legal and moral platform for foreign policy conduct in a manner substantially different from that of Switzerland. This uneasy task was accomplished above all by a pre-eminent international-law expert, then the Director of the Institute of International Law in Vienna, Alfred Verdross.

Verdross (1956) argued for compatibility of neutrality (as it was defined by international law and by the envisaged Neutrality Act) and the United Nations Charter. While Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations postulated “the obligation for all Members to take immediate economic steps against the aggressor and to allow the transit of troops through their territories” and thus a priori excluded any possibility of neutrality, the United Nations Charter is according to Verdross “much adaptable, since ... Members of the United Nations are not bound to take action immediately against the aggressor, as was the duty of the Members of the League of Nations.” More-

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over, “...it is left to the Security Council whether a Member is to be invited to take measures; the Security Council is able to excuse individual Members from such measures” (Verdross, 1956: 65–67). Because the UN accepted Austria as a member without reservations and with full awareness of its neutral status it could be concluded that it also did not expect Austria to participate in any measures that were not compatible with Austrian neutrality. This part came to be known as Verdross doctrine. But Verdross’ argument went much farther than this. He specifically stated that a neutral state “is bound to obey the international rules of neutrality during a war between other countries”. The only case when neutrality has to be employed in peacetime is when particular obligations to another country could get a neutral state involved in war. Other than that the neutral country is “absolutely free in its domestic and foreign policy ... in particular it is not bound to observe an ideological neutrality” (Verdross, 1956: 63–64, 65).

An active foreign policy was largely synonymous with the moral good of “freedom” and “sovereignty”. The Verdross’ aim was, indeed, to protect an active foreign policy from neutrality. This is exactly the point that has been officially emphasized in 1955–1956. The Austrian government stressed that neutrality is aligned solely with the wartime circumstances and did not leave any doubt that it is unwilling to tie its hands by putting neutrality on the top of its foreign policy agenda. Instead, the Austrian debate whether to participate in the nascent European integration process occurred with considerable enthusiasm (see e.g. Gehler, 2002a: 119–167). For the first time, we could see the way that scientific enterprise – in this case international law expertise – willingly adapted so that it conformed to the political agenda of its days.

NEUTRALITY: AN ACTIVE AGENT IN AUSTRIAN MORAL SPACE BUILDING

The Hungarian uprising in October – November 1956 and subsequent events put the Austrian pro-western foreign-policy activism to the edge. The courageous Austrian response to the Soviet invasion to Hungary was in perfect accord with its moral status as an independent and free international actor. However, it also brought (at least for the time of being) an end to the rather benevolent attitude of Soviet representatives to the Austro-Western honeymoon. It became clear that Austria had to be much more careful in its pro-western expressions. It must also be stressed that there were important domestic developments, particularly the raising importance of the EC-sceptical current within the SPÖ that contributed to the abandonment of the extensively pro-European and openly pro-western course. The important point is, however, that it was not before the beginning of 1957 that the Austrian foreign-policy begun to be more closely related to the neutral status.

Obviously, the first victim of this shift was the previously discussed possibility of full membership in the EEC. To defend the decision not to take a part in the integration process the new Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky (SPÖ) returned to the commitments made in the Moscow Memorandum and defined neutrality in broad “Swiss” terms. (Kreisky’s speech at the SPÖ assembly, November 13, 1959; source, Gehler, 2002b: 236) Instead of the EEC, Austria opted for the creation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Again, this decision had to be justified and, indeed, there emerged a consid-
erable amount of analysis arguing that EFTA membership – contrary to that of EEC – is fully compatible with neutrality.

One example: in an article for Die Furche newspaper (November 28, 1959) Alfred Verdross expressed his conviction that membership in the EEC would bring such deep economic commitment to other countries that the possibility of maintaining neutrality is \textit{a priori} excluded in the case of an armed conflict. On the other hand, the argument went, that membership in EFTA threatens neither economic nor military neutrality\textsuperscript{8} (source, Gehler, 2002b: 237).

The Austrian government also began to openly state that joining the EEC would violate Article IV of the \textit{State treaty}. This Article forbade Austria from any political or economical unification with Germany. Since Germany is ‘one of the most important states of the EEC’, Austrian admission, “would oppose the State treaty”\textsuperscript{9} (Kreisky’s speech at the SPÖ assembly, November 13, 1959; source, Gehler, 2002b: 236). The desire for unification with Germany was for many reasons the only possible way of streaming foreign-policy activism during the First Austrian republic. After the Second World War this had to be altered – one of the first example of the detachment from Germany is the so called \textit{victim myth} (see e. g. Frölich-Steffen, 2003: 115–123) asserting that Austria did not hold co-responsibility for the crimes of the war, and that it was a new state born in the aftermath of WWII\textsuperscript{10}. It was not until 1957 and the events surrounding that year that Germany was officially declared as \textit{the other} (however “friendly”).

It has often been argued that it was this \textit{otherness} from Germany that since 1945 been used as a tool for establishing the spiritual foundation of the new Austrian \textit{Staatlichkeit} (see Stourzh, 1990; Pelinka, 2000; Fröhlich-Steffen, 2003; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart, 2003: 55–58). The issue is nonetheless much more complicated which, partly helps to explain the new-born overwhelming attractiveness of neutrality. The Austrian pro-German sentiment was something that could not be immediately abandoned. Even after the end of Second World War, it was possible to find a strong societal current within Austria rejecting the idea that Austria is a separate entity.

For this reason it was risky to attempt to erect Austrian statehood solely around the notion of otherness from Germany,\textsuperscript{11} and there have been a lot of controversies over a distinct Austrian identity during the 60s and 70s that could prove this point. Thus, Austrians were unable to freely choose any form of \textit{Staatlichkeit} myth without carefully observing whether \textit{the} particular choice could not cause some kind emotional harm or political instability. The importance of this assertion is only accentuated by the fact that May 15\textsuperscript{th} (a date when the \textit{State treaty} was signed) was not chosen as an Austrian \textit{National day}. Instead, in 1965, October 26 was chosen, i.e. the date when neutrality was declared, a date “much less susceptible to emotional loading” (Brückmüller, 1998: 85)

Edward Timms (1998) rightly pointed out that Austrian identity was built on rather schizophrenic foundations, those oscillating between Austrian and German components (see also Heer, 1981). There were no elites nor was there any unifying common past experience that could readily be relied on to define a distinct Austrian national character. One of the most easily accessible and emotionally neutral elements that could be transformed in to a distinct na-
tional consciousness was to be found in Austrian culture. Later, as the success of the second republic became clear, other examples of Austrian achievement were used: social stability, “social partnership” or federalism. Another, equally valuable and emotionally neutral feature was neutrality. It was here where neutrality lost its purely strategic and military meaning and gained a strong normative element. For the first time the otherness from Germany along with Austria as “Geisteskontinent, Kulturnation” (Busek, 1995: 17) also materialised in the normative aspect of neutrality, this could smoothly supply the required stuffing for the emerging Austrian state-/nationhood.

This helps to understand how the interpretation of the scope and purpose of neutrality underwent a radical change after 1957. From then on it was not a priori limited to the wartime circumstances. The new re-interpretation suggested that a neutral country is not only obliged to stay away from armed conflict and to pursue a policy that eschews any possibility of getting trapped into war but also that it has to actively seek policies that create conditions eventually leading to the abolishment of wars as such. This shift could not be more substantial. While the pre-1957 neutrality was described in largely negative terms and was kept apart from foreign policy conduct, the new neutrality was seen as standing in the very heart of the foreign policy agenda. The reach of neutrality was extended to the peace-time foreign policy orientation and thus broadened to also include non-military issues.

We can see a major discursive change. Freedom, sovereignty and the spatial dimension of Austria were deemed to be largely secured and the following steps can be seen as a progress towards securing the moral and genuinely Austrian political and moral space. In contrast to the early post-war period, the “good” of being different from Germany prevailed. This otherness could be only promoted in “moral” not “national” terms. This “good” made it possible to differentiate Austria from Germany and, indeed, from any country that would not hesitate to take part in a possible armed conflict. This Austrian uniqueness as a presumed active peace builder supplied the necessary boundaries for its moral space by its abstention from the earthly struggles of other countries. That this role was above all subjectively construed by Austrians themselves and not really appreciated by others is apparent from the rather sceptical or at least hesitant attitudes towards this Austrian task as expressed by the superpowers and certain other European countries (Rathkolb, 1998; Schröck, 2002; Maschke, 2002).

Until 1990s neutrality was consciously used as a tool (national buzzword) “which had helped in the construction of a single common national self-portrayal” (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart, 2003: 104). From the preceding paragraphs we can see that there was nothing natural or determinate in neutrality for it to become one of Austria’s defining features. Instead, it was a blend of intersecting events, framed by an identity building discourse process. As a consequence, neutrality as part of the Austrian identity has to be seen as a result of this discursive process.

MORAL ARGUMENTS WRAPPED INTO LANGUAGE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Again, this line of argumentation had to be anchored in an “objective” expertise, for the time being still based on an international law reasoning. One of the
best examples is Karl Zemanek’s (1961) contribution to the original Verdross doctrine. Zemanek argued that “although a permanently neutral state has rights and duties under the laws of neutrality only during a war between other states (...) the state must adopt a ‘policy of neutrality’ (...). Nothing prevents it from participating in universal activities for peaceful purposes (...) contemporary permanent neutrality must be active. It is only justifiable if it serves, besides its own immediate purpose, the superior aim of international peace. (...) It would thus signify a complete failure of the policy of neutrality should the status of permanent neutrality appear to be an expression of narrow egoism or should the impartiality (...) seem to be indifference.” (Zemanek, 1961: 415–418)

This assertion is identical with the governmental line adopted and executed above all by Bruno Kreisky (SPÖ). The message is clear: (1) Austrian foreign policy lost nothing of its post-war activism (as an attribute of “sovereignty”); (2) while until 1957 this activism was presented as opposed to neutrality, since 1957 it was one of neutrality’s defining features (an attribute of “uniqueness”).

**BOUNDED NEUTRALITY IN A RATIONALIST SKIN**

This situation was not principally altered until roughly 1983–1984 when the new coalition government (SPÖ/FPÖ) took over and broke with the active all encompassing global foreign policy of the Kreisky-era. This break was signified by asserting “a regional rather than global line of vision” and by changing “emphasis towards [Austrian] immediate environment” (Kramer, 1996: 169).

The era of foreign minister Leopold Gratz (SPÖ) and, even more importantly, since January 1987 that of Alois Mock (ÖVP) was later to be known as a period of “realistic foreign and neutrality policy”. Foreign policy was to be designed for nothing more but to respond to the “actual needs” and “interests”, aiming at “defending the status quo” by a policy of “natural self-restraint”. (Kramer, 1996: 170)

Moral imperative of this period was: to be “normal”, and to be “rational”. The scholar response to this shift was very much in harmony with the prevalent intellectual fashion of the IR-mainstream in the 1980s emphasizing the rational discourse in inquiries And building on various theoretical sources of “small-states literature” (for an overview see Vogel, 1983; Skuhra, 1983; Knudsen, 1996; Hey, 2003) Austrian scholars now tried to find the best possible ways for a “rational” foreign policy conduct, looking at various “variables” and “levels of analysis”, and turning away from universally minded goals and global commitments. Another point that can illustrate this “rationalising” move is the way in which, the Active Neutrality phase was now presented. With a growing tendency it was depicted as if the active global policy was above all a rational “realist” foreign policy enabled by a unique international setting. According to the argument, only due to its activism during the previous phase was Austria able to safeguard its immediate goals: sovereignty and independency. Moreover, through the global foreign policy and UN-activism it was easier for Austria to solve some of its less fundamental issues: i.e. the dispute over South Tyrol or some of its economical objectives (Höll-Kramer, 1983: 198). The morality of neutrality was turned on its head once more.
Thus, the basic scholar assumption, as it emerged in the late 1980s, was that there is a rational foreign policy “out there” and it is literally waiting to be discovered. What role could neutrality play in this enterprise? It was for example seen as a tool for preventing Austria, given its status as a small industrialized and developed country, from being forced into an external dependency (see in general Höll /ed./ 1983; in particular Mouritzen, 1983; Rotter, 1983; Höll and Kramer, 1983). Austrian active armed neutrality was also grasped as a strategic security tool in the case of an all-out conventional war on European soil: the principal task was “to persuade a potential aggressor that an attack is too risky, costly, and time consuming” (Luif, 1992: 26). Interestingly enough, even the “old fashioned” international-law orientation, previously calling for a global peace policy, was suddenly able to alter itself and to carry out this more modest and reserved position (see Zemanek, 1984).

The question of EC membership as it grew relevant in the second half of the 1980s shed yet another light on the neutrality issue. With the support for EC accession increasing, firstly and above all inside the ÖVP and among the large industrialists attached to this party, one could encounter a fresh analysis arguing for the compatibility of EC membership with the permanent neutral status. In a ground-breaking article, eloquently written for (and paid by) the Federation of Austrian Industrialists (VÖI), international law specialists Waldemar Hummer and Michael Schweitzer (1987; see also Luif, 1992; Falkner, 2001) built-up their analysis around an argumentation strongly evoking the mood of 1955–1957.

Once more attempts were made to align neutrality solely with wartime circumstances as only these would require an EC member to retain absolute freedom to act as a requisite for maintaining its neutrality. In contrast to the previously prevalent assessments (1960s–early 1980s) trade autonomy was not regarded as an indispensable feature of permanent neutrality. On the contrary – “international interdependence had made autarky an impossible goal” (Luif, 1992: 80). Thus, to pursue a broadly defined neutrality regardless of its previous standing could be portrayed as an “irrational” enterprise which would in turn only harm the “real” Austrian interests.

Finally, since the end of 1980s, it became common to think of Austrian neutrality as a concept completely apart from the conduct of foreign policy. It was Franz Vranitzky, then the Austrian Federal Chancellor, who in the midst of events (that were conceived as going far beyond anyone’s comprehension) asserted the conviction that “[n]eutrality and neutral policy are parts of a dynamic and fluid process that has to be adapted and developed in and according to a changing international environment” (Vranitzky, 1992: xix). Vranitzky went on: “as politicians of neutral countries, they must strive to define and maintain neutrality in these changing circumstances – at least as long as neutrality has not become wholly obsolete by a total transformation of the international order” (ibid.: xx).

The latter point – neutrality as being obsolete – throughout the 1990s, has been vigorously asserted by the FPÖ closely followed by the ÖVP in its more moderate approach. As the then ÖVP Foreign Affairs speaker Andreas Kohl
put it: “The political bridge-building function of Austrian neutrality has died out (...) other concepts have their future. As far as the European peace-order has been achieved (...) the Austrian neutrality is definitely surpassed” (quoted in Fröhlich-Steffen, 2003: 169). On the contrary, the question of abolishing neutrality was (generally) ruled out among SPÖ’s politicians. The issue of neutrality has gradually become one of the leading political agendas and a subject of endless struggle within the government led by SPÖ/ÖVP coalition. The clash over neutrality was after all one of the reasons for the final break-up of the “grand” coalition in 1999. With ÖVP-FPÖ coalition coming into power in February 2000 the neutrality-sceptical position made it into the government, even with the ever-constraining SPÖ’s influence. It became a truism that classical all-around neutrality must be superseded by “solidarity” within EU.

This position found its clearest expression in the new Security and Defence Doctrine (January 2001). The debate over a new security perspective was ignited by the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition soon after resuming power in 2000 and the doctrine passed only with the support of the coalition parties as the opposition voted against the resolution of the Doctrine (December, 2001). The Doctrine’s wording and implications have had far reaching implication. The Austrian government changed its perception of threats (Comprehensive National Defense Program) and changed its defence and security perspective accordingly. It also presented its own view on the history and function of neutrality. The most eloquent part of the Doctrine is as follows: “Austria (...) has radically changed its status of permanent neutrality in international law... (its) status in international law corresponds to that of a non-allied state rather than a neutral state. Austria is sovereign to decide on the future development of its security policy. However, the better Austria is integrated into the international security architecture, the more efficiently will it be able to safeguard its security interests and peace policy objectives and to contribute to shaping a stable and peaceful environment. (...) Austria will continuously assess the value of NATO membership for its security and defence policy and the option of joining NATO will be kept open.” (National and Security Doctrine, 2001)

The ÖVP-FPÖ government took full advantage of the opportunity to “construct” the national defence interest (see in general Buzan and Waever and de Wilde, 1998; Campbell, 1996) and thus to reshape the official position on neutrality. It even put neutrality in direct opposition to the efficiency in safeguarding its security and the possibility to contribute to a stable and peaceful environment. Thus, neutrality found itself directly in opposition to every meaning it has assumed throughout its history. Additionally, in a speech given at the occasion of the Austrian National Day in October 2001 Chancellor Schüssel ridiculed neutrality and compared it to a cliché similar to Lipizzaner and Mozartkugeln (quoted in Neuhold, 2005). How was this radical shift explained in the mainstream scholar literature? It was not. In principal, it only followed the official government position.

RATIONALITY IN A SCIENTIFIC CLOAK

The mainstream scholar narrative unfolded as follows: in spite of all the attempts to “rationalise” and “de-normativise” the Austrian foreign policy in the 1980s, the changing international environment of 1988–1990 found Aus-
tria totally aimless and helpless. No antecedent concept seemed to make any sense vis-à-vis the processes in the Soviet-bloc and in world affairs in general. The Austrian foreign policy was nothing more then an incremental “muddling through”.18 Neutrality, bridge-building, Ostpolitik – nothing was taken as a relevant and meaningful guidance through the uncertainty of this fevered interlude (for an overview see, Neuhold /ed./, 1992). Helmut Kramer (1998: 169–172) coined this situation with the term “crisis of normalisation”. The discursive background of this particular reading of Austrian foreign policy of the late 1980s and the early 1990s is more than apparent: while the period of global foreign policy is seen as something “abnormal”, the moderate and limited foreign policy is seen as “normal”, regardless of the painful experiences the process of “normalisation” can bring about. There is even some undeniable teleological feeling to it: Austria is bound to move from a utopian (active-neutral) to a realist (“real-interest” based) foreign policy behaviour. The path of “normalisation” is henceforth open, there is a clear end in sight and the pains are only caused by the residual “ab-normal” elements, not by the illusion of the entire concept of “rationality” in foreign policy altogether.

The already contested concept of neutrality was subsequently assaulted with even more scathing force. This assault did not circumscribe itself on the question of joining the EC. Neutral states were suddenly seen as “too weak and not sufficiently recognized ... and are not indispensable” in any new initiative of the peace-building process (Gärtner, 1992: 30).19 From the “confession” that neutrality is not indispensable while at the same time it is not fully rational there is only a single step to the argument that neutrality is nothing more than a “comfortable position” (Lehne, 1992: 207) thus it is not needed and, consequently, is indeed a “burden of history” (Luif, 2003). The burden that has (for some time before had been dumped) to be carried on the road to normalisation.

NEUTRALITY – A BURDEN OF HISTORY IN THE MAKING?

According to the majority of scholar literature dealing with this subject matter neutrality is seen as obsolete and, indeed, a menace to the rational orientation of foreign and security policy (see e. g. Gärtner, 1992; Lehne, 1992; Neuhold and Luif, 1992; Zemanek, 1995; Neuhold, 1995; 1998; 2003; 2005; Kramer, 1996; 1998; Luif, 1995; 2003; Hummer, 2000; Höll, 2002; Phinnemore, 1995).20 That the above depicted attitude stands at odds with next to everything commonly associated with neutrality until the very last days of the 1980’s (see e. g. Höll, 1982; Neuhold and Thalberg, 1984; Däniker, 1992; Visuri, 1992) is not surprising. What is striking, though, is that the mainstream explanations did not bring up anything that would differ from the explanations presented by the politicians.

Routine explanation of this principal shift thus focuses its attention to systemic-level developments and its impact on the foreign policy behaviour: the once celebrated neutral stance has lost its substantial meaning due the abrupt dusk of the cold-war international system. With the bipolar dynamics faded away, the neutrality stance was no more tenable as an active “bridge-building” or “peace-promoting” international factor. Neither of these offer neutrality a meaningful position for security and foreign policy making in the
face of new security challenges (peculiar to post-cold war period, see in particular Enos-Attali, 2005). Thus, neutrality is not rational *vis-à-vis* the overwhelming structural changes of 1988–1990 and the subsequently changed security environment.

The most important element for both academic and political reasons for the “irrationality of neutrality” was the manner in which the meaning of the Cold war’s end was secured: the end of the East-West tension was supposed to be *the* reason for giving up on neutrality. However, when taking a closer look, this reasoning will reveal itself as considerably false. First of all, it is necessary to point out that the single fact that the tension between East and West has ceased to exist does not logically lead to the necessity of abandoning neutrality. Given the enormous tasks loaded on the shoulders of neutrality in the 60s and 70s, given the overwhelming global reach of the active-neutral foreign policy (i.e. the Middle East conflict), one has to conclude that in the view of Kreisky’s foreign policy the East-West conflict was but one of the world’s enmities, though the most pressing one. The termination of one conflict would not make any harm to the (supposedly) transcendental value of neutrality as understood in the 1970s.

Therefore, it was above all the restriction to the scope of neutrality in the 1980s that allowed for the later calls for its ultimate abandonment and not the changes in the international environment. And, as we could see above, this re-definition (limitation) of neutrality was of an endogenous nature (e.g. the rise of the pro-EC movement). To support the argument against neutrality on the ground of an exogenous (systemic) development is thus largely irrelevant. This will be even more apparent when looking at the latest development of neutrality-related discussions. In spite of all neutrality sceptical scientific accounts, neutrality has recently enjoys a resurgence, even among those politicians who ridiculed neutrality only a few years ago.

**NEUTRALITY – MORAL SPACE REDISCOVERED**

In the 2004 presidential elections, no less than 52.4 % of Austrians ballot-ed for Heinz Fischer, SPÖ candidate who is ardently dedicated to neutrality.\(^{21}\) In October 2004 ÖVP pledged for the inclusion of permanent neutrality to an annex to the new “European constitution” and the call for NATO membership was abandoned. What is more, on the occasion of a military-parade held on the Austrian National Day in 2005 the air was replete with unreserved panegyric statements stressing the importance of a continuous neutrality. Federal Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP) avowed that “a core of our neutrality remains”. \((\text{Die Presse}, 26. 10. 2005)\) Even the chairman of the FPÖ (formerly the most anti-neutral attuned party) Heinz-Christian Strache changed his position\(^ {22}\) and warned against “abolishing neutrality” \((\text{Die Presse}, 26. 10. 2005)\). All of this fits well under what Hanspeter Neuhold (2003: 17) terms a “re-discovered” neutrality.\(^ {23}\)

How to explain the re-discovered neutrality, this perspicuous sense of unity between the pro-neutral socialist-green opposition and somewhat neutrality-sceptical black-orange (ÖVP-BZÖ)\(^ {24}\) coalition? Mainstream scholars offer two conventional answers to this puzzle and together they form one comprehensive whole. According to the first, neutrality is seen as an extremely elas-
tic and fluid concept (for general considerations see Koppelman, 2004) allowing it to be formulated and reformulated with respect to actual needs. It implies that no matter what the actual foreign policy orientation might be it always can be portrayed as neutral (e. g. Cox and Ginty, 1996: 123–126; Ojanen and Herolf and Lindahl, 2000: 10–33). Thus, Austria could become an active figure within the framework of ESDP development, an institution formerly seen as a major obstacle of the Austrian pro-integration policy, and yet remain in the neutral “camp” (see Rezac, 2003; Neuhold, 2003; 2005).26

The other answer pictures neutrality as one of the pillars of the Austrian national identity (Kramer, 1996; Reiterer and Wittich, 1998; Bischof, 2002: 41; Fröhlich-Steffen, 2003; Luif, 2003). This line of arguments is echoed in the way David Phinnemore (1995: 369) puts it: “(neutrality) distinguishes German-speaking Austria from Germany. For most, however, it is more closely associated with independence, peaceful coexistence, prosperity and international standing”. As far as neutrality is an indispensable feature of Austrian national identity it is also an indispensable feature of Austrian foreign and security policy. Combining what has been said above with these two explanations one can get a very convincing picture of the current development: neutrality has lost much of its original power and raison d’être due to the system-level post-cold war developments. Nonetheless, since it is an important feature of the Austrian identity, the content and nature of neutrality has to be (and can be) adapted so that it can survive without it hurting a “rational” foreign policy conduct.27 As such it can easily become a largely political matter and a tool for public mobilisation, with both camps (pro- and anti-neutral) have to be extremely careful and cautious when playing the neutrality card.

However, neutrality has actually undergone a process of “rediscovery”. How can this be related to the mere “caution” caused by the fear of the public reaction to any anti-neutral move? If mere “caution” was the case, neutrality would not be “rediscovered”, instead, it is possible, that it would be swept out of the public stage until more favourable conditions for its abolition occur.

This is in accordance with the findings of Ruth Wodak and her colleagues (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart, 2003: 104), who by a careful examination of commemorative speeches in the public arena (one of the most influential discourse-building instrument) in 1995. They decided that: “[t]he attempt was made, more or less cautiously, to prepare the Austrian population for the impending renunciation of neutrality”. Yet, this did not happen. Instead, what we are facing is an actual change in the attitude towards neutrality, one that once again sees it as increasingly moral imperative. As the following examination reveals, this change can not be grasped when seeking an explanation and asking why questions.

DISCURSIVE GAMES OF RECENT TIMES

In this regard, it is worthy to point out some of the spins that the relationship between foreign policy, neutrality and the other concepts involved (rationality, identity) has undergone since the 1990s. It was argued that the main discursive structure framing the possible inquiries in the 1980s and 1990s was
a question of rationality/irrationality of Austrian foreign policy. This cleavage dominated the academic debate that rendered Austria as unmistakably set on its path to “normalisation”. Yet, another discursive change emerged through the second half of the 1990s. The dualism “rationality” versus “irrationality” was replaced by a dualism “solidarity” versus “neutrality”.

While prior to this shift neutrality was seen as something not exactly “bad” but certainly “irrational”, after this shift the emerging moral good has epitomized itself in “solidarity”, “responsibility” and “burden-sharing”. Anyone arguing in favour of neutrality could expect an accusation of “isolationism” and “egoism”. Both of these dichotomies are expressed in the Defense and Security Doctrine and it seemed it was only a matter of time till neutrality would be condemned in these moral terms. The road to “normalization” was (for a brief moment) replaced by a road to “solidarity”.

Quite recently, though, the “neutrality sceptical” camp made an interesting move. In a position avowed in late December, 2003 by tandem Wolfgang Schüssel and the then ministry of foreign affairs Benita Ferrero-Waldner both (spatial and moral) dimensions of discursivity merged together. In what they called the “solidarity outside – neutrality inside” doctrine they tied “solidarity” to European soil and neutrality was to be applied to the space outside Europe. Thus, the fight against terrorism in Europe or the UN-administrated safeguarding campaign in Kosovo was a matter of solidarity. Anything else could be in an à la carte manner chosen and subjected to the “neutrality-outside” part of the doctrine (this happened, for example, in the case of abstention from the 1999 NATO-led air-strike campaign in Kosovo or in 2003 US-led Iraq operations).

The pro-neutral camp response to this move was no less interesting. The solidarity-neutrality position was held as “irrational” since it is not possible to maintain neutrality while at the same time following the principle of solidarity. The SPÖ argument is as follows – because the ESDP does not represent a clear-cut solution to all security risks and that NATO membership is ruled out, there is only one “rational” way – to remain neutral. Thus, surprisingly, “neutrality” could, in moral terms, be merged with “rationality” but, what is more important, neutrality was again linked to genuine security issues.

FPÖ came up with yet another proposition of moral goodness – neutrality as a safeguard for freedom and the distinct Austrian character. In fact, by reviewing the speeches, party programmes and newspaper of the last year, it seems that it is this notion of “freedom” against “solidarity” that emerges as the privileged discursive cleavage with regard to neutrality.

What do these spins and games have to do with the pre-existing notion of identity, rationality or goodness? Crudely to say: nothing. They are only pieces and bread-crumbs of the previously shared meanings tossed into a different context. It is a process that cannot be explained in causal terms, because of the fact alone that any evidence at hand is made possible by the very process itself.

Despite this, the mainstream academic debate pretends to have a clear path through this maze and claims that it is capable of finding the Archimedes’ point. Exactly this type of reasoning continues to shape the mainstream academic debate on foreign policy and neutrality.
As a result, inherently ambiguous meanings are attached to previously empty and shapeless concepts, these are subsequently taken for being solidly grounded and the scientific enterprise is erected on them. Or, as Richard Rorty puts it, this type of epistemic stance picks and chooses “among the contents of our minds or our language and say that this or that item ‘corresponds to’ or ‘represents’ the environment in a way that some other item does not” (Rorty, 1991: 5). In the following section, I will try to develop an argument that this is a result of “epistemological realism” which is by and large the epistemological platform of the recent Austrian scholarship.

**REALISM – AND ITS EPISTEMOLOGICAL AKIN**

Firstly, it has to be made clear why it is important to add the adjective “epistemological” to the noun “realism” when in philosophy and the philosophy of science the term “realism” has acquired an outspoken meaning. Philosophical realism (explained roughly) rests upon two presuppositions: one of existence and the other of independence. An ideal-type realist has no suspicion about the existence of the outside world and about the fact that the outside world exists independently of what humans say or think about it. As such, this belief can be quite benign and harmless. However, when the belief in existence and independence of the outside world encounters a conviction that a certain privileged group of people (such as scientists or priests) is capable of having a direct access to the knowledge of this world, we are facing a wholly different shift altogether. It is an epistemological presupposition that the external world is knowable in its authenticity; therefore, “epistemological” realism. “Reality” is taken as an independent, inevitable, objective and unalterable entity that is to be (and can be) revealed if using the correct method of inquiry (George, 1994: 11).

It should be stressed that it is not the philosophical realism in general that this section aims to debunk, it is the other step – the epistemological confidence that the outside world can be transmitted through various forms of knowledge-seeking to human beings. The critique of this epistemological stance builds on a longstanding current within philosophy and the philosophy of science that argues against the idea of the possibility of maintaining a clear-cut division between the knower and what is to be known. This specially applies to the realm of social inquiries. For this approach, “social” is by no means susceptible to the naturalist-like scientific inquiry exactly because there is no way of maintaining the epistemological distinction between the mind and social phenomena. As Peter Winch puts it: “social relations are expressions of ideas about reality” (Winch, 1977: 23). If this statement is correct, than we have only ideas that the society is permeated with which allow us to decide what we think really exists. Under these circumstances there is no way of maintaining the distinction between the scientist and the object (society). In Friedrich Kratochwil words: “descriptions are not neutral and somehow objective but embrace all types of social practices and interests that then make the things into what they are called or referred to”. (Kratochwil, 2006: 42)

**OPENING THE AVENUE**

Despite the above criticism, the epistemologically realist line of thought is – with some exceptions (see Fröhlich-Steffen, 2003; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl,
Liebhart, 2003) – still largely prevalent in the academic writings on the Austrian foreign policy and neutrality. While materialist ontology (which has dominated the “rationalist” academics in the 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s) had gradually yielded to idealist ontology, the naturalist “realist” epistemology still firmly reigns over academics. Through the observation that neutrality became one of the pillars of Austrian national identity and as such it affects and influences its foreign policy, identity and that ideational ontology has made its way into the reasoning about Austrian foreign policy. Identity is treated as an intersubjectively shared element and it is considerably present in the way foreign policy is created. This confession fulfils the basic requirement of ontological idealism. Yet, as far as these intersubjectively shared ideational elements are treated as “relatively stable” intervening independent variables or as factors that causally explain selected features of the foreign policy conduct, this approach remains firmly embedded in the naturalist, epistemologically realist camp.

This approach is consistent with that of Katzenstein (1996) or Wendt (1999, 2000), who principally treat identities as immaterial basis for interests. Katzenstein and his colleagues argued that when a state faces a security choice it does not react only in the context of their material capabilities of physical conditions but also on the basis of normative self-understanding. He argues that “security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors”. (Katzenstein, 1996: 2) In the case of Alexander Wendt, the principal argument goes that the relatively stable identity of the state informs its interest and, in turn, its actors.

Neither this approach permits to comprehend the “social” in world politics. This type of inquiry tends to ignore the contingency and indeterminacy of social reality, the inevitable and ubiquitous intentionality of the (scientist’s) consciousness (for the latter, see Berger–Luckmann, 1966: 34) and our inability to detach our selves from the discourse, from the social world, that is, from the world of our making (e.g. Onuf, 1989).

We could see that with respect to the Austrian identity and neutrality, there is a continual on-going fight over the right to constitute the ultimate moral good and to define what, on the other hand, will be excluded as a moral good. “Identities are continuously articulated, re-articulated and contested, which makes them hard to pin down as explanatory categories. The stories we tell about ourselves are not necessarily coherent [identities] ... are defined in discourse” (Zehfuss, 2002: 92). If the social scientific inquiry expects some “explanation” by mere including identity as an ontologically ideational explanatory variable, such an expectation is bound to be disappointed, over and over.

The proposition here is to drop the rather naive Cartesian notion of social reality that is independent of our thoughts about it and that is at the same time more or less directly accessible to the “scientific mind”. Critical social theory (which serves as a basic platform for this critique) takes every concept and every meaning attached to it as firmly embedded in a particular discourse. Such concept can give the semblance of objectivity, but remaining altogether subjective. According to Richard Ashley, this is exactly the function of discourse since it tends to: “neutralize or conceal ... arbitrariness by projecting an image of normalcy, naturalness, or necessity. [A] dominant mode of subjectiv-
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It is normalized by utilizing the concept of hegemony [which is] an ensemble of knowledgeable practices, identified with a particular state and domestic society. Hegemony refers to the projection and circulation of an ‘exemplary’ model, which functions as a regulative ideal. Of course the distinguishing characteristics of the exemplary model are not fixed but are historically and politically conditioned” (quoted in Burchill–Devetak, 2001: 199).

No interpretations are primary, all are arbitrary. Instead of explaining selected features of “reality” by using a discursively objectivised matter, a critical approach suggests to focus at the relationship between discursive practices, knowledge and political and institutional structures (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart, 2003: 9). The main question might be thus posed this way: “how, by way of what strategies, displacements, and shifting emphases, are fields of practice pried open, bounded, and secured? How, by way of what manoeuvres and in opposition to what resistances, are regions of silence established?” (Ashley 1987: 410)

Such conceived inquiry might help us to “identify and contrast competing configurations of national identity as well as divergent narratives of identity” (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart, 2003: 9). In our case, this approach allows to understand the process of aligning neutrality with the Austrian national identity which, in turn can contribute to opening the largely black-boxed area of understanding the interdependent process of foreign policy making and national identity structuring.

As we could see above, the emerging discursive cleavage in the recent games is one between “freedom” and “solidarity”. Both are of extensive normative consequences to the way Austrians conceptualize themselves and the “outside” world. Neutrality as “freedom” points at the self-conception that ultimately contradicts the Austrian moral space and dissociates it from the rest of the world. It is aligned with the “small state” and the “non-value” foreign policy, national uniqueness and so forth. Neutrality as “solidarity” puts Austrians on an equal footing with Western civilisation, with everything that it goes along with it, including the common “radical-Islamist” threat perception, enforcement of particular values throughout the world and so on.

As any other human agency, these games are expressions of needs largely irrespective of the values claimed, and are used as a tool of more or less conscious attempts to align and identify Austrian society to historically particular social relations and a political order. By carefully examining these discursive games we can see the considerable indeterminacy and irrelevance of both.

This reflexive enterprise is, according to critical social theory, more valuable than the reification of the discursive practices by designing them as an objective scientific knowledge. It can open up space for communicating other modes of “goodness”, modes that have been neutralized by the prevalent discourse.

CHALLENGES TO CRITICAL STANCE

A significant problem is posed by those more radical critical theorists (with whom the author of this essay more or less identifies) who assert that even this interpretative and reflexive approach to social reality tends to reify the object of study (e. g. Campbell, 1996). Moreover, it presupposes that there are
some “closed spaces” prior to the analysis that can be “opened up”, which to a certain respect undermines the anti-realist stance. The only possible way out for the moderate critical camp is simply to commit to the emancipatory and reflexive task of knowledge (Dryzek, 1987: 657; Linklater, 2002), while acknowledging the risk of “reifying by understanding” (which is, in a way, unavoidable). It seems worthy of the attempt. By analyzing the discursive process, and by focusing at its context, contents, strategies, means and forms of realisation one should be able to point at those modes of thought and knowledge and find the ones that the authors of the discourse are attempting to marginalise. At least in some respects this approach can be understood as the inversion of the realist stance that a priori takes social reality as given and knowledge of it as independent.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the first part I have showed that the mainstream scholarship – no matter of which vein – has either unquestionably adopted the political line of argumentation or stood helpless vis-à-vis any substantial change to it. In the second part I have argued that the reason for this failure principally stems from false epistemological presuppositions which are followed by unattainable demands. Recently, mainstream scholarship has accepted some ontologically ideational elements but it displays no signs of moving towards an interpretative epistemology. In other words, it seeks casual explanation of the relationship between foreign policy – identity – neutrality.

For this causal relationship to work, it is necessary to take the nature of the meanings attached to a given social phenomenon as fixed. If not, the belief that one can arrive at a successful explanation by employing “ideas” (as an objective causal factor) is entirely groundless. Different meaning attached to the same phenomenon will result in a different manner of behaviour (note that this logic is one of the defining functionary principles for those committed to ontological idealism in the social science). As a result, the entire causal explanatory construction will blow-up.

What is even more important for this construction is the epistemological realism. A scientist using the above depicted research strategy must believe that the concepts he/she is employing in order to explain certain phenomenon have their tangible counterpart somewhere in reality. He/she must believe that there are tangible “kinds” in the world and that he/she has direct access to them. In other words, he/she must be convinced that his/her concepts and their nature are not only (inter)subjectively developed ideas about a certain (inter)subjectively selected object, nor that they are only linguistic instruments springing from the specific (inter)subjectively shared social context (discourse). If this epistemologically realist conviction does not hold, the scientist can never hope to arrive at nothing even remotely resembling an objective causal explanation.

Instead of claiming to provide an “objective account” and an explanation of reality it is suggested to start from the assumption that knowledge is always socially constructed. Thus, observers would do better to attempt to reflect upon the construction and effect of knowledge (Linklater, 2002: 276) and through it to reflect the discursive context related to it. It seems that after
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roughly fifteen years we are facing another major change in the realm of the Austrian conception of neutrality (a move toward neutrality “re-discovered”). An attempt to understand the process of change by pointing at the various ways in which, the ultimate moral imperatives are constructed and their oppositions neutralised. This seems to be acute and, above all, an extremely tempting and challenging task, particularly with regard to the important role different conceptions of “goodness” play in shaping world politics.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BZÖ – (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich) – Alliance for the Future of Austria
EC – European Communities
EEC – European Economic Community
EFTA – European Free Trade Association
ESDP – European Security and Defense Policy
FPÖ – (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs) – Freedom Party of Austria
ÖVP – (Österreichische Volkspartei) – Austrian People’s Party
SPÖ – (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs) – Social Democratic Party of Austria
UN – United Nations
VÖI – (Vereinigung Österreichischer Industrieller) – Federation of Austrian Industrialists

ENDNOTES

1 Instead of studying the linguistic system and its functional semantic potential per se, Vienna School of Critical Discourse Analysis focuses at establishing “the linguistic relations between specific linguistic subsystems and social structures” (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart, 2003).

2 Since there is a great many accounts of “rationalism” within IR it is necessary to clarify the meaning this term bears throughout this essay. It can be started by stating, what is not meant by rationalism herein: it is neither rationalism in the pure philosophical and epistemological sense neither is it its offspring within the IR theories, that is rationalism as envisaged by the English school (which holds that states can agree on certain common interests and values as a way to support more peaceful international relations). Rationalism as understood here refers to various formal and informal applications of rational choice theory to IR questions, or, broadly speaking, to any scientific exercise in explaining foreign policy by reference to goal-seeking behavior (Fearon and Wendt, 2005: 54, see also Snidal, 2005 and George, 1994: 98–107).

3 In the realm of IR it is mostly argued that, as of states, the “good” is fabricated around the spatial elements (Walker, 1995). According to Simon Dalby, “geopolitical discourse constructs worlds in terms of Self and Others, in terms of cartographically specifiable sections of political space, and in terms of military threats” (quoted in Burchill–Devetak, 2001: 198). It was this “spatial” discourse that has for many years been subjected to a fierce criticism on the part of critical IR scholars (Ashley, 1987; 2002; Linklater, 2002).

However, there exists very different account of discursively, ones which involves constructing “good” as a “moral space”. People inhabit moral spaces – “domains within which the ethical consequences of actions achieve a place within familiar public discourses” and these discourses can be identified “within a nation-state geopolitical imaginary” (Shapiro, 1998: 696). Spatial exclusion is in this case coded in moral terms (Campbell, 1996: 81) leading to “moral geographies” (Shapiro,
The question that bridges both practices could be, according to Richard Devetak, posed this way: “how (...) cartographic boundaries serve to represent, limit and legitimate a political identity (...) how, through which political practices and representations are boundaries inscribed?” (Burchill and Devetak, 2001: 197).

The full title of the Act is: “Constitutional Law on the Permanent Neutrality of the Republic of Austria”.

The relevant parts of the Act is as follows:

a) “For the purpose of the permanent maintenance of its external independence and for the purpose of the inviolability of its territory Austria, on its own free will, declares herewith its permanent neutrality. Austria will maintain and defend it with all means at its disposal.

b) In order to secure these purposes Austria will never in the future accede to any military alliances nor permit the establishment of military bases of foreign States on its territory” (Cit. from Zeimanek, 1961).

This particular statement was made in context of debate over full Austrian membership in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

The article was finished just weeks before the Neutrality Act was adopted and declared.

It is well known that throughout the sixties there has been an extensive debate about strengthening the relationship between EFTA and EEC. This debate was even more accelerated after Great Britain made her voice for the EEC membership. The most promising way how to solve this was an Association treaty. The Soviets strongly rejected the idea, however, for a long time, most of the international law professionals and politicians kept arguing that “association” is compatible with the broad status of neutrality. (See Gehler, 2002a: 208–253; for important and illustrative documents see Gehler, 2002b: 213–425).

This (re)invention of such a broad interpretation of the State treaty was very much conformable with the Soviet line of argumentation (Hakovirta, 1983) yet, it is not entirely clear whether the Soviet position was so unalterable and resolute as it used to be depicted (see Kux, 1990). Some recent works (probably in order to evoke a semblance of pro-European orientation’s continuity in Austrian politics) asserts that “Austria have never accepted Soviet argumentation regarding incompatibility of the State treaty and ... membership in the EEC” (Pelinka, 2000: 77). These assertions stand in stark opposition to the evidence of the period in question and can serve as another example of discursive nature of treating the neutrality/identity issues.

In fact, those who first came with the idea of Austria as a first victim of Nazi terror were not to be found among Austrians themselves. Instead, it was firstly explicitly and publicly expressed on behalf of Allies in the Moscow Declaration of 1943. It has been lately argued that the reason for this declaration was to awake and provoke an anti-Nazi movement among Austrians. However, E. Timms was probably right when asking who or what was to be awoken in order to restore the independence of Austria? (Timms, 1998: 48; see also Burr-Bukey, 2000).

According to findings of Ernst Brückmüller, it was the SPÖ (aside from the traditional pan-German moods as they were expressed among the adherents of the German-liberal Lager) that was only reluctantly to accept the idea of a distinct Austrian nationhood. Eloquently, Karl Renner (SPÖ), the first post-war Chancellor, was well known for his pan-German and pro-Anschluss attitude. He expressed himself very clearly in Die Gründung der Republik Österreich, a pamphlet from the summer 1938 justifying the Anschluss. It is no coincidence that this work was not published until 1990. (For more see e. g. Stourzh, 1995: 301–310.)

This view was held earlier than in 1980’s and flowed from an Abhaltstrategie (deterring or dissuading strategy) that was in fact also common to other European neutrals like Switzerland, Sweden or Finland (see Dänikar, 1992). This strategy its clearest expression in the Austrian National Defense Plan of 1985 found.

The VÖI, The most important Austrian private-sector organization representing the interests of the majority of large-scale private industries, deeply adhered to the idea of EC-accession. As an actor of the Austrian Sozialpartnerschaft and thus of the entire Proport (connected mostly to the ÖVP) it was able to considerably influence the governmental orientation in favor of EC-membership. (See Gehler, 2002a: 280–292.)

Hummer and Schweitzer (1987: 286) supported their claim by pointing at the 1966 Luxembourg Compromise which de facto stipulated a possibility of veto when ‘important national interest’ is at stake. It was argued that neutrality could be proclaimed as a matter of “national interest”, therefore the EC-membership would not endanger Austria’s neutrality commitments.

Note that this argumentation took place before the Cold war was over despite the fact that it is usually the end of the Cold war what is held mostly responsible for the waning relevance of neutrality.
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16 During the first half of 1990’s, however, Vranitzky changed his position quite remarkably. As opposed to the above statement of the end of 1989, in the mid-1990’s Vranitzky argued for maintaining the neutral status even in the “active” Kreisky fashion. (See for example his answer to parliamentary interpellation delivered on the July 7th 1996/file No. 9893, on-line: www.parlament.gv.at/portal.)

17 This state of affairs is manifest even in the official Austrian foreign policy yearbooks of 1988–1990 as they could not hide the extremely incremental nature of dealing with the most pressing issues (Aussenpolitisches Jahrbuch 1988–1990, see also Vranitzky, 1992).

18 In a telling remark Hanspeter Neuhold (1998: 206) asserted that Austrian foreign policy towards the Soviet bloc countries could be described as “drilling small holes to the Iron Curtain”.

19 This was an extremely biting remark (made in relation to the arms control process) since the struggle to present neutrality as an internationally recognized and, indeed, chanted feature of the Austrian republic was one of the cornerstones of its identity.

20 It is certainly not that this attitude was peculiar to Austria. On the contrary, a rather reserved and dispassionate sentiment towards neutrality has emerged in the beginning of 1990s both in the broadest theoretical and analytical reflection of foreign and security policy issues (see Neuhold, 1992; Cox–Mac Ginty, 1996) and in assessments and analyses of particular policies of various neutral countries throughout Europe (see e. g. Huldt, 1992; Fanning, 1996; Ojanen–Herolf–Lindahl, 2000).

21 Despite verbal efforts of both prime candidates (Benita Ferrero-Waldner /FPÖ/ and H. Fischer) the question of neutrality developed itself into one of the principal issues of the 2004 presidential elections.

22 The quest for NATO membership was for a long time one of the FPÖ’s defining features. (Kořan, 2003: 106) However, in the hands of the very recent “echte” FPÖ, neutrality is treated as an indispensable guarantee of freedom which is – according to the party’s program and legacy “the highest good”. As the October parliamentary elections get nearer neutrality and freedom is with an ever increasing force presented as standing in dichotomical opposition to the Austrian dependence on the EU. This point that was also largely emphasized in the FPÖ’s campaign “Österreich bleibt frei”.

23 H. Neuhold (2003: 17) linked “re-discovery” of neutrality to the NATO air-strikes against Yugoslavia in 1999 and to “Operation Iraqi Freedom” in 2003. Popularity of NATO among Austrians has substantially suffered after these events. Therefore and the governing parties “which considered neutrality obsolete and called for NATO membership in the past, are refraining at present from proposals to abandon Austria’s neutral status for the fear of playing into the hands of the SPÖ”.

24 BZÖ is a junior coalition party founded as a result of secession from FPÖ by some of FPÖ’s most prominent members (among others by Jörg Haider, Ursula Haubner, and Hubert Gorbach) in early April 2005.

25 From the very beginning in 2003 Austria participated in the ESDP missions as these were not conceived as posing any problem for the question of neutrality. However, it should be also noted that Austria took a very active part in efforts of other non-aligned EU-members to make ESDP at least minimally compatible with their neutral status (see Ėnoss-Attali, 2005).

26 This is exactly the official position of the ÖVP and, subsequently, that of the Austrian government (see e. g. Andreas Kohl (ÖVP’s Foreign Affairs speaker) position as of 1994 in Gehlert, 2002: 682; or recently see Hajnoczi, 2005).

27 Upon joining the EU, for example, the Austrian National Assembly added (among others) a special constitutional provision (Art. 23f) that stipulates its readiness to fully participate in the CFSP policy as stated in the Treaty on EU. This amendment is classified as altering the nature of Austrian neutrality in a rather extensive way.

28 Which, ironically, is a position that turns up-side-down the message conveyed by classical realists, such as Hans Morgenthau (Morgenthau, 1965; 1978).

29 In this regard, my approach follows the pragmatist stance as expressed among others by Richard Rorty (see e. g. Rorty, 1991)

30 It has to be noted that these scholars are not IR professionals; they primarily deal with the critical deconstruction (especially in the case of Wodak et. al) of the Austrian identity.

31 It has to be noted that author of this essay does not consent to the enlightenment-like task of science pursued by moderate habermasian critical theorist. This claim pushes this text more toward the post-modern camp of IR. However, this is a normative and not epistemological struggle, while it was the latter this essay was primarily concerned with.

32 These are the most important elements of discourse construction, according to methodology suggested by Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart, 2003: 30–47).
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CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY AND AUSTRIAN NEUTRALITY


Complex Systems —
New Conceptual Tools
for International Relations

ION CÎNDEA

Abstract: Globalization, as a social process, induces particular constraints on the analysis of peace and war. The increasing complexity of social systems can only be ignored at the cost of inefficient social intervention and a decrease in the understanding of the phenomena. The distinction between the “classical” and the “complex” system becomes an issue at the core of the epistemological debates. Non-linearity is inherent in politics, and therefore linearity assumptions do not help very much in understanding the non-linearity of the real world. In order to analyse peace and war from a complex systems perspective we need to identify the ways in which the states of peace or war can be stable attractors of the systems. The property which makes the attractors valuable for studying conflicts and peace is their emergent nature. In order to make the concept “attractor” more operational, we analyse the “degree of freedom” of the systems and the way it is diminished by the emergence of certain normative regulations. Social attractors express the limitation on the degree of freedom of the systems. The emergence of a powerful conflictual attractor in the system causes the system to return, after any perturbation, into the state of conflict. On the other hand, the emergence of pacific attractors is a condition for any stable peace. Finally, the case of the European Union is analyzed as an example of a pacific attractor that shaped the post-war European states system.

Key words: peace, war, complex systems, attractors, European Union

INTRODUCTION
Why apply a theory that originated in physics in international relations? In an article (Bernstein et al., 2000) that analysed the position of the social sciences, particularly of the science of international relations, in the framework of other scientific disciplines, the extreme difficulty to make consistent and valid predictions on the incidence of wars is considered a paradigmatic example that illustrates the explanatory weakness of theories in the field of the international relations. As the chemical or nuclear processes, wars are caused by the interactions between the underlying causes and catalysts. Although the arms race and the formation of alliances can be seen as the causes of the First World War, it was the assassination in Sarajevo that eventually triggered the conflict, i.e. the catalyst of the conflict. Even when we can identify the determinant factors, or causes, of a conflict, the effect of the catalysts, which is rather random in most of the cases, makes actual prediction of a conflict extremely difficult. This makes general statements about the causality of war highly problematic, “since we have no way of knowing what wars would have occurred in the presence of appropriate catalysts” (Bernstein et al., 2000: 47).
No single factor can be considered a unique cause for the emergence of wars. In such complex systems as the human system, concepts as cause or effect have “a dubious value” (Boulding, 1974: 31). Correlations between factors, non-linear causal relations, simultaneous processes, and critical momentary values of certain variables, usually form an incomplete and oversimplified picture of war.

Some specialists (e.g. Goertzel, 1994; Louth, 2005; Mesjasz 1988, 2006) have suggested that in order to build more applicable explanations in social sciences, it is better to approach the phenomena through the lenses of a complex systems theory, hoping that it would increase the understanding of the phenomena. It was even said that the complex system approach to the social science is a very essence of the “interdisciplinarity” concept (Bar-Yam, 1997).

The first section of the paper outlines some of the concepts of the complex system theory. The next section the paper looks at the reasons that make us consider the complex system approach appropriate to the study of international relations. In the third section, the current systemic approaches in social science and particularly in international relations are reviewed. In this section the paper focuses on the distinction between the classical systemic approach and the complex systems approach.

The fourth section develops the concept of “attractor”, trying to operationalise the term so that it is usable in social sciences and more precisely in international relations. The fifth section of the paper analyses the idea of conflicts as attractors, introducing the distinction between conflictual attractors and pacific attractors. The sixth and final section analyses the European Union as a pacific attractor, outlining a new area of research in the international relations, under the complex systems approach.

1. THEORETICAL OUTLINE

Complex system theory is not just another theory, rather it is more a general perspective of analysis (Morel and Ramanujan, 1999), a paradigm that brings new instruments into the conceptual toolkit of science of international relations. In this section, we will define some concepts of the complex systems theory that will later be used to explore the new tools that this approach can bring to the field.

We use the term complex system to denote a set of interconnected and interdependent parts. The most important features of the complex systems are interconnectedness and the emergence, i.e. the fact that the whole cannot be reduced to the sum of the components. Later in the third section the paper makes the distinction between the classical notion of system and the “complex” one. In the social field, many authors prefer to use the term “complex adaptive systems”, that refers to the capacity of a complex system to adapt and therefore to react to the challenges from the external milieu.

To approach international relations through the lenses of the complex systems paradigm we must take a look at the older idea of the level of analysis. The first time that this was used in international relations was by Kenneth N. Waltz (1959), who structured his explanatory theories of war, on three separate levels: the individuals, the state, and the states system. The number of levels of analysis that different scholars used as references were in some cas-
es even greater. An analysis (Buzan, 1983) of the concept of security also used intermediary levels that were considered useful for the research aimed at proving that sub-state communities can be considered relevant. One of the scholars that approached the society as a dynamic of complex systems, starts from the cell, then increases the aggregation to its highest level, which for him is the human civilization (Bar-Yam, 1997). The most important thing is not to de-compose a complex system into lower level complexities, or to increase the level on a scale of increasing complexity, instead we should look at the logic of the interaction and the manner in which it reaches the emergence of the phenomena. In complex systems, from the living cell to the global social system, we can essentially identify an infinity of levels of organisation. Of course, not all of them are relevant for the purpose of this paper. Although the human person as an individual can be analytically decomposed into lower level complexities, for the purpose of the present analysis – the approach to peace and war – we will consider the individual as the elementary unit of analysis. From the level of analysis point of view, the emergence is the most important property of the complex systems. From one level of analysis to another, the functioning of the component parts is not sufficient to describe the behaviour of the next level. An organ is not just the sum of a few thousands of cells, as the functioning of every component cell, taken separately, is not enough to explain the behaviour of the whole tissue. As Bar-Yam pointed out, the emergence is the property that forces us to approach complex systems with the prerequisite of multiscale complexity, that is, assume complexity at all levels. In this sense, the complex system theory is a useful tool to bridge the micro-macro gap in social science (Goldspink and Kay, 2004).

To analyse peace and war from a complex systems perspective means to identify the way the states of peace or war can be stable attractors of the systems.

The concept of attractor emerged in the mathematical analysis of complex systems (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984) that showed that some behaviour was more likely in the system than other behaviours. Even seemingly chaotic behaviour could reveal, after a large enough number of iterations, some behavioural pattern which appears to be stable. Non-determination is not complete, and the chaos disguises a certain order, even if it is difficult to visualise or to intuitively represent it. The graphic representations of states of a complex system – iterative maps, in mathematical language – illustrate in many cases the existence of a certain order behind the apparent chaos (Bar-Yam, 1997). After a sufficiently high number of iterations, some points or regions of the iterative map seem to be repeating, in essence they are fixed. In terms of systems behaviour analysis, the fixed points are states that tend to attract the parameters of the systems, no matter what the intermediary states are. The system behaves in such a way that the fixed points attract its states. The system has, in essence, certain preferred states. There is a basin of attraction that consists of all the states of the system that will naturally move towards the attractor points.

An analysis (Skyrms, 1992) of systems’ behaviour, founded on game theory analysis, concluded that in the dynamics of social systems, the attractors are better explanatory concepts than the equilibrium. The property that makes
the attractors valuable for studying conflicts and peace is their emergent nature. The conflict is not an event, but a process. In the systems, the attractors emerge as self-generative and self-maintained processes. The attractors are useful in explaining the way in which the conflict occurs but also to explain the manner in which the complex systems remain in the state of conflict. Under this conceptual framework, the issue of conflict solving refers to changing the dynamics of the system from the conflictual state to a non-conflictual stable state, that is, from containing conflictual attractors to containing non-conflictual (pacific) ones. The long term approach is important: if these attractors can be identified and properly described, then it is possible that more pragmatic and effective theories for maintaining peace in social systems can be formulated and tested.

The complex systems approach is situated at the border between the nomothetic and idiographic science. In international relations, this approach is placed at the boundary between constructivism and structural realism, contributing to the agent-structure debate in international relations (see Buzan, Little and Jones, 1993). Although many analyses of the complex systems are quantitative, our approach is qualitative in nature. This does not exclude more quantitatively oriented approaches in the future, as the mathematical apparatus of complex systems theory will be doubled by properly operationable concepts.

2. WHY COMPLEX SYSTEMS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS?

At the beginning of the new millennium, the theory of international relations finds itself in the situation of having remained tributary to an obsolete conceptual system. The nation-state, the main reference point of the dominant paradigm in the international relations, is now seen as an insufficient concept for describing a world which is experiencing an accelerated process of globalization. The borders of states are becoming more and more permeable, almost to their dissolution, and military power cannot by itself secure a state’s survival. Globalisation, reflexivity of object studied, and the social indeterminism principle are the main arguments in favour of a complex system approach of the international reality.

The need to refresh the conceptual means of international relations is illustrated by the globalization phenomena, the increasing interdependency between still partial understandable phenomena and other less predictable ones. The metaphor of the butterfly that, at the flapping of its wings, unleashes a hurricane in another part of the globe becomes less a simple metaphor and instead it illustrates the non-linearity of the social domain. As Urry (2002) stressed, September 11 shows the limitation of the linear approach to the global reality.

Globalization, as a social process, induces particular constraints in the analysis of peace and war. The increasing complexity of social systems can only be ignored at the cost of inefficient social intervention and a decrease in the understanding of the phenomena. At the same time, the conceptual toolkit of contemporary international relations proves itself inefficient both on the level of the explanatory and the action dimension, confirming the inadequacy of the theoretical framework as a premise for action in the increasing complexity of the social reality.
In social research we are ready to calculate correlations between dependent and independent variables. We can even calculate the proportion in which the variation of one influences the variation of the others. By this logic, we ignore the intercorrelations between elements and variables, and the reality that they co-evolve leading to the emergence of new phenomena. The project “Correlates of war”, probably the biggest effort to systemise empirical data about a large number of wars in history did not really have impressive results at the level of theoretical development (Singer and Small, 1972; Small and Singer, 1985). When referring to humans a complex adaptive system also has the capacity of self-reference. This is the consequence of the self-reproduction of the systems. “As part of the structure of the human nervous system, it is possible for humans to generate a domain of ‘self’ or to become self-conscious. This is referred to as reflexivity” (Goldspink and Kay, 2003: 462).

The collapse of the Soviet empire, an event that was not predicted by any analyst of the time, also raises questions on the non-linearity phenomena in the social sciences. Forty years ago, Stanley Hoffman (1965: 134) compared international relations with a huge casino roulette game, where some families get more or less rich, depending of the stakes and into which pocket the ball lands. At certain moments, some families are eliminated, new ones enter the game, but at no time does the game itself stop.

The situation was properly synthesised by Steven Bernstein et al. (2000: 51): “The more people think that they understand the environment in which they operate, the more they attempt to manipulate it to their advantage. Such behaviour can relatively quickly change the environment and the rules that appear to govern it, possibly to the detriment of all those involved.”

“Few political scientists would deny the fact that the political systems are complex” – wrote Bruner and Brewer (1971: 84). At the same time, few of them would deny that we, as humans, have only a limited capacity to understand the political systems as wholes. The relevance of both assertions makes it necessary to display caution when approaching any of the social and political systems.

In physics, the principle of indeterminism formulated by Heisenberg (1930) referred to the difficulties in precisely measuring certain phenomena, as any operation of measure is conditioned by an exchange of energy between the object and the instrument of measure. This interaction, subject-object, made it impossible to ever get a totally accurate measurement, with the errors being very significant in the field of quantum physics. In fact, the analogy between physics and the social sciences, a desire of the founding fathers of sociology, can be functional if we refer to the field of quantum physics, but much less applicable if we expect an analogy with classical mechanics, with more rigid laws and very high probabilities.

The same law concerning the two-way relationship between subject and object can also be used when dealing with society. The social indeterminism principle is founded on the rationality and the conscience of the individuals. A physics theory, be it right or wrong, concerning the way a particle behaves, has no effect whatsoever on the actual behaviour of the particle, as it has not been proved so far that the particles have any consciousness. In some ways things are similar in social sciences, but there are a few marked differences.
The knowledge of social science has, if disseminated, consequences at the social level, influencing the social reality. The consciousness of people is a factor that decreases the possibility of making accurate predictions, as the self-altering prophecies affect the system in the same way the presence of the observer and the measuring device influence the position of the particle. The rationalness and consciousness of human behaviour along with social aggregation decrease the possibility of predictions. The analogy between social processes and chemical ones is a simplifying one. Unlike people, molecules or particles have no memory, consciousness or capacity to learn.

A public statement about the imminent insolvency of a bank, be it real or not, can bring about a real crash, if the depositors withdraw their money. A self-fulfilling prophecy, as sociologists describe it, is a paradigmatic example of the distinction between the science of nature (e.g. classical physics) and the field of social sciences. In the case of social science, some analysts even exclude the possibility of making accurate predictions.

When he wrote that the consumer does not expect his dinner from the bakers’ or grocers’ benevolence, but from their tendency to follow their own interest, Adam Smith was referring to what sociologists would later name “aggregation effects”. In the same way, two queues in front of two ticket booths will tend to be equal not because of anybody’s intentional action or any imposed rule, but because of the wish of people to wait the shortest amount of time.

Smith needed the concept of an “invisible hand” to explain the regulatory role of market forces. Later, sociologists brought into discussion the “aggregation systems” to express the way in which individual actions are composed at the level of collectivities. The term effets pervers explains in the logic of actions that undesired or unforeseen results are the results of aggregation logic. A more neutral term “aggregation effects” covers essentially two categories of unintended consequences, classified as “weak” or “strong” forms, that are or are not predictable by the actors involved (Linares, 2003). The partially (at best) predictability of behaviour of human aggregates cause the analysts to find more effective theories in order to better explain society. In this the systems theory, and later, the updated complex systems theory are particularly useful.

To summarise, there are two main arguments for using a complex systems approach in international relations. Firstly, it can help to better frame a reality that is highly complex by its own nature. The intrinsic complexity of the field of human interaction allows us to hope that a paradigm that accepts complexity at all levels will be useful in explaining the phenomena. Secondly, as we already showed, the contemporary world’s complexity is increasing, and the assumed complexity at all levels is able to bring new insights in to the field.

3. SYSTEMATIC APPROACHES IN SOCIAL SCIENCE AND TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The systemic approaches in social analysis precede the explicit formulation of systemic theory as such. For instance, the discussion about the social equilibrium is a much older idea. Malthus performed a systemic theory avant la
When he analysed (1963) the intrinsic disequilibrium between the geometrical progression of population and the arithmetical progression of the means of subsistence. The excessive increase of the populations related to the possibilities of the environment to support them is prevented, as he believed, by self-regulation mechanisms: the emergence of vices, wars and epidemics. War, in Malthusian vision, was part of a great plan of Nature, the unstoppable effect of natural laws, very similar to gravity.

Launched by Bertalanffy (1968), the systemic approach quickly became a preferred paradigm for many specialists, particularly because of its high adaptiveness to different situations, whether in technical matters or social life. The isomorphism between the technical and social systems, previously suggested by the systemists, brought the hope of surpassing the excessive disciplinary fragmentation of the sciences. Beside the analysis of social and natural entities, systemic thought allowed the design of highly predictable technical devices.

As von Bertalanffy pointed out (1968: 38), general system theory had as purpose to highlight the tendency of integration between the natural and social sciences and to help the formulation of exact (i.e., mathematical) theories in non-physical fields of science. Moreover, it was expected that the theory would bring about the unification of the scientific disciplines. This idea was not entirely new; Comte hoped that industrial society will be lead by scholars, while “social physics” (see Bagehot, 2001) that emerged at the end of the 19th century, expressed the profound faith that humankind was following a road towards rationality. At its beginnings, the systems theory seemed to be the most appropriate theoretical instrument of this progress (Laszlo, 1972b).

a) Realists’ “international system”

For the representatives of the Realist paradigm of International Relations, the notion of system denotes a power configuration, more or less stable, that are the result and structural expression of a balance of forces. When talking about the international system, the Realists were mainly referring to the relations between different powers, the system being equivalent to the power configuration, as the interactions of individual agents influence in a certain manner the actions of each individual agent. An article belonging to Kaplan (1957), for instance, was focused on the structure of the world system itself, analysing the stability of the “balance of power” system in comparison to “bipolarity”. This macro-level approach set out to prove that the Realists’ “international system” is nothing but a fashionable concept that was adapted to a paradigm that considered that things were clear theoretically. Paradoxically, for the Realist, the concept is emptied of its systemic content. Morgenthau, for instance, considered that equilibrium is an essential dimension of the social system (1967: 163). However, if we are prepared to admit, even theoretically, that not all the elements of a system are necessary for its survival, then the discussion of concepts as “equilibrium” or “balance” in terms of stability is but an intellectual exercise. If we look at European history from the perspective of some actors (e.g. Poland), the notion of equilibrium did not prevent them from disappearing from the map or at least from losing parts of their territory.
b) Reconciliation: Structural Realism

The representatives of Structural Realism (Waltz, 1979; Buzan, Little and Jones, 1993) try to reconcile classical realism with the notion of the system. In this approach, the system is composed of units, but also includes the interactions between the units as well as its structure, all these must be taken into consideration when designing the actions of any actor. Gilpin, for example, developed (1981) a systemic model that associates the equilibrium to peace and the disequilibrium with war. In his model, peace and war are part of the processes that govern stability and change in the international system. In his approach, the structure of the international system, a certain power configuration – not exactly a conceptual innovation – is stable to the extent to which unequal development produces an increase in the power of certain marginal actors that can endanger the position of the dominant actors. The disequilibrium emerges when an economical, political, or technological development increases the benefits or decreases the costs of the revisionist actors’ attempts to change the structure of the system. The discrepancy between the structural configuration and the real power distribution is the factor that produces a systemic crisis that generates the systemic change and the restoration of the equilibrium through its restructuring. This process is similar to the homeostasis of the human organism; the overheating of the system generates a feed-back reaction that lowers the temperature. War shapes the system’s structure at a particular moment. The hierarchy of power, prestige, and the distribution of territory are dependent on the successful use of potential power, ultimately of war. It is impossible to accurately evaluate this power without the test of military confrontation, though this has the precise function of shaping the power and prestige hierarchies in the international system. As Gilpin concluded, the hegemonic war is the main mechanism of systemic change in international relations that mark the start of a new cycle of development and expansion.

c) Peace and war as equilibria

Another model that analyses peace and war in terms of social equilibrium belongs to Boulding (1978). For the American economist, the interaction of two human systems can be placed on a scale with two extremes states: peace and war. To explain the phase transition from peace to war, Boulding needs two variables: strain and strength. The ratio between these two variables determines the transition of the systems from peace to war. If the strain of the peace system is bigger than the peace strength then the transition from peace to war occurs. Likewise, if the strain of the system is bigger than its war strength, the system transits from war to peace.

A stable peace or a stable war are, in Boulding’s model, equally stable and equally probable. Unstable peace or war are the intermediate states, the dialectic of the ratio strain / strength makes the system prone to rapid and frequent transition cycles, dominated by one of the states.

Boulding’s composite variables are rather abstract. The static variables that express the strain refer to the image of the past, professionalisation of the conflict, political structure and the prevalent social ethos. The arms race, the repression race, economic, and demographic processes, differences in growth, but also the way the conflict itself is perceived, are the descriptive variables
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of the strain. The strength is described by variables, such as, the memories of the past, the professional specialisation of those that are involved in the conflicts, the functionality of diplomacy, the growth of traffic and communication networks, and the economic interdependence. All those are factors strengthen the system, increasing its resistance to strains.

Boulding’s composite variables are quite abstract, but more important is the fact that they are rather ambivalent: some factors are mentioned both as increasing strain, and as increasing strength.

The two systemic models share the common focus on the economic dimension. They translate the theories of the economic cycles of growth and decline to the peace-war alternation.

d) From “system” to “complex system”

In 1990 Kaufman announced the birth of a new “science of complexity”, expressing his hope that it will transform both the biology and the social sciences. It was recently pointed out (Mesjasz, 1988) that the latest developments in systemic theories – especially those that discuss complexity as a fundamental feature of social systems – reveal numerous interdependences in the social world and also promise new research avenues.

To add to a system the attribute “complex” is not a simple semantic exercise. Bertalanffy himself defined his general system as “a complex of interacting elements” (1968: 55). Through this definition, he considered the systems to be a priori complex, but the complexity in this case was not a feature of the system; it rather results from the structures and hierarchies, and the sense is that of “complicatedness”. A machine composed of a large number of interacting and hierarchically organised parts was considered complex, though such a machine was just complicated, as the parts are interacting in a strictly deterministic fashion. On the other hand, the complex systems (e.g. the weather) involve not only a large number of components, but also nonlinear interactions and emergence.

This idea was also expressed by Jervis, who wrote that “we are dealing with a system when a set of units or elements are interconnected so that changes in some elements or their relations produce changes in other parts of the system, and the entirety exhibits properties and behaviours that are different from those of the parts” (Jervis, 1997–1998: 570). The systemic theory, itself, was considered the answer to the need to order and to optimize a world in which the disciplinary fragmentation was not efficient in helping us to understand it, a world in which the network interaction begin to increase exponentially.

The distinction between the “classical” and the “complex” system is an issue that animates a considerable part of the epistemological debates of our time. The first attempts to use the complex systems approach was to model chemical reactions or to make accurate weather predictions. Terms such as chaos or catastrophes bring into the field of science irregularity or unpredictability, shaping the way to scientific acceptability and respectability of non-linear phenomena and to similar approach in the field of biology or the social sciences. The difference that the complex systems brings to analysis is the adaptive character of biologic or social communities, their capacity to
co-operate in achieving certain objectives, and their capacity (especially of
the human communities) to build technical tools to adapt themselves to the
external environment. To describe this we use the concept “complex adaptive
systems”. But, if some chemical reactions seemed complex, the notion “com-
plex system” is really comes to the forefront by its use in the social field.
Complexity is an upgrade of the paradigm, as the “classical” systemic ap-
proach showed its limits in analysing social entities. The notion of complexity,
as Nicolis and Prigogine pointed out, refers to evolving systems, in which
history plays an important role in their behaviour (1989: 36).

The simplifying assumption “ceteris paribus”, is the basis of the expres-
sion of causal relations in social science, which are then dissolved to a reality
to continual movement and evolution. The analysts hoped that through the
causality, which reminds the mechanics and the “laws of nature”, we are able
to explain everything (Allen, 1989). The classical causality can explain many
things, but it proved incapable of explaining evolution. The social reality re-
fuses often to conform to the schematically and static models of the analysts,
and the understanding of this fact is probably one of the most important ele-
ments of the complexity theory. In systems “we can never do merely one thing” (Jervis, 1997–1998: 570), and this assertion proves its truth if we refer
to social systems.

In the field of international relations, the first acceptance of the term “com-
plex systems” refers to the international system itself. The interconnectedness
and the interdependence between the components and the variables that de-
scribe the components has for a long time been emphasised. Even the debates
between the paradigms, i.e. different frameworks of analysis of the interna-
tional reality, can be in itself an argument in this sense. The second accep-
tance refers to the components of the international system that can, in their
turn, be analysed as complex systems. The most used example by interna-
tional relations scholars, the state is a good image for what we call “com-
plexity”, if only because the interactions between the components (firms, dif-
ferent social groups, the powers of the state) create unique configurations of
a dynamic character. Different sub-state groups, for instance ethnic groups,
can also be analysed as complex systems. This makes the paradigm very use-
ful in analysing internal conflicts (ethnic or otherwise). Social aggregations at
a lower level can also be analysed as a complex system.

There are important qualitative distinctions between different levels of ag-
gregation, from the chemical systems to human civilization. There are, of
course, relevant distinctions between the biological and physical systems. If
when we talk about the level of indeterminacy, the physical and biological (or
social) systems face certain similarities, one of the distinctions refers to the
degree of equilibrium of the systems. The physical systems tend to equilibri-
um, that is states characterised by high levels of probability or to the lowest
degrees of organisation (maximum entropy). On the other hand, biological
systems behave differently. Concepts as organization, wholeness, directivity,
teleology and differentiation are not useful for physicists, situating the bio-
logical and social system in the category of that far-from-equilibrium (Berta-
lanffy, 1968: 34).
Another important element that distinguished the biological and physical or chemical systems is their relation to their environment and the way it alters their behaviour. The physical or chemical systems are analysed as “closed systems”, in the sense that their relation to the external milieu is irrelevant, the exchange with the environment being only a matter of exchange of energy. In closed systems, the final state is determined by the initial conditions, and the system evolves, according to the second principle of thermodynamics, towards the state of maximum entropy. Living systems, on the other hand, are in a permanent state of exchange of matter and energy with the environment, but they are able, between certain limits, to function independently of the changes in their environment. In a potentially hostile environment, the organism needs homeostasis in order to keep its vital processes stable. The animals, for instance, keep their body temperature constant even in conditions where the external temperature varies. The anti-entropic mechanisms that function in the case of living organisms are cybernetic processes of negative reactions that are energetically maintained by metabolic processes (Laszlo, 1972a). Even when far from the equilibrium state, living systems are relatively stable in relation to the environment.

Non-linearity is inherent in politics, and our linearity-founded assumptions do not help us much in dealing with this non-linearity (Hoffmann and Riley, 2002). This is basically the reason why the complex systems approach can make our research more in touch with reality. Hoffmann and Riley also stressed that the approach will not become popular until it reaches a more important empiric dimension. This is what the paper looks at in the next section.

It is quite logical for analysts to hope to get to the causes of war. If one can identify the cause (or causes) of war, one could at the same time, at least in theory, avoid it by removing the respective cause. In the particular case of the science of international relations, the ultimate purpose of mainstream (positivistic) research programs is to be aware of the mechanisms of the international system, so that the decisions made by statesmen and by bureaucracies that manage the external relations of the states can be the correct ones. Beyond the inherent satisfaction of any intellectual work, the implicit pragmatism of the field imposes certain requirements. At the beginnings of the discipline, the link between theory and policy was explicit, and the purpose of the research, which was also explicit, was to build a better world, by removing the scourge of war (Burchill et al., 2001: 87). These hopes were fuelled by the first positivistic approaches of international relations and of decision-making in international relations. In order to fulfil such a policy-oriented purpose, a minimum of operationalisation is necessary.

4. ATTRACTORS – FROM METAPHORS TO OPERATIONALISATION

Attractors were used more as metaphors than as rigorously defined concepts. We will try to operationalise the concept in order to make it more applicable in social science, specifically in international relations.

From the complexity theory point of view, the attractors are the effects and not the causes, although they may appear similar to gravitational centres (Cramer, 1993). They can be compared to the eye of a tornado: it is not the cause of the movement of the air, but the air is moving towards it.
While attempting to elaborate a general theory of social equilibrium, we can describe three types of attractors (Fararo, 1993): the stable attractors – the stable states of the system (fixed points) and the cyclical attractors (representing the situations in which the system repeats periodically different states) are the easiest to analyse. The attractors that were named “strange” by mathematicians (see Nicolis and Prigogine, 1989) are associated with chaos and are more interesting from the mathematical point of view. In some ways, they can be considered cyclical attractors with a very long cyclical pattern, which does not make them easier to predict. From the point of view of the social theories, the first two types of attractors seem easier to analyse. To build valid nonlinear explanations in international relations, that are useful for policy-oriented works, we cannot analyse a concept like peace as an unpredictable state, or as a momentary one; the stable attractors of the social systems are, from our point of view, the most relevant. An attractor is not necessarily a fixed point, representing an invariable state of the system. In social systems, the attractors can also represent a collection of states, or a cluster of possibilities.

In isolated (e.g. physical) systems, the equilibrium state appears as an attractor for the far-from-equilibrium states. The tendency of increase of entropy in thermodynamical systems, revealed by the second principle of thermodynamics, expresses the existence of a maximum entropy state as the attractor of the system (as in Figure 1). The intuitive image of the states of a complex system is represented by a landscape with hills and valleys; the lower a point is situated, the more stable is the state it represents.

Any change in the system’s state (towards B or C) takes a certain amount of energy from outside the system and therefore such changes can only be temporary. As soon as the energy influence from the outside environment stops, the system will evolve by itself towards the state of maximum entropy (point A in figure 1), i.e. the attractor of the system.

In the case of an open system (including the social system), the attractors are not simply the result of the general laws of the physics. In social systems, the factors that shape the emergence of certain attractors in the systems function along different dimensions. Composite concepts as “energy” were considered useful for operationalising them, but a consensus is still far from being achieved by researchers.

In mathematical systems, the attractors are the result of random factors. In social systems, the randomness is no less important, but the (at least partial) consciousness of human behaviour should help, at least in theory, to make the attractors more easily identifiable.

The attractor functions if there is a basin of attraction, i.e. it requires the existence of certain forces inside the system which return its state towards the attractor when perturbed (as long as the perturbation is not as big as to surpass the limits of the basin of attraction). The fundamental distinction between closed and open systems seem to be that as the former have only one attractor, which is the highest probable state, while the later (the living systems being a very good example) are maintained in function by the emergence of far-from-thermodynamic-equilibrium attractors. In living systems, the perturbations start the feed-back mechanisms, bringing the system back to the attractor. If the limits of the basin of attraction are surpassed, the system
leaves the limits of the functioning of the living system, and the system evolves towards another attractor: in the thermodynamical equilibrium. Essentially, the attractors are the results of a set of convergent processes, which induce a dynamic self-generative process, the result of a “structural conspiracy” (Goertzel, 1994).

**Figure 1: The attractor as the equilibrium state of the closed system**

![Diagram of attractors](image)

In complex social systems two or more attractors can be identified, each of which have their own basin of attraction. In Figure 2, the points A, B and C represent the attractors of the system. They are not identical; some of them have a larger basin of attraction, or are more stable than others.

The movement of the system from the stable state A to the stable state B actually represents the movement of the system from the basin of attraction of the attractor A towards the basin of attraction of the attractor B, through the point E. Intuitively, an attractor is similar to the flood plain of a river which attracts surplus water in the case of a flood, in essence the water floods toward the points which have the lowest potential energy. The realisation of different attractors is possible by intervention into the system; building a new channel is a way of accessing the basin of attraction of another attractor.

In the social systems, it is the *sociality* factor which shapes new attractors, and which refers to the subordination of individuals to the norms. In the case of social systems, the aspirations of actors are important; they generate certain expectations and influence the actions of the actors towards their fulfilment. Social action is shaped by aspiration, but also by social norms – behavioural prescriptions that the system’s conservation impose.

The attractors can have a generative role, as far as they are the source of aggregation processes. The model of Axelrod and Bennett (1993) illustrates this. Shaping a theory of aggregation of the human systems, the Axelrod and Bennett model considered it essential that there is a tendency of two nations to be on the same side in the event of a conflict. This tendency of the two nations is considered symmetrical and is analysed on pairs of states. The shaping of multi-state aggregations can be analysed for all possible variants of
grouping. It is obvious that not all the possibilities are equally beneficial for all the components of the system. One can calculate the frustration generated by each combination for each of the countries, and the sum of the frustrations, taken together within the dimension of each country, express the energy that can be associated to each of the possible configurations – a measure of the aggregated frustration. An energetic map can then be built from the points that unite the level of energy of each of the configuration, revealing the point with a minimal energy level, towards which any evolving state of the system, respectively the points with minimal aggregated frustration, tend to move.

Applying the model they looked at the international situation prior to WWII. Axelrod and Bennett considered the European states of that period as entry variables of the system and built an energetic map of the interaction between the European states in 1937, two years before the outbreak of the Second World War. The calculations revealed that two of the possible configurations of the alliances, with the lowest aggregated frustrations, had Germany and the Soviet Union in different camps. Moreover, one of them was extremely similar to the actual configuration of the alliances at the outbreak of the war, validating this theory of aggregation.

Figure 2: Graphical representation of a system with three attractors

The conclusion that Axelrod and Bennett reached is that the configuration of the alliances in the international system before the outbreak of the Second World War constitutes an attractor of the system, a minimum energy configuration, with minimal aggregated frustration. The identification of the attractors of the system is thus very important for describing the future behaviour of the system.

For analytical and operational purposes, we must analyse the concept of “degree of freedom” of the system that is linked to the potential states of the system. Each system can be characterised by a certain number of variables that describe its functioning. The degree of freedom of the system is higher when the number of the possible potential states of the system is bigger.

A mental experiment is useful here. We can, for this purpose, imagine a system that is not linked to anything, not even to the environment. Such a system would theoretically have an infinity of degrees of freedom. That means that the variables that describe the state of the system would be able to
take any value, without being linked to each other. This is, of course, an analytical fiction. The discussion on degrees of freedom is senseless if there is no limitation on the evolution or behaviour of the systems.

On the other hand, we can imagine a system that is totally influenced by its environment, in the sense that its environment is entirely controlling its behaviour. Such a system would have no autonomy whatsoever in its behaviour, that is, its degree of freedom would be extremely low, virtually zero.

Of course, it is a truism to say that any system operates within a specific environment that includes all the reality that is not part of the system. It seems that the real systems have a limited degree of freedom, as they are linked to their environment.

Social systems were analysed (Goldspink and Kay, 2003) as self-reproducing systems. This kind of systems, that were earlier named (Maturana and Varela, 1980) “autopoietic”, are autonomous in relation to their milieu. What distinguishes them from the “open” systems of the classical systemic theory is their two-way relationship with their environment. When an autopoietic system enters into contact with a certain environment, either one or the other (or both of them) is modified. When the relationship is recurrent, the autopoietic systems become “structurally coupled” between them and/or with their environment, at a physical or a non-physical level, creating systems of a superior order. A similar behaviour of two or more systems, the emergence of a language, is just one of the possibilities of structural coupling of social systems that lower the degree of freedom of the systems. The structural coupling of a larger number of autopoietic systems reveals common behavioural patterns, normative models that constrain their behaviour, and the development of feedback mechanisms maintains the functionality of norms.

In mathematical systems, the (theoretical) degree of freedom does not have an upper limit, in the sense of the number of possible states. This makes prediction within the complex systems very difficult. Nevertheless, the emergence of relatively stable behavioural patterns in social systems is equivalent to a lower degree of freedom. In this sense, the attractors are expressing the lowering of the degrees of freedom of the systems. However, in any social system, the emergence of certain normative regulations reduces the degree of freedom of a system, in the sense that the component subsystems internalise behavioural regulations, limiting the possible system states (Goldspink, 1999). To summarise, we have a social attractor when there is a complex of factors that reduce the degree of freedom of the sub-systems, that is, when there is a behavioural reference that influence their behaviour as it reduces their alternatives.

5. CONFLICTS AS ATTRACTORS

Why does a system evolve constantly towards a certain state? Because there is an attractor that generates certain types of behaviour, answer the complex system theorists. A group of analysts (Nowak et al.) shaped a theory that explains the emergence of persistent conflicts through the emergence of certain attractors in the social system. The reduction, at a cognitive level, of multiple dimensions of the interaction between two (or more) groups into one di-
mension – the conflictual one – induces the behaviour to refer only to one, no matter what kind of interaction is concerned. Their hypothesis is that when the conflict loses, in the eyes of the actors, its multi-dimensional nature, than it becomes an attractor of the system, that represents a cluster of stable attitudinal patterns, that motivate the individual and the collective action. Furthermore, as the links between the elements strengthen, the degree of freedom of the system decreases, and the state of an element becomes strongly dependent on that of the others’. If the elements which are relevant to the conflict self-organise themselves into an autonomous structure, the intervention in the system by the action on one single variable of the system is no longer effective. The variation of a variable induces the variation of others, and successive feed-back loops activate generative factors. From the standpoint of the complex system theory, the emergence of a powerful conflictual attractor in the system causes the system to return, after any perturbation, to the state of conflict.

The idea of protracted conflicts as attractors of the social systems is extremely important. The key to the understanding of the social conflicts seems to be the emergence of an attractor that stabilizes the malignant dynamics between individuals or between groups. The solution to these conflicts is, in this logic, the disassembling of the malignant attractor and the shifting of the system toward another attractor – that implies the pre-supposition that it exists or that it can be built. Notions as “conflict transformation” (Galtung, 2000) or “building a civilization project” (Malića 2001) came to illustrate the idea of dis-assembling the conflictual attractor and of building a new pacific attractor, able to attract the social system. If we are able to identify the degree to which a social conflict acts as an attractor to the systems involved, than we will know when hostilities will end and that peace will only be temporary.

When looking at states of the system we refer to certain configurations of the dynamic variables that characterise it; these configurations generate the emergence of certain conflictual attractors. Coleman et al. illustrate the phases that could lead to the radicalization of a conflictual relation eventually leading to a protracted conflict. As the conflict evolves, we can observe the “emergence of strong, stable attractors (patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting)” that lead the system into a self-sustained conflict. Through such phenomena as cognitive dissonance and selective processing of information, the attractors channel the mental and behavioural experience to a narrow range of behaviours, that form a logically coherent system and that are validated through self-fulfilling prophecies. The attractor is not the result of certain values of the system’s variables, but merely of the equations that define the relations between themselves. The conflict-generative factors do not act independently, they activate each other as if they were dominoes through the fact that they become a self-sustained system with positive feed-back loops. A very coherent structure is built, through the inter-conditionality and the co-evolution between elements. Coleman et al. identify the stages of this process. Firstly, the positive feed-back loops induce the causal factors to activate one by one, thus making the attractor emerge. In the next phase, the positive feed-back loops are replaced by negative feed-back loops, stabilising the attractor. For example, in the first stage of a conflict, the acts of hostility of the
citizens of two antagonistic nations reinforce each other (positive feed-back loop), up to the point they become critical and the conflict is triggered. In the second phase, the conflict itself can become a regulating factor of the system. The group intervenes to adjust the individual conducts that are contrary to the perpetualisation of the conflict (negative feed-back loop). The conflict becomes part of the group identity that is defined as opposed to the one of the antagonistic group. The intervention of certain individuals to put an end to the conflict becomes, under such circumstances, incredibly risky and dangerous. Assassination committed against leaders that concluded arrangements to end hostilities are an extreme of such risks.

Ben Goertzel (1994) is very convincing in illustrating the way reality is an attractor of the mental equation of humans, by leading the learning processes toward consistency with it and by permanently validating one’s own knowledge. In the same way, the faith systems act as attractors of the mental processes, without being the subject of external validation.

By intuitively representing the attractors as a “hill and valley landscape”, Coleman et al. have formulated the hypothesis of the difference between the “width” of the basin of attraction of conflict attractors and its “depth”. A “wider” basin of attraction will determine the evolution towards a conflict of a much bigger number of initial states, and a “deeper” one will be much stronger, namely it will need a bigger quantity of energy inserted in the system in order to exit the basin of attraction. In figure 2, the basin of attraction of attractor A is wider than that of attractor C, and that of attractor C is, on its turn, wider than the basin of attractor B, this meaning that attractor C is much more powerful than attractor B.

6. THE PACIFIC ATTRACTORS: THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A PACIFIC ATTRACTOR

Malța (2001) analyses human interactions into two ideal-types, as cultural – types (involving faiths, values and attitudes) and as civilisational-types (involving knowledge). The creation wealth does not necessarily involve a choice on the level of values, but efficiency in economic terms, acquired through the use of science and technology. The identity of the actors is, in this type of interactions, irrelevant. This distinction, though, could be useful in analysing the pacific attractors. Thus, the common projects that involve interactions of economic nature, have an important civilisational character, and can therefore be the basis of peace constructions. On the other hand, the cultural-type interactions, that involve identity and the distinction in-group – out-group, are more likely to activate inter-group differences and thus lead to conflicts. It means, if we translate this approach into complex systems terms, the civilization-type projects are able to stimulate the emergence of pacific attractors, i.e. the attractors that keep the system in a non-conflictual state.

The state of peace can be analysed on the international system level or at a lower level of social aggregation. The second variant allows, on the one hand, the analysis of a system with a smaller number of actors, but also a greater link to dealing with real cases. From the viewpoint of a peace theory, history provides us with a unique efficient model: the European Union. The analysis of
the European Union is the paradigm case of a pacific attractor for the European system of states. Initially conceived in order to control the production of raw materials required for waging wars, the three European Communities (of coal and steel, of atomic energy, and the economic community) have contributed to its emergence as an attractor for ever more European states.

This European post-war project does not represent the first attempt to unify the continent. In their desire for a vital space or solely for a worldly glory, many political leaders have designed political projects concerning this unity, which could be accomplished under the ruling of a dominant culture. Many of them left painful traces in the collective memory. As an object for military confrontations and for barter at the negotiation table, Alsace and Lorraine have represented, for many centuries, an excuse for transgressions in a Europe experiencing intensifying nationalism. What led to surpassing these previous attempts is extremely important for a peace theory. Since the end of the Second World War, Europe has experienced peace for more than half a century, and France and Germany have since not been in a situation of confrontation. The European project seems to have constantly attracted towards itself elements of the system, the five enlargements being a proof for this assertion. If we can identify a unifying factor, then this could be used as a foundation of other peace projects. Schumann and Monnet, the initiators of this project, wanted to use it in order to “de-intoxicate the relations between France and Germany, eliminate their secular opposition, and bind West Germany to France through a solidarity of interests” (as quoted in Malita 2001: 273). The essence of the European project meant focusing it on the civilisation dimension. It is not the language or faith that counts, but the capacity of the project to provide welfare for the citizens of the member states. The four liberties guaranteed to citizens – the free movement of individuals, goods, capitals and services, as well as the freedom to reside within any member state – no matter the nationality and based on non-discrimination, are all parts of a civilisation project. According to the project of the European Constitution, the European Union has a double dimension: union of citizens and of states.

The pacific attractor of the European system is the common project, situated in the sphere of civilisation. The reference to the individual as a citizen, and the fact that the European citizenship doesn’t replace the national citizenship, but adds to it, are all fundamental elements of the project’s functionality. The national identity of the citizens becomes irrelevant under the framework of European citizenship. From the point of view of its functioning, the common project comes into being through norms specific to each field of activity. Being considered as a super-regime, the functioning of the European project is ensured by an impressive number of common regulations, which become compulsory for the member states, engendering expectations and standards for all producers. Although the norms involve in many cases underlying values, some of them now becoming universal norms. The prohibition of killing another human being, for example, is a norm that exists in almost all cultures. We can consider them as belonging to the civilization sphere, as it is the case with all human rights.
A regime that represented an immediate attractor for the population of East-European states is that of human rights, the first European standard adopted by all the states aspiring for the quality of membership. The *aquis communautaire* was a mean of generating a collective process that made the institutional structures of the aspiring countries become more similar and to generate convergent dynamics. Peat (2002) is probably right when he writes, referring to organisations, that the history of the relationships and the repetitive pattern of behaviour is relevant concerning their evolution.

The European Union functions through norms. The prescriptive logic of European norms refers to the ruling of the component subsystems behaviours. Starting with the individuals and continuing to trading companies or states, the obligatory character of subordinating to the norms provisions allows no exception. The term “norms” is used here in a broad sense, also involving cases of common patterns of behaviour which are internalised by individuals, without necessarily being written in a code of law (for instance, the codes of proper behaviour in society, which are ethically defined, or the customary law in international relations). Without being established as legal provisions in all the states, human rights are part of the common ethos and European project.

From the perspective of the functionality of pacific attractors, the relevant normative systems are those which contain practical methods of implementation. The League of Nations was not able to be set up as a pacific attractor of the international system, because it did not dispose of ways of sanctioning non-cooperation. The United Nations is slightly better in that it does dispose some forms of sanctions, but their functionality is still not enough to create a pacific attractor of the international system. On a little lower level of analysis, the international regimes can be considered, in certain conditions, pacific attractors of the system, as long as they don’t transform into “talking machines” lacking means of implementations.

To better understand the role learning plays in the functionality of the pacific attractor it is useful to look at a recent book by Robert Wright (2000). He emphasized the fact that as history progresses, people learn to play more non-zero sum games. The increase in complexity is equivalent, for Wright, with the increase of non-zero sum situations in human interactions, and the two processes are simultaneous, coherent and mutually sustaining. The successful performance of non-zero-sum games leads to an increase in complexity, but the increase of the non-zero-sum situations is hindered by two mechanisms. The first is represented by the existence of free-riders, those that have the tendency to benefit from others’ generosity without reciprocating. To parasite the systems can be a simple behavioural alternative for some participants, as the cooperation involves at least one cost: the reduction of freedom of action. For small groups, the moral indignation is a sufficiently powerful mechanism of exclusion from the group – or at least exclusion from the benefits of the common good in discussion. This is not sufficient in the case of bigger and more complex social groups that impose the existence of a value allocation mechanism that must maintain cooperation through sanctions for free-riders.
The second important thing is the fact that if the contribution of participants is different, and the distribution is equal, some tend to participate less than others. It also forces people to monitor others’ contribution to the common action, in order to compensate for the entropic tendencies of the system.

From this perspective, the problem of the emergence of society is how to make non-zero-sum relations between individuals and groups permanent. Cooperation does not produce sociality if it is occasional, but only when it is permanent, and this action is realised by the social norms in the largest sense, by prescriptions that encourage the desirable behaviours and discourages – through public disgrace or through criminal penalties – the undesirable ones. As social references, the norms make the behaviours of the members of the groups converge.

The functioning of the pacific attractor thus is twofold: on one side it is maintained by the internalisation of the norms, and on the other side, a large array of sanctions, from public disapproval to legal penalties, punishes non-cooperation of some actors that do not internalise them sufficiently.

A prerequisite for the functionality of a pacific attractor is its stable character. The hegemony may not, from this viewpoint, lead to the emergence of a stable pacific attractor. Modelski and Morgan exemplified (1985) the way that the emergence of a hegemonic power in the international system follows a rather cyclic pattern, which may eventually be analyzed as a cyclic attractor. The hegemonic cycles have included, as the two analysts mentioned, wars with systemic amplitude or situations of major conflict, which led to the changing of the hegemonic attractor. Obviously, we cannot speak of a pacific attractor if it leads to war.

CONCLUSION

Peace and war are processes, rather than social states. From the point of view of the complex system theory, war or peace are even more that that: ensembles of processes which co-exist and co-evolve, so-called attractors. In these terms, peace and war can be analysed as attractors of complex social systems. These are states (in the dynamic sense) of social systems towards which their behaviour converges. The attractors of this kind do not only represent an abstraction of these notions; understanding these mechanisms means understanding the manner in which peace and war reproduce themselves. Furthermore, using these concepts in the analysis allows the understanding of peace as an anticipatory learning process (Botkin, Elnadjra and Malitza, 1998). The endemic conflicts, which seem very difficult to solve, are only situations in which the convergence of certain cultural factors produces conflicting attractors. On the other hand, the pacific attractors describe states of stable peace, circumstances in which society creates itself feedback mechanisms capable of bringing back the system to its stable state, mechanisms of co-operation in which there are means of drawing in and possibly sanctioning those who might be tempted by parasitic non-cooperation.

In an analysis of international regimes, Arthur Stein stressed (1982: 301) the idea that not even the most liberal societies allow their citizens to act arbitrarily. Even the market, the essence of human freedom in modern societies,
is not left by itself to regulate human actions. As in social systems individual actions are constrained by society, limiting through a “social contract” the permanent war between the individuals. The rules set by the actors of the international systems act similarly, as the functional equivalents of the social contract that constrain the states’ behaviour in certain areas. The constructivist idea of rules as means to control behaviour is not complete without the mechanism to make sure that the rules are observed. A functional regime is an attractor of the social system only as long as it identifies feed-back mechanisms, by sanctioning free-riders, as the perturbations of the social system which determine the activation of correction mechanisms. A recent analysis (Werner and Yuen, 2005) of the stability of peace agreements attach less importance to their provisions, but try to identify factors that explain the maintenance and the enforcement of commitments. This is, of course, a possible issue for future research.

Approaching the evolution of humanity through the angle of the complexity theory looks at the idea of a future seen as a cluster of possibilities, out of which humanity can choose. Being aware of the existence of multiple possibilities is similar to a learning process, and humanity is only at its beginning.

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Ion Cîndea
The Geographical and Systemic Influences on Greek Foreign Policy in the Balkans in the 1990s

GEORGE VOSKOPOULOS

Abstract: The aim of this article is to structurally and operationally link geography to foreign policy. Greek foreign policy will be used as a case study in order to define reasons for policy differentiation between Greece and its EC/EU partners. The analysis builds upon a state-centric assumption of state behaviour according to which a state’s foreign policy is determined by geography, culture, threat [mis]perceptions, domestic politics as well as its systemic features such as structure, interactions amongst players, the input and output ratio of the local subordinate system as well as its self-stabilizing potential. The analysis is formulated on the assumption that foreign policy choices are dependent on cultural elements, and that foreign policy cannot be formulated in a vacuum of domestic interests. To support the view that geography and system structure define state behaviour and affect international outcomes, the paper uses the two-security zone typology of M. Singer and A. Wildavsky that operationally and structurally differentiates Greece’s environment from that of its EC/EU partners. The emergence of the post-Cold War Balkan subordinate system and its characteristics will provide a causational approach to the adoption of self-help policies that may distance the country from its European partners. To look into the causes of this trend in Greek foreign policy in the 1990s, its policy adjustment margins in a zone of turmoil will be compared to the Western European zone of peace and within Greece’s systemic operational framework (Balkan subordinate system).

Key words: Greek foreign policy, Balkan security, European security zones, Balkan subordinate system, geography and security, threat [mis]perceptions

GREEK FOREIGN POLICY AND DOMESTIC POLITICS: AN OVERVIEW

State international behaviour is influenced by a number of parameters not commonly acknowledged by international relations paradigms. This analysis suggests that domestic politics play an important role in the formulation of foreign policy. The Greek case foreign policy choices in the 1990s have been substantially affected by domestic politics parameters and inter-party rivalry.

More particularly, a covert or overt maximalism as far as goals is concerned, along with political instability and consecutive elections in the years 1989–1993 affected dramatically the conceptual model through which the Greek political elite looked at the regional challenges that emerged after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Outside mediation or military involvement (i.e. Richard Holbrooke’s mediation in the “Macedonian dispute”, the U.S. bomb-
Two Security Zones: Why Is Greek Foreign Policy So Different?

The Balkan endemic insecurity resulting from the security paradigm adopted by Balkan states, namely “security competition”. The term describes a conflictual inter-state relationship, which “commences when state actors come to view their security as highly competitive and divisible, not quasi-harmonious and semi-divisible”.

B. Domestic Politics: Domestic politics in Greece played a catalytic role in the formulation of foreign policy, a fact that did not allow for much flexibility and policy adjustment. Non-cooperative behaviour on the part of the Greek political elite is thus partly due to the restraints imposed by the domestic environment.

C. The “Great Idea” of the Balkan States that constitutes a constant, overt or covert, challenge to the territorial status ever since the end of the 1912-1913 Balkan wars.

D. Long standing territorial disputes not accommodated by the intrusive policies of powerful out of system players.

E. Historical and national stereotypes and the long-standing enmity on the part of the Balkan peoples, along with the catalytic role of self-identity and historical continuity.

The Two-Security Zone Model

In their security typology M. Singer and A. Wildavsky divide the early post-Cold War world into two contrasting security zones, two “fundamentally different worlds” with incompatible characteristics and orientation. The suggested division into “zones of peace” and “zones of turmoil” refers directly or indirectly to a geographically-defined and structurally-affected framework of foreign policy formulation. This stems from a system’s structure and sets the problem of the lack of operational security unity within the EC/EU, which, in the early post-Cold War era, set systemic limitations to Greece’s international behaviour.

Zones of peace were identified with those zones controlled by NATO, while zones of turmoil were almost identical with ex-communist zones. The ad hoc early post-Cold War division of Europe into two security zones set the incompatible operating and structural settings from which states in the zones of turmoil and those in the zones of peace operated.

The inherent destabilising characteristics of the Balkan zone of turmoil may be categorised as those related to economic factors and those connected with politico-historical variables.

Economic related characteristics centre around economic backwardness, resulting in underdevelopment and are enhanced by transitional issues. Poli-eco-historical variables include anarchical structure, lack of a local security regime, catalytic and at times distorting historical and national stereotypes, use or threat of use of military force, as well as long-lasting boundary disputes, that have long challenged the territorial status.
Southeast Europe has been haunted by diachronic instability and political fragmentation (Balkanisation), due to inherent and endemic systemic deficiencies as well as antagonistic relations of powerful intrusive actors which then became reflected in intra-Balkan relations. On the contrary, zones of peace or the “no-war parts of the world” are characterised not only by a no-war culture, but also by economic advancement and complex interdependence enhanced by collective security mechanisms.

The two-security-zone model attempts to scrutinise international, interstate relations through two different lenses, since, in the authors’ opinion “if you try to talk about the world as a whole all you can get is falsehoods or platitudes”. Under this spectrum, generalisations do not help to understand the essence of the problems entities face in zones of turmoil, the geographical context of their security considerations, as well as the dictates of their domestic political arena.

As suggested, “the domestic politics of a state cannot be fully understood without reference to the neighbouring environment in which that nation has developed”. This statement suggests that a national policy, whether it is constructive or not, ought to be seen under the geographical and structural settings within which it is formulated. These two fundamental parameters define [mis]perceptions domestically and lead to varied reactions to either input to the system or actions, stemming from actors within the system.

In essence the two-security zone model refers to dissimilar regional settings with distinctive features. In both zones there are forces of integration and forces of fragmentation that compete with one another with different outcomes in each security zone. Fragmentation is the key word describing the political, operational and strategic setting of a zone of turmoil, while integration is the key determinant of co-operative interstate relations in zones of peace.

This suggestion pinpoints the incompatible orbits of the Western European zone of peace and that of the South-eastern European zone of turmoil. Western Europe’s post-Second World War course to economic and political integration, accelerated during the early 1990s with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, was heavily contrasted by South-eastern Europe’s contrasting transition course, its political parcelisation and disintegration, triggered by emerging nationalistic trends, that had long been contained under the ideological polarization of the Cold War.

Entities in zones of peace build their security policies, inter alia, on military power, although their primary aim is not territorial expansion, but protection of the economic advantages of their developed economies, since a failure on the military security level could void economic achievements. However, as noted, “the political relations among countries in the zones of peace and democracy will not be influenced by relative military power”. There is no harmony of interests amongst entities in zones of peace, yet, this does not lead to war, as there is “internal peace” within the stability zone and this eliminates war as a cost-effective means of resolving disputes.

As a result, concern about direct military threats in the Western European zone of peace has lost part of its importance, since industrially, socially and above all politically developed nations refrain from going to war with one
another, despite their ability to project military power. Max Singer & Aaron Wildavsky make the suggestion that wealth, democracy and peace are inter-connected characteristics and thus cannot be separated. This reflects the opposite portrayal of the Balkan subordinate system, where economic backwardness, poverty and lack of long lasting democratic institutions have given birth to zero-sum policies and conflictual approaches to interstate disputes.

States in the zones of peace and democracy “have most of the power in the world (economic and military), so they will not face a serious threat to their national survival or freedom, regardless of the outcome of conflicts in other zones”. The suggestion sets the operational and structural ground for differentiated international behaviour on the part of Greece and defines reactions to security considerations and threat perceptions to a substantial degree. It also sets the strategic setting of a security environment dominated by the non-cooperative security paradigm of interstate relations. As a result, military force has become the key determinant of power in zones of turmoil, since the use, or threat of use, of military force is the basis of exercising foreign policy, in a way that infers to the Clausewitzian concept of conducting politics (war), resulting in the use of force and marginalisation of international law.

THE SIDE-EFFECTS OF THE END OF BIPOLARITY ON GREECE’S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

To look into the impact of geography and thus the structure of the Balkan subordinate system on Greece’s international behaviour this paper will analyse the geopolitical effects of the end of the Cold War on security in the region.

According to L. Cantori and A. Spiegel a subordinate system is defined as a state system that “consists of one state, or of two or more proximate and interacting states which have some common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social, and historical bonds, and whose sense of identity is sometimes increased by the actions and attitudes of states external to the system”. A system is also defined as “the totality of relations which exist between the autonomous units in a particular arena”.

It is these state interactions that define qualitatively the parameters of a particular security environment (i.e. zone of peace or a zone of turmoil) and provide the operational milieu for exercising foreign policy. The Balkans became entangled in intense ethnic politics that affected the internal balance of the Balkan subordinate system by setting a conflictual transformation norm. In its turn, Greek foreign policy was formulated to a substantial degree by the challenges of the re-structuring process of the Balkan security environment, consisting of neophyte actors that longed for independence and yearned to express their politico-cultural otherness.

A thorough evaluation of Greek foreign policy ought to be based on Greece’s geographical and structural setting. Greece’s geographical proximity to Balkan flashpoints makes it, to this day, part of an insecure state subsystem. Not being instability-proof from endemic Balkan fluidity, Greece does not share the same perceptions of threat with its Western European partners, a fact that differentiates it in a number of ways, as far as security priorities are concerned.
The Balkan aspect of Greece’s foreign policy, influenced by inherent systemic instability, has often contradicted its European course and orientation, making it painful and politically costly for the Greek political elite to find common ground with its EU partners. The early post-Cold War geopolitical arrangements perplexed Greece’s systemic milieu and its internal balance and gave its policy a Janus-like character, which, at times, became the target of intense criticism.

The catalytic geopolitical consequences of the end of bipolar era and the subsequent dissolution of Yugoslavia altered qualitatively and quantitatively the structural features of the Balkan subordinate system and turned geography into a catalyst in foreign policy making. The post-Cold War security vacuum in southeast Europe resulted in the dominance of certain non-constructive aspects of Greek policy over its overall foreign policy choices.

**Figure 1. Greek Foreign Policy Trends**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European Agenda</th>
<th>Balkan Agenda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western European Policy</td>
<td>Western European Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek policy</td>
<td>Greek Policy in the Balkans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Result:</strong> Compatibility on a satisfactory level</td>
<td><strong>Result:</strong> Incompatibility and adoption of self-help policies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Greek and the other EC/EU state policies in the Balkans in the 1990s were formulated on a divergence axis (the Yugoslav break-up, the Macedonian Issue, Kosovo, Serbia) while Greece’s policies on what constituted the EC/EU agenda (institutional issues, European constitution, consensus) were formulated within a convergence ratio (see Figure 1). The two trends illustrate that the two agendas resulted in incompatible behaviour as there was limited consensus on regional issues.

**POST COLD-WAR TRANSFORMATION OF THE BALKAN SUBORDINATE SYSTEM**

A depiction of the Cold War Balkan subordinate system according to the Cantori and Spiegel model would divide it into three axes (see Figure 2). First, the core actors, the states that are the local, internal elements of the system, second, the peripheral actors, states that neighbour the system states and which have immediate interests in the region and third, the non-system actors (the intrusive system), consisting of states external to the system, these are powerful actors with their own geopolitical weight and local interests, who are able to interfere in the region and dominate the interests of local actors.
The [de]stabilising potential of the intrusive actors is of tantamount importance, but it does not always apply, since state interests do not remain the same and vary according to the given in the international political arena, as well as its structure.

Figure 2. The Cold War Balkan Sub-System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Actors</th>
<th>Peripheral Actors</th>
<th>Non-System Actors (Intrusive system)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>EC actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The onset of the de-communisation process in the late 1980s coincided with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, which led to the structural collapse of the bipolar Balkan subordinate system and triggered in-system centrifugal forces. Ethnic groups complicated the picture as they engaged in intense rivalries after decades of social and political isolation. The new state system that came into existence included neophyte actors that changed the security arrangements and strategic balance of the Cold War era.

According to the L. Spiegel / S. Cantori’s subordinate system model, the post-Cold War Balkan subordinate system may be described as follows (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. The Post-Cold War Balkan Subordinate System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Actors</th>
<th>Peripheral Actors</th>
<th>Intrusive System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia (until 1992)</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Slovenia (since 1992)</td>
<td>EC/EU actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia-Montenegro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The early post-Cold War system re-arrangement in the Balkans altered its internal politico-military balance, which, during the Cold War, under the ideological communist / non-communist divide and the overall cleavage and polarity of the two blocks, managed to sustain its internal cohesion.
However, the end of block confrontation resulted in the emergence of two negative structural elements in the region, namely the non-creation of a local security community and second, the formulation of a competitive security complex. In the first case border changes did not facilitate the creation of a local security community defined as “a group of states which neither fear, nor prepare for the use of force among themselves”. As a consequence, territorialized ethnic politics dominated the agenda of interstate relations and allowed nationalism to defuse the Balkan rationale that brought the local system into the state of Realist anarchy.

In the second case, conflict over control of territories and the fate of ethnic groups prevented the establishment of a security complex defined as “a group of states whose primary security concerns overlap sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot be realistically considered separate from one another”. Under this spectrum, Greek foreign policy choices were formulated under the impact of geography, the system’s inherent instability and its immediate security environment in a regional rather than a pan-European level.

Regional, geographically-related threats dominated the Greek security agenda and became the qualitative determinants of the course of action taken, while the rest-EC/EU focused on a generalised approach to European security, without the necessity to engage in foreign policy activity, based on the “need to protect and defend the common interests of the governments”. The post-Cold War emergence of a new subordinate system in the Balkans did not threaten the national survival of Western European states, a fact that refers to the suggestion that in the zones of peace the survival of the states is not in question. This set the geographical and structural framework of Greece’s differentiated regional policy, dictated by threat perceptions and their intensity, whether they were accurate or distorted misperceptions. Kegley and Wittkopf suggest that, “the way we act is shaped by what we perceive, we must continually question the validity of our images of world politics and ask if they are accurate views of reality or misperceptions”. Greek officials, like many of their European and American counterparts, have viewed intra-regional politics under the mental model of Balkan instability. Such mental models may distort real images either by “exaggerating some features of the real world... or... ignoring others”.

By contrast, Greece’s European partners looked into the region through their intrusive role deprived of the proximity factors that affect foreign policy choices. The aforementioned contending perception framework set the operational basis for Greece’s self-help policy.

**THE EMERGENCE OF NEOPHYTE ACTORS AND ITS CONSEQUENCE ON THE BALKAN SUBORDINATE SYSTEM**

The dissolution of Yugoslavia with its tectonic geopolitical consequences and side-effects substantially altered the political map, the structure, and the balance of power of the Balkan subordinate system. The neophyte states did add to the political pluralism of the Balkan subordinate system, but they also perplexed its endemic systemic inefficiencies, as their emergence brought to the surface the traumatic intra-Balkan history, namely the Serbian-Croatian...
historic incompatibilities and the long-standing struggle for control of geographical Macedonia, which has been the apple of discord for over a century. As noted, “the newness of these states, their turbulent history of internecine wars with neighbours, and the expansion and contraction of their borders, contribute to enduring feelings of insecurity. This is most evident in Greece’s reaction to the emergence to the Macedonian issue”.31

For Greek policy-makers the emergence of a new security system, related to Balkan politics, constituted an unprecedented challenge, since the post-Cold War territorial changes allowed for the re-emergence of the Macedonian Issue that always dominated Greek foreign policy in the Balkans. History seemed to have played its catalytic role and become the qualitative axis of Greek policy, affected heavily by the long-lasting but temporarily dormant boundary disputes that have haunted the Balkans ever since the dissolution of the Ottoman and Austrian Empires. Although, “freedom, flexibility and interaction” were the benefits of the post-Cold War security arrangement, these new situation caused Balkan instability, which resulted from the revival of historical grievances.

THE BALKAN SUBORDINATE SYSTEM AS A SOURCE OF INSTABILITY

In the early post-Cold War Balkan subordinate system Greece operated from a zone of turmoil, an immature system of anarchic structure in which “each state recognise no other legitimate sovereign unit except itself”.32 In such systems, the systems themselves “not only generate many of the threats which define the national security problem, but also constitute a major target of national security”.33 Under this spectrum, Greek insecurity is a non-desired side-effect of the country’s security environment and not a matter of choice. In essence it was a problem stemming from its geography.

Despite certain aspects of cooperative behaviour, the Balkans, as a state system, appeared to have an anarchic structure and thus constituted a source of insecurity per se for Greece, which adopted a self-help international behaviour, due to:

a) Systemic inefficiencies created by its members’ conflicting goals (status quo versus non-status quo powers) and exacerbated by national stereotypes and history.

b) Domestic inefficiencies of the Greek political arena, rooted in inter-party rivalry.

c) Long-lasting destabilising interference of non-system actors (the intrusive system).34

d) Political instability, economic backwardness and lack of a win-win political culture on the part of local actors.

Conflicts in the region could not be peacefully accommodated in a compromising way since for local policy-makers the “irreducible core of national interests”35 could not be bargained for. This may attributed to the fact that “a certain minimum of interests belong to all the members of the community, which must at all costs be safeguarded and which are so important and so well grounded that they turn into principles and gain unquestionable and unreasoned acceptance”.36
To a substantial degree, the Balkans represented a microcosm of the structural condition described by the Realist term anarchy, or the Hobbesian world of “all against all” or “the state of nature”. Anarchy may have the form of “mature anarchy” (utopian anarchy), in which, with the application of certain criteria a state “could recognise and accept each other’s legitimacy and at the same time increase their own”.37 However, this was not the case with the Balkans, particularly in the 1990s, when disputes were territorialized and seen through a zero-sum prism. Actually this differentiated South-eastern Europe from central Europe, where the creation of an advanced political culture and a win-win approach to conflict resolution allowed for peaceful transformation.38

The difficulty in maintaining the security balance of the Balkan sub-system lies in the conflict of interests and goal divergence, since “a system is maintained when certain functions are performed. If a system is to be maintained, interests must be coherent and deprived of their divisive potential”.39 Any interference, either from within or outside the system must have the form of a system maintaining activity, otherwise, local actors, even if they have stabilising intentions, may act in an un-cooperative manner. If the mediating potential of local actors is not encouraged, the system is at stake, as it tends to be prone to destabilising changes, uncooperative behaviour and be vulnerable to instability, since it is “at the centre of a flow”.40 The suggestion underpins the significance of self-stabilising mechanisms and the [de]stabilizing potential of powerful intrusive actors.

Local and non-system stabilisers were expected to enhance equilibrium, meaning ”mechanisms that try to absorb the consequences of anomalies, irregularities that upset the system... positive functions are eufunctional, while destabilizing policies dysfunctional”.41 The above will assist the states to formulate the operational framework of the needed regulatory mechanisms to keep the system together and enhance its cohesion. As noted, “a system must maintain its fabric in existence... To maintain a system, its members must be socialised, meaning must accept the system’s way of operating”.42

The early post-Cold War Balkan state-system did not form a eufunctional operational mode and stabilising mechanisms that could provide the common ground for inter-Balkan co-operation. Nationalism, revisionism, violation of human and civil rights, strategic minority expansionism, ethnic politics and poverty, along with the institutional problems of the de-communisation process originally marginalized the prospects of co-operation and the establishment of a community of states. It appears that there was not a strong sense of common fate amongst local actors, resulting in the adoption of self-help security policies at the expense of a local security regime. This provided a complex structural setting which affected the local players’ international behaviour.

At this point the application of a system functioning model and its comparison with the Balkan subordinate system’s structural and operational characteristics may illustrate the degree of the system’s dysfunctionality. According to Roy Jones’ functioning model (see Figure 4), systems operate at three levels:43
In the early 1990s particularly the Balkan subordinate system seemed to be economically and politically cut off from its external environment and constituted a nucleus of instability within post-Cold War Europe. This affected heavily its capability to absorb the shock caused by the massive politico-economic changes. To make things worse, the input coming into such a state-system could not assist its stabilisation. EC/EU actors, including Greece, championed their national preferences and supported local actors on a selective basis, acting at times as a negative input provider. Under the then circumstances, the catastrophic outcome was unavoidable, as the system lacked self-stabilising mechanisms that could prevent or at least contain conflicts to a no-war framework.

The Yugoslav break-up illustrated the system’s operational dysfunctionalities and its inherent systemic anomalies, which dramatically affected Greek policy. Furthermore, domestic inter-party rivalry made Greek inefficiencies apparent, despite the application of groupthink practices that meant to overlay Greek security worries. In the Greek case, although groupthink did not prevent Athens from adopting self-help policies, it mentally and operationally “imposed” security norms that functioned on generalisations that exaggerated or downgraded actual or potential threats. In part, this may also be attributed to the non-application on the part of the EU of a single, common operational norm on both the western European zone of peace and the Balkan zone of turmoil. It appears that there were two contending trends adopted by Greece and its European partners. While Greece tended at times to magnify actual or potential threat perceptions, EC/EU states tended to undermine the geographical limitations imposed on Greek foreign policy and its security implications.

A causal explanation of the two incompatible tendencies is that the Balkans did not pose a direct threat to Western Europe, to the same degree they did to Greece. The restructuring of the Balkan subordinate system affected Greece’s international behaviour, since it was considered to be a direct threat to its physical base defined by its populations and territory.

It is argued that, “insecurity, after all, is a condition rather than an end. It is a product of the structure of the international system, a reflection as much as a cause of tension”. Seen through this prism, Greek insecurity was not a self-imposed choice, but rather an unfavourable situation stemming, inter alia, from systemic deficiencies since “for ordinary states security is an exercise in execution; for the strong it is a matter of definition”.

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**Figure 4. System Levels of Operation**

1. System’s capabilities, as reflected from its relations with the external environment

2. System’s way of responding to inputs coming into it, which are converted into outputs.

3. System’s maintenance / self-stabilising mechanisms
way insecurity perceptions were imposed on Greek officials and people by the structural elements of the security environment. Furthermore, inter-Balkan politics could not be disconnected from Balkan history and its catalytic impact on Balkan peoples’ national psychology that distorted perceptions of the other side (mirror images). This sense of otherness, these distorting images have long divided Balkan peoples, and along with the ever-changing nature of the Balkan subordinate-system turned the peninsula into a zone of instability.

**GEOGRAPHY AND SYSTEM ORIENTED SECURITY PERCEPTIONS AS A POLICY DIVERGENCE POINT**

The non-existence of a common strategic approach among EC/EU states in the 1990s, along with their unwillingness or inability to express a compact Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) on issues affecting the European periphery, marginalised the stabilising and mediating role of the EC/EU in the Balkans, enhanced the role of the US in European security and externalized Greek security [mis]perceptions.

The lack of security unity in the absence of a pan-European security regime was also hindered by the lack of an institutional framework that would promote convergent trends within the EC/EU and deal with European security under a compact, holistic spectrum. This was of tantamount importance to Greece’s security, as Greek officials considered that the country was threatened by conflicts, which did not affect the national security systems of its European partners. The above suggests that Greece appeared to be facing security problems stemming from its geographical positioning in the Balkan sub-system. By contrast, similar issues had long been peacefully resolved in the western European zone of peace, where territorial disputes or the threat of war as a foreign policy instrument were eliminated.

Geography and the local security environment set the operational axis for Greece’s differentiated policy. The precondition for the application of a common approach to security issues demanded, inter alia, convergence of national interests, setting common goals and above all a common perception of threat(s). However, as security threats are often subjective, idiosyncratically-defined and geographically-rooted, they may be interpreted in several ways, as well as applied on many levels. Under this perceptual spectrum formulated within a geographical divide, it is difficult to find wide consensus of what an actual or potential threat consists of, since security is, inter alia, a state of mind, affecting judgment and evaluating procedures.

The meaning of security is vague and takes a form according to how it is defined and conceived by policy makers and defence analysts. After all, “security is a relative concept... and...it is easier to apply to things than people”, a suggestion aiming at pinpointing the catalytic role of psychological aspects in the formulation of threat perceptions. To the same direction points the suggestion that “the ambiguity of the word security is due both to its deliberate misuse in international diplomacy and to the inherently subjective nature of the concept. Thus, the phrase pursuit of security concerns has often been used as a euphemism for aggressive action or in a broad context which goes beyond defensive needs”.48

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It may be assumed that, by definition, it is a highly contested issue to pinpoint what a security threat is, particularly when looking into matters from different angles, without the pressure of geographical proximity to flashpoints. These constitute the structural elements of Greece’s foreign policy system and qualitatively defined threats and their intensity as well as perceptions. The importance of security perceptions for the formation of foreign policy choices should not be underestimated and ought to be linked with the conditions of being safe. It is suggested that “a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war”. Besides, as “the search for security is perennial... all foreign policies of all states are basically influenced by it”. The two suggestions may explain the fact that although Greek policy in the Balkans was aimed at stability and did not express territorial claims, certain policies adopted were non-constructive. Greek foreign policy choices have been determined to a substantial degree by the qualitative determinants of foreign policy, dictated by “the activities of other members of the region” which, in a security zone of anarchical structure, enhances the perpetuating security dilemma.

The above depict the geographical element of the country’s security environment, a main element defining foreign policy choices. The second defining element is the lack, in the Balkans, of an advanced political culture that would accommodate disputes within a win-win framework as was the case with Central European states. Balkan states adopted a competitive model of security in inter-Balkan relations, under the weight of historical suspicion and antagonism for the scarce resources of the peninsula, a fact that caused their alternative policy choices to be trapped in zero-sum policy norms.

The geographical setting, the system’s structure, and the adopted policies revealed the link between [mis]perception, intensity of threats and geography. In its turn, the systemic and operational link between geography and security depicted and defined the structurally oriented security problem of Greece in the Balkans.

Greek policies and [mis]perceptions were also influenced by proximity and territoriality factors. Proximity theory uses statistical tools to suggest that armed conflicts break out among neighbouring states. Although proximity may not be the primary cause of a war, it provides the opportunity for states sharing borders to become involved in a war. In this way, proximity among long-term rivals and territorial disputes that constitute fundamental conflicts of interest appear to be prerequisites for conflictual approaches, a fact supportive of the suggestion that armed conflicts occur among neighbouring states. Thus, the probability of war and the territorial issues Greece faced in the Balkans provided motives for foreign policy differentiation and at times led to aggressive policies (i.e. the Greek embargo against the Republic of Macedonia in 1994) not appreciated by its European partners.

DISUNITY IN THE EUROPEAN ZONE OF SECURITY AND ITS SOURCES

By definition the term “disunity” refers to a parcelised, dissimilar security setting and implies the existence of different security structures or differentiated geographical settings. As already suggested, the lack of common ap-
proaches to security issues resulted from the different structural settings from which Greece and its European partners operated. The convergence/divergence policy ratio was magnified by the lack of security unity in Europe, while the security disunity pattern was deteriorated by the two major contending and self-paralyzing trends within the EU namely intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. The two approaches support integration at two different qualitative levels, a vertical (deepening-supranationalism) and a horizontal (widening-intergovernmentalism) with the final result being a compromise between the two trends.

The lack of security unity, inaugurated de facto with the early 1990s division of Europe into zones of peace and zones of turmoil, found Greece geographically isolated in a zone of instability, seemingly dominated by territorial expansionism, lack of democratic background, economic backwardness, lack of social cohesion, clashing nationalisms and explicit or implicit irredentist claims. The aforementioned qualitative and quantitative deficiencies of the Balkan subordinate system did not characterise the western European zone of peace, which was not affected to the same degree and with the same intensity the Balkans were by the post-Cold War geopolitical changes. As a result, the institutional framework of the EU’s CFSP was satisfactory for western European member-states but inadequate to accommodate Greek security worries.

The uncontrolled changes in the Balkan subordinate system illustrated the EC/EU’s lack of adaptation to the rapidly changing geopolitical conditions in South-eastern Europe. European security unity became a heavily contested issue since EC/EU partners had long faced a teleological problem as far as European integration and its finite goal were concerned.

The institutional perplexity of the EC/EU nationalised its members’ foreign policies, resulting in the expression of divergent views. As the process of de-nationalisation of EU members’ foreign policies had been highly imperfect, Greece found itself institutionally deprived of EC/EU mechanisms that would accommodate its systemic-rooted and geographically defined security worries, while the eventual adoption of maximalistic policies allowed little space for compromise and flexibility. However, the need to construct new institutional and analytic approaches to security issues was not of the same intensity for Greece and its European partners, nor was it within the ability of the Greek administrations to influence policy choices and outcomes. The Greek side felt that the EC/EU was unable to express a casus foederis towards it and thus operate as a strategic guarantor of the territorial status quo in the Balkans.

GREECE IN A ZONE OF TURMOIL

The unstable character of the Balkan subordinate system was de jure acknowledged with the 14 May 1997 resolution adopted by the European Parliament, where the Balkans was referred to as the principal zone of instability in Europe. The statement acknowledged the structural, political and economic diversification of the region and provided the ground for causational explanation of the geographical limitations imposed on Greek policy-makers’ policy adjustment capability.
In the Greek case and in accordance with the publicly stated political goals of the Greek political elite, security, reflecting the general Realist definition, referred to the preservation of territorial status and thus acquired a defensive meaning, orientating towards containment of specific multi-level historical threats the country has faced in a fragile security environment. The feeling of insecurity was heavily reflected on excessive defence expenditure, which acquired more than a semiotic significance or a vague sense of being threatened.

Although Greece is a defence-oriented country, meaning a stern supporter of territorial status quo, it has been forced to spend more than its European partners on defence since “defence-minded states are much more liable to indulge in military and technological overinsurance” a fact that has long affected the country’s economy. Defence spending in Greece has been well above the NATO norms, a fact indicative of the particular security considerations of Greek policy-makers.

Policy divergence and non-compliance, stemming from incompatible perceptions of threats or non-involvement in the process of evaluating the intensity of a threat or misperception of a threat, may give vent to disagreement on the nature of threat, since in zones characterized by perennial territorial fluidity states may differentiate their policies when threats or perceived threats are justifiably or not linked to survival.

The fundamental operating elements in zones of peace are peace and the lack of fear of war, while the development of democracy fortifies the security regime. By contrast, “zones of turmoil are regions where war at all levels, from organized urban violence to international conflict, is not only plausible but endemic. And from the prevalence of armed conflict, or the constant threat of violence, flow the instability, insecurity, and absence of a reliable institutional order…”

It is within this security environment and geographical setting that Greece was expected to apply a coherent, stable and non-reactionary Balkan policy. In a way, acting as a stabilizer would mean adopting a neutral stance in regional crises taking place at Greece’s immediate security environment. However, neutrality in a zone of turmoil was an extremely demanding task, particularly when [in]direct threats, concerning territorial status, are expressed on a long-terms basis. As underlined, “the absence of territorial claims and the ensuing stability of frontiers are a contributing factor securing a policy of permanent neutrality”. This seems not to have been the case in the post-Cold War Balkan subordinate system where threats to territorial status were overtly or covertly expressed by multiple actors.

Under a neo-realist perspective the environment (systemic milieu) defines reactions and perceptions particularly in the case of small states since “it is a much more important variable than for a great power, and hence any reasoning about its role should probably start by an identification of the type of international system in which it has to operate”. For Greece, the territorialisied perceptions of threats had a catalytic impact on the state’s security agenda and foreign policy formulation. To make things worse, war in the Balkans had been an endemic feature, as “the platitude that military force does not solve anything has been invalidated daily in the Balkans”. The 1990s Balkan crises illustrated that military aggressiveness and the use of military force has
been used in its Clausewitzian notion, as a means of advancing political aims, thus, fortifying M. Singer and A. Wildavsky’s structural depiction of a zone of turmoil.

On their part, Western European states assumed that local actors disposed of the required political will to resolve disputes within a mutual compromise framework. This evaluation was formulated outside Greece’s systemic environment and its priorities agenda. However, “world-order policies such as the one exemplified by the League of Nations after World War I and the UN after WW II, failed because their authors assumed that peace could be created by political will and that all sovereign governments shared the same basic goals of international peace and domestic prosperity. But the world is not the same everywhere. Governments in the zones of turmoil tend, for many reasons, to have different purposes and priorities than do governments in the zones of peace... Promoting peace in the zones of turmoil is a matter for generations not for a single administration.” 64

The above suggestion portrays the priority and urgency divergence between Greece and its partners and the particular security setting within which Greek officials operated, as well as the security dilemmas they faced. An alternative policy for Greece would be to adopt the “pilot-fish behaviour”, meaning a policy fully compatible with that of the most powerful EC/EU states, or the “anti-balance of power behaviour”. 65 In such a case systemic peculiarities would have to be ignored while the domestic factor of exercising foreign policy would have to be affected in order to allow changes in policy orientation.

GEOGRAPHY AND [MIS]PERCEPTION OF THREATS

To provide an explanation for self-help prone Greek foreign policy in the Balkans and the country’s inability to agree with its European partners’ policies one should scrutinize the concept of insecurity or perception of threat and take into account the psychological effects of this perception (an operational prerequisite). Similar psychological parameters are of paramount importance since “in international society it is beliefs about that situation (and the attitude of the actors), rather than the reality, which will determine the course of action” 66 to be adopted.

The beliefs and [mis]perceptions of Greek policy-makers, concerning evaluation of threats and their intensity, along with the search for security, were the qualitative determinants of the adopted policy. However, as “the inaccuracy of perception in international society affects the effectiveness of the action taken”, 67 it should be pointed out that Greek policy reflected the degree of accuracy of threat perception of Greek policy-makers within a particular structural setting.

Thomas Schelling claims that, “the extent of knowledge we have of other actors may determine how far the action we take is rational and how far, in the long term, maximizes our interests”. 68 The aforementioned suggestion may imply that either Greek policy was formulated within a limited knowledge framework or an irrational axis or that its European partners ignored perceived threats due to limited understanding of the limitations geography imposes on foreign policy drawing.
A perceptual model for scrutinising Greek-other EC/EU states incompatibilities in the Balkans should first look at the target of the perceived threats. Seen under this spectrum, divergence in goal setting and foreign policy norms may be exacerbated by the fact that certain threats or perceptions of threats are (in)directly related to parts of national territory with an enhanced emotional and historical value, since, “although as a rule states will contest all challenges to their territorial integrity, some pieces of territory are clearly more valuable than others”.\textsuperscript{69} This suggestion underpins the contending, and at times conflicting, angles of approaching security issues, the ambiguity of naming threats, as well as their sentimental and historical value for local communities. This very fact, at least in part, provides explanation for Greece’s motives in adopting uncooperative policies in the Balkans, although the current analysis does not aim at rationalising or purging non-constructive policies.

To most Western European policy-makers, the Greek policy, particularly in the Yugoslav crisis and the “Macedonian Issue”, was irrational and uncooperative, though the very concept of irrationality was not common between Greece and the rest of the EC/EU states. Eventually, “irrationality can imply a disorderly and inconsistent value system, faulty calculation, an inability to receive messages or to communicate efficiently”.\textsuperscript{70} Divergence, stemming from the existence of opposed value systems, may lead to misunderstandings, concerning the motives of the states. Furthermore, Greek-other EC/EU states often incompatible strategies were exacerbated by both sides’ inability to receive and send messages in a communicative way, due to different motives, priorities and perceptions.

**CONCLUSION: DEFINING ELEMENTS OF GREEK FOREIGN POLICY INCOMPATIBILITY AND ITS SIDE-EFFECTS**

This analysis has focused on a number of factors that define state international behaviour and the adoption of self-help policies such as geography, threat [mis]perception, proximity to flashpoints, history as a qualitative determinant of national attitudes as well as the lack of an advanced political culture with enhanced conflict resolution and accommodating capacity. Among these, the geographical element of foreign policy drawing constitutes a defining factor for the adoption or elimination of alternative choices.

In the case of Greek policy in the Balkans during the 1990s geography operated as the qualitative element for defining threats, their perceptions and intensity. Eventually it structurally imposed a mental model of looking into regional issues and resulted in Greece adopting a policy incompatible with the policy of its European partners. It prevented the adoption of a concrete, compliant with the rest EC/EU, cooperative, and eufunctional policy for a number of reasons related to structure, the policies of intrusive actors, domestic politics variables, and cultural elements.

First, the post-Cold War emergence of a new subordinate system in the Balkans constituted by its operating mode an unstable geographical and operational milieu leading Greece to formulate a nationalised foreign policy under the impact of the structural elements of its near abroad. This is reflected by the different agendas and priorities set by EC/EU members and may explain, to a certain degree, why threat perceptions between Greece and the other
EC/EU states often did not coincide, leading the Greek administrations to adopt incompatible policies, magnified by contending strategic perceptions and influenced by geographical variables.

Geography defines security to a considerable degree, as “it conditions, shapes, and influences the course of a polity’s historical choices”, particularly in those regions or sub-systems which are politically and culturally divided and eventually Balkanised. Under a statist prism, Greek interests in the Balkans were perceived as related to the survival of the country, a fact that, at times of crises, drove the Greek political elite to adopt non-co-operative approaches to regional issues or to even become part of the destabilising processes.

Second, the Balkan subordinate system did not operate in a eufunctional way due to the interference of intrusive actors and particularly the antagonism between European actors and the U.S. The intrusive system and out-of-system interference played a catalytic role in the internal balance of the Balkan subordinate system and its operating mode as well as the capacity of Greece’s European partners to accommodate Greek security worries. This did not assist Greece to become a stability chain in the power and security vacuum in the 1990s Balkans, since, in the Greek view, stabilising-oriented input marginalised Greek interests and downgraded actual, potential or perceived threats. Although Greek intransigence cannot be underestimated, powerful intrusive actors may also be held co-responsible for Balkan instability and the magnification of Greek insecurities, as “the West has always found it difficult to devise adequate geopolitical concepts for Eastern Europe”.

Third, Greek policy did not adapt to the new period of the transitional phase of international and above all regional politics. The lack of stabilising mechanisms that would absorb insecurity side-effects during the early transitional phase in Balkan politics affected Greece’s international behaviour heavily. Greek policy became at times uncooperative in its quest for security, which is “a perennial goal... [as] all foreign policies of all states are basically influenced by it [security]”. Security policy is driven by threat perceptions and the notion of national interest, which is catalytic when it affects actual or assumed irreducible national interests related to the survival of the state. Greece adopted non-constructive policies, since perceived non-negotiable interests were formulated within a zone of turmoil, a systemic setting that became a major hindrance to adopting non-zero sum policies.

Fourth, Greek policy-makers assumed that they could not expect a priori their European partners to fully acknowledge Greek security worries, an anticipation that could not be materialised, since it did not take into considerations the particular and at times conflicting national interests of the other EC/EU states in the Balkans. This implies that Greek foreign policy did not function in a national priorities vacuum and failed to converge with the interests of the other European actors due to zone dissimilarities and urgency. Divergence in the perception of threat between Greece and the other EU states in the 1990s was at times schismatic, while the contrasting operating frameworks within which the contending parties (Greece-other EC/EU) functioned set a de facto conflictual operational setting. At this point geography defined policies, attitudes, perceptions, misperceptions, and eventual alterna-
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tive policies. Even if the perception of threat was the same, its intensity was different, which was a qualitative structure-stemming characteristic of paramount importance. This set an incompatible zone-related framework for approaching regional issues and led to conflicting policies. Eventually proximity or non-proximity to the Balkan subordinate system defined courses of action and reaction to particular policies.

Finally, besides the geography and structure-oriented elements that critically defined Greek foreign policy choices one should take into consideration the peculiarities of domestic politics, the effects of domestic public opinion and their catalytic impact on foreign policy issues. Public opinion imposed operational limits on diplomatic efforts to resolve bilateral issues. The above parameters constitute useful evaluation criteria in the process of analysing the foreign policy process and the alternatives at hand.

Conventionally it is suggested that, “while diplomacy may help to contain or temporarily diffuse disputes, this can usually only be done at a politically prohibitive price”.75 The inflexibility of the Greek political elite, functioning under the catalytic pressure of domestic politics, brought Greek policy-makers to a dead end. This appears to comply with the suggestion that, within the foreign policy domain, “the choices will also be affected by the procedures and processes through which selections are made”.76

Under the impact of a geographically-defined operational setting, the realities of the domestic environment, and the maximalistic tendencies of the actors involved in regional disputes, the adopted policies eliminated alternative foreign policy choices and the prospects of compromise. As a result, the Greek political elite constructed an agenda of perceived or assumed national interests, which brought it on a collision course with its partners.

The division into two security zones makes a critical qualitative distinction between security issues in the two zones: distinction between non-military threats and actual, potential or [mis]perceived threats to the survival of a country.77 This distinction differentiates Greece in a zone “agitated by powerful [centrifugal] forces that are difficult to recognise and essentially impossible to control”.78

Endnotes


6 Central European states escaped this arrangement and adapted to the new politico-economic given, transforming their politico-economic systems in an orderly way, without the catastrophic and destabilizing processes adopted by the Balkan states.
8 As suggested, “history plays a catalytic role in zones of turmoil, as it is the case of the Balkans”.
9 Ibid., p. 6.
10 Ibid., p. 23.
12 In the study of comparative national policies integration is defined, inter alia, as “creating a sense of territorial nationality which overshadows-or eliminates-subordinate parochial loyalties”. See Weiner Myron (1967), “Political Integration and Political Development”. In: Welch C. (ed.), Political Modernization. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co., p. 150.
13 See Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel, op. cit., p. 12.
14 In the case of the EU, political integration may be broadly defined as “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” and is seen either as a process or a means. See Haas Ernst (1958), The Uniting of Europe. Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 16.
15 As noted, “the rich and peaceful countries are all democracies”, a suggestion that depicts the socio-political and economic situation in zones of peace. See Singer Max & Wildavsky Aaron, op. cit., p. 37.
16 Ibid., p. 3.
17 Ibid., p. 22.
18 Ibid., p. 3.
19 See Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel, op. cit., p. 6.
20 Ibid., p. 3.
24 The concept aimed at facilitating regional security analysis and pinpointing the variables affecting inter-state relations, namely geography, history and proximity that play a decisive role in the formulation of foreign policy choices within a particular security environment.
30 Ibid.
32 Ibid., p. 96.
33 Ibid., p. 93.
34 Indicative as well as revealing is the estimation made by the CIA, the Intelligence Organisations of the Department of State and the Joint Staff in mid-1950s, according to which “foreign influences play an important role in the Greek political system”. See Foreign Relations of the United States 1955–1957, Vol. XXIV, No. 276, National Intelligence Estimate, 18-1-1955, p. 528.
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37 See Barry Buzan and Morten Kelstrup, op. cit., p. 96.
40 Ibid., p. 22.
41 Ibid., p. 23.
42 Ibid., p. 24.
43 Ibid., pp. 23–24.
45 See Peter Mangold (1990), National Security and International Relations. London: Routledge, p. 3.
47 See Barry Buzan and Morten Kelstrup, op. cit., p. 88.
52 The economic backwardness of the Balkans turned the port of Thessaloniki into the apple of discord for local peoples. See Arnold J. Toynbee (1928), Survey of International Affairs 1926. London: Oxford University Press and Royal Institute of International Affairs, pp. 165–177.
55 The name FYROM will be used in events described after the 1995 Interim Agreement between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia.
58 See Peter Mangold, op. cit., p. 12.
59 This has been a diachronic hindrance to development in the post-Second World War era. As noted as early as the mid-1950s, “...it is improbable that a politically acceptable standard of living can be maintained without some form of economic assistance unless there is reduction in Greece’s contribution to its defence budget”. See Foreign Relations of the United States 1955–1957, Vol. XXIV, Washington: US Government Printing Office, No. 276, 1989, National Intelligence Estimate. The Outlook for Greece, 18 January 1955, pp. 527–528.
62 Ibid., p. 34.
67 Ibid., p. 45.
69 See Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, The National Security Problem in International Relations, op. cit., p. 63.
70 See Thomas Schelling, op. cit., p. 16.
73 See Lawrence Freedman, op. cit., p. 12.
74 See P. Reynolds, op. cit., p. 51.
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TWO SECURITY ZONES: WHY IS GREEK FOREIGN POLICY SO DIFFERENT?


Christien van den Anker:
The Political Economy of New Slavery


The editor of this book, Christien van den Anker, is lecturer at the Centre for the Study of Global Ethics at Birmingham University, where she focuses on the intersection of international normative theory, globalisation, and human rights. She is a convenor of the British International Studies Association’s Working Group on Global Ethics.

This book is the result of a workshop that took place at the Centre for the Study of Global Ethics at Birmingham University in 2002. It is a collection of independent analyses related to contemporary slavery. The term contemporary slavery is used here mainly because it is a powerful and vocative word that draws rapid attention to the drastic need for the public and governments to act to end it.

Part I, containing the first two chapters, is entitled Causes and Perspectives. Part II, Cases and Recommendations, contains chapters three through nine, and the third and final part, Strategies and Frameworks for Change, contains chapters ten to thirteen. As a whole, the book provides analyses of current forms of slavery in various parts of the world connected with globalisation and migration. The use of terminology in this field is explained. A number of chapters together provide a good overview of current international law and policies against slavery, offering a wide range of possible strategies for such efforts.

This work appears to be the first contemporary collection of analyses on modern-day slavery and the effects of migration and economy on its many forms – human trafficking, bonded labour, human smuggling as result of illegal immigration, etc. Much has been written on slavery as a historical phenomenon – abolished many years ago – without recognising that it is still flourishing in many parts of the globalised world. In addition, a number of publications have been released on the topic of human trafficking – as it is an issue brought into open debate only recently – but these works have mainly summarised the situation, and lacked empirical evidence. In comparison, the authors in this collection have contrived to use groundbreaking approaches their analyses of slavery and its forms.

In Chapter 1, entitled “Contemporary Slavery, Global Justice and Globalisation”, the author and editor of the entire collection, Christien van den Anker, writes about the concept of contemporary slavery, providing the reader with its roots, and the development of acts associated with it. She identifies the word slavery as such. According to her, slavery is one of the results of globalisation. She defines globalisation from a political standpoint as a long-term political project. Examples of the effects of globalisation on contemporary forms of slavery are discussed in detail. The issue of slavery is also analysed from the perspective of the moral wrong of it.1 International law banning
Slavery is an important asset here, and a number of examples of countries are given to illustrate the gaps in the international system, concluding with five principles to guide policy-making. As author of the first essay, it is unfortunate that some of the information given seems contrary to the current situation of victim protection in many EU countries. She wrongly states that the only countries where victims of trafficking are offered legal means to stay are Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain. Most EU countries, including the Czech Republic, have now implemented a functioning system of victim support, cooperating with local NGOs and the International Organisation for Migration to assure a combination of victim reintegration and trafficker persecution.

Chapter 2 is entitled “Migration and Security: The Wrong End of the Stick?” and is written by Jeroen Doomernik, Program Manager and Lecturer at the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, University of Amsterdam. He connects slavery with the migration flows created after the collapse of the Communist block. Migration is a security issue in the globalised world. The national interests of states facing asylum seekers are compared with global interests. Illegal migration in the form of people smuggling is explained, and the different ways of reaching a final destination identified. Doomernik argues that increased border security causes an increase in organised crime, and leads to its strengthening. As solution, he offers liberalisation and an opening of borders. By doing that, the countries in question would cause the international groups of organised crime to go out of business, so the money formerly used to combat it could be used in many other ways. Doomernik’s theory comes at a time when states are strengthening border controls, and trends show that this is what they currently prefer. As self-critique, he admits that many countries may not currently be prepared to do what he suggests. He also makes the fairly brave statement that the Iraqi government might have been involved in, and profited from, ridding itself of dissidents by providing easy access to smugglers. Such a suggestion deserves more exploration and evidence.

David Ould, Director of Anti-Slavery International, is author of Chapter 3, entitled “Trafficking and International Law”, giving a historical overview of the connections between human trafficking and slavery. Different forms of slavery and exploitation caused by trafficking are listed, acknowledging the problematic availability of statistical data, and calling for increased research and investigation. Ould further describes the changing patterns of women-trafficking, and the first definitions of trafficking and smuggling, distinguishing between these two terms. He also explores the international protocols outlawing trafficking. A classification of trafficked women is provided based on their previous awareness of the type of their future occupation, which is particularly important when determining whether any one is or is not a victim of trafficking. Steps taken by individual states to help victims are outlined, noting that many still act for their own benefit. Most importantly, Ould introduces the idea that individual states should provide victims with the capability to bring civil claims for compensation against their traffickers, as well as with sufficient economic support to prevent them from being re-trafficked. The idea of civil claims against the trafficker is a breaking point that seems very difficult at present, given the psychological pressure on the vic-
tim and lengthy asylum procedures. This should, however, be incorporated into the work of NGOs and governmental victim social programs in the future. Furthermore, since Ould suggests a form of financial support for the victim, it would be appropriate to suggest where this financial support should come from, which he does not.

Victoria Firmo-Fontan, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at Sabanci University, Turkey, is the author of Chapter 5, on “Responses to Sexual Slavery: From the Balkans to Afghanistan”. Although little is written about Afghanistan, a very attention-grabbing point is made here by labelling the trade of women an unfortunate result of peace. Peace and war are the core phenomena here, with the study of their influence on societal behaviour and perceptions of trafficking and its results, especially with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina. International missions in this region should be a positive element there, she says, when instead they are often involved in the issue of trafficking, yet are also frequent guests to local brothels. That international missions and programs are often disorganised, and their members often undereducated about trafficking, is very important here.

Chapter 6, entitled “Migrant Domestic Workers and Slavery”, was written by Bridget Anderson, of the Institute for Social and Cultural Anthropology of the University of Oxford, and a worker for the Kalayaan organisation. Her paper analyses the possible means of exploiting migrant domestic workers, placing them in connection with the particular social standards people tend to adopt, and calling for us to examine our own attitudes towards slavery and its victims: “The confinement of tasks to those merely necessary for individual survival would enable most productive workers to service themselves. ...It is necessary work in that without domestic work humanity would not continue.” Changes to the current visa, immigration, and labour codes are criticised and examples of how potential victims can protect themselves are given. Although Anderson is correct when stating that most migrant domestic workers are women, we must not forget the small percentage of men that fall prey to their employers. Almost the entire paper operates with the pronoun, which I view somewhat incorrect.

Chapter 8 was written by Rachel Nizan, graduate of London Institute of Latin American Studies, and is titled “Child Labour in Latin America: Issues and Policies in Honduras”. Yet the chapter offers a new look at childhood, and how its perceptions vary globally. Nizan explains two theories of the relationship between children and work: one that the two are incompatible, and the other that children have the right to work and that work gives them a status in society. “These skills would basically prepare children for adulthood, which was seen much more as a gradual process and not a complete separation of childhood and adulthood, as it often is perceived in the West. These skills develop the child’s sense of belonging and a sense of responsibility...Child labour is acceptable, as long as the child is not subjected to hazardous and exploitative forms of work.” Nizan also works with two terms – child work and child labour – clarifying the need to differentiate between the two. All of the above is demonstrated with the example of Honduras.

Amanda Berlan, research student at the Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology of Oxford University, is author of Chapter 9, entitled “Child...
Labour, Education, and Child Rights among Cocoa Producers in Ghana*. The chapter gives a detailed description of Ghana’s cocoa industry, including the reasons for poverty and child labour there, warning against certain myths that sponsors of free trade have created. Berlan identifies Ghanaian culture, with all its particularities affecting child labour, as well as the particular status of children there. She warns against the common idea that education is for children a viable alternative to work, stating the contrary: “Many children see caning as part of school life in the same way as learning to read or write, and never question this practice because they have grown accustomed to it. The experience of children in rural Ghana indicates a need to remain pragmatic when promoting school attendance. It also reinforces the need to improve conditions in deprived schools in order to make education a real alternative to child labour.” 5)

Van den Anker states that the main aim of this book is to contribute towards an ending of contemporary slavery. She achieves that by providing analyses of current forms of slavery, introducing the results of recent empirical research and providing strategies and frameworks for change. The education of the world about the evils of global slavery is a worthy and just cause. If politicians, academics and policy-makers read these essays, they would find a wealth of informed articles and a good overview of international law and policy-making on which to base their decisions. One of the main thrusts of the book is that we cannot be complacent in the fight against global slavery. The book shows how, through innovative methods, this problem can be tackled. Yet there are some issues in this book to the detriment of this cause. These are repeated definitions of slavery-related terms, statistical data from international organisations, and listings of international legal documents, and also some minor inaccuracies concerning the current systems of combating trafficking in selected countries.

The collection is a valuable resource for students, academics, NGO workers, or anyone who wishes to gain good overall knowledge of the global human trafficking situation and forms of slavery. Also, that the currently equally used terms of Kosovo and Kosova are spelled here as Kosov@ is gratifying to advocates of correct terminology. The Political Economy of New Slavery is a worthy book that deserves to be read to educate the public about global slavery more effectively. Despite its minor flaws, it is recommended.

Tereza Němcová

ENDNOTES

2 Ibid., p. 93.
3 Ibid., pp. 109–110.
4 Ibid., p. 142.
5 Ibid., p. 174.
Globalising the “rest of the world” is a challenging task at the time of general controversy over globalisation’s transformations – amplifying uniformity across the world’s regions culturally, politically, and economically. This volume, issued in 2003, demonstrates that globalisation has gone a great distance, entering and probing the pores of the “developing societies”. The book’s method centres around explorations of the forms of globalisation and attempts at resistance, or as a minimum, resilience to globalisation, in the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Egypt, Russia and Latin America (Venezuela and Brazil).

As indicated by editors Andreas Boeckh and Harald Barrios in their introduction “Resistance to Globalization: A Comparison of Three World Regions”, the volume, which is the outcome of a conference, encompasses articles and studies written by political scientists, economists, and geographers of various levels and sources of “resistance to globalization” by political scientists, economists, and geographers. Unfortunately, the editors overlooked giving other details about the conference which gathered these experts; as a result we are denied information about its time, place and occasion. Using the word “resistance” according to a double meaning, as an “active, intentional resistance to tendencies rejected on political and moral grounds by presenting alternative discourses and concepts founded in specific cultural and national traditions” (p. 3), or as a resilience “in a sense that traditional patterns of development and politics are resistant to change” (p. 4), they try to show how such processes vary and the results of globalisation are very different across regions. For practical reasons, this volume is organised in three parts, according to the spotlighted region. While correctly indicating that the frequency of globalisation as a term has almost “beaten [it] to death by overuse”, the editors insist on the uniqueness of the subject of their conference, which focuses on empirical findings showing highly differentiated patterns of globalisation in different regions. The adjustments are made both ways – countries are remoulding to the requirements of the globalised world, and globalisation impulses are adjusting to regional, national and sub-national economic and political patterns.

In the opening article Martin Beck gives, as he calls it, a “mainstream research on globalization” in the Middle East, a region which has been fairly neglected by the general research done on globalisation. Examining the development of its three major indicators – the spread of internet hosts, the growth of exports, and the development of FDI – in comparison with other world regions, and considering the background of authoritarian regimes and “petrolism”, he seeks to explain intra-regional differences, and the influence of political and cultural factors on perceptions of globalisation as a threat.
Beyond the challenging title “Globalization as one way street? The case of the Islamic Republic of Iran” emerges a study of “the only country in world where Islam has officially become the foundation of the society and the government” (p. 41). Henner Furtig goes as far as 1979/80, during the Iranian revolution, to explain the ideas and credo of its leader, Ayatollah Khomeini: “Rely on the culture of the Islam, resist Western imitation, and stand on your own feet” (p. 35) as pan Islamic and anti-globalist. In opposition to the West, “the dominant global power responsible for all the existing injustices, inequalities and misfortunes in the world” (p. 47), and at the same time rivalling the East and communism, Iran promotes a revitalised and politicised Islam as the one and only alternative for every true Muslim, consequently becoming an Islamic “counter-globalisation” force, which “deserves its name since it is directed at the entire globe” (p. 48).

In her essay, Sonja Hegasy concentrates on the debate on cultural globalisation from the Arab perspective, trying to deal with the usage of the terms McDonaldisation, Marlborosation and Dollarisation (in other words, Americanisation), as the reality emerging from globalisation, as suggested by Sherif Hetata in his article “Dollarization, Fragmentation, and God”. This is actually Hegasy’s attempt to debate with Hetata on consumerism, on the aggressiveness of the West in creating global culture, global needs and values, and his idea of self-exclusion from the Global Village as a form of resistance to globalisation.

In her case study of Egypt, Ivesa Lubben studies the idea of morality as a central notion in the Egyptian discourse at the turn of the millennium, a development which can also be extended to other Middle East rentier-states. Lubben investigates the changing notions and dilemmas of Egyptian society, which has found the best strategy for dealing with globalisation by using morality – and not just any morality, but the sexual morality defined by Foucault.

The second part of the book, called “Russia”, explores in four essays the non-transparency and globalisation in Russia, beginning with “Russia’s unwritten rules” (Alena V. Ledeneva), moving on to an analysis of globalisation as an intellectual puzzle in the discourses and practices of the Russian Elites in “Eurasianism”, perhaps the strongest anti-globalist intellectual stream (Andray S. Makarychev), then elucidating the process of anti-globalisation under transformation and the administrative barriers in the Russian economy at the turn of the millennium (Andrei Shastitko), and finally outlining the socio-economic cleavage of “open” and “closed” Russian regions and their specific modes of resistance to globalisation (Natalie Zubarevich). This section analyses in-depth the different levels of Russia’s post-soviet society and the struggle of political and economic actors to find ways to cope with the global market, global competition, and the urge to confront globalisation. The section thereby presents a striking portrait of a society torn between resistance and adaptation. In Russia individual forms of globalisation diffuse from leading city-centres to the periphery, which display somewhat vague and shifting borders, depending on institutional barriers, incomes and the extent of modernisation.

In the two final essays the authors study two cases in Latin America. Andreas Boeckh (one of the editors of the volume) examines Venezuela and its painful (in an almost literal meaning of the word) transition, caused by the difficulty of
its rentier state status, and the interaction between the globalisation and neopopulist regression there. Then Jorg Faust writes about Brazil and globalisation with its federal circumstances. The different political currents and reforms, old economic rules, corruption, and international players like OPEC, the IMF and World Bank have created grounds for both disaster as well as for improvement in the new democracies and market economies of Latin America.

The highlighting of the effects on globalisation of the September 11th attacks by many authors is somewhat eye-catching: From Sonja Hegasy suggesting that the September 11th attacks were the result of globalisation perceived as cultural imperialism (p. 65), to Henner Furtig implying the contradiction in the condemnation by the president, minister for foreign affairs, and the entire cabinet of the Islamic Republic of Iran “immediately after the terrorist attacks against the visible symbols of economic and financial as well as military might of the most powerful Western country” (p. 34).

Similarly important is the tone of most authors (with one or two exceptions), which is startling in either promoting or at least defending globalisation, and there is a visible tendency to wards underestimation and mockery in discussing the anti-globalisation movement, its ideas and followers. In this regard even the title of the book is somewhat misleading. If by Resistance to Globalization one expects more anti-globalisation rhetoric, here we have more pro-globalisation views instead. The only style-related difficulty for the “non-expert” reader is the extensive usage of economic terms in some of the essays, although clearly this is aimed at providing a more credible analysis.

This is a biased yet very informative volume. The volume’s less than 180 pages offer economic and statistic figures, political and economic analyses, and information and facts about the Middle East, Egypt, and Iran, Venezuela and Brazil. A deep and thorough analysis of many aspects of Russia, a gigantic and complex country, caps the wealth of information provided. Furthermore, the authors all make great use of references, demonstrating their serious and analytical approach to the issue.

The essays answer at a grand scale the questions posed by the editors in the introduction, concerning the different degrees and patterns of integration for three very different regions (Latin America, the Middle East and Eastern Europe). The essays de facto contradict the assumption of rapid homogenisation across different types of economies and political systems, with which the globalisation is usually charged. On the other hand, the book studies whether we are ‘already dealing with some kind of anti-global backlash, emphasising regional and national idiosyncrasies’ (p. 3), as the editors (Boeckh/Barrios) postulate. Hence, this book is immensely useful for those researching and studying economical and political developments in the regions of interest, and furthermore as a guide to the march of globalisation in the world in general.

Gabriela Jovanoska

ENDNOTES

The fundamental transformation effecting a complete change of economic order in twenty-seven countries, with more than 400 million inhabitants, happening over roughly the past fifteen years and even in some cases continuing today, has its counterpart in the theoretical reflection on economic processes. The low relevance and poor applicability of various classic textbooks have been shown in frequent dependencies on a range of silent assumptions, counting on a more-or-less smooth functioning of an economy’s necessary institutional network. This situation introduced new impulses for the so-called institutional economics, a discipline bridging economic theory and social science and concerning itself with the economic evolution of all relevant institutions (in the broadest sense of the word), and their influence on an economy’s functioning.

The above-mentioned processes gave rise to the so-called new political economics, which attempts to analyse the interactions between the economic and political spheres and their ramifications for economic development and the development of society, using the analytical framework of institutional economics. However, the new political economics does not incorporate the radical criticism to the existing economic systems that is close to some schools of institutional economics. On the contrary, it struggles for a synthesis of the “...liberal approach of economic systems... with historically informed institutional analysis”.\(^1\) László Csaba as the author of the reviewed book associates himself with this school of economics, also called neoclassical political economy, understanding the book as his contribution to the subject and its methods of analysis. The aim of the analysis is “to highlight developmental, regional and post-Communist specific features of economic processes”,\(^2\) although the main goal of the analysis could be considered the effort at “endogenizing the state and collective action, as well as introducing these in the standard analysis in order to produce policy relevant and interesting new outcomes”.\(^3\)

The first chapter, following quite an extensive, methodologically focused introduction, is entitled A Comparative Overview of Empirical Evidence. It aims to organise the large and sometimes labyrinthine empirical material on the development of transforming countries (Csaba most widely uses the term emerging economies). A basic comparison of the individual countries and entire regions undergoing transformation is offered, using Gross Domestic Product, Inflation, Unemployment, and External Balance as the main indicators characterising the overall state and development of an economy. At the end of the chapter, the author proposes a few preliminary conclusions, expanding and discussing them further in the following chapters. Amongst other things, he forms certain criteria of success and failure of the transformations of individual countries, and suggests a division of them into the groups of frontrunners
and laggards. He fully acknowledges the opinion in texts on transformations that fulfilling the basic set of reforms referred to as SLIP (stabilisation, liberalisation, institution building and privatisation) is the necessary prerequisite for a successful economic transformation. He also states that "...with the time passing the relevance of the Communist legacy diminishes", as individual countries gradually become members of the respective parts of the global economy, depending on their socio-economic characteristics. The chapter is ended with a complex series of tables illustrating the development of all basic macro-economic quantities in all the transforming countries, as well as some others.

The next chapter deals with the so-called development dimension of the post-communist transformation, or – more simply – its ability to launch the growth and development necessary for boosting transforming countries’ economies and living standards. The author offers quite a scathing criticism of various ideologically motivated, dogmatic and inflexible approaches to the basic transformation tasks: “Uncritical reliance on standard, pre-cooked solutions, coupled with ideological postulates stressing speed over quality, and instrumentalizing the concept of spontaneous institution emergence for trivial political ends, often swept away any attempt at analyzing local conditions on their own right. This led to a neglect of those contextual circumstances which decide about the success or failure of the application of a proven theoretical insight to policy-making.”

Csaba supports a market-based approach to development based on connections into global economic processes. At the same time, he realizes the great importance of the role of the state and the public sphere for a successful modern economy: “It is worth emphasizing that a market-based approach to development is by no means equivalent to the revival of the "night watchman state" ideal. Instead of preaching the minimal state, a strong state is required: one constrained by constitutional, legal, procedural and other democratic checks and balances.”

The following chapter gives the author’s opinion on the widely perceived and debated contradiction regarding the transforming countries; that of the functioning transnational markets on one side and the strictly localised framework of the existing political sphere on the other. He is quite sceptical about the term globalisation, which he considers "...overused, non-specified and emotionally loaded" and "...has become a much too widespread label" and proposes to use the term transnationalization instead, “...in line with the vocabulary of international relations”. Although he considers the process incontestable and inevitable, Csaba believes that the actual ways of functioning of individual economies and societies, as well as people’s quality of life, are decided mainly on the level of individual states: "...transnational processes themselves are not decisive. It is the way local politics interacts with these that shapes the outcomes in the longer run".

Nevertheless, in the following chapter, “Globalization” and “Europeanization”: A Double challenge for Emerging Europe, Csaba accepts that there are global issues, challenges that demand a unified response by western states and their allies. These include international terrorism and the spread of HIV. However, Csaba also includes in this list the so-called localization of
some aspects of life and people’s thinking. This localisation sparks some negative outcomes in culture and the media: “...in the political and information flows there is a tendency to focus on the funny at the cost of the important. Infotainment is dominant over analyses, and the survival of public broadcasting stations, as well as of major quality papers has been questioned.” The author seemingly has much less confidence in market forces here (the development of the media is decisively influenced by market forces) than in the major portion of the book. At the same time, however, he does not offer any solutions to remedy or reverse this problem.

Another chapter looks at relations between transforming countries and the EU. The author examines the degree to which the process of preparing for EU accession helped solve basic transformation tasks. On one hand, he accepts the important role the EU played as an institutional anchor for candidate countries, keeping them on the necessary course for further development. On the other hand, however, he criticises the EU’s contemporary regulation framework. Some EU policies are singled out for criticism, especially the common agricultural policy and regional policies: “recent empirical studies could not establish any positive correlation between the amounts drawn from EU funds and the relative position of the recipient regions”. At the same time, Csaba comes out in favour of a “...re-orientation of common agricultural policy to environment-friendly and rural development projects”. In this chapter Csaba commits a minor inexactitude regarding the motives for the Czech Republic’s territorial reorganisation in 1997. This was not an effort to create entities complying with the NUTS 2 regional division, as in Poland, but rather a compromise resulting from the momentary balance of power among urban political representatives, justified by a very tenuous link to the traditional historic regions.

The next chapter examines European integration from a very different angle. It is a debate of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), about which there has been much recent criticism and equivocation. The chapter discusses the Pact’s importance for the new EU member states, concluding that although the SGP is imperfect (he summarises his mild criticisms in six points), some form of such a pact is inevitable in the future to guarantee the stability of the common currency: “...the idea of creating at least some soft form of a ‘straitjacket’, that is institutional anchoring and procedural rules for the EU, especially if stability of the single currency is a supreme joint objective, may hardly be questioned on academic grounds”. For the new member states, the SGP could also represent a new institutional anchor to replace the now obsolete one, the achievement of full EU membership. This new anchor could have a similar disciplinary influence on the states’ fiscal and monetary policies. The author considers accepting the common currency an absolute priority in the new member states, and one in perfect compliance with the Maastricht criteria. There are at least three key reasons: Accepting the currency union rules institutionalises low inflation and healthy public finances, which by itself is a value and a prerequisite for a successful economic development; this will contribute to creating a favourable climate for investment; and also has a political meaning, since staying outside the Eurozone necessarily introduces a second-rate membership into the Union. Here the public fiscal deficit in
the Czech Republic and two other Central European countries is also studied. The 2004 state budget deficit, at 12.9 percent of GDP, appears ominous at first but can be interpreted neither outside the context of the difficult methodology of the indicator’s counting, nor without the data on previous deficits, or the following ones (which, of course, the author had no access to). With hindsight, the year in question witnessed a concurrence of several negative circumstances (e.g. the consequences of generously provided government liabilities to commercial banks) that did not recur in following years.

Two chapters offer territorial perspectives. The first gives a broad and up-to-date analysis of the economic and social transformation in Russia. Both pros and cons are juxtaposed in a very correct and objective manner, alongside the country’s successes and failures over the course of its transformation. Despite all the specifics and paradoxes here, the country does not present an inexplicable problem on the basis of the standard theoretical approaches. The chapter is complemented with a quite extensive table illustrating the country’s economic development from various viewpoints since the mid-1990s.

The second territorial chapter, bearing the somewhat provocative title of Market Socialism: The Viable Impossible? draws attention to another important phenomenon of world economy – China. Overall, it can be said that the success – in terms of growth dynamics – of the economic reforms continuing for more than two decades in China can be ascribed mainly to the country’s unique factors, such as its long tradition of decentralisation, the Chinese trade spirit, and the contribution of the vast Chinese diaspora, etc.

The last two chapters present a conclusion of the book. Entitled Privatization, Regulation and Regulated Markets and Institutions and Growth: What is the Nexus? they allow the author to summarise and elaborate upon his ideas and conclusions. The author states that the main goal of the book was to put the analysis of transforming countries into the context of general economic theory, especially the theory of growth: “The study of emerging economies has perhaps contributed, though to a limited degree, to clarifying and understanding these more general considerations of economic theory.” The author also indicates the future direction of his further research.

László Csaba has done a great deal of precise scientific work, creating a very consistent text summarising the up-to-date theoretic reflections on the transformation process (the amount of sources is impressive) and putting them into the analytic framework of institutional economics. At some points he departs from analysis in favour of forming more concrete suggestions. The gist of his economic-political suggestions lies in – put as briefly as possible – bringing individual countries at the broadest possible level into global economic processes capable of shattering all relations based on patronage, “crony” relations, etc.: “...success is indeed directly related to joining the global processes.” Another characteristic of the book is Csaba’s firm agreement with institutionalism (“A civilized market is one constitutionally constrained and protected”), yet he vacillates between criticising the political leaders of transforming countries for neglecting some tasks when creating necessary institutions and regulatory mechanisms, and querying whether it was actually possible to manage them all under the chaotic conditions of transformation.
Despite the overall sound analytical approach, the reviewer cannot help feeling that in some cases, the author has been influenced by an ideological worldview. Probably the most striking example of such an approach may be the author’s “dealing” with the issues of employees’ co-decision in Germany and other European countries. The author claims that “co-decision rights and other corporatist practices... are to blame for much of Western European unemployment,” which he backs up by asserting that the European Commission makes steps purportedly against this institution. His assertion is supported by referring to Handelsblatt, November 11, 2004. We should add that in the mentioned issue of the German newspaper, there is no article corroborating any resistance of the Commission to the German system of co-decision. The newspaper only contains reports on the negotiations of the German government with its European partners on how to apply this right in the case of amalgamations of German companies with those from different EU member states.

The reviewed book is not aimed – due to its high readability – only at theoreticians in the field. It can also educate and inspire a wider group of interested parties like officials, politicians, journalists, as well as anyone who is simply willing to better understand social development.

Jan Hřích

ENDNOTES

2 Ibid., p. 18.
3 Ibid., p. 17.
4 See ibid., p. 62.
5 Ibid., p. 62.
6 Ibid., p. 83.
7 Ibid., p. 94.
8 Ibid., p. 102.
9 Ibid., p. 102.
10 See ibid, pp. 137–140.
11 Ibid, p. 141.
12 Ibid, p. 166.
13 Ibid, p. 62. The author, however, never mentions the likely situation of some of the most afflicted and disadvantaged regions if the EU’s structural policy did not exist from the perspective of their absolute level, which is, in the end, the decisive for people living there.
14 Csaba, László (2005), cit. op., p. 168.
16 The accepted form of self-governing regions was also criticised by various sources because they will probably be too small for the purposes of NUTS 2 regions. These fears proved correct, and for such purposes eight artificial units were created: in one case, the unit consists of three districts, in four cases of two, while three districts are identical with the NUTS 2 regions. For more on territorial reforms in the Czech Republic, see e.g. Hřích, J.; Larischová, K.: “Die Tschechische Republik – Der langwierige Weg zur Reform der öffentlichen Verwaltung”. In: *Jahrbuch des Föderalismus* 2000. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2000, pp. 358–369.
18 Ibid., p. 187.
19 See ibid., p. 199.
20 See ibid., p. 191.
21 In 2005, a “miraculous” decrease of state budget deficit to 3 percent of GDP occurred (see Czech Statistical Office: www2.czso.cz/csu/redakce.nsf/l/er:_makroekonomickie_udaje), while in 2006 the level of the deficit should have been only slightly higher. Overall, it can be said that the 2004 “excess” shows how fragile and vulnerable the Czech public finances are.
23 Ibid., p. 62, see also e.g. p. 105.
24 Ibid., p. 94.
25 See ibid., pp. 103, 108.
26 Ibid., p. 48.
27 See ibid., note 27 on p. 48.
28 The European Commission has recently supported the issuing of an extensive manual on the implementation of co-decision rights (by no means only a German “speciality”) following the implementation of the guidelines of the European joint-stock company (see Norbert Kluge; Michael Stoll /eds./: The European Company – Prospects for Workers Board-Level Participation in the Enlarged EU. Brussels: ETUI-REHS, 2006).
Due to their ethnic and religious diversities, and the histories of conflict based on the two, the former Yugoslav territories and the Caucasus are two of the most relevant areas for analyses of the development of ethnic conflicts, and their violent or non-violent resolution. In those territories, ethnicity has become territorialised, and systems of ethno-federalism became the basis for secessionism. Ethnic diversities, ethno-cultural factors and unsolved conflicts between ethnicities, unable to reveal themselves under communist regimes, blazed up after the dissolution of Yugoslavia and of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Many authors have acknowledged the collapse of the states as a key variable for explaining conflicts (p. 12). But this should not be seen as the sole explanation for conflicts and violence. Instead it should be seen as the macro-context, and an additional spark to the blaze.

The introduction to this volume, written by editors Jan Koehler and Christoph Zürcher, is a good summary of the thirteen analytical essays, and a necessary act of the editors to help the reader understand the complexity of the conflicts analysed, and the complexity of conflict as such. In the introduction we are acquainted with the role of official and unofficial institutions in the collapsed states, with social variables in the different cases, and we are introduced to the potential for conflict, violence and disorder in the territories of the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. The authors get to the point right at the beginning in explaining the problems deriving from a state’s collapse – a conflict-prone process:

“The former centrally administered society fragments into multiple societies, which have to (re-) build state administrations, (re-) draw boundaries and (re-) invent loyalties. They have to establish new institutional arrangements for self-regulation in order to ensure security, political participation and economic development after empire” (p. 1).

Institutional weakness – inevitable when it comes to state collapse – is both a cause and a consequence of violent conflict. It is used by different factors in a society, who have particular competing (economic, political and/or ideological) interests, and can develop themselves to a level of so-called unofficial institutions, and gain important positions of power in a society or a state. These factors range from single political entrepreneurs to well-structured unofficial institutions like mafia and para-state institutions, such as the “secessionist pseudo-state” (p. 46) of Herzeg-Bosna in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Following the introduction, the book focuses on the question of which parts of society have been able to use the state power vacuum for their own benefit. This can be done by manipulating both the creation of official institutions in new states and their weaknesses, enabling them to come to power, to consolidate their ideology among the people and to benefit from armed conflicts.
The first five chapters analyse the conflicts and their background in the territories of the former Yugoslavia. The authors analyse the situation in the Krajina region of Croatia (Hannes Grandits and Carolin Leutloff), the separatist Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Kristof Gosztonyi), and Kosovo and Macedonia (Norbert Mappes-Niediek). Our attention is then drawn to sometimes forgotten factors in conflict resolutions, such as the unofficial institution of the Albanian mafia (Xavier Raufer), and the historical factor in land reforms (Christian Giordano). These chapters are followed by five more analysing the situation in Dagestan and Chechnya (Enver Kisriev), Georgia (Pavel K. Baev), and Nagorno-Karabakh (Jan Koehler and Christoph Zürcher). Following the country-level approach, the Caucasus is studied regarding the development of a regional identity (Olga Vassilieva), and state society relations and conflict in post-socialist Transcaucasia (Barbara Christophe). The volume ends with three chapters: on reconciliation after ethnic cleansing (John Borneman); on interventions in markets of violence, providing insights into the economics of ending organised violence (Georg Elwert); and on the issue of institutions and the organisation of stability and violence (Jan Koehler and Christoph Zürcher).

The analysis of conflicts’ causes draws upon a mix of factors from the historical and ethno-cultural to the personality of political entrepreneurs and the institutional frameworks of official and unofficial institutions—their status, and the centralisation of power and responsibility within them. Case studies from both regions explain that there is no single or simple cause for conflict and violence. For example, the chapter on land reforms in Romania and Yugoslavia can be used as a caricature of the complexity of the cases. Land reforms were namely “aimed at changing the ethnic diversity of historically mixed regions along with disputed, changeable, uncertain and essentially unstable boundaries” (pp. 76–77), and thus represent one potential cause for contemporary ethnic conflicts.

Yet there is no simple solution for the conflicts. The case studies show that similar conflicts can end differently because the political elites act differently, as with Dagestan and Chechnya. In Dagestan, the potential conflict did not erupt because the leading ideology of the nation favoured the republic’s existing political status; the political leaders represented the nationalities of the republic as a whole, and they worked well together for the republic’s wellbeing. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Chechnya and Georgia, the official institutions were either too weak to control the unofficial ones (para-state institutions, mafia, paramilitary organisations and entrepreneurs), or the historical background, with present events, stimulated fear and intensified nationalism among the people, which was played upon by political entrepreneurs.

State collapse, the weakness of a newly established state, and the peoples’ uncertainty and fear (p. 8) all increase the possibility of violent conflict. But the social institutions on the ground also have to be taken into account when we are looking for the resolution to the conflict. Organised crime, for example, plays an important role in supporting and organising violence. The cases of Kosovo, with its well-established mafia structure, and of Georgia draw our attention to the interconnectedness of political violence and organised crime.
REVIEW

The new post-communist leadership in Georgia was unable to control the paramilitary organisations that relied entirely on illegal sources of income, similar to the UCK in Kosovo, so those organisations had a strong influence on both wars in Georgia: in Abkhazia and South-Ossetia.

Potentials of Disorder, with its wide range of material, will appeal to students, researchers and readers interested in the complexity of conflicts and the different outcomes of similar ethnic conflicts. This is a book which not only reads smoothly, but also, and more importantly, offers some solid approaches to conflict analysis.

Špela Veselič
The two authors – each of a different generation, Václav Tomek is a historian of Czech anarchism and Ondřej Slačálek is a student of political science and an anarchist by conviction – have produced a noteworthy work. Their book presents the development of anarchist ideas from their initial glimmering in shared streams of thought to their present day form. The development of anarchist political ideas is the subject matter of their study (published as the second volume of the History of Ideas series), while at the same time the biographies of the main anarchist thinkers, and the historical development of particular anarchist movements, are a constant reference.

This is reflected in the structure of the book. The main part (20 chapters) analyzes the thought of selected orthodox writers. These are followed by four chapters mapping the general development of anarchism, two chapters reviewing anarchism in the Czech lands, one on anarchism in Spain, a review of some seminal works in the domain and finally an epilogue, more in the form of an independent essay than a conclusion of the work.

The introduction to the book was written by sociologist Jan Keller, who emphasises the value of certain anarchist ideas in our present situation. The authors themselves do not treat anarchism as an historical phenomenon only of the past. Anarchism is at the outset defined as the rejection of oppression in the political, economic and cultural domains (with reference to Italian turn of the century anarchist Errico Malatesta.) This vague and normative definition reveals the difficulty of reaching a more precise conceptualisation of this heterogeneous stream of political thought. The authors focus above all on those ideas directly connected with the anarchist movement throughout history. In a work written as a history of ideas, this would be a disputable, but possible, starting point. However, the only thing we learn about certain streams traditionally classified as anarchist (above all the right-leaning libertarianism, also referred to as “anarchocapitalism”), is that the authors do not consider them anarchist (p. 469).

The book presents anarchism as presenting a variation of the traditional left-wing emphasis on liberty and equality, with the exception of the forms proposed by Max Stirner, a Young Hegelian and radical individualist, and John Zerzan, a contemporary primitivist. As such, it is a variation which rejects the state, which is conceived by most of the left as at least a temporary guarantee of these values, for being their antithesis and negation. In an attempt to provide a different form of a guarantee, emphasis is laid on benign human nature (most notably in Kropotkin, pp. 206–208) and on the significance of culture, presented in opposition to the detested principle of power over people (pp. 421–427). Anarchism aims at an organisation of society that would realise human freedom, both individually and collectively possible, i.e. in decisions...
of both personal and social nature (pp. 617–618). A constant critique of coercive institutions and the dismantling of those that have failed to demonstrate their utility (p. 525) serves as a means to that end. These general social ideals took on various forms in the past; the book aims to reflect these various forms with a variety of references (despite being marked by its context and the political positions of the authors).

Different anarchists have sought their predecessors amongst Taoists, Buddhists and medieval Christian heretics. This tendency the book represents with a critical distance. The authors tend towards the conclusion that anarchism can be discussed only as a complete political philosophy after the advent of the anarchist movement. Even chapters dealing with authors whose texts usually rank among the classics of anarchism (enlightenment-era critic of government William Godwin, the individualist Max Stirner, the unorthodox socialist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and the lesser-known precursor of anarcho-communism Joseph Dejacque) are appended to the section concerning the precursors of anarchism.

Mikhail Bakunin is considered, not only by the authors, the first anarchist in the true sense of the word. As we read, he was a Russian revolutionary with certain very disputable episodes in life, such as his servile confession to the Czar in prison, or his collaboration with the fanatic Netchayev. Bakunin formulated the basic principles of the anarchist political program towards the end of his life, and lead an important polemic with Marx in which he warned against the avant-gardism of left wing intellectuals and the threat of the “red dictatorship”. A whole range of authors, starting with Engels and ending with Chomsky, have considered Bakunin a mediocre political thinker. The exposition of his views can be considered an implicit attempt by the authors to dispute this.

Apart from Bakunin, the authors present the natural scientist of the second half of the 19th century, Elisée Reclus, the terrorist Johann Most, the educationalist Francisco Ferrer, and above all, the anarcho-communist natural scientist and historian Peter Kropotkin. This Russian revolutionary tried to combine his conviction about good human nature with Darwinism. As the authors suppose, Kropotkin’s anarcho-communism emphasised the natural competition among particular species. Yet between members of the same species the whole spectrum of mutual interactions and relations plays a significant role, and in this situation the most successful interactions are those that overcome competition in favor of cooperation.

The radical religious pacifist Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy, better known as a writer, is, with a greater or lesser note of criticism, also considered an anarchist by the authors, as well as by many historians. His humble and non-violent approach to life obviously caused many to believe that Tolstoy’s approach is the opposite of other anarchists’s approach. Thus Tolstoy is often categorised, with William Morris and Oscar Wilde, among the “fellow-travellers of anarchism”.

The book argues that Anarchism was developed in the 19th century from a very strong normative ideal of human emancipation. The political and economic ideals of anarchism also originated from this ideal of an emancipated human being. The absolute negation of bourgeois society shifted into the des-
perate form of terrorist attacks. The contra-productivity of these actions be-
came clear only some decades later, and anarchism sought better means of en-
forcing its goals. Some of these means were community experiments, participa-
tion in emancipation movements (women’s rights, anticolonialism, antimilitarism, antireligious movements) and above all, in the radical trade
unions. For anarchists, the trade unions were not only organisations meant to
enforce the rights of workers, but were also an alternative to political parties
and instruments for a revolutionary transformation of society.

In the first half of the 20th century, anarchists have participated in the revo-
lutionary movements in Mexico, Russia, Italy, Germany, Manchuria and, above
all, Spain. However, they were defeated by counter revolution or by authori-
tarian elements in the actual revolutionary movements. Eventually the Anar-
chists could not stand up to their own ideals. Not only did they cooperate with
authoritarian revolutionaries, but they also participated in the resultant gov-
ernments (the cases of Germany and Spain).

The book argues that Czech anarchism, which was particularly developed
at the turn of the 19th and 20th century, also shows a total loss of identity. In
its resistance to Austria-Hungary, the Czech Anarchist Movement merged
with the national socialists’ party. Thus the Czech Anarchists gained a seat in
the parliament and in the government. In the later opposition against the First
Republic they were not in anti-state positions, but they were a part of the
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

Thus in the 20th century anarchist conceptions were evolving from the
forms they took in the 19th century, to adapt to the new conditions. It seems
that in spite of the original meaning of the word “anarchy”, it was taking its
load from the past. Despite this, they brought some new views into this rad-
cially changed atmosphere. The authors describe how the French anarcho-syn-
dicalist Émilé Pouget connected far-reaching anarchist visions to the prac-
tices of the unions. He, with his collaborator Émilé Pataud, created a unique
“syndicalistic Utopia” (p. 362).

On the other hand, the German visionary Gustav Landauer emphasized the
ethical side of anarchist thought. The career and work of anarcho-feminist
Emma Goldman is also especially interesting. She pointed out the condi-
tioned relationship of equality of a man and women. In her work she also en-
forced the thought of freedom and antiauthoritarianism. We can read the work
of Hitler’s contemporary Rudolf Rocker like a radical antithesis of German
Nazism. Rocker, a Jewish leader and later the leader of a German trade union,
claimed that any kind of thoughts of dictatorship are a lamentable heritage of
the bourgeois thinking contaminating the labor movement. He also considered
the nation a construct only substituting for the legitimising role of religion,
which was in decline.

After World War II, Anarchism underwent a period of recess. This was
also due to the tragic fate of the anarchist movement in Franco’s Spain.
The anarchists opposed both sides in the Cold War. In their critique of the
Stalin regime they not only pointed out the dispute between Bakunin and
Marx, but (referring to Stalin’s estrangement to Marx’s thoughts) they also
further developed the older anarchist critique of utopian thinking. Anarchist
theorist Marie Louise Berneri did not considered the envisioned perfect societies
the desired aim. For her, these were just a nightmare needed by the omnipotent state. However, she herself presented her own liberal utopias against this dominant stream of authoritarian utopias (Diderot, Morris).

Anarchism gained new relevance in the 1960s with new political themes such as protection of the environment or equality for women. The authors describe how the thinking of this period influenced the works of social environmentalist Murray Bookchin, playful and practical thinker Colin Ward and self-described “traditional anarchist” Noam Chomsky. Newer anarchism is also represented in the thinking of radical critic of modern civilisation John Zerzan and the only “collective author”, with which the book better acquaints us, the British Anarchist Federation. Further on, one chapter maps the development of Czech anarchism after 1989, taking note of the similarities between anarchism and critical Marxists from the 1930s to the 1980s (Záviš Kalandra, Egon Bondy, Robert Kalivoda, Petr Uhl, etc.).

After a strong bibliographic chapter – the bibliography, which sometimes causes useless fragmentation, is a very strong feature of the publication – follows an interesting epilogue in the form of a brisk essay. It attempts to explore problematic spheres in anarchist political thinking. However, it has to be said that this relatively short ending provides little in the way of a conclusion, or even of a proper discussion of the questions raised in the last 660 pages. This huge amount of text deserves a stronger, more conclusive, ending. The rich bibliography includes many useful references to web pages and samizdats. Readers will probably also appreciate the monochrome illustrations – quite uncommon in domestic publications of this kind.

In summary, the authors’ attempt to encompass the history of anarchism is definitely successful. This project must have been very difficult to complete, and it was much needed and expected in the Czech environment. The authors offer descriptions of the main streams of anarchist thinking, which is still highly relevant today. Hopefully this publication will contribute to a further discussion of anarchism in academia. The term “anarchy” as used in the theory of international relations, and also as used by the anarchists to express their ideal of “order without rule” also merits further discussion.

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